Commander of the Southwestern Front. Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General Kirponos: feat and death. Combat operations of the troops of the South-Western Front in the Kiev direction

But from the taiga to the British seas, the Red Army is the strongest of all.

(Song )

Torn to pieces and exhausted by the war, seemingly thrown back almost into the Middle Ages, the country entered another military autumn. The wind tore the purple of the last foliage from the trees. As the sun went down, vast expanses of Russia plunged into darkness. Making its way through this darkness, the train hurried, carrying the emergency people's commissar to the South, where the red units with difficulty restrained the pressure of Denikin's troops, who were gaining strength.

He again had to correct other people's mistakes. Stalin arrived at the headquarters of the Southern Front, located in the village of Sergeevskoye southeast of Diven, on October 3. It was not by chance that Trotsky “ran away” from the Southern Front. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, appointed at the insistence of Stalin a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army, gave a vivid description of the state of the headquarters and the front of this period.

But at this time, Stalin did not just "put things in order." In essence, he won the Civil War ... Even before his arrival in the troops, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, in accordance with Trotsky's plan, ordered Shorin, commander of the South-Eastern Front, to strike in the direction of Tsaritsyn - Novorossiysk in order to go to the rear of Denikin's army. This Moscow-born strategic plan, which looked solid on the map, did not take into account the political situation at all.

Fulfilling this plan of the commander-in-chief and Trotsky, striking from the Volga to Novorossiysk, the Red troops had to go through the Don steppe, inhabited by Cossacks hostile to Soviet power. In Moscow, they did not understand that the local population, embittered against the authorities by the Sverdlovsk-Trotskyite decossackization, defending their territory, would meet the Bolshevik units with fierce resistance. This alone doomed the campaign to failure.

However, Trotsky had his own vision of solving the problem. On October 6 of this year, the commander of the cavalry corps F.K. Mironov and his colleagues were sentenced to death by the emergency tribunal in Balashov. After the capture of Rostov by the Denikinites, Trotsky decided to use the commander, popular among the Don, as a trump card and "forgive" the condemned.

In a telegram dated October 10, Smilga Trotsky wrote: “1) I put the question of changing the policy towards the Don Cossacks for discussion in the Politburo of the Central Committee. We are giving the Don, the Kuban full "autonomy", our troops are clearing the Don. The Cossacks break with Denikin. ... Mironov and his comrades could act as mediators, who should have gone deep into the Don.

Trotsky demanded that Mironov “not be released, but sent under gentle but vigilant control to Moscow. Here the question of his fate can be resolved in connection with the question raised above.

Of course, Stalin could not have known about this assumption built on sand, Leiba Bronstein's next adventurous plan.

Arriving in the village of Sergievskoye, where the headquarters of the Southern Front was located, and already on October 3, having familiarized himself with the order of the commander-in-chief, Stalin categorically rejected the plan proposed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. He put forward his version. His plan was to strike the main blow not through the Cossack territories from the Volga to Novorossiysk, but from Voronezh to Kharkov, Donbass, Rostov, where the Bolsheviks could count on the support of the proletarian population of industrial regions.

On October 5, Stalin outlined the essence of his plan in a letter to Moscow. "Comrade Lenin! he writes. - About two months ago, the commander-in-chief did not fundamentally object to a strike from west to east through the Donets Basin as the main(my italics. - K. R.). If he nevertheless did not go for such a blow, it was because he referred to the "legacy" received as a result of the retreat of the southern troops in the summer, that is, to the spontaneously created grouping of troops in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe current South-Eastern Front, the restructuring of which (groupings) would lead to a big waste of time, to the benefit of Denikin.

That's the only reason I didn't mind the official direction of the strike. But now the situation and the grouping of forces connected with it have changed fundamentally. The 8th Army (based on the former Southern Front) has moved into the area of ​​the Southern Front and looks directly at the Donets Basin; Budyonny's corps (the other main force) moved to the Yuzhfront area; a new force has been added - the Latvian division, which in a month, having been renewed, will again present a formidable force for Denikin.

You see that the old grouping (“legacy”) is gone. What makes the Commander-in-Chief (Stavka) uphold the old plan? Obviously, only stubbornness, if you like, is factionalism, the dumbest and most dangerous factionalism for the Republic, cultivated in the commander-in-chief by the "strategic" cockerel Gusev.

The other day, the commander-in-chief gave Shorin a directive on the offensive from the Tsaritsyn region to Novorossiysk through the Donetsk steppes along the line, on which, perhaps, it is convenient for our aviators to fly, but it will be impossible for our infantry and artillery to roam.

There is nothing to prove that this extravagant (proposed) campaign in an environment hostile to us, in conditions of absolute impassibility, threatens us with complete collapse. It is easy to understand that this campaign against the Cossack villages, as recent practice has shown, can only rally the Cossacks against us around Denikin to protect the villages, can only make Denikin the savior of the Don, can only create an army of Cossacks for Denikin, that is, only strengthen Denikin.

That is why it is necessary now, without wasting time, to change the old plan already canceled by practice, replacing it with the plan of the main strike from the Voronezh region through the Kharkov-Donets basin to Rostov.

First, here we will have an environment that is not hostile, on the contrary, sympathetic to us, which will facilitate our progress.

Secondly, we get the most important railway network (Donetsk) and the main artery that feeds Denikin’s army, the Voronezh-Rostov line (without this line, the Cossack army is deprived of supplies for the winter, because the Don River, through which the Don army is supplied, will freeze, and the East -Donetsk road Dashing - Tsaritsyn will be cut off).

Thirdly, with this advance, we cut Denikin's army into two parts, of which we leave the Volunteer to be devoured by Makhno, and we threaten the Cossack armies to enter their rear.

Fourthly, we get the opportunity to quarrel the Cossacks with Denikin, who (Denikin), in the event of our successful advance, will try to move the Cossack units to the west, which the majority of the Cossacks will not agree to, unless, of course, by that time we put before the Cossacks the question of peace, about peace negotiations, etc.

Fifthly, we get coal, and Denikin will be left without coal.

The adoption of this plan must not be delayed, since the commander-in-chief's plan for the transfer and distribution of regiments threatens to turn our recent successes on the Southern Front into nothing. I'm not talking about the fact that the latest decision of the Central Committee and the government - "Everything for the Southern Front" - is ignored by the Headquarters and has actually already been canceled by it.

In short: the old plan, already canceled by life, should in no case be galvanized - this is dangerous for the Republic, this will certainly alleviate Denikin's position. It must be replaced by another plan. Circumstances and conditions are not only ripe for this, but imperatively dictate such a replacement. Then the distribution of regiments will go in a new way

Without this, my work on the Southern Front becomes meaningless, criminal, unnecessary, which gives me the right, or rather obliges me to go anywhere, even to hell, just not stay on the Southern Front. Your Stalin.

The need to cite this document is entirely due to the fact that it is perhaps the most important document of the Civil War. It was the adoption of Stalin's plan that became a milestone, a turning point in the struggle of Soviet power for the right to its existence. Stalin not only proposed, but also defended the plan that determined the outcome of the civil confrontation. This decision alone makes him an outstanding strategist of the Civil War.

He was convinced of the advantages of such a decision, and the very vehemence of the author, who is going to reject his plan of "going anywhere, even to hell," testifies to the special sharpness and significance that he attached to his plan.

He weighed everything. He took everything into account. He suggested to the commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev to appoint former lieutenant colonel of the tsarist army Alexander Yegorov, whom he knew from the Tsaritsyn defense, as commander of the front. Kamenev objected: "By personal characteristics, he is unlikely to cope with such a task," but Stalin insisted on this appointment.

Therefore, when the new commander took office on October 8, it was not difficult for Stalin to win him over to his side in choosing the direction of the main attack. On the same day, a request to change the original direction of the offensive against Denikin was made to Moscow.

The answer came to the headquarters of the Southern Front at 3 am on October 9. Kamenev's directive gave the right to implement the new plan.

Now Stalin's plan to launch an offensive along the Kursk railway in the direction of the Donbass has entered the stage of implementation. By morning, at 5:25, the front commander signed directive No. 10726 op, in which he set specific tasks for the formations. The directive was approved by "Stalin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, Commander Egorov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, Lashevich and Nashtayuzh Pinevsky."

So, two weeks after Stalin's arrival, the Southern Front reopened its operations. However, the beginning of the offensive was not strewn with roses. On the contrary, initially events unfolded unfavorably for the Reds.

On the morning of October 11, when the Southern Front set off on the decisive campaign of the Civil War, its headquarters moved to Serpukhov, and the front's shock group immediately came into contact with the enemy. The battle was heavy, the Reds faltered and retreated, and on October 13, the Kornilov division captured Orel. But this was the last serious success of the Denikinnev, the next day near Orel, the Red Army again went on the offensive. The Latvian rifle division hit the left flank of the Kutepov 1st Corps, Budyonny's cavalry entered end-to-end with the Volunteer and Don armies.

After difficult battles, the city was taken on October 19, and on the 24th, Budyonny's cavalry corps broke into Voronezh on the move, leaving for the rear of the volunteers. A turning point occurred on the Southern Front, and from that moment there was a turning point in the entire Civil War. Under the pressure of the Red Army, the White front collapsed and began to rapidly roll back; their ranks were melting from fighting and desertion; whites came to their senses only behind the Don

The last chief of staff of the White Army, Lieutenant-General Makhrov, wrote in his memoirs: “The Don army was in the last stage of decomposition. The military orders of the chiefs were no longer carried out. The Kubans ignored the directives of the Headquarters and were incompetent. Only the Volunteer Corps still retained some fighting strength.

At one time it seemed that the main mass of the Don army turned into green. “The retreat finally turned into a chaotic flight. Huge masses of Cossacks and civilian refugees blocked the rear and the escape routes of the Volunteer Corps.

So, the outcome of the Civil War was decided on the Southern Front. Later, Lenin told Budyonny: “If your corps had not been near Voronezh, Denikin could have thrown the cavalry of Shkuro and Mamontov onto the scales, and the Republic would have been in especially grave danger. After all, we lost the Eagle. The Whites approached Tula.

Lenin, of course, is right, noting the merit of the outstanding hero of the Civil War, Semyon Budyonny. But first of all, he had to refer these words to Joseph Stalin: had Stalin not been in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, the Soviet government might not have resisted.

However, the mere fact that the Reds had their own cavalry, which managed to "appear" at the right time in the right place, was also Stalin's merit. As noted earlier, Trotsky was an opponent of Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Division, and its emergence as part of the 19th Army on the Tsaritsyn Front is largely due to Stalin. He later cherished this division, which turned into a cavalry corps, and then into the Budyonny Cavalry.

Back in early October, having become a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front, in a letter to Budyonny he asked what was needed to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. In response, the corps commander, having described in detail the problems of his formation, proposed to reorganize the cavalry into the Cavalry Army.

Stalin appreciated this idea and already on November 11 approved the decision to organize the Cavalry Army, and on November 16 he left for Moscow, where he defended his decision at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Returning to the headquarters of the front, on November 19, 1919, he signed an order to rename the Cavalry Corps into the Cavalry Army. He was a strategist and thought in terms of modern times. In the upcoming battles, he counted on powerful cavalry and decided to get to know the combat unit better. Stalin and Yegorov arrived in Voronezh on November 29.

There are records of this trip. The front command was met by Voroshilov, Shchadenko and Parkhomenko. Then we drove on together. The train stood for a long time at the bridges destroyed during the fighting, the sections of the tracks being restored, they arrived in Kastornaya only in the early morning of December 5th. By evening the train arrived at Novy Oskol. Here the high authorities were waiting for a sleigh with a trio of horses and a half-squadron of cavalrymen. It was already late at night in Veliko-Mikhailovsky.

In the morning, at a joint meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front and cavalry commanders, an order was read out to rename the 1st Cavalry Corps into the Cavalry Army of the RSFSR. The discussion of the tasks of the new formation was summed up by Stalin. Budyonny was given an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon - a saber with the Order of the Red Banner superimposed on its hilt; the chief of staff - a personalized gold watch.

The next day we went to the war zone. The day was frosty and clear. Stalin, Yegorov and cameraman Tisse rode in a sleigh, while Budyonny, Voroshilov and Shchadenko were on horseback. Suddenly, shells began to explode almost nearby. Machine-gun fire crackled in the distance. The battle began. Mamontov's cavalry converged in a counter attack with Budyonny's cavalry. Climbing up the hill, Stalin carefully examined the picture of the unfolding battle. The guns fell silent, and only the clatter of many horses was heard. Noticing that on the left flank the enemy was bypassing his cavalrymen and there was a threat to command, Budyonny asked Stalin and Yegorov to leave. "No!" Stalin answered shortly and sharply. Then the commander of the Cavalry, at the head of the reserve division, went on the attack himself. The enemy was pushed back.

Budyonny recalled: “After the battle, there was an oppressive silence, broken by the groans of the wounded and the voices of the orderlies who were troublesomely picking them up. Stalin, Voroshilov, Yegorov, Shchadenko and I drove slowly over blackened hills littered with the corpses of people and horses. Everyone was silent, looking mournfully at the traces of a cruel cavalry battle. It was hard to look at the bodies of people disfigured by checker strikes. Stalin could not stand it and, turning to me, said: “Semyon Mikhailovich, this is monstrous. Is it possible to avoid such terrible victims? But why are we here?" - And he again plunged into thought ... "

Stalin's calculation in choosing the direction of the offensive turned out to be correct. There was a turning point in the war. On November 17, units of the Southern Front entered Kursk, on the 12th Kharkov was cleared of Denikin's troops, and on December 16 the Reds liberated Kyiv.

The government appreciated his merits. The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 27 stated: “In a moment of mortal danger, being himself in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe battle line, under military fire, by personal example he inspired the ranks of those fighting for the Soviet Republic. In commemoration of all the merits in the defense of Petrograd, as well as his selfless further work on the Southern Front ... "I.V. Stalin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Having comprehended with his analytical mind the subtleties of military art, he already felt confident in the military environment and, feeling the “wings of victory” behind his shoulders, found new techniques to fight the enemy. He speaks military language and thinks in terms of tactics. In one of the orders of this period, he demands to use "in the performance of the assigned tasks, not advance in lines, but infliction by concentrated forces flat strikes to the main forces of the enemy operating in the most important directions” (directive of October 9, 1919).

In another directive, he proposes a different tactic: “I confirm to all commanders ... do not scatter their forces, but strike in the chosen direction concentrated, fisted, on a narrow front swiftly and decisively” (directive of October 20, 1919).

His manner of commanding troops already has his own creative style. In one of the directives, he explains that the key to victory for the command is "realistic setting of combat missions, careful preparation of the operation, skillful accumulation of reserves and organization of joint actions of units, bold maneuver and decisiveness in the offensive."

The winter of 1920 was the continuation of the chain of triumphant victories of the Red Army. From January 3 to 10, the South-Eastern and Southern Fronts liberated Tsaritsyn, Rostov-on-Don, Novocherkassk and Taganrog. After the capture of Rostov on January 10, the Southern Front was renamed the South-Western Front, and three days later Stalin prepared a directive to pursue the White armies retreating to the ports of the Black Sea coast. Then he left for the combat area of ​​the 14th Army, where he stayed from 11 to 14 January.

Now that the military prospects on this sector of the front had taken a clear direction, in addition to the duties he had, Stalin received new ones. By the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of January 20, he was included in the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army. He was elected Chairman of the Council, and, without stopping preparing the operations of the Southwestern Front, he began the restoration of the Donbass coal industry. Parts of the front consisted largely of miners, the Red Army men were engaged in coal mining.

The strategic policy with which he began his activities on the Southern Front has borne fruit. In February, Ukraine was liberated from Denikin's troops.

The tasks of economic construction began to occupy more and more attention in the minds of the leaders of the country. In 1920, the Supreme Defense Council was reorganized into the Labor and Defense Council (STO). Stalin retained his post in this highest emergency body countries. But the precise functioning of the executive control machine could not be carried out without the organization of a control system.

On January 23, the Politburo decided to develop a body of state control - the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin, RKI). The very next day, Stalin wrote a detailed instruction on its activities. On the 28th, its content was considered at a new meeting of the Politburo, and two days later - at the Plenum of the Central Committee. On February 7, this issue was discussed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which adopted a resolution on the reorganization of the People's Commissariat for State Control into the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Stalin remained Commissar of this Commissariat. True, due to long absences from Moscow, he was not able to engage in this work closely and continuously. Therefore, on February 23, he ordered his deputy Avanesov: to inform him every week in messages - reports on the affairs of the People's Commissariat and the progress of its reorganization. His working day is still filled to capacity.

He did not stop his activities in managing the work of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. On November 22, 1919, he spoke at the opening of the II All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East. On February 7, 1920, the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee introduced him to the commission to develop the issue of the federal structure of the RSFSR.

When Ukraine began to be liberated from Denikin's troops in February, Kharkov, where Stalin was at that time, became its capital. Here, from March 17 to March 23, he led the work of the IV All-Ukrainian Conference of the CP(b)U. He delivered a report and a closing speech on economic policy. The conference nominated him as a delegate to the IX Congress of the RCP(b).

Already on the day of the end of the conference, Pravda published Stalin's article "Lenin as an organizer and leader of the RCP", dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the founder of the party. On the same day he left for Moscow for the IX Congress of the RCP(b). This congress, which was held from March 29 to April 5, considered numerous issues related to the restoration of the country destroyed by the war. Among his decisions was the adoption of an economic plan, the creation of labor armies, and the development of cooperation. Stalin was again elected a member of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b).

The war that dragged on from August 1914 bled not only human, but also economic resources. The country longed for a long-awaited peace, and among the primary tasks requiring immediate resolution was the question of fuel. In mid-April, Stalin made a report on the situation in the Donbass coal industry at a meeting of the Labor and Defense Council.

Stalin's plan to conduct the main campaign in the Civil War against the Whites ended in successful implementation. Denikin's troops were defeated, their troops, defeated in battles and decomposed from desertion, rolled back to the Crimea. April 4 Denikin resigned. However, the Civil War continued.

Baron Wrangel became the next hope for internal and external enemies of Soviet power. Specialists from England, France, the USA and Japan were represented at his headquarters. The retreating and disorganized forces of Denikin poured into the army of the next leader of the White movement.

Soviet power did not receive a significant respite. But a new blow followed not from the south. On April 25, 1920, the 65,000-strong Polish army launched an offensive against Ukraine. She went along with the troops of Petliura. These anti-Soviet forces were opposed by the 12th and 14th Soviet armies, numbering only 20 thousand bayonets and cavalry. At the same time, 79 thousand Polish legionnaires launched an offensive against Belarus.

The arrogant Polish gentry had reason to be confident in the success of the invasion. By the spring of 1920, Poland had a 200,000-strong army well armed by Western countries. Only France put at its disposal 1494 guns, 350 aircraft, 2500 machine guns, 327 thousand rifles. French instructors were engaged in combat training of legionnaires. Even the plan of attack on Russia was developed under the leadership of the French Marshal Foch and with the direct participation of the head of the French mission in Warsaw, General Henri.

During this period, the entire Red Army consisted of 500 thousand people scattered on the fronts from the Amur to the Gulf of Finland. On April 26, the Polish-Petliura nationalists occupied Korosten and Zhitomir, on the 27th they occupied Kazatin, and on May 6 captured Kiev.

For Stalin, this offensive did not come as a surprise. As early as February 26, the command of the Southwestern Front - Stalin and Yegorov - submitted a report in which it was noted: “We will certainly have to fight with the Poles ... We believe that in future actions against the Poles it is impossible to confine ourselves to the main blow on the sector of the Western Front, but it is necessary to support him from the side of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Rovno - Brest.

Therefore, back in March, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic decided to transfer Budyonny's Cavalry Army to the Western Front. Initially, this transfer was planned by rail. According to Budyonny and Voroshilov, the redeployment of a huge cavalry army of many thousands could take several months, making it difficult for the combat training of the fighters. The leaders of the cavalry offered to make a raid in marching order.

However, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, Chief of Staff Lebedev, and Chief of Operations Shaposhnikov opposed this proposal. Budyonny and Voroshilov, who had come to Moscow to resolve this issue, asked for an appointment with Trotsky. Trotsky did not accept them. He casually ordered to pass through the secretary that "busy with the affairs of the IX Congress of the Party."

Then the commanders of the Cavalry Army turned to Stalin. After listening to the complaint, he invited them to the congress, where he arranged a meeting with Lenin. They justified their perseverance, in particular, by the fact that during the raid the young horsemen would get the practice of riding, and the commanders would strengthen the skills of interaction in the formations.

Lenin appreciated these rational considerations and asked Stalin to convey to the commander-in-chief that "he agrees with the opinion of the command of the Cavalry Army." From the right bank of the Kuban, cavalry divisions moved to Ukraine on April 11. Having made a thousand-kilometer raid unprecedented in modern history, by May 25 the army concentrated in the Uman region. Already on the 27th, Budyonny's horsemen went into battle ...

This will happen later, and two days after the beginning of the offensive of the White Poles, on April 28, the Politburo considered the plan of operation to repel the Polish-Petliura invasion. It was decided: to transfer "everything possible" from the Caucasian direction and send it to the Polish front. At this meeting, the duties of a member of the RVS of the Southwestern Front were removed from Stalin and he was entrusted with overall control over the actions of the Caucasian and Southwestern Fronts.

In practical terms, the implementation of the Politburo's decision to strengthen troops in the Polish direction was hampered by an acute shortage of weapons and uniforms, and the collapse of transport hampered the transfer of army units. The “way out” of this situation was found by the Labor and Defense Council (STO) in the fact that, in addition to former duties On May 10, Stalin was appointed chairman of the commission for supplying the army with cartridges, rifles, machine guns and for organizing the work of cartridge and weapons factories.

At the same time, he was appointed chairman of the commission for supplying the Western Front with clothing. He was again ordered to take urgent measures. However, he quickly figured out the situation. He presented a list of measures for an immediate solution in two reports at the SRT meeting.

But this time, he was not allowed to bring the matter to its logical end. And, as has already happened more than once, he is again forced to change organizational, political and economic issues to military ones. It seems that it has already become an established tradition that whenever a critical situation developed at the front, Stalin was sent to the catastrophic sector ...

That is what happened at this moment. On May 18, by decision of the Central Committee, he was approved as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front. This was the fourth appointment in the past month; at the same time he was introduced into the RVS of the Republic.

Stalin left Moscow on May 26. The next day he was in Kharkov. The headquarters of the front was located here. Having understood the situation, he went to Kremenchug - closer to the advancing troops.

The Southwestern Front was a strange symbiosis. Its southern, left wing opposed the troops of Wrangel, who was still sitting in the Crimea, and the right held the line of the Soviet-Polish front, stretching across the entire Ukraine. In the future, such a defense structure promised battles on two fronts; moreover, independent opponents, which, of course, was a gross miscalculation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Arriving at the Crimean sector, already on May 29, Stalin informed Lenin about the measures he had taken to repulse the White troops who were threatening from the Crimea. On May 31, he signed a directive on the defense of Odessa. Even before his arrival at the southern sector, on the other wing of the Southwestern Front, in the area Uman the Cavalry Army of Budyonny concentrated. Having made from April 11 to May 25 an unprecedented thousand-mile march from the right bank of the Kuban to Ukraine, already a day later, the horsemen entered the battle with the Poles. The day before, the 14th Army of the Fastov group of the Reds launched an offensive.

He objectively assessed the situation and raised the question of strengthening the front, but Lenin could not help him. On June 2, sending a telegram to Kremenchug with the note “Hand over only personally to Stalin for personal decoding,” Lenin admits: “On the Western Front, the situation turned out to be worse than Tukhachevsky and the commander-in-chief thought, so the requested divisions must be sent there, but you can’t take more from the Caucasian front, for there are uprisings and an extremely disturbing situation ... "

Reporting on the dangerous situation on the Western Front, at the end of the encryption, Lenin noted: “You, of course, remember that the attack on the Crimea has been suspended. pending a new decision by the Politburo."

The essence of the problem referred to in Lenin's cipher was that the troops of the Southwestern Front, opposing the left wing of Wrangel, who was sitting in the Crimea, with their right wing, in the Polish sector, were in contact with the Western Front of the Reds. On April 29, Tukhachevsky took over command of his troops in Smolensk. The plan proposed by Tukhachevsky to defeat the Poles was approved in Moscow the day before, on the 28th.

Implementing his plan, the new commander on May 14 launched an offensive against Sventsyany, Molodechno and Borisov, occupying these cities. Apparently, for this success, the 28-year-old former lieutenant, who during his service in the tsarist army did not even command a company and, of course, did not graduate from the "academy", - at the height of the operation, on May 22, along with S.S. Kamenev and A.I. Egorov, was assigned to the General Staff.

However, Tukhachevsky's triumph did not last long. The fact is that the “wunderkind” commander had no reserves. However, this was no accident. They couldn't be. On December 24, 1919, Tukhachevsky outlined his credo regarding the conduct of the war, when he delivered a program lecture at the Academy of the General Staff: "National and class strategy."

“Strategic reserves,” the lieutenant proclaimed in her self-confidently, “ the usefulness of which has always been questionable(my italics. - K. R.), in our war and at all not applicable... The fronts of the armies are enormous. Communication routes are in complete disarray. At the same time, operations are developing at a rapid pace. All this makes use of strategic reserves with the aim of striking the enemy at a decisive moment completely unnecessary and harmful self-debilitation.

One does not need to graduate from the academy to understand the obvious delusion of such a statement. These are the arguments of an amateur who did not understand the basics of military art. And the Poles soon gave the "brilliant" commander an enlightening lesson.

When, in response to Tukhachevsky's blow on May 30, the Poles launched a counteroffensive, they not only pushed his troops back. The Poles threatened the complete destruction of his front. Having no reserves and unable to organize the defense, Tukhachevsky could not do anything. His troops retreated helplessly. Only the 15th Army of Kork, with its last strength, clung to the bridgehead in the Polotsk region. A convincing defeat was supposed to cure the young commander of self-confidence and carelessness, but, as subsequent events showed, this bitter lesson did not go to the future.

Only the actions of Stalin saved Tukhachevsky from the complete defeat. It would seem that, having received Lenin's refusal to replenish the forces of the Southwestern Front, Stalin could calmly wait in the hope of better times. But, unlike the self-confident "wunderkind", he did not believe in miracles and soberly assessed the situation. His understanding of military matters was in striking contrast to the superficiality of the former tsarist lieutenant.

A sober realist, an experienced and creative person, Stalin was looking for a way out of the mousetrap in which the Southwestern Front found itself, sandwiched between the White Poles and Wrangel due to the ill-conceived military policy of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the commander in chief.

And he found the solution himself. The very next day after receiving Lenin’s encryption, he submitted it to the Central Committee for consideration. Stalin’s proposal read: either establish a truce with Wrangel and, as a result, remove “one or two divisions” from the Crimean Front, or defeat Wrangel’s troops and free up forces to fight with the White Poles.

An experienced politician who knew how to look into the future, carefully separating the desired from the possible, he warned the Kremlin against the intention of chasing "two birds with one stone" at once. He suggested that the Politburo “take all measures to ensure a truce (with Wrangel. - K. R.) and the possibility of transferring units from the Crimean Front, or, if this is not possible due to the situation, to authorize our offensive in order to eliminate the Crimean issue in military order."

That is, he proposed to defeat Wrangel, and then deal with the White Poles. However, the insightful Lenin did not appreciate the depth and meaningful pragmatism of Stalin's proposals. In a telegram, he wrote to Trotsky: “Will it cost too many sacrifices? Let's lay down the darkness of our soldiers. You need to think about it ten times and try it on. I propose to answer Stalin: “Your proposal for an attack on the Crimea is so serious that we must inquire and consider it carefully. Please wait for our response."

But Stalin, who knew the state of affairs better than the Kremlin and had a sharper sense of the situation, had no time to wait. Unlike the members of the Politburo who were in Moscow, Stalin really understood the situation, and he had a different point of view on the intentions of Wrangel, who threatened his front from the Crimea.

He saw the danger unmistakably. And on June 4, at a meeting of the SRT, Lenin was handed a new telegram from Kremenchug, in which Stalin announced Wrangel's intention to launch an offensive. It was a timely warning. However, Lenin again was in no hurry to accept this proposal.

Still, Stalin's warning alarmed him. Sending the telegram to Trotsky, Lenin wrote: “We must inform the commander-in-chief and demand his conclusion. Send me, after receiving his opinion, your conclusion to the meeting of the Defense Council or we will talk (if it ends late) by phone.

In response to Lenin, Trotsky did not offer anything, but he could not resist a petty caustic remark that, by addressing Lenin directly, Stalin “violates subordination (such information should have been sent to the commander-in-chief Yegorov).”

Playing along with this bureaucratic idiocy with offended pride, Lenin wrote in his reply: "Not without a whim(italics mine. - K.R.) here, perhaps. But it needs to be discussed quickly. What emergency measures? (It turns out that under "capriciousness" in which Lenin "accuses" Stalin in his famous "Letter to the Congress", at this point he understood the violation of subordination and hierarchical etiquette).

However, after requesting the opinion of Commander-in-Chief Kamenev and discussing Stalin's warning in the Central Committee, he was refused. True, the rejection of his proposals was veiled by the indication that an offensive against Wrangel was possible only after careful preparation and taking into account diplomatic circumstances. It was demagogy.

Stalin reacted to the indecision of the Center on the same day. He continued to insist: “So, we need to prepare ... It is clear that nothing will be adopted without the sanction of the Central Committee ....” The last phrase was an attack on Trotsky, who obviously created delays to delay the decision. He understood that the ears of a “beautiful nonentity” were sticking out behind the answer from Moscow.

But the leadership of the country and the army no longer had time to “prepare”. Stalin timely discerned the likely turn of events. His warning did not take long to come true. The day after his telegram, June 6, Wrangel's troops left the Crimea. And although units of the 13th Army resisted heroically and stubbornly, two days later the Whites occupied Melitopol, and on June 12, the Reds, leaving Kakhovka, withdrew to the right bank of the Dnieper.

Now the Southwestern Front faced the fatal necessity of fighting on two fronts, but Stalin did an excellent job with the task before him.

Subsequently, his name would never have become the loudest in the world if, like his opponents, who “shone” with fireworks only in the stands, he obeyed the circumstances. But for him, getting things done came first. And the thing was that Stalin was not inactive and did not sit out in Kremenchug, exchanging queues of Morse telegraph lines with Lenin and the military administration in Moscow.

He expected this turn of events. Moreover, he took action in advance. Therefore, his affairs developed brilliantly. Negotiations with Moscow were accompanied by real machine-gun and artillery fire, but he did not pursue two goals. Putting the Crimean sector of the front in a stubborn defense, he began with the most arrogant enemy.

We repeat that Stalin saved Tukhachevsky from the complete defeat in Belarus. On June 2, in Kremenchug, Stalin held talks with the command of the 1st Cavalry Army. Having discussed its plan of action, on June 3, 1920, he signed the directive of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front on the defeat of the Kyiv group of the White Poles.

While telegrams were being exchanged with Moscow about the prospects for the Crimean sector, Stalin, together with the command of the Cavalry Army, was preparing a new strike on the Polish sector of his front. And in those days when the Poles drove Tukhachevsky's troops from Belarus, in accordance with Stalin's directive, the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny launched an offensive near Kiev.

The offensive developed rapidly. Having begun it, on June 5, the red cavalry broke through the front and, overturning the well-armed Polish divisions, went deep into the rear of the enemy, sowing chaos and panic in his ranks. On June 7, the Budenovites took Zhitomir, from where the Polish headquarters fled in panic, and the city of Berdichev.

The Cavalry, which Stalin carefully nurtured, did not let him down. The next day (June 8), having defeated the Poles' cavalry near Belopolye, the cavalrymen cut off the supply lines of the Kyiv group of Polish troops, and they began to hastily retreat from the Dnieper. On the same day, Budyonny turned east, towards Fastov, moving towards Kiev. To fight Budyonny, Pilsudski urgently transferred several divisions from the front of Tukhachevsky, but the Poles failed to defeat the 1st Cavalry.

Simultaneously with the Budenovites, the 12th and 14th armies went on the offensive, and on June 12 Stalin reported to Lenin about the liberation of Kyiv. The Polish front in Ukraine began to fall apart, and the Red armies continued to advance. It was Stalin's triumph

Meanwhile, while Stalin was crushing the Poles on the right wing of the Southwestern Front, the Entente leadership struck at the rear of the Red front on its left wing. We repeat: the threat of Wrangel's danger, about which Stalin warned the Kremlin on the eve of the unfolding events, has found its real embodiment. Continuing the offensive launched in early June, Wrangel occupied Northern Tavria.

However, worried about the defeats of the Polish invaders, the leadership of the Entente simply could not help but deal such a blow. But if the strategic success of the Whites was the result of the incurable myopia of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, then in fact he highlighted yet another miscalculation of Trotsky with a bright light. However, the conceited and envious Trotsky, who showed obvious short-sightedness, did not want to admit his guilt.

As has happened more than once, he again tried to shift the responsibility for miscalculations onto someone else's head. This time, Trotsky blamed Yegorov for the reasons for the unsuccessful actions against the Wrangelites. Leib Bronstein tried to make the commander of the Southwestern Front a "scapegoat". At the same time, this allowed him to put his protege in leadership of the front.

Not accepting such a game, Stalin resolutely opposed the next intrigue of the "beautiful nonentity." On June 14, 1920, he telegraphed: “Moscow, the Central Committee of the RCP, Trotsky. I strongly object to the replacement of Yegorov by Uborevich, who is not yet ripe for such a post, or by Kork, who is not suitable as a comfortable front.

Yegorov and the Commander-in-Chief (Kamenev. - K.R.) missed the Crimea together, because the Commander-in-Chief was in Kharkov two weeks before the onset of Wrangel and left for Moscow without noticing the decomposition of the Crimean Army. If it is so necessary to punish someone, you need to punish both. I believe that we cannot find better than Yegorov now.

It would be necessary to replace the commander-in-chief (Kamenev), who rushes between extreme optimism and extreme pessimism, gets in the way and confuses the front, being unable to do anything positive.

Resolutely rejecting Trotsky's attempt to find a random switchman, Stalin defended the commander of the Southwestern Front. True, in the telegram he did not directly name the main culprit of the failures. It was clear and without superfluous words.

Trotsky was forced to swallow the unspoken accusations against him. After the retreat of Tukhachevsky's troops in Belarus and Stalin's apparent triumph in the Ukraine, Trotsky clearly realized the futility of a showdown with Yegorov. He could not enter into another open conflict with a member of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Egorov remained in his place. However, the situation in the South was indeed serious. Northern Tavria was in the hands of the Wrangelites. Fierce fighting continued. To rectify the situation, on June 24, Stalin left for Sinelnikovo, the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front. On the same day, he commented on his understanding of the situation to an UkrROSTA correspondent.

Stalin was in Sinelnikovo from June 24 to July 3. With his arrival, the offensive of the whites was stopped. The measures taken by him on the spot did not give the Wrangelites the opportunity to develop success. However, it was not possible to knock them out of the occupied bridgehead. The available Soviet troops were not enough to carry out a successful operation; this required additional forces and means.

Being on the southern flank of the front, Stalin drew up a new plan for the defeat of Wrangel. With this plan, he went to Moscow. Here, with the participation of Stalin, from July 7 to 11, a meeting was held with the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic with the commander-in-chief and chief of the field headquarters Lebedev. In addition to the general plan of military operations of the Southwestern Front, it discussed the transfer of additional reserves to the Crimean sector.

The list of units scheduled for redeployment, Stalin handed over to Lenin on the 11th. Right after the meeting. On the same day, when Pravda published his conversation with the correspondent of the newspaper, he went back to Kharkov.

In an interview with a journalist, he emphasized: “We must remember: as long as Wrangel has the opportunity to threaten our rear, our fronts will limp on both legs, our successes will be fragile. Only with the liquidation of Wrangel can we consider our victory over the Polish lords secured.

Even after the successful defeat of the White Poles in Ukraine, Stalin again drew attention to the strategic complexity of the position of the Soviet fronts. He again speaks of the danger of a war on two fronts. However, this obvious axiom for him could not be understood by the military and political leadership of the country. It was this misunderstanding that later led to adventurism.

From Kharkov on July 14, Stalin went to the Volnovakha station, located on the left flank of the Crimean Front. A day later, on the 16th, on the issues of the Azov fleet, he left for Mariupol. It is significant that his visits to the sectors of the front are chronologically linked with the aggravation of the combat situation there.

Twice, on July 19 and 31, in the midst of heavy fighting, he arrives at Lozovaya station, and from August 9 to 14 he again makes a trip to the Crimean sector of the front. Stalin paid the most serious attention to the fight against Wrangel.

A man who was constantly on the most important fronts of the Civil War, he understood: when leaving the Crimea, the success of the Whites was accompanied by the fact that Wrangel's striking force was the cavalry. The separate cavalry corps of General Barbovich (Donets) and the cavalry group of General Babiev (Kubans).

Unlike Trotsky, Stalin was well aware of the importance of the cavalry in a mobile war. Therefore, at that time, one of the most important results of his activities was the organization of a new cavalry army. To counter Wrangel's cavalry on the basis of the 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions of Dumenko, who was shot on the orders of Trotsky, in July Stalin organized the 2nd Cavalry Army. Its commander was Budyonny Oka Gorodovikov.

This army has come a long way. From the summer of 1920, her divisions suffered serious losses in heavy fighting. Since the beginning of September, after the reorganization, already under the command of F.K. Mironov, 2nd Cavalry participated in all operations to defeat Wrangel. In Northern Tavria and Crimea, ending the Civil War in the South with the occupation of Simferopol.

In the summer days of 1920, Stalin was torn between two fronts. And, although the Red Army failed in June-July to expel the Wrangel troops from Northern Tavria, the danger of their connection with the Poles was eliminated.

Even before Stalin's trip to Moscow, continuing to smash the Poles in Ukraine, the 14th Army of the Southwestern Front occupied Proskurov on July 8, and liberated Rovno a day later. The success of the 1st Cavalry near Kiev and the ongoing offensive of the Southwestern Front to liberate the western part of Ukraine from the White Poles created the prerequisites for a new intensification of the actions of Tukhachevsky, who had already recovered from the May defeat.

Having received serious reinforcements, including Guy's 3rd cavalry corps, on July 4, the Western Front went on the offensive. After the redeployment of part of the legionnaire formations to Ukraine, the Polish front in Belarus was now significantly weakened. And under the pressure of Tukhachevsky's forces, he began to quickly retreat. True, without serious losses, often without even coming into contact with the Soviet troops.

This allowed Tukhachevsky to concentrate two-thirds of the forces of the Western Front on a narrow section of 90 kilometers. Not meeting much resistance from the enemy, on July 11, his troops occupied Minsk. The armies of the Polish North-Eastern Front retreated in disarray: “they threw the public out of the railway stations, robbed and killed the population and set fire to the city ...” on the territory of Poland.

Successes in the Polish direction caused euphoria in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Central Committee. Impressed by the hasty, almost panicky retreat of the Poles, it already seemed to many that the way to Warsaw was now open. The capture of Warsaw as a "prologue to the world revolution" was also dreamed of by the former second lieutenant - the commander of the Zapfront.

Before the start of this unopposed offensive, Tukhachevsky issued a well-known order calling for "eyes to the West." “In the West,” he wrote, “the fate of the world revolution is being decided. Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to the world conflagration. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working mankind. To the west! .-Warsaw - march!

The rosy prospects of the Polish, German and world revolution in the "Campaign for the Vistula" were drawn not only by Trotsky's protégé - Tukhachevsky. Many shared them. It is rarely mentioned in historiography that during this period of general triumph and rapture with the triumph of victories, Stalin warned against a state of euphoria in the war with Poland. A man who never lost his sobriety of mind, he remained a realist both in the hours of defeat and in the days of victories.

But what was especially important in the interethnic war, he very keenly felt and understood the psychological nuances of the relationship and the interests of the population of different nationalities. And his predictions have always been politically infallible. Moreover, they proceeded from the peculiarities of the situation. Even a day before leaving for the Southwestern Front, in his article "The Entente's New Campaign in Russia", published on May 25-26 by Pravda, Stalin pointed out the unreliability of the rear of the Polish white occupiers who had undertaken the intervention.

“Moving out beyond the borders of Poland,” he noted, “and deepening into the regions adjacent to Poland, Polish troops are moving away from their national rear, weaken the connection with him, fall into a strange and mostly hostile environment. Worse, this hostility is aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of the population of Poland ... consists of non-Polish peasants, enduring the yoke of the Polish landowners... This, in fact, explains that the slogan of the Soviet troops "Down with the Polish gentlemen!" finds a powerful response ... the peasants ... meet the Soviet troops as liberators from the yoke of the landowners ... rise at the first opportunity, striking the Polish troops from the rear.

From the very beginning, he made no secret of his skeptical views regarding the conduct of the war on the territory of Poland. “Not a single army in the world,” Stalin pointed out, “can win (we are talking, of course, about a long and lasting victory) without a stable rear. The rear for the front is the first thing, because he, and only he, feeds the front not only with all kinds of allowances, but also with people - fighters, moods, ideas. An unstable, and even more hostile rear necessarily turns the best, most cohesive army into an unstable and loose mass ... "

But having drawn such conclusions, Stalin warns that in the event of an invasion of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland - the situation will be diametrically opposed.“The rear of the Polish troops,” he writes, “in this respect differs significantly from the rear of Kolchak and Denikin to a greater advantage for Poland, the rear of the Polish troops is homogeneous and nationally soldered. Hence its unity and resilience.

His prevailing mood - the "feeling of the fatherland" - is transmitted through numerous threads to the Polish front, creating national cohesion and firmness in the units. Hence the resilience of the Polish army. Of course, the rear of Poland is not homogeneous ... in class respect, but the class conflicts have not yet reached such strength as to break through the feeling of national unity... If Polish troops were operating in the region of Poland proper, it would no doubt be difficult to fight them.

Almost already at the beginning of the new Soviet-Polish war, even before the victories near Kiev and Minsk, even before the Warsaw catastrophe, he prophetically pointed out the political and moral factors that would determine the further development of events. These were serious and important warnings.

However, Joseph Stalin's colleagues in the Politburo had a different point of view. Trotsky wrote that the war ... will end in a workers' revolution in Poland, there is no doubt about this, and there can be no doubt, but at the same time, there is no reason to believe that the war will begin with such a revolution ... ".

That is, Trotsky, with his mind of an international adventurer, proposes to bring such a revolution to Poland on the tips of the Red Army bayonets. However, Poland itself seemed to Trotsky only the fuse of the revolution in Europe: Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, and there, you see, the world revolution. Trotsky's illusions were also shared by Lenin. In a speech at the VI All-Russian Extraordinary Congress, in November 1918, he said: "We are approaching the last, decisive battle, not for the Russian, but for the international socialist revolution!"

Thus, on final stage During the Civil War, Stalin's tactical and strategic assessment of the situation did not coincide with either the position of Lenin, let alone Trotsky. Among the cohort of October leaders, he was one of the few, if not the only one, who did not succumb to the general delusion, the hypnotic fascination with the dream of a world revolution.

Nor did he count on an easy victory in the war with the Poles. When, under the impression of the convincing successes of the Southwestern Front in Ukraine, an opinion arose in government and military circles that Poland would soon be defeated, he condemned these illusions.

Stalin scrupulously weighed the chances and possibilities of the opposing states. He sensibly assessed the state of the enemy forces. In an interview with an UkrROSTA correspondent given on June 24 in Kharkiv, he said: "We must not forget that the Poles have reserves that have already been brought up to Novgorod-Volynsky and whose actions will undoubtedly affect one of these days." At the same time, he took into account both Poland's own capabilities and its support by the Western powers. He warns: "We are at war not only with the Poles, but with the entire Entente, which has mobilized all the black forces of Germany, Austria, Romania, supplying the Poles with all kinds of allowances."

He did not lose his sober judgments and assessments later, when, as a result of the successful advance of the troops of the Western Front, Minsk was occupied on July 11. Giving an interview to a Pravda correspondent on the same day, the statement that “the Poles are basically done with” and it remains only to commit March on Warsaw he again regarded as "unworthy bragging".

He remarks: “I will not argue that this bragging and this complacency is completely do not match neither Soviet government policy nor the state of the enemy forces at the front.

It would seem that everything is clear. Stalin resolutely and even without comment rejected the plan of attack on Warsaw. Moreover, in his opinion, the "march on Warsaw" did not correspond to the "policy of the Soviet government." A man of political and state responsibility, he never made rash statements.

He knew what he was talking about. It was on this day, July 11, that a British note signed by Foreign Minister George Curzon arrived in Moscow. She proposed the conclusion of a truce in the Polish-Soviet war and the recognition as the eastern border with Poland of the line drawn up at the end of 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente. It is significant that just this line, known as the Curzon Line, became the border of Poland with Ukraine and Belarus after the Second World War.

However, Stalin's frank warnings went unheeded. They did not want to hear. But when the subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of his point of view and assessments, few people remembered them. For a long time, historians also “did not remember” them. Meanwhile, Stalin's assessments and forecasts soon began to come true with inexorable consistency.

However, the war did not immediately acquire its adventurous character. Events began to take a dangerous turn on 16 July. When the Central Committee of the RCP (b) recognized the need to continue the offensive until Poland itself requests a truce. The next day, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, in response, informed the British government that Soviet Russia was ready for peace, but London's mediation was unacceptable: since it could not be considered neutral in the Soviet-Polish conflict.

But even this step did not portend disaster. The government and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic were led into the sin of an adventure with a "march on Warsaw" by a young "cockerel" - Tukhachevsky. After the troops of the Western Front occupied Molodechno on July 15, without encountering serious resistance from the Poles, Tukhachevsky continued to advance further. Intoxicated with victory, the 27-year-old second lieutenant was already trying on the “red Napoleon” hat. And, anticipating world fame, Tukhachevsky proposed to the commander-in-chief Kamenev a plan to capture the Polish capital.

Budyonny later recalled: “From the operational reports of the Western Front, we saw that the Polish troops, retreating, did not suffer heavy losses. The impression was created that the enemy was withdrawing before the armies of the Western Front, saving strength for the decisive battle ... I think that Tukhachevsky was largely influenced by the excessive optimism of Smilga, a member of the RVS of the Western Front, and Chief of Staff Schwartz. The first of them convinced that the fate of Warsaw was already a foregone conclusion, and the second presented ... to the commander in chief ... erroneous information about the superiority of the forces of the Western Front over the enemy twice.

It is difficult to say whether such an assumption by Budyonny is justified? By the way, Tukhachevsky's chief of staff was not a random person in the army. The former colonel of the Russian General Staff, Schwartz, had a higher rank and education, and more experience than the front commander.

But be that as it may, the proposal to capture Warsaw came directly from Tukhachevsky himself. He did not doubt the success of the operation. And when on July 19 units of the Western Front entered Baranovichi, and Gai's cavalry corps occupied Grodno, Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev.

On the same day, the Commander-in-Chief issued a directive to the Western Front: to capture Warsaw by August 12. Of course, such a decision could not be made without the participation of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. But the point is not that Trotsky wanted to crown his nominee with laurels. He, too, wanted to perpetuate, above all, himself.

Psychologically, the People's Commissar of the Navy was influenced by the fact that at that moment, on July 19, the Second Congress of the Comintern began its work in Moscow. Trotsky believed that the capture of Warsaw would be indisputable proof of his military talent and would help strengthen his authority as a "revolutionary" strategist and leader in the eyes of international social democracy. Moreover, such a triumph promised him the glory of the leader of the "world revolution".

However, later Trotsky himself explained what reasons prompted him to the Warsaw adventure. “We have returned Kyiv,” he admitted. Our progress has begun. (This is Trotsky shamelessly pulling over Stalin's successes. - K. R.) The Poles rolled back with such speed that I did not count on ... "

True, Leiba Bronstein was forced to “carefully” admit in hindsight: “But on our side, along with the first successes, an overestimation of the opportunities opening before us was revealed. A mood began to take shape and grow stronger in favor of turning the war, which began as a liberation war, into an offensive revolutionary war. In principle, of course, I could not have any arguments against this.

Of course, Trotsky is cunning. It was at the insistence of him and Tukhachevsky that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic decided to carry out the Warsaw operation and "bring the revolution to Europe on bayonets." Trotsky did not suffer from doubts about his own foresight, and he convinced Lenin of the feasibility of his military plans. However, as early as July 20, Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and Commander-in-Chief Kamenev instructed the Southwestern and Western Fronts to advance on Warsaw in converging directions. And the process started.

As noted above, Stalin did not share this delusion. He turned out to be right and pointing to the internal reserves of Poland. This was confirmed soon. When the Red Army entered the territory of the enemy, the government of Poland announced a mobilization, which gave 573,000 soldiers and 160,000 volunteers. But the country's authorities went further. They took political countermeasures against the revolution. Back in mid-July, a law was promulgated on the limitation of landlord estates and benefits for peasant farms. And on July 24, in Warsaw, with the participation of the Social Democrats, the "workers' and peasants'" government of Vitos-Dashinsky was formed.

Stalin was not mistaken in the forecast about the support of Poland by the West. Already on July 21, British Prime Minister Lloyd George stated bluntly that "France and England can provide everything necessary for the organization of the Polish forces."

And yet, being an opponent of the "march to Warsaw", Stalin could not but reckon with the possibility of a convincing defeat of the Poles, but Warsaw was not his goal. Given the successful development of hostilities in Ukraine, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front on July 21 sent a telegram to the commander-in-chief with a proposal to transfer the direction of the main attack of their units from Lublin to Lvov. That is, Stalin did not intend to take Warsaw at all.

He proposed to strike under the southern border of Poland. Stalin, Yegorov, Berzin justified their strategic decision by the fact that "the Poles are putting up very stubborn resistance in the Lvov direction," and "the situation with Romania remains indefinitely tense." Strategically, the choice of such a direction was optimal. He cut off the Poles from the Drohobych oil basin; subsequently created a threat to Krakow, and then threatened to take Lodz, forcing the Poles to practically wage war on two fronts.

Commander-in-Chief Kamenev appreciated the merits of this proposal and on July 23 approved the plan of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Yugzapfront. Apparently, the fact that, a day earlier, on the 22nd, the government of Poland and its General Staff addressed Moscow with a proposal for a truce, also played a role in this decision.

However, Stalin never concealed his negative attitude towards the “march on Warsaw”. He stated this publicly on June 20, when, after returning from the front to Kharkov, three days later he gave an interview to an UkrROSTA correspondent.

Talking about the breakthrough of the White Poles front near Kiev and the successful offensive of the Southwestern Front, he pointed out: “There will still be fierce battles ahead. Therefore, I consider it inappropriate bragging and harmful to business complacency, which affected some comrades: some of them are not satisfied with the successes at the front and shout about the "march on Warsaw", others, not content with the defense of our Republic from an enemy attack, they proudly declare that they can only make peace in "red Soviet Warsaw."

Meanwhile, on the northern wing of the Soviet-Polish front, the Poles continued to retreat almost in panic, and by the end of August the troops of the Western Front entered Brest-Litovsk. As subsequent events showed, having been satisfied with this achievement, the Red Army would have avoided the shame of defeat.

But Tukhachevsky was not able to soberly weigh the situation. He longed for glory, and it seemed to him that the laurel wreath of the winner was already ready to fall on his head. He did not see a serious enemy in the Polish army. Even later, Tukhachevsky claimed that the Polish “military units had lost all combat stability. The Polish rear was teeming with deserters. Everyone fled back, could not stand the slightest serious battle ... ".

From this he made a hasty conclusion: “With the shock to which the Polish army was subjected, we had the right and had to continue the offensive. The task was difficult, daring, difficult, but timid world issues are not resolved(Italics mine. - K. R.)”. I mean, he knew what he was doing. What did you go for. Considering himself capable of nothing more or less than solving "world issues", Tukhachevsky insisted on the capture of Warsaw.

However, on August 2, when the Politburo met in Moscow for a meeting to consider the further military prospects of the Republic, it was not yet clear to everyone: what should be put at the forefront? Wrangel? Or White Poles?

Stalin was not present at this meeting. The day before, on August 31, on the day when Tukhachevsky's troops reached the Bug, he again arrived at the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front, in Lozovoe.

However, all the participants in the meeting knew his position. For a long time he insistently sought to unite the operation on the Polish sector of the front under a single leadership, and proposed to separate the fight against Wrangel, which, in his opinion, was of paramount importance, into an independent campaign.

Strategically, Stalin's plan was a win-win. To ensure a decisive victory, he put the defeat of the whites in the South in the first place. He defined his position clearly, without reservations: "Only with the elimination of Wrangel can we consider our victory over the Polish lords secured."

But glory and laurels for the export of the world revolution was craved not only by the "green" lieutenant commander of the army. RVS Chairman

Trotsky (also striving to resolve "world issues") supported Tukhachevsky's proposal.

Moreover, the resourceful and cunning Trotsky intercepted Stalin's idea of ​​\u200b\u200bdividing the fronts. The Polish part of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Western. However, at the insistence of Trotsky, everything was done according to the principle - on the contrary. The main task of the meeting was determined not by the defeat of the White forces, but by the capture of the Polish capital. Lenin, Kamenev and Krestinsky agreed with Leiba Bronstein

Now everything was turned upside down. Stalin's proposal to defeat Wrangel in the first place was rejected, and the Soviet front against the Whites in the South turned into a secondary one, which had no immediate prospects.

The political subtlety of this intrigue was that, having stolen from Stalin the idea of ​​reorganizing the Polish front, the author himself, at the suggestion of Trotsky's Politburo, was pushed into the shadows. So, shamelessly twitching his cards, Trotsky intended to break the bank in his favor.

Let us pay attention: for the umpteenth time during this war, after Stalin created the conditions and prerequisites for defeating the enemy, he was not given the opportunity to complete the hostilities with a convincing victory. The glory of the "winner" was intercepted by Trotsky and his minions.

Of course, the removal of Stalin, who practically ensured a turning point in the fight against the Poles, from participation in the upcoming operation looked at least dishonorable. Everyone was aware of this. Lenin took upon himself the unpleasant mission of communicating this solution, which hurt the self-esteem of a comrade-in-arms.

On the same day, August 2, he diplomatically telegraphed Stalin: “The division of fronts has just been carried out in the Politburo, so that you exclusively deal with Wrangel In connection with the uprising, especially in the Kuban, and then in Siberia, the danger of Wrangel becomes enormous, and within the Central Committee there is a growing desire to immediately conclude peace with bourgeois Poland. I ask you to very carefully discuss the situation with Wrangel and give your opinion. I agreed with the commander-in-chief that he would give you more ammunition, reinforcements and airplanes ... "

Of course, in an effort to sweeten the unpleasant "pill", Lenin was cunning. Half a month ago, the Soviet government rejected the British proposal for peace talks between Russia and

Poland. Stalin could not fail to understand that he was tactfully removed from the leadership of actions in the western direction. Behind Lenin's diplomacy loomed the intrusive shadow of Trotsky.

And Stalin could not have doubts about the inner meaning of these maneuvers. He was offered to "pull chestnuts out of the fire" to strengthen the glory of "beautiful nonentity." But he took the message calmly, almost indifferently. Meanwhile, the decision of the Politburo took place at a time when the troops of the Southwestern Front, including the 1st Cavalry Army, which approached Lvov, were already fighting stubborn battles for the city.

In response to Lenin, he stated: “The fierce battles continue with increasing force, we must lose Aleksandrovsk today. I received your note on the division of fronts, the Politburo shouldn't be occupied with trifles."

But, not wanting to enter into a showdown, in essence, he resigned “I can work at the front for a maximum of two more weeks, I need a rest, look for a deputy. I do not believe the promises of the commander-in-chief for a minute, he only fails with his promises. As for the mood of the Central Committee in favor of peace with Poland, one cannot but notice that our diplomacy is sometimes very successful in frustrating the results of our military successes.

Obviously, Stalin still could not contain his emotions. And it can be understood. He did a great job, turned the tide of the war in favor of the Soviet Republic, and now, when thanks to his actions the Polish army was defeated, he was relegated to the background. Of course, he was not devoid of sound ambition. The obvious disdain offended him. Lenin, too, was aware of the duplicity of the situation. And, feeling embarrassed by the fact that he followed Trotsky's lead, he pretended that he did not understand the reasons for Stalin's discontent

“I don’t quite understand,” he asks on August 3, “why you are unhappy with the division of fronts. State your motives. It seemed to me that this was necessary, since the danger of Wrangel was growing. As for the deputy, tell us your opinion about the candidate. I also ask you to let me know what promises the Commander-in-Chief is late with. Our diplomacy is subordinate to the Central Committee and will never frustrate our successes if the danger of Wrangel does not cause hesitation within the Central Committee ... "

Lenin felt he was wrong in relation to Stalin, but the temptation of Trotsky's plan already fascinated him - the goals of the world revolution are beyond psychological scrupulousness. trying

to smooth out the awkwardness that has arisen, he asks rhetorical questions that do not require an answer. And he agrees to the "resignation" of Stalin.

The next day, having already managed to "cool down", Stalin did not aggravate the conflict and answered only on the merits of the reorganization itself. His considerations are balanced and rational. He proposed to keep the property and apparatus of the Southwestern Front behind the new Southern Front and indicated that the transferred 1st Cavalry and 12th Armies should "served by the headquarters of the Western Front in their current form."

In a telegram, Stalin emphasized that such a combination “would make it possible to unite all the anti-Polish armies into a single Western Front, which is what I was trying to achieve…”

However, attention should also be paid to the fact that in this case we are not at all talking about sending the First Cavalry to Warsaw. However, the question of Budyonny's cavalry in this period could not stand like that; The cavalry had already taken part in heavy battles with the White Poles on the Lvov sector of the front.

However, Lenin did not want Stalin to retain the opinion that the head of the party was following Trotsky's lead. Another telegram from the Kremlin left for Lozovaya on 4 August. “Tomorrow,” Lenin reported, “the Plenum of the Central Committee is scheduled at six in the morning. Until then, try to send us your opinion on the nature of the hitches at Budyonny and on the Wrangel front, as well as on our military prospects on both fronts. Major political decisions may depend on your conclusion.”

Lenin did not agree. Moreover, he did not inform Stalin that the issue of the priority of the attack on Warsaw would be decided at the Plenum, and the mention of "hitches at Budyonny" sounded almost like a reproach.

Stalin sensed this reticence. Answering the same day, he remarked rather dryly: “... I don’t know why, in fact, you need my opinion, therefore I am not able to convey to you the required conclusion and will confine myself to reporting bare facts without coverage.”

However, limiting himself to a “grouchy” remark, he briefly, with his usual balancedness, outlined the essence of the problems: “Budyonny’s hitch is temporary, the enemy threw Lithuanian, Lutsk and Galician groups at Budyonny in order to save Lvov. Budyonny

he assures that he will defeat the enemy (he has already taken a large number of prisoners), but Lvov will be taken, obviously, with some delay.

In a word, Budyonny's hitch does not mean a turning point in favor of the enemy. As for Wrangel, we are now, although weak for the reasons outlined above, we are still holding the enemy back; no later than in a week we will launch 30 thousand fresh bayonets ... "

From this slightly nervous exchange of telegrams between the two members of the Central Committee, it is quite obvious that it was Stalin who proposed to transfer the 1st Cavalry Army and the 12th Army to the command of the headquarters of the Western Front. But it was only about actions near Lvov and in no way touched on the question of the direction these parts to Warsaw.

Of course, at that moment, Stalin could not have known the plans of the Polish leadership, but let us note that he timely and correctly assessed Pilsudski's tactics. And almost guessed the intentions of the enemy. The Poles did not refuse to continue the struggle on the Lvov sector of the front.

Explaining his actions, Pilsudski later wrote: “My strategic plan was: 1) the Northern Front (standing against the forces of Tukhachevsky. - K.R.) should only gain time; 2) to carry out energetic training of reserves in the country - I sent them to the Bug, without getting involved in the battles of the Northern Front; 3) put an end to Budyonny and transfer large forces from the South for the counteroffensive, which I planned in the Brest region. I adhered to this basic plan to the very end.

We emphasize that we are talking about the defeat of Budyonny near Lvov, and not in the suburbs of Warsaw. However, the Kremlin had other plans. In the morning On August 5, the Plenum of the Central Committee considered the question of the prospects for war. On the eve of Lenin asked the opinion of the military. The answer of the Revolutionary Military Council (read: Trotsky) was categorical and optimistic: "August 16, the Red Army will be in Warsaw."

Therefore, at the Plenum, instead of a sober assessment of the military situation and the political situation in Poland, Trotsky excelled in impromptu oratory about the "world revolution." And although with regard to actions on the Lvov and Wrangel sectors of the front, a decision was made: "Approve proposed com. Stalin option adopted by the RVSR", but the main decision was to attack Warsaw.

Meanwhile, following Piłsudski's directives, the Polish legionnaires took every measure to "put an end to Budyonny". And even on the eve of the day when the Plenum of the Central Committee approved the operation proposed by Trotsky to seize Warsaw, the situation in the Lvov direction changed dramatically.

On August 5, Stalin received information about the stubborn resistance of the Poles at Brody, where the 1st Cavalry Army failed to succeed. The army demanded a break. About the need to provide her with rest and replenishment, Stalin immediately telegraphed to Moscow.

“In this regard,” he said, “since yesterday, Budyonny has switched from offensive to defensive, and one cannot count on the occupation of Lvov in the coming days.” As it turned out later, in reality, the army was able to recall only two divisions out of four.

But let's pay attention to one more significant fact, which, due to strange "frivolity", has fallen out of sight of historians. The fact is that, while negotiating with Lenin and the Revolutionary Military Council, Stalin was in the south of the country - on the Wrangel front. That is, hundreds of kilometers from Lviv. His connection with Budyonny was kept only by wires. In the conditions of that time, this in itself created certain difficulties for coordinating the actions of the 1st Cavalry.

Since subsequently unsubstantiated reproaches were thrown at Stalin, as if the insane “march on Warsaw” had failed almost through his fault, these details are significant. Of course, Stalin was not involved in the events that followed. Other figures stood at the origins of the collapse of the Warsaw adventure.

Having made a decision on August 2 to divide the fronts into the Southern one, which opposed Wrangel, and the Western one, the Polish one, the Politburo and the Revolutionary Military Council radically changed the logic of command and control. Now the commander of the Western Front, Tukhachevsky, was charged with the responsibility of directing both operations near Lvov and units intended for an attack on Warsaw. This was what main point reorganization - to transfer operations on the Soviet-Polish front to one hand.

The logical conclusion from the decision, respectively, was the implementation by Tukhachevsky of the leadership of the actions of the 1st Cavalry, the 12th and 14th armies, who fought near Lvov. However, the front commander was in no hurry to assume control of the troops of his section of the front near Lvov. However, it seems that there were objective difficulties for this.

Later, Tukhachevsky explained this by the fact that “... swampy Polesie did not allow direct interaction between the Western ... and South-Western (sections of the Western. - K. R.) Front ... When ... we tried to implement this unification, then it turned out that it was almost impossible: due to the complete lack of means of communication, Zapadny ... (section. - K. R.) could not establish the latter with South-Western. We ... could not complete this task soon, not earlier than August 13-14 ... ".

In other words: it was just on paper, but they forgot about the ravines. Realizing this, in a correspondence with the commander-in-chief on August 8, Tukhachevsky proposed "temporarily managing" the armies of his southern sector of the Western Front "through an operational point created by the forces and means of the headquarters of the (former) Southwestern Front."

Of course, Yegorov and Stalin objected to such a frivolous decision. They could not split up their headquarters, which led the fighting against Wrangel. And, of course, they demanded that the operational point should be created by the forces of the leadership of the Western Front itself. “Any other solution to the issue,” they telegraphed, “we consider harmful to the cause in general, in particular to achieve success over Wrangel.”

The “new” commander, apparently, himself understood this. In a telegram to the commander-in-chief dated August 8, Tukhachevsky admitted that "the creation of an operational point" according to his scheme "will entail the fragmentation and disorganization of the headquarters apparatus of the (former. - K. R.) Southwestern Front."

It would seem that Tukhachevsky had to think over the decision and take measures to ensure control of his troops on the southern flank. However, the "genius commander" did not think about such "trifles". Frivolously leaving the southern section of his front to the mercy of fate, on the same day he gave the order to the northern group of troops - to force the Vistula on the 14th.

In such a situation, the armies in the South became "ownerless". And the point is not at all that Tukhachevsky cared about the Lvov direction of the Polish front - he himself did not need these problems. He was obsessed with the desire for fame. He solved "world issues" ... He had a goal - Warsaw, and he was sure that he was capable of achieving it. He had no doubt that he would take the Polish capital with the forces of only the northern group of troops. So did the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev recalled, “Naturally, our command faced the question in full magnitude: is it feasible to immediately solve the upcoming task for the Red Army, in the composition and state in which she approached the Bug(italics mine. - K. R.), and will the rear cope ... "

The high command decided that it was feasible, and these calculations were not built on sand. As part of the Western Front of Tukhachevsky in August 1920, there were 795 thousand people. True, Pilsudski estimates the contingent in the units that took part directly in the Warsaw battle in the ratio: "Tukhachevsky's forces are 130-150 thousand fighters, and the Polish troops opposing them - 120-180 thousand."

That is, there were serious reasons for the victory. In addition to military commanders ... So, Tukhachevsky issued an order to take Warsaw on August 8th. Later, the question of an employee of the headquarters of the Red Army V.N. Ladukhina: “I can’t fully understand why all of a sudden in August ...” - the “wunderkind” commander cut off with a replica: “In war, it often happens“ suddenly ... ”

Noticing the perplexity of the interlocutor, he explained: “The command of the Western Front, developing the offensive, had every reason to by the end of the summer of the twentieth year contribute some amendment to the operating plan(my italics. - K. R.). Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev did not object to the maneuver of the armies of the Western Front north of Warsaw. He, like me, at first was not particularly worried about the left flank of the Western Front.

Are comments needed? From this explanation it is clear that, firstly, it turns out that the original operational plan was different, and its “correction” came from Tukhachevsky; and, secondly, it is unlikely that at that moment he was generally “concerned about the left flank” of the western sector of his front.

His order stipulated that armies 3, 4.15, 16 and Guy's corps, which had pulled ahead, were advancing north of Warsaw. South of the Polish capital, he sent the Mozyr group of Khvesin and the 58th division from the 12th army. Since Tukhachevsky later explained his defeat by the absence of Budyonny's army near Warsaw, we note that the order again did not mention the 1st Cavalry Army.

But let's say more: in the existing conditions, relying on Budyonny's army was tantamount to a desire to steal a horse from someone else's chessboard in order to use it in your playing game, and this is a trick from the tactics of the famous Ostap Bender.

Meanwhile, the Poles did not discount Budyonny. As early as August 6, having approved the decision to “adopt pitched battle near Warsaw", the Polish headquarters ordered its commanders to "tie up the enemy in the South, covering Lvov and the oil pool (in the Drohobych region)" by directive.

To do this, Marshal Pilsudski ordered the 6th Polish Army to retreat to Lvov. He also foresaw the possibility of an attempt by the Cavalry Army to help Tukhachevsky: “If Budyonny moves north, then all of our cavalry and the best infantry division should immediately follow him and interfere with his advancement by any means.”

In order to protect the center of the Polish front, a place was chosen for concentration, "protected by a relatively wide river Veps, with the support of the left flank on Deblin." This maneuver, Pilsudski recalled, covered bridges and crossings over the Vistula and Vepsz.

Tukhachevsky and the commander-in-chief did not take into account such a maneuver of the Polish armies. On the contrary, when on August 10 the fighters of the 1st Cavalry intercepted the order of the command of the 3rd Polish Army dated August 8, which set the task of withdrawing to concentrate in the Vepsha area, Tukhachevsky and Kamenev considered it to be disinformation.

But let's look at another piece of evidence. The commander-in-chief of the Polish troops, Pilsudski, generally considered Tukhachevsky's references to help from the 1st Cavalry and 12th armies unreasonable.

“I confess,” he writes in his memoirs, “that both during the war itself, and ... and during its analytical analysis, I cannot get rid of the impression that Mr. Tukhachevsky did not at all count on interaction with the South, so he put imagine such a distant goal as crossing the Vistula between Polotsk and Modlin ...

And it was pointless to associate the achievement of such a deep goal with the actions of the 12th Army, timidly shifting from foot to foot near the Bug, and with the actions of Budyonny's battered army, which for several days after the failure near Brody showed no signs of life. If the concentration of Soviet troops near Warsaw (which, by the way, I expected) moved Mr. Tukhachevsky more than 200 kilometers from the 12th Army on the Bug, then the downstream beyond Warsaw(which I didn’t expect at all) added a good hundred kilometers to this distance, turning into a complete illusion the interaction with the 12th Army that remained somewhere far in the east.

As shown later, the Polish commander was not mistaken in his calculations. Meanwhile, S.S. Kamenev still tried to withdraw the Cavalry from the battle near Lvov. However, as Budyonny wrote: “all attempts by the commander-in-chief to replace the Cavalry with infantry and completely withdraw it to the reserve, starting from August 6, were unsuccessful.” The command of the Cavalry was able to pull back only two divisions out of four.

Stalin did not take part in these timid manipulations of the high command. We repeat that, actually removed from the leadership of the Polish direction of the former South-Western Front, united in the Western, from August 9 to 14, he was many hundreds of kilometers from Lvov - on the Crimean Front.

And yet, a real war was going on on the military lines of the Republic, and not maneuvers on the glossy staff maps. Since Tukhachevsky never established contact with the left wing - the section of the Soviet-Polish front transferred to him, the commander of the "Southern" front, Yegorov, actually continued to lead the battles near Lvov.

Counterattacks of the Poles near Lvov did not stop. And, adhering to the existing operational plan, Yegorov and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front ordered the 1st Cavalry “to destroy the enemy on the right bank of the Bug with a powerful blow in the shortest possible time, force the river and “on the shoulders of the remnants of the 3rd and 6th Polish armies, capture the city of Lvov” .

In strategic terms, such a decision promised serious strategic advantages. Firstly, the planned operation tied the Polish troops near Lvov, did not allow them to be removed for transfer to the North - to help Warsaw. But most importantly, it created the prerequisites for the development of an offensive deep into Poland. The Cavalry of Budyonny launched an offensive early in the morning of August 12.

It is symptomatic that even after the Civil War, Tukhachevsky did not fully understand the situation on the Soviet-Polish front. In his "memoirs" he argued that only one and a half Polish cavalry divisions and "Ukrainian partisan units" were operating near Lvov.

Ironically over the author of the essay, Pilsudski writes: “Regarding our actions, Mr. Tukhachevsky has another misunderstanding. He claims that we have withdrawn almost all the troops from Galicia, leaving only the Ukrainian formations of Petlyura and General Pavlenko with one cavalry division there. ...However, things were completely different. Only the 18th division and a small part of the cavalry were withdrawn from our 6th army, while the 12th, 13th and half of the 6th division remained in place. In addition, the 5th division arrived there ... "

The situation near Lvov remained tense, but even in this situation, the former tsarist colonel S.S. Kamenev assessed the situation in the Warsaw direction more soberly than the former lieutenant Tukhachevsky. Apparently, the commander-in-chief already had fears for the success of the case in the North. The day before, on August 11, he sent a directive to Yegorov to stop the offensive against Lvov and ordered "to urgently move the Cavalry Army in the direction of Zamostye - Grubeshov."

However, “due to technical reasons” (the cipher was distorted during transmission), this directive reached the headquarters of the Southwestern Front only on August 13. And, although Yegorov and Berzin on the same day gave the order to reassign the Cavalry Army to the Western Front, it was not possible to “pull” it out of the battles.

In response to the commander-in-chief, Yegorov reported: “I report that your orders No. ... have just been received and deciphered. The reason for the delay is being investigated. The armies of the Southern Front are fulfilling the main task of capturing Lvov, Rava-Russkaya and are already involved in the matter ... I consider it already impossible to change the main tasks of the armies in these conditions.

Stalin also objected. He realistically assessed the situation, and after negotiations with Budyonny, making sure that the cavalry had already become involved in hostilities, he telegraphed Kamenev: “Your latest directive unnecessarily overturns the existing grouping of forces in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthese armies, which have already gone on the offensive.

The directive should have been issued either three days ago, when the Cavalry was in reserve, or later, after the Cavalry had taken the Lvov region. At present, it only confuses matters and inevitably causes an unnecessary, harmful hitch in business. In view of this, I refuse to sign the corresponding order in the development of your directive.

However, the commander-in-chief insisted on carrying out his directive. Submitting to this pressure, Yegorov, the commander of the front, on the 13th gave the order to withdraw the Cavalry from the battle. Yegorov's order was signed only by RVS member Berzin.

Budyonny also opposed this decision. There were very objective reasons for this. Marshal writes in his memoirs that on the same day, August 13, “talking on a direct wire with the commander of the Western Front,” he pointed out the previous failure of the commander-in-chief’s attempts to withdraw the cavalrymen from the battle and “stated that the Cavalry is now standing in front of the infantry wall, which she still hasn't been able to crush it."

It is noteworthy that on this day Tukhachevsky did not insist on speeding up the implementation of the intention to involve the Budenovites in the operation near Warsaw. What is a miscalculation? An expression of indifference? Or did he still not have a strictly thought-out plan for his operation?

Apparently, both that, and another, and the third. Carried away, as it seemed to him, by the victorious offensive towards the Polish capital, he "forgot" about the First Cavalry. He "remembered" her only on August 16, when it became hot near Warsaw.

Only on this day, as front commander, Tukhachevsky finally sent a directive to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Army from the battle and concentrate it in the Vladimir-Volynsky region for a strike in the Lublin direction. But at that moment, such a task became even more impossible than five days earlier. Heavy cavalry battles beyond the Bug continued until August 20. There was no one to replace the Cavalry.

However, the idea of ​​​​using cavalry at this moment with Lviv sky section of the front was generally built on sand. Budyonny writes that “it was physically impossible to withdraw from the battle within one day and make a hundred-kilometer march in order to concentrate in the indicated area on August 20,” and if this impossible had happened, then with access to Vladimir-Volynsky, the Cavalry all the same “could not to take part in the operation against the Lublin grouping of the enemy, which ... operated (much to the east) in the Brest region.

It would seem that everything is clear. But let's say more: if Tukhachevsky really had military leadership talents and foresaw a possible turn of events, then the Warsaw operation should have begun not with actions in the North, but with an offensive against the Poles by the Budyonny Cavalry on the southern flank.

In refusing to blindly obey Kamenev's orders, from the standpoint of military art, Stalin was absolutely right. Nevertheless, in connection with the principled expression of his position, on August 14 he received a telegram from the secretariat of the Central Committee: “The friction between you and the commander-in-chief has reached the point that ... it is necessary to clarify through a joint discussion during a personal meeting, so we ask you to come to Moscow as soon as possible” . On the same day he left for Kharkov, and then, on August 17, he went to the capital.

Meanwhile, the death of the armies of the Western Front was a foregone conclusion. The operation to capture Warsaw was launched by Tukhachevsky's troops on August 13. The “wunderkind” commander remained true to his principles: to conduct military operations without worrying about reserves.

He believed that, having "moral superiority" and having "at least 14 ... rifle divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Corps against the right flank of the Polish main group", he would win an easy victory. This was not true.

Tukhachevsky continued the offensive, but his plan was already bursting at the seams. The fact is that, starting the operation, the "brilliant strategist" was in full confidence that almost the entire Polish army was in Warsaw and to the north of it. The front commander was wrong. This was not true. In addition, this time the Poles did not flee in panic.

On the contrary, the very next day they went on the offensive. Moreover, on August 14, it began, according to Tukhachevsky, "the weakest in number of units and the weakest in spirit" the 5th Polish Army, led by Sikorsky. It included "four and a half rifle and up to two cavalry divisions."

Against the "weak" army of the Poles, the commander of the Western Front had as many as three armies. Expecting to immediately defeat Sikorsky, Tukhachevsky ordered his "15th and 3rd armies to meet the enemy's offensive and push him back across the Vkra River, and the 4th army to attack the enemy in the flank and rear in the Novogeorgievsk direction from the Rationzh-Drobin area" .

The order was energetic and rhetorically persuasive, but it all ended with epistolary rhetoric. Perhaps this was the first and last order in the operation that had begun. The only attempt of the comfront to control the fighting.

In fact, all three armies of Tukhachevsky were unable to defeat the "weak" divisions of the enemy. On the contrary, now the initiative was in the hands of the Poles. The 5th Polish Army, “having a powerful (4th) army (Tukhachevsky) of four rifle and two cavalry divisions on the flank and rear, continued the offensive against the 3rd and 15th armies” of the Reds.

The actions of the superior forces of the Western Front turned out to be inconsistent and stupid. The collapse of the plan for the Warsaw operation was a foregone conclusion. No one led the "war" near Warsaw. From the first hours of the battle, Tukhachevsky began to lose contact with his armies. On the 14th, he lost contact with the headquarters of the 4th Army, not restoring it before the start of the retreat.

Misunderstanding, confusion and confusion reigned in parts of the front. This is clearly evidenced by the surviving record of a conversation between the commanders of Tukhachevsky's armies. On the night of

On August 15-16, G.D. Gai requested the commander of the 4th DA by direct wire. Shuvaeva: “You allocated one regiment for the capture of Strasbourg. I don't understand why we need this city so urgently?

Another regiment of Tomin's division, on your own orders, is trying to break into the town of Lyubich near the city of Thorn. Why, who needs it?

A decision must be made taking into account the specific situation ... The remaining parts of the corps are concentrated at your request in two places remote from each other to force the Vistula in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe cities of Neshava and Vlotslavsk. Is it possible, with such a dispersed state of the troops, to achieve the success expected of us by Tukhachevsky?

This staff skirmish makes you wonder if the “wunderkind” commander had any holistic plan at all? At Polish commander Pilsudski had such a plan. He provided for the defeat of the Reds in parts, and this was carried out brilliantly. The Mozyr group of Tukhachevsky and the 58th division of the 12th army were defeated on the first day of the Polish offensive launched

August 16 from the turn of the Vepsh River. Already on the evening of that day, "the Mozyr group ... ceased to exist as an operational unit." The fact that the same fate befell the 8th division of the 16th Army, which was in the front reserve, Tukhachevsky learned only on August 17th.

To avoid a trap, the commander gave the order to the units located in the Danzing corridor to begin a retreat. But at that time he did not know that the Mozyr group and the 16th army, called upon to delay the attacking Polish grouping, actually no longer existed.

Commander of the 4th Army Shuvaev received Tukhachevsky's directive to withdraw to the southeast. However, Shuvaev was no longer able to assemble the divisions and brigades operating far from each other. Without imagining the situation on the left wing, instead of withdrawing, he ordered his divisions and Guy's corps to continue operations to force the Vistula.

It didn't make sense anymore. But the demonstration of the height of absurdity, which gave the Warsaw operation the character of a tragicomedy, was on August 16, when Guy's cavalry corps crossed the Vistula and occupied Wloclavsk. On this day, not understanding the situation, Tukhachevsky sent a jubilant telegram to Moscow. In it, he reported that Warsaw was taken!

The defeat and death of Tukhachevsky's armies was predetermined not by a lack of forces, not by the advantages of the enemy, and not by the absence of the 1st Cavalry Army on this part of the front. The reason for the ensuing tragedy was the professional amateurism of the front commander

However, Tukhachevsky practically did not lead the course of the battles of his armies. Unlike Piłsudski, who controlled the Polish Middle Front from his headquarters in Puławy, on the right bank of the Vistula, Tukhachevsky oversaw the operation near Warsaw... from Minsk!

G. Isserson, even apologetically related to Tukhachevsky (one of his closest collaborators), writes: “Tukhachevsky, due to his youth and still insufficient experience in conducting large-scale strategic operations in the difficult days of the defeat of his armies on the Vistula, could not be at the proper height ...

Tukhachevsky and his staff were far behind the lines. All his administration rested on telegraph wires, and when the wire connection was interrupted, the commander found himself without troops, since he could no longer give them a single order.

As they say, comments are superfluous. Meanwhile, the divisions of the 3rd Army of the Western Front, having invaded the Danzig corridor, by August 18 occupied Soldau and Strasbourg. However, by this time, the forces of the Polish strike force, called the Middle Front, had launched a decisive offensive.

Now the troops of Tukhachevsky, who were behind enemy lines, had lost all combat capability and controllability. Pilsudski's message to General Sosnowski testifies to their tragicomic situation. On the night of August 19-20, the Polish commander ironically wrote to the Minister of War:

“It's hard to imagine what's going on here. You can’t drive calmly on any road - there are so many wandering around in the vicinity of broken, scattered, but also organized detachments (red) with cannons and machine guns. So far, the local population and the rear bodies of our various divisions are coping with them ... if it were not for the armed peasants, then tomorrow or the day after tomorrow the neighborhood of Siedlce would probably be in the power of the Bolsheviks defeated and scattered by us, and I would sit with detachments of armed residents in fortified cities.

And yet: what did Tukhachevsky do to save the situation? Did you organize the withdrawal of your units? Shot himself?

No. Isserson admits: "Tukhachevsky ... remained an indifferent spectator of the defeat of his armies." However, this is not entirely true. Dealing with the actions of Tukhachevsky, historians forget the other side of the "medal". As a result of the mediocre actions of the commander of the Western Front, there was not only a disaster near Warsaw. At the same time, the Red Army lost what the Southwestern Front had won with great difficulty.

As happens with narrow-minded people, having lost the ability to control more than 150,000 fighters near Warsaw, Tukhachevsky clutched at a straw. He nevertheless “pulled out” the 1st Cavalry from near Lvov. Amateurish improvisations continued. Now they were destroying the front near Lvov.

Outraged Voroshilov telegraphed the Revolutionary Military Council on August 21: “The removal of the Cavalry from the Lvov Front at the moment when the army came close to the city, chaining up to seven enemy divisions to itself, is a major mistake, fraught with significant consequences.

I won't talk about the moral effect this approach has on the army. You will take this into account yourself if you remember our huge losses in recent battles, but I must say that by continuing the battles for the capture of Lvov, we not only served as a magnet for the enemy, but at the same time the most serious threat to the rear of his strike group, which we could deliver a crushing blow through Lublin ... "

Voroshilov was not listened to. The chain of tragic military mistakes continued to multiply. After moving away from Lvov, following the order of Tukhachevsky on August 23, the 1st Cavalry moved to Zamosc. Having made a desperate and senseless raid, embittered and depressed, here she escaped with difficulty from the encirclement.

But even worse, more tragic was the position of the fighters on the Western Front. Two armies withdrew to Prussia, where more than 40 thousand Red Army soldiers were interned, more than 80 thousand were in Polish captivity. Later, 40,000 of them died there, in the concentration camps.

Isserson testified: "Uborevich asked Tukhachevsky why he did not appear among his troops in these critical days on the Vistula and did not personally organize their breakthrough from the encirclement north of Warsaw. Uborevich said that he would make his way to his troops by any means - by car, by plane, finally, on a horse - and, taking direct command, would lead them out of the encirclement ... Thinking, Tukhachevsky replied that he then understood the role of the front commander otherwise..."

What could the defeated commander answer? He had nothing to say in his defense.

It goes without saying that the whole campaign, planned by Trotsky, arrogantly and mediocrely carried out by Tukhachevsky, and imprudently supported by Lenin, was a mistake. Of course, the defeat of the Poles near Kiev, and then their retreat in Belarus, created the impression of an easy success.

This turned the heads of many. And yet the main culprit of the Warsaw disaster was Tukhachevsky. The operation he carried out was not thought out and not prepared. She did not take into account the possible moves of the enemy. Her plan was based only on the ambitions of the former second lieutenant. The commander, who was barely 27 years old, craved glory and did everything contrary to the laws of military art. All his plans were only the hopes of an amateur.

Tukhachevsky drove the troops forward. He broke away from the rear and hoped to capture Warsaw on the mere enthusiasm of the Red Army. Sitting out with headquarters in Minsk, he lost control of the troops and at the end of this adventure left his fighters and commanders to their fate. As a result, over 120,000 of them ended up in Polish captivity and interned in Germany. Nobody counted those who died in the battles.

The historical absurdity is that, despite the guilt of Tukhachevsky for the biggest defeat allowed by the military leaders in

During the Civil War, there is a point of view that the “marshal” who was shot later was almost a “brilliant commander”.

Is it so? Are there any real prerequisites for such a point of view, apart from tendentious writings of outright propaganda? Since Tukhachevsky's line will still intersect with Stalin's biography, let us dwell in more detail on the figure of this candidate for military "geniuses".

Mikhail Tukhachevsky was born in 1893 in the family of an impoverished nobleman with Lithuanian roots. His father, married to a simple peasant woman, was not fond of alcohol, but he squandered a small income "with a large excess" in losses at the races.

Apparently, it was from his father that Mikhail inherited his irrepressible passion and unsatisfied, almost hypertrophied ambition. Already at the Alexander Military School, where he entered in 1912 and where in his senior year he became a sergeant major in a company, those around him suffered from his inflated ambition. Vladimir Postoronkin, who knew him in those years, wrote that “among his fellow students ... (he) did not enjoy either sympathy or sympathy; everyone avoided him, they were afraid and knew for sure that in the event of some kind of oversight, no mercy could be expected ...

Feldwebel Tukhachevsky treated the junior course completely arbitrarily: he punished with the highest penalty for the slightest offense newcomers who had just entered the service and were not accustomed to the official situation ... he handed out penalties in full measure and in abundance, never entering into consideration of the motives that prompted one or another omission in the service.

Tukhachevsky's official despotism, petty martinet cavils and reprimands caused at least two Junker dismissals and "three suicides." However, the scandals were hushed up. But they were not just a manifestation of "hazing" in a blunt form. The power-hungry and prudent sergeant-major sought the approval of his superiors and sensitively looked around "at everything that could somehow threaten him service career».

The apprenticeship lasted only two years. Of course, for such short term the future "commander" could not acquire any fundamental knowledge either in strategy, or in tactics, or in the organizational aspects of military art. By Soviet civilian standards, the school that the future "genius" graduated from did not even look like a decent technical school. But Tukhachevsky never studied anywhere else.

Having graduated from college before the war with the rank of second lieutenant, according to the already established psychology and acquired knowledge, the freshly minted specialist remained a sergeant major for life. Of course, military experience could be acquired in the war. However, Tukhachevsky did not have to fight for a long time either. Having got to the front in September 1914, to the post of junior officer of the company, he soon found himself in captivity.

There he spent almost the entire First World War. He escaped from captivity in the fall of 1917. Under very vague circumstances, breaking the word of an officer. After a while, through Paris, he arrived in Moscow, where he stayed in the family of “old acquaintances - N.N. Kulyabko. Here he was lucky. His friend - musician N. Kulyabko became a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and participated in the "formation of the institute of military commissars." On the advice of a friend, Tukhachevsky prudently joined the party on April 5 and quickly rose through the ranks.

At the end of June 1919, he was sent to the command of the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front Muravyov, a former colonel in the tsarist army, a dashing socialist-revolutionary and a desperate adventurer. Here, a second lieutenant with a party card was immediately appointed commander of the 1st Army.

Again, the young specialist was lucky in two weeks. During the uprising of the Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Soviet regime that began in Simbirsk, Muravyov was shot dead. Tukhachevsky began to perform the duties of the front commander.

For 10 days of his command, the Whites took Syzran, Bugulma, Melekess, Sengiley and Simbirsk itself ... The new commander, former Colonel Vatsetis, who arrived, barely found Tukhachevsky in Penza. But, demanding that he "dangle less in the rear," Vatsetis left the young man with him.

Things on the Eastern Front were going to disaster, and Trotsky came to restore order. On his orders, in the retreating Petrograd regiment, the commander, commissar and every tenth soldier were shot. Trotsky liked the communist lieutenant by talking about discipline and tribunals so much that later the People's Commissar of the Navy wrote letters to him, promising help and support.

But relations with the new commander Vatsetis did not work out. The reason was that first Tukhachevsky surrendered Simbirsk, and then lost Kazan with the gold reserves of Russia located there. Later, when almost all Czechoslovak troops on the Eastern Front had already been withdrawn from the fighting and the situation had improved, Tukhachevsky developed a plan for capturing Simbirsk and even took the city.

Here he was first lucky and then unlucky. As A. Kolpakidi and E. Prudnikova rightly ironic: “The Red units on the move, without thinking and without reconnaissance, crossed (along the bridge not destroyed by the enemy) the Volga and - who would have thought! - suddenly came under attack from the Kappelites. The Whites drove them back, and the battles for the long-suffering Simbirsk began again.

In practice, these were the same miscalculations that later led the "military genius" to a disaster near Warsaw. The same handwriting. Even Trotsky "taunted" his favorite: "An unsecured offensive represents, in general, Comrade Tukhachevsky's weak side." And which side of the young "brilliant strategist" was strong?

This was determined by how lucky. Soon Tukhachevsky was lucky three times. Firstly, he was assisted by units of the right-bank group of the 5th Army, which, after the liberation of Kazan, were transferred along the Volga to Simbirsk. Secondly, the situation developed in such a way that the main White forces fought against the 5th Army in the Kazan direction and against the 3rd in the Perm region. Thirdly, he nevertheless took Simbirsk.

But the most important thing was that his liberation of the city coincided with the treatment of Lenin after the assassination attempt. The quick-witted Tukhachevsky sent a telegram to Moscow, which was included in all history textbooks: “Dear Vladimir Ilyich! The capture of your hometown is the answer to your one wound, Samara will be the second!”. Very lucky ... Tukhachevsky could do nothing more in the Civil War - he had already “went down in history”.

Meanwhile, Tukhachevsky continued to do his favorite "business". The essence of it was that he was in conflict with someone all his life. His “movement along the fronts,” write A. Kolpakidi and E. Prudnikova, “is marked by a rainbow tail of squabbles and complaints.”

On the Eastern Front, one of these conflicts was his "contradictions" with the commissar of the 20th Penza Division Medvedev. Tukhachevsky came out victorious in this conflict. Having sent a denunciation to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the front, he called the commissar a provocateur who "systematically undermines the army", and achieved the recall of his opponent from the formation.

What was Medvedev's "provocateurism"? What was the disagreement between the commissar and the commissar? The conflict was not political in nature. The thing was that the lover of “devouring pigs”, the 26-year-old child prodigy commander, surrounding himself with a kind of servants - hosts and hosts, relatives of his wife, stood out with lordly manners, delusions of his own grandeur and infallibility.

Many people were involved in the disassembly. My first impressions of meeting S.P. Medvedev and Tukhachevsky were outlined by another political commissar - F.I. Samsonovich. He arrived on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1919 from Petrograd. Six months later, in a letter to the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Sverdlov, Samsonovich wrote:

“In Penza, we were met by Comrade. Medvedev... It was, it seems, not the division commissar, but a soldier who had been in the trenches without a break for several months, covered in dust, in a worn-out soldier's overcoat, tanned, haggard, concentrated... Comrade. Almost all the time Medvedev was at the forefront, among the Red Army soldiers ... It involuntarily comes to mind to compare the first meeting with ... Tukhachevsky, who arrived in a saloon car with his wife and numerous servants, and even near the car in which Tukhachevsky was, it is difficult it was necessary to pass so that someone from Tukhachevsky’s servant would not ask: “Who are you? Come on, don't stop!"

The reasons for the conflict, for which the communist lieutenant Tukhachevsky began to complain about the commissar “in a dusty overcoat” to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front and the Republic, were also explained by O.Yu., a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, military commissar. Kalnin.

Tukhachevsky's claims to the commissar were straightforward, like the manners of a sergeant major. He claimed: Medvedev “undermines the authority of the commander, namely - cancels a business trip authorized by the army commander assistant head army intelligence department who, as the main thing, was instructed to purchase and bring for headquarters officials for the holiday butter, pigs, flour ... ".

That is, while continuing to cultivate the habits he had acquired while still in school, Tukhachevsky was dissatisfied with the fact that the commissar canceled his order on actions that were not part of the functions of the army intelligence department. However, the claims to the commander from the "political commanders of the army" were not only gastronomic in nature.

Refuting Tukhachevsky's demagogic accusations against Medvedev, O.Yu. Kalnin explains: “The reason for the aggravation of relations between the political commissars and the army commander is the following. With the development of the army, the headquarters of the army also developed, as well as the entire administration, but only in quantity and staff, but not in quality. Hidden sabotage, negligence, and nepotism were noticed. ... From the highest officials and the army commander, a cadre was formed that protected itself with a Chinese wall from the influence and control of the political commissars.

In addition, those around it noticed that already in the third month of his stay at the front, the 26-year-old commander began to have the "red Napoleon" syndrome. Kalnin noted that “with every praise from the high command” he had a growing sense of greatness and his own infallibility: “On December 22, Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis (Tukhachevsky) declares that he, as a commander and, moreover, a communist, cannot put up with him, that he is on an equal footing with the old political commissars were appointed by the generals ... "

Hostility to the lordly "wunderkind" grew, and although Trotsky did not lose sight of his favorite, supporting him, at the end of 1918 the position of the lover of "pigs" in the 1st Army became unbearable. And then he was seconded to the Southern Front - the commander of the 8th Army.

By this time, the situation on the Southern Front was developing favorably for the forces of the Red Army. As a result of the third defeat near Tsaritsyn, the decomposed troops of Krasnov randomly retreated. The army, commanded by Tukhachevsky, met almost no resistance from the Cossacks.

However, he was also unlucky here. He almost immediately quarreled with the commander of the Southern Front Gittis. In addition, since February, troops of the Volunteer Army have entered the Donets Basin. Having arbitrarily turned the 8th Army to Millerovo and not having achieved tangible success, Tukhachevsky got stuck at the Donets. After two months of command, he was again returned to the Eastern Front, but already in the 5th Army.

Tukhachevsky's stay on the Eastern Front almost ended in exile in May, when he entered into another conflict. This time - with the commander of the Eastern Front, a former tsarist AA general. Samoilo.

In 1958, Samoilo wrote that with "a sharp conflict between me and the commander of the 5th Army, Tukhachevsky, due to his incorrect reports on the actions of his divisions," the situation of the front itself became more complicated. Gusev, a member of the RVS of the Republic, took the side of Tukhachevsky, but when the former general turned to commander-in-chief Kamenev, he "received permission to remove commander-5 from command of the army." However, "according to the conditions of the operational situation," the Komfront did not consider it possible to carry out this resolution.

Samoilo tactfully kept silent about the fact that in his careerist aspirations, the former second lieutenant widely used the technique inherent in upstarts. He exaggerated his own successes, and instantly transferred his failures to the accounts of others.

Historians note that Tukhachevsky, who fought in a swoop and in a rush, not caring about reserves and rear lines, who did not know how to organize communication and interaction of units, won only when he had a numerical superiority over an unorganized enemy. When faced with resistance, he immediately asked for reinforcements and usually received them.

Even Trotsky understood the professional sores of a potential candidate for the favorites of the children of the Khrushchev thaw. In 1937, he wrote about his ward: "He lacked the ability to assess the military situation. There was a clear element of adventurism in his strategy." However, Trotsky's creature got away with everything.

However, long time Tukhachevsky was an insignificant person in the army lists. He received relative fame only after the war with Kolchak. In fact, he was only one of the ordinary figures - the commander of one of the armies in the group of Red troops. But, of course, not the former second lieutenant determined the outcome of this war.

The fact is that the situation at the front was changing rapidly even without military operations, and already in the summer Kolchak's army became incapacitated. On July 12, Kolchak's Minister of War, Baron A.P. Budberg wrote in his diary: “The front completely collapsed, many units stopped following orders and without any fight, and without seeing the enemy for several days, they go east, robbing the population, taking away their carts and fodder.”

The fact that in the summer of 1919 the 5th army of Tukhachevsky practically did not meet the resistance of the enemy is already evidenced by the following fact: the losses in killed, wounded and missing in the first half of July amounted to less than 200 people. Therefore, there are absolutely no grounds for allegations about the alleged military leadership talents of the commander.

Kolchak retreated. Everything came together, as in the well-known cadet song: "and the enemy is running, running, running." After the retreat of the Whites from Chelyabinsk, an uprising of workers broke out there, and the 5th Army entered the city, as if in a parade. Attempts by Wojciechowski and Kappel to hit the flanks of the Reds did not bring success. The former Red Army soldiers who prevailed in the Kappel units simply refused to go on the offensive.

Against the background of the general retreat of the Whites, the command decided to encourage success, and on August 7, the commander of the 5th Army was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. And yet, the pursuit of the retreating Kolchakites was not strewn only with bay leaves. This happened when the already completely decomposed troops of the "supreme ruler" stopped at the turn of the Tobol River. For the first time in this campaign, the 5th army of Tukhachevsky was really given the main task: to force the river, capture Petropavlovsk and, having defeated the 3rd army of the white general Sakharov, move to the Kolchak capital Omsk.

Crossing the Tobol on August 20 without hindrance, meeting no resistance and passing 180 kilometers in a short time, the 5th Army found itself on the distant approaches to Petropavlovsk. It is symptomatic that the self-confident second lieutenant tried to compensate for the lack of a military outlook, the lack of a real military education, with his own improvisations, which, as a rule, ended in failure.

Fulfilling the order, Tukhachevsky decided to attack along two lines: along the Zverinogolovskaya - Petropavlovsk highway and along the Kurgan - Petropavlovsk railway. However, V. A. Olderogge, who commanded the Eastern Front of the Reds from August 1919 to January 1920, planned the offensive differently.

It should be assumed that the former tsarist general understood something in military affairs. If only because, having graduated from the cadet corps, Konstantinovskoye military school, and in 1901 - in the first category of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, Olderogge during the First World War commanded an infantry regiment and, with the rank of major general, a brigade and a division.

He insisted on concentrating forces in the direction of the railroad, where the main white grouping was concentrated. In addition, the front commander took into account that the route passed through the Cossack regions, and here one could expect strong resistance from the local population.

Tukhachevsky tried to object, but, forced to obey, he failed to carry out the operation according to the plan of the comfront. Moreover, he narrowly escaped a crushing defeat. Later, explaining in 1935 the reasons for his failures, in the article "On the Eastern Front" he blamed the failure of the 5th Army's offensive on the former tsarist general Olderogge, who was shot in 1931 in the "Spring" case. In reality, the responsibility for the defeat of the 5th Army lay entirely with Tukhachevsky.

As predicted by the front commander Olderogge, this time the enemy did not withdraw without a fight; already on the outskirts of Petropavlovsk, the Whites launched a counteroffensive. They "forged parts of the 5th Army from the front, and moved two infantry divisions to the right flank and rear", the Siberian Cossack Corps of Ataman Ivanov-Rinov and the cavalry group of General Domozhirov.

The corps of Siberian Cossacks defeated one of the brigades of the 26th Infantry Division and, having overturned the 5th Army, drove Tukhachevsky's units back to Tobol. Commander-5 was unable to stop the panic, and the same Olderogge saved the army of the “second lieutenant prodigy” from complete defeat. The commander reinforced the units of the unfortunate "commander" with a division from his reserve, and against the left flank of the Whites he threw the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front.

The fled, battered army of Tukhachevsky was able to retreat, avoiding complete dispersion, and cross back over the Tobol without irreparable losses. Only on October 14, having replenished at the expense of Chelyabinsk workers, she was able to fight on.

After the Civil War, in his self-promotion, Tukhachevsky painstakingly described his relative successes in Siberia. But even then it was known that, on the whole, the 5th Army owes its successful actions to a member of its Revolutionary Military Council, I.N. Smirnov, who had connections with the Siberian underground, and through him with the partisans. It was Smirnov who was called the real winner of Kolchak.

However, a stubborn oppositionist - who had signed the "Statement of the 46" back in 1923, in 1927 - the "Statement of the 83", was expelled from the Party more than once and sentenced to death in 1936 in the case of the "anti-Soviet united Trotskyist bloc" - I.N. Smirnov remained in the shadows. Official laurels went to Tukhachevsky.

However, many remained in the shadows, including the former tsarist generals commanding the Eastern Front, who led the defeat of Kolchak. The "wunderkind second lieutenant" played the most direct role in this process. The beginning of Tukhachevsky's self-promotion was facilitated by the fact that in December 1919 the commander of the 5th Army prepared a report submitted to the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council E.M. Sklyansky.

No, the young army commander did not show off the genius of military art, sharing his experience of tactics and strategy during combat operations. The topic of his report was rather dry: "On the use of military specialists and the promotion of communist command personnel (according to the experience of the 5th Army)."

Decisive was that the author of the report found a win-win trump card. Having no real military education and a decent post in the pre-revolutionary army, Tukhachevsky passionately disliked military experts with high ranks - former tsarist officers and generals.

He experienced an inferiority complex and therefore immediately dismissed the role and merits of this category of military men who served in the Red Army during the Civil War. In essence, it was at his suggestion that ideological propaganda subsequently nullified the significance of the pre-revolutionary officer corps in the ranks of the Reds.

Tukhachevsky was the first to turn the truth inside out. “It is customary for us,” the former second lieutenant self-confidently proclaimed, “that the generals and officers of the old army are in the full sense of the word not only specialists, but also experts in military affairs ... In fact, the Russian officer corps of the old army never possessed anything no other quality. For the most part, it consisted of people who received a limited military education, completely downtrodden and devoid of any initiative.

So shamelessly and categorically, he "debunked" the professional military. We repeat that, according to the calculations of the historian A.G. Kavtaradze, only in the positions of commanders in the Red Army out of 100 during the Civil War, 82 regular officers of the tsarist army served. Of the more than 70,000 former officers (approximately 43 percent of the total officer corps by 1918), 639 officers of the General Staff (almost half of the elite of the Russian officer corps), including 252 generals, ended up in the ranks of the Reds.

Meanwhile, the arguments of the newly-minted military theoretician were not desperate intoxicating delirium. The lieutenant knew what he was doing - pushing the "old" officers with his elbows, he made his way first of all for himself. He shamelessly stated that “well-trained command personnel, thoroughly familiar with modern military science and imbued with the spirit of bold warfare, there are only among the young officers ... ".

In a section loudly titled “The Doctrine of the Civil War,” the former second lieutenant stated: “In order to understand the nature and forms of the Civil War, it is necessary to be aware of the causes and essence of this war. Our old officer corps, completely unaware of the fundamentals of Marxism, cannot possibly understand the class struggle...

With such a level of political development of officers, of course, it is difficult for him to understand the foundations of the Civil War, and as a result of this, the operational forms arising from them ... "

By the way, in a practical situation, in particular in the Soviet-Polish war, Tukhachevsky completely neglected even the rational grains of his own "theory". However, these dogmatic conclusions, far removed not only from military theory, but also from Marxism, turned out to be enough to form an opinion about their author as a representative of a new military thought.

It must be admitted that Tukhachevsky's demagoguery was a clever and win-win trick. The ambitious lieutenant-communist managed to find that zest, which, having fermented in the public consciousness, exalted not only himself, but indirectly also the unofficial patron of the "wunderkind" - Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Trotsky.

Tukhachevsky's thoughts fell on fertile ground. Already at the end of the Civil War, and especially in the first years after it, ideological propaganda forgot about the role of the red officers, turning Leiba Trotsky into the only "organizer of the Red Army".

And it may even seem strange that by the beginning of 1920 the "Siberian winner" was out of work. The theoretician, who supposedly understood the "foundations of the Civil War", turned out to be of no use to anyone. When at the end of December the "wunderkind" was sent to command the 13th Army, the commander of the Southern Front A.I. Yegorov did not appoint him to the post. On January 19, the former second lieutenant, living without prospects at the headquarters, sent a desperate letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: “I have been sitting aimlessly for almost three weeks, and only two months with nothing to do. If I have any merit in two years of commanding various armies, then I ask you to let me use my strength in live work, and if there is none at the front, then I ask you to give it in the matter of transport or military commissars. It seems that he did not even care where to make a career.

By the irony of history, Stalin helped the young unemployed "genius" to settle into business. Having intervened in the conflict between the leadership of the 1st Cavalry Army and the commander of the Caucasian Front, on February 3, 1920, he telegraphed Budyonny and Voroshilov: “I achieved the resignation of Shorin and the appointment of a new commander Tukhachevsky, the conqueror of Siberia and the winner of Kolchak.”

Of course, at that moment, Stalin did not yet know that, under the guise of a generous gift, he received a Trojan horse from Trotsky. But be that as it may, although before the revolution Tukhachevsky did not even command a company, in an instant he became the commander of the front.

He got lucky again. This time, Tukhachevsky had to finish off the already defeated, demoralized and retreating army of Denikin. The enemy fled again, and in such a disposition, the "wunderkind" knew how to fight. The main result of his command of the Caucasian Front was that in March, in the course of pursuing the Whites who were rapidly retreating to the Crimea, he did not allow the evacuation of Denikin's volunteer corps from Novorossiysk to be carried out calmly. However, the Cavalry Army of Budyonny, which played the main role in this campaign, knew its tasks even without a front commander.

The failure of the May offensive of the Western Front in the war with the Poles by Tukhachevsky has already been mentioned. Only the successful actions of Stalin and Yegorov on the Southwestern Front, which pulled back part of the troops from Belarus to Ukraine, and the breakthrough of Budyonny's cavalry into the rear of the Poles allowed Tukhachevsky to occupy Minsk left by the enemy and, continuing to pursue the retreating, move west.

But this raid of his troops, which seemed to be the road to glory, ended in Warsaw disgrace. And if the actions of Tukhachevsky as a commander on the Eastern Front, an almost guerrilla war in Siberia and a comfort front in the Caucasus can still be classified as relatively successful results of command, then suppression named after the Kronstadt rebellion and the Antonov uprising.

These were frankly punitive actions. Thus, the frank illegibility of the propaganda of the Khrushchev period, which molded a cult figure from the “executed marshal”, was needed so that the myth of Tukhachevsky as a “genius commander” could arise.

On closer examination, even through a magnifying glass, one cannot find not only signs of talent, but also generally impeccable military practice in the vain former second lieutenant. On the contrary, according to the results of the “march on Warsaw”, he should enter the book of records of the Civil War as a military leader who suffered the largest and most crushing defeat.

However, if we are to believe Tukhachevsky’s relative Lydia Nord, many years later the failed “commander”, explaining the causes of the Warsaw disaster, admitted in a conversation with her: “I clearly saw that after all, my army consists of 50 percent of all rabble and that it the one I would like to have. That I still do not have enough experience and knowledge for a big war ... Others sometimes let them down a lot... Smilga (a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front. - K.R.), observing his political control, got mixed up in other people's affairs... Schwartz (Chief of Staff of the Western Front. - K.R.) believed that he, a colonel of the General Staff, is a better strategist than I ... "

What can be added to this frank confession? Only that he again obviously shifts the blame to others. After the Warsaw catastrophe, from the experience of the "big war" Tukhachevsky did not acquire anything other than the skills of a punisher. Unlike his army colleagues, he did not receive theoretical knowledge either, since he did not continue his military education.

He remained an outstanding mediocrity - the "commander" of defeat, the "marshal" of the non-belligerent armies of the peaceful period, the strategist of parade maneuvers and the inventor of mass landings that had no real significance for the future war. A win-win amateur, obsessed with megalomania, "won only with a pen", advertising his "talent".

The failed "winner" of the Poles did not learn a lesson from his defeat either. When on August 17 the "peace conference" with the participation of the Polish delegation began its work in Minsk, on August 20 the commander of the Western Front issued an order. In it, he argued that the Polish delegates pursued exclusively espionage purposes and that peace could only be concluded "on the ruins of white Poland."

He got carried away again. It was so irresponsible to issue such a document in conditions of apparent military bankruptcy that the Politburo was forced to adopt a special resolution. It condemned this "worse than tactless order, undermining the policy of the party and government."

Meanwhile, Tukhachevsky had a chance to take revenge and show military leadership talents, if any existed. Despite the Warsaw disaster, he remained commander of the Western Front. However, when the Poles resumed their offensive in early September, the troops of the Western and Southwestern fronts rolled back to the east, offering almost no resistance. It was not just a defeat - it was a rout.

The Poles advanced so successfully that they captured Minsk without a fight, from which, during the Warsaw adventure, Tukhachevsky watched the defeat of his front. The future marshal commented on these events almost infantilely: "The Poles went on the offensive first, and our retreat became inevitable."

The army has lost everything that it has gained as a result of the summer campaign. However, this defeat did not deprive Tukhachevsky of conceited illusions. Trotsky, who visited him at that time, wrote in his memoirs: "At the headquarters of the front, I found moods in favor of a second war." It seems that the People's Commissar of the Navy was impressed by such sentiments, but he was sobered by the fact that they were not shared in parts. Trotsky states: "The lower I went down the military ladder - through the army to the division, regiment and company, the clearer the impossibility of an offensive war became."

By the way, from Minsk to Moscow it was a little more than to Warsaw. Only Smolensk remained on the way, and, perhaps, only the entry into force of the terms of the Soviet-Polish truce on October 12, 1920, saved the capital of the Republic from being captured by the Poles.

Be that as it may, Stalin immediately assessed the situation differently. He took the army's failures keenly. The Politburo reviewed the current military situation at its meeting on August 19th. It heard reports from the RVSR and Stalin on the situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts.

He did not share the optimism of amateurs. His report was deeply thought out and soberingly objective. The reason for the failures of the army, he called the lack of replenishment of troops, poor provision of weapons and ammunition and ill-conceived decisions of the Supreme High Command.

As a result, a resolution was adopted: to consider the Wrangel direction as the main one. This was what Stalin was talking about back in the middle of summer. Now it was necessary to find a way out of the created difficult situation.

And on August 25, he submitted a note to the Politburo, in which he outlined measures for organizing and preparing reserves. Summarizing what had happened, he proposed adopting a program to improve the army, in particular, to provide "measures for setting up and strengthening auto-, armor- and aircraft industry...».

"It's in the twentieth year!" - Exclaims, commenting on this fact, Richard Kosolapov. Yes it is. At a time when the "generals" Trotsky and Tukhachevsky were being washed from the sins of defeat, when the Nazi Wehrmacht did not even exist on paper, Stalin proposed the organization of mechanized combat arms.

However, Trotsky immediately rejected Stalin's conclusions. He did not want to admit the reasons for his failure. He claimed that the preparation of reserves had already been established, and he tried to blame the failures on the Polish front on the failure to send the 1st Cavalry Army to the Vistula region.

Trotsky argued that the army has reserves. Not understanding or unwilling to understand the prerequisites for his fatal miscalculations and defeats, he shifted the blame onto someone else's head. Leiba Bronstein was the first to create a legend, eagerly picked up by other defeated military leaders, that the transfer of the 1st Cavalry Army to Warsaw could ensure victory over the Poles.

Of course, the talented commander Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny was head and shoulders above both the former second lieutenant and the son of an Odessa merchant. He proved this more than once during the Civil War, but then the legendary Cavalry Army could not save the adventure that was obviously doomed to failure from collapse.

But the question turned into a matter of principle, and on August 26, Stalin wrote a statement to the Politburo: “In view of the rumors spreading among party circles about me as a person who slowed down the transfer of the 1st Cavalry Army from the Yugozap to the Zapfront, I declare that the directive of the commander-in-chief on the transfer The 1st Cavalry of the Zapfront was received by the Revolutionary Military Council of Yugozap on the 11th or 12th (I don’t remember the date) of August, and the 1st Cavalry on the same day was handed over to the Zapfront.

As is often the case, spreading false rumors, the perpetrators of the defeat grossly distorted the facts. And Stalin could not help but be offended by this impudent attempt to turn him into a "switchman" responsible for the Polish catastrophe. He picked up the gauntlet thrown down by the People's Commissar of the Navy, and on August 30, 1920, demanded that the Politburo investigate "the conditions of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front."

On the same day, after reading Trotsky's report on the recruitment of reserves, Stalin wrote to the Politburo: “Trotsky's answer about the reserves is a reply.<...>The Central Committee must know and control all work organs of the military department, not excluding the preparation of combat reserves and field operations, if he does not want to face a new catastrophe ... "

The defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw caused a sharp controversy at the IX Party Conference, held in September. In its course, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council played with words and tried to smooth out the sharp corners of the criticism directed at him.

With almost pathological stubbornness, he did not want to call a spade a spade. Stubbornly refusing to admit to the mistakes he and Tukhachevsky made, Trotsky did not find anything better than to demagogically explain the defeat by the fact that the Soviet troops near Warsaw were in a state of "half somnambulism." Unable to find a way to shift the blame to others, he tried to explain what had happened with almost mystical powers.

Of course, this was only rhetorical verbiage. Unable to stand it, Lenin remarked to this: “In the debate, Comrade. Trotsky was pointed out that if the army was in a half-somnambulistic, or, as he later put it, half-tired state, then the Central Strategic Command was not, or at least should not be, half-tired. And the error, of course, remains ... "

Perhaps this was already reminiscent of the persuasion that forced the delinquent schoolboy to confess to a misdemeanor. However, Trotsky did not want to single-handedly admit guilt for the adventurism of his plans for a campaign against Warsaw and shamelessly stated that Stalin was also optimistic about the possibility of taking the Polish capital.

Stalin categorically rejected this reckless assertion by Leiba Bronstein. In a note to the presidium, he wrote: “Trotsky’s statement that I portrayed the state of our fronts in a rosy light does not correspond to reality. I was, it seems, the only member of the Central Committee who ridiculed the current slogan about the "march on Warsaw" and openly warned comrades in the press against being carried away by successes, against underestimating the Polish forces. It is enough to read my articles in Pravda.

It wasn't bragging. A man who judged firsthand the real events that preceded the largest defeat of the Red Army during this war, he did not discount either the mistakes of the Central Committee or the disastrous miscalculations of the front command, the direct culprit of the disaster.

To the reproach about his biased attitude towards the Western Front and to Lenin's assertion "that the strategy did not fail the Central Committee," he answered by explaining the nature of the error of the party leadership. Stalin pointed out that it was the Central Committee that made the decision "in the direction of continuing the offensive war", trusting the erroneous information of the commander Tukhachevsky and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Smilga Front. "The logic of the Central Committee was correct," he agrees, "but its initial premises turned out to be unreliable."

In the discussion that arose on this occasion, soberly weighing all the circumstances, tracing the details of the development of events, he laid bare the truth, opposing the weaknesses in the arguments of the parties. A skilled polemicist, he connected the real facts and the precariousness of the logic of justifying statements. Comparing the essence of actual events and arguments of justification that did not correspond to them, he logically brought the truth to an almost ironic conclusion.

He emphasized: “The Central Committee had a telegram from the command about the capture of Warsaw on August 16th. The point is not that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 - this is a small matter - but the point is that the Western Front, it turns out, was facing a catastrophe due to the fatigue of the soldiers, due to the lack of rears, but the command did not know, did not notice.

Stalin could afford such a tone. In the Warsaw adventure, everything was done contrary to his plans, calculations and warnings, but the catastrophe broke out, and the ambitions of its organizers cost too much sacrifice. Its consequences could not be overlooked.

The logic of his reasoning was irrefutable: “If the command had warned the Central Committee about the actual state of the front, the Central Committee would undoubtedly have temporarily abandoned the offensive war, as it is doing now. The fact that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 is, I repeat, a small matter, but the fact that this was followed by an unprecedented catastrophe, which took 100,000 prisoners and 200 guns from us, is already a big oversight of the command, which cannot be left without attention.

That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission, which, having found out the causes of the catastrophe, would insure us against a new defeat. T. Lenin, apparently, spares command(Italics mine. - K.R.), but I think that it is necessary to spare the cause, and not the command.

The age-old question "Who is to blame?" in the Warsaw failure was not filmed at the conference. Passions around this topic did not subside for a long time after the Civil War. An emotional "sentence" to one of the participants in the Warsaw adventure - when discussing the book by V.A. Triandafilov "The nature of the operations of modern armies" - in 1930, one of the participants in the discussion announced. Indignantly, he threw a “verdict” in Tukhachevsky’s face: “You should be hanged for 1920!”

The conclusions reached by Stalin in explaining the reasons for the defeat did not suit either the Politburo, or the Revolutionary Military Council, or Lenin. In essence, they were all guilty, but they did not want to admit the obvious. Stalin understood this and, not counting on support, soon asked to be released from military work. Such a step became a kind of protest, and the Politburo granted his request. True, in part: having relieved Stalin on September 1 of his duties as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, it left him a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, but he received a vacation, which he had asked for back in early August.

The arguments that the approach of the 1st Cavalry Army to the Vistula could have prevented the defeat of Tukhachevsky are untenable. The course of this thought was intended to lead away from reality, to give rise to misconceptions about the objective causes and actual perpetrators of the tragedy. Of course, one Cavalry army could not save the outcome of the entire campaign.

And not even because, as the researchers reasonably note, the Budyonovites “would have to overcome 300 kilometers on their own in a couple of days and immediately join the battle.” Something else was even more important. The Polish command foresaw such a maneuver, and it had enough strength to prevent the Cavalry from reaching Warsaw.

Explanations must be sought elsewhere. The defeat in the Soviet-Polish war in itself testifies that the country and the Red Army during this period were not ready to fight. All designs

The organizers of this campaign became a continuous chain of adventures, and even the capture of Warsaw could not ensure victory. At its core, the war with Poland was no longer a Civil War. In fact, it was a war with a foreign state, and the hopes for a revolution in Poland turned out to be an illusion.

Of course, Stalin was depressed by the fact that the defeat near Warsaw completely destroyed the fruits of his efforts. Crossed out those successes and achievements that the Soviet Republic acquired thanks to his activities on the Southwestern Front. As a result of the Polish offensive, which began in the fall, the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus were lost. Everything he did went down the drain.

When signing on October 12, 1920 in Riga, a bilateral armistice agreement between the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, and on March 18, 1921, a Soviet-Polish peace treaty, the Soviet government undertook to pay reparations in the amount of 30 million gold rubles and return military trophies and valuables, " exported from Poland since 1772!

And yet, Stalin will return the lost territories of Galicia to the country and "take" Lvov. True, this will happen many years later, as a result of a new difficult war, but even now he will not “join” Poland to Russia.

But back to 1920. Autumn has come. The civil war was drawing to a close. In November, the Red Army liberated Crimea from the Whites, and the remnants of the Wrangel troops crossed over to Turkey. On the eve of this event, after a short vacation, Stalin again began to fulfill his many duties. He is People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs and People's Commissar for State Control, a member of the Politburo and the Orgburo, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Council of Labor and Defense.

Moving away from military affairs, he again focused his attention on the activities of the two People's Commissariats headed by him. Now that the inviolability of Soviet power had been really confirmed as a result of the Civil War, it was necessary to resolve the issues of national community and control over the functioning of the mechanism of government that bind the country.

These questions became the subject of his main activity. On October 10, in an article published by Pravda on national politics, he bluntly presented his vision of the problem. His position was sovereign.

“The demand for the separation of the border regions from Russia,” Stalin declared, “

as a form of relations between the center and the outlying regions must be excluded, not only because it contradicts the very formulation of the question of establishing an alliance between the center and the outlying areas, but above all because it fundamentally contradicts the interests of the masses of the people both in the center and the outlying areas. ."

Pointing to the example of the situation of Georgia, Armenia, Poland and Finland, which became vassals of other countries and retained only the appearance of independence, as well as the recent "plunder" of Ukraine by Germany and Azerbaijan by Great Britain, he made a peremptory conclusion:

“Either together with Russia, and then - the liberation of the working masses from imperialist oppression; or together with the Entente, and then - the inevitable imperialist yoke. There is no third way...

However, when Stalin made these conclusions, there was practically no state as such. By the end of the Civil War, only a sketch model had developed, which had yet to be put into an acceptable form, providing this mechanism with drive control belts and all the attributes of state power.

In the meantime, many new issues were on the agenda. From that fateful milestone, which was marked in 1914, for six and a half years of practically unceasing war, the country rolled back. Almost medieval. But even now, the leadership of the Republic has not yet faced the task of restoring what was destroyed in all its grandiose complexity and historical inevitability.

While required elementary. At least roughly establish a complex system of control of the machine of the state. Those people who were to rule in the country at its various levels came to the drives of the state machine in the context of the Civil War. They learned life and developed spiritually in extreme conditions; they did not have the necessary experience, knowledge, and often even ordinary education.

It was Stalin's first task to establish management of life in the localities from the Center, to ensure direct and feedback on the implementation of government directives. These days, he very clearly outlined his position on the issue of organizing control over the activities of already established institutions of power and their leaders.

At the same time, he was also aware that since October - and over time the trend has become even more acute - a large number of people who are far from the ideals of the revolution, but who strive to acquire those benefits and privileges that objectively were given authority.

Stalin undertook resolutely for the establishment of a control mechanism. Speaking on October 15 with a speech at the opening of the 1st All-Russian Conference of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, he demanded: “Do not spare individuals, no matter what position they may occupy, spare only the interests of the cause. This task is very difficult and delicate, it requires great restraint and great cleanliness, impeccable cleanliness on the part of the workers (inspection).

A man who had vast experience in organizational work, he perfectly knew the essence of the system of any government. Therefore, without omissions, he pointed out that "the country is in fact ruled not by those (people) who elect their delegates to parliaments under the bourgeois order or to congresses of Soviets under the Soviet order."

He left no room for intellectual "democratic" verbiage. “No,” he emphasized emphatically. “The country is actually ruled by those (people) who have in fact mastered the executive apparatuses of the state, who direct these apparatuses.”

Proceeding from this important thesis, Stalin noted that if the working class really wants to master the questions of governing the country, then it must have its representatives both where these questions are “discussed and decided” and “in those places where these decisions are carried out in life".

It is noteworthy that he did not idealize the possibilities of the already established ranks of the ruling party in ensuring the functioning of the state system. On the contrary, from the first steps he raises the question of attracting new forces to the administration, fresh cadres from a truly popular milieu.

"The main task of the RKI," he concluded his thought, "is to cultivate and train these cadres, enlisting broad sections of workers and peasants in their work." The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, he concluded, should become a school for these managerial "cadres of workers and peasants."

However, real conditions did not allow him to focus only on complex and multifaceted work - the regulation of the mechanism of government. However, this issue, in all its diversity, he had to deal with all his subsequent life.

In fact, during this period, the state itself was not yet in its final form. The situation of Soviet power was especially uncertain in the outskirts. In areas with a diverse population. And soon the Caucasian Bureau asked the Central Committee to send him to the Caucasus.

The situation in the Caucasus was complicated by the fact that in addition to the territories on which Soviet power was established, there existed here, formed back in 1918, after the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federation, the so-called Georgian Democratic Republic. It was headed by the government of Stalin's old "acquaintance" - the Menshevik Noah Zhordania.

An essential argument in the position of Georgia was that an oil pipeline from Baku to the ports of the Black Sea passed through it. The West looked at him lustily. In the summer of 1918, the head of state, N. Zhordania, concluded an agreement with Germany, which practically made Georgia a German colony. The Germans left Georgia only in December, but the British immediately took their place. Their "peacekeeping" expeditionary corps guarded the same Baku-Batum oil pipeline.

During the Civil War, Georgia carried out "democracy" in full. She invaded the Kuban, occupying Adler, Sochi and Tuapse, taking away cattle and equipment; Democrats even took out the rails of the Gagarin railway. In the summer of 1918, Georgian democrats brutally suppressed an uprising of Ossetians and Georgians in Tskhinvali and the peasants of Abkhazia.

Stalin never let the state of affairs in this region out of his attention. As early as June 5, 1918, in a telegram to Chicherin, he suggested: “In extreme cases, the independence of Georgia can be recognized, if only Germany officially recognizes the issue of the Kuban, Armenia and Azerbaijan as an internal issue for Russia, this must be insisted resolutely and irrevocably.”

However, to Chicherin's request to write an appeal to the Georgian people, Stalin replied with a categorical refusal: "I can't write an appeal to the Georgian people, I have no desire to address an appeal to the dead."

In April 1920, the 11th Army occupied Azerbaijan, and in May an agreement was signed between the RSFSR and Georgia. According to him

Georgia undertook to clear its territory of foreign troops, but for the time being it remained "independently" Menshevik.

Stalin arrived in Rostov-on-Don on October 18, and the next day, at a meeting of the Caucasian Bureau, he made a report on the tasks of the RCP (b) in areas inhabited by the peoples of the East. On October 21, he left for Vladikavkaz, from where on the 27th he transmitted information about the state of affairs to the Central Committee. He arrived here to participate in the regional conference of the communist organizations of the Don and the Caucasus. The meeting was held from 27 to 29 October, and he made a report "On the political situation of the Republic" at it.

From the point of view of understanding his future position, the idea expressed by him in this report is noteworthy: “Some participants in the October Revolution were convinced that the socialist revolution in Russia could succeed ... if a revolutionary breakthrough in the West begins immediately after the revolution in Russia. This view ... was refuted ... for socialist Russia, which did not meet with the support of the Western proletariat and was surrounded by hostile states, has been successfully continuing its existence and development for three years now.

This was not his first philippic to the dogmatic adherents of the world revolution, but it meant much more. In practice, Stalin publicly presented the thesis already emerging in his mind about the possibility of building socialism in one country.

Here he was caught by Lenin's telegram. She was anxious: “The Entente will go to Baku. Think over and prepare hastily measures to strengthen the approaches to Baku from land and sea, to bring in heavy artillery, and so on. Let me know your opinion."

Arriving in Baku, he fulfilled Lenin's order, and on November 4, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), he discussed the situation in Armenia and the terms of negotiations with Georgia. On the eve of the third anniversary of October, on November 6, he made a report at the Baku Council. Soon, together with Sergo Ordzhonikidze, he left for Temir-Khan-Shura.

They arrived at the place on November 12, in a wagon, and already at the station they heard cannon fire. There were fights in the mountains. The streets of the city, the bazaar and the station square were filled with armed people. In the evening of the next day, the Extraordinary Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan began its work.

Having announced the declaration of the Soviet government on autonomy at the opening of the congress, Stalin bluntly explained: “Dagestan must be autonomous, it will enjoy internal self-government, while maintaining fraternal ties with the peoples of Russia ... Autonomy does not grant independence. Russia and Dagestan must maintain contact with each other, because only in this case Dagestan will be able to maintain its freedom.”

Stalin's position on the national question, which he pursued consistently and in the future, was deeply thought out by him. He resolutely insisted on the rejection of "cavalry raids on the part of the "immediate communization" of the backward masses of the people" and called for "passing over to a meaningful and thoughtful policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general channel of Soviet development."

He associated this process with the need to preserve national languages, national culture and involve representatives of the local population in the management of the outlying regions of the country. He saw the main condition for strengthening ties with the Center in "that Soviet power become ... dear and close to the people's outskirts of Russia." “But in order to become native,” Stalin emphasized, “Soviet power must first of all become understandable to them."

Lenin was worried about the state of affairs in Transcaucasia. The next day, November 13, he contacted Stalin by direct wire. The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was interested in many questions: “How is the fight against gangs going?.. Do you think it is possible to settle relations with Georgia and Armenia, and on what basis? ...Are serious work being done to strengthen Baku? Please inform about Turkey and Persia.

After answering the questions posed and reporting on the situation in the region, Stalin pointed to the increased activity of the British. This was alarming, and Lenin asked to expedite his arrival in Moscow "to make proposals to the Politburo."

However, the impatience with which the head of the Soviet government hurried to recall Stalin to the capital was due not only to preoccupation with affairs in the Caucasus. In a note to Trotsky about the impending purge of institutions, both Moscow and local, he notes: "we will decide after Stalin's arrival."

But the main thing was that a big event was being prepared in Moscow. VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Held on December 22-29, it was dedicated to the restoration of industry, transport and agriculture. It was on it that the well-known GOELRO plan was adopted. At the congress, Stalin was again elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

The names of the famous marshals and generals who became the direct blacksmiths of the Great Victory are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... There is hardly anyone in Russia who is not familiar with these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders have been repeatedly described in historical and memoir literature. Much less fortunate in this regard were those Soviet military leaders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war, never knowing the joy of victory over the Nazis. But we all owe them as much as we owe to those who reached Berlin. After all, it was these people, the real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, superior in armament and technical equipment, on the borders of the Soviet country. In this article, we will talk about one of these heroes.

Kiev Special Military District in the period preceding the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, was considered by the high command as one of the key military districts of the country. The Kiev military district was created on May 17, 1935, as a result of the division of the Ukrainian military district into the Kiev and Kharkov military districts. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kiev Military District into the Kiev Special Military District (hereinafter - KOVO). In the western direction, its role was decisive, since it covered the strategically important territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, it covered the Kyiv, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lvov and Drohobych regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

The district was border, and this determined its strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet state. The largest grouping of Soviet troops in the western direction was stationed on the territory of the district. Naturally, a person worthy and trusted by Moscow should have commanded such an important district. Since the formation of the Kiev Special Military District, the post of commander has been occupied by such famous Soviet commanders as the commander of the 2nd rank Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (in 1938-1940) and General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1940-1941).
On February 28, 1941, Georgy Zhukov, who became the winner of two major military games that practiced the offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction and, accordingly, the defense in the western direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The question arose of who would replace Georgy Konstantinovich as commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. It was supposed to be no less worthy and talented military leader. Ultimately, Stalin chose Lieutenant General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos. Forty-nine-year-old Lieutenant General Kirponos, before being appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, commanded the Leningrad Military District. He was a military leader with great combat experience, who received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the Soviet-Finnish war.

From peasant son to red commander

Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was, as they say, a man of the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9, according to the old style), 1892, in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernigov province, into a poor peasant family. His education amounted to adolescence to the year of the parochial and three years of the zemstvo school. Since the family did not have much money, they had to stop studying and, like many peers from the village, go to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a watchman, a forester in the forestries of the Chernihiv province. In 1911, he married the daughter of a saddler, Olimpiada Polyakova (later he divorced her in 1919, leaving two daughters for himself, and in the same 1919 married Sofya Piotrovskaya). When did the first World War, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 years old.

In 1915 young man called for military service. He graduated from instructor courses at the Oranienbaum officer rifle school, after which he was assigned to the 216th reserve infantry regiment stationed in Kozlov (now the city of Michurinsk in the Tambov region). In 1917, Kirponos changed his military specialty - he graduated from a military paramedic school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258th Olgopol Infantry Regiment. Twenty-five-year-old Mikhail Kirponos becomes chairman of the soldiers' regimental committee, in November of the same year - chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26th Army Corps.

Apparently, during these years, young Kirponos not only sympathized with the revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized fraternization with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 demobilized from the Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to his homeland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops were in charge, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and Austrians, and against the troops of the Central Rada. Having joined the Red Army in August 1918, Kirponos almost immediately (the next month of September), as an experienced military man, was appointed company commander in the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. The division, by the way, was commanded by the legendary division commander Nikolai Shchors.

In the Red Army, Kirponos' career went rapidly - in December, two months before that, having commanded a company, he became a battalion commander, and then - chief of staff and commander of the 22nd Ukrainian Rifle Regiment as part of the 44th Rifle Division. In this capacity, the regiment commander Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhytomyr and Kyiv. In July 1919, a new appointment came - as assistant head of the divisional school of red foremen (red commanders) of the same 44th rifle division. Here begins the temporary decline of Kirponos, apparently due to his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became an assistant to the head of the economic team of the 2nd Kiev school of red foremen, and in June 1921, a year later, he became the head of the economic department, then - assistant commissar of the same school. In 1922, Kirponos graduated from the 2nd Kyiv school of red foremen, thus receiving a military education without interrupting his service at school.

After receiving a military education, Kirponos continued to serve for a year at the Kharkiv School of Red Starshina (October 1922 - September 1923), where he served as assistant chief for political affairs. Then followed study at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze, which Kirponos graduated in 1927 and was assigned as a battalion commander to the 130th Bogunsky Rifle Regiment. However, already in December 1928, he again returned to the system of military educational institutions - this time as an assistant chief - the head of the educational unit of the Kharkov Military School of Chervon foremen named after. VTsIK. April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant, and then as division chief of staff.
In March 1934, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed head and military commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir United Military School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR. Kirponos led this military educational institution for more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school has undergone several renamings - in December 1935 it was renamed the Tatar-Bashkir Military Infantry School named after the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in April 1936 - the Kazan Infantry School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in March 1937 - to the Kazan Infantry Military School. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR and, finally, in March 1939 - to the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR. Since March 1937, the military school became an all-Union one and young people from all the Union republics of the USSR were able to enter it. During the five years that Kirponos led the Kazan School, many worthy commanders received training and were released into the troops, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself rose in ranks during the leadership of the school and college. On October 26, 1935, he was awarded the rank of brigade commander, and four years later, on November 4, 1939, the rank of division commander.

The cadets of the school remembered Kirponos as an excellent commander and educator - military pedagogical activity was his real vocation. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was also engaged in administrative and economic work - after all, at that time the organization of the normal supply of the school also seemed to be quite difficult and, at the same time, a very necessary thing. Party and political activity remained the most important for Kirponos - since the end of the First World War, when he was elected chairman of the regimental soldier's committee, Kirponos was actively engaged in social activities. A convinced communist, he took an active part in all party meetings of the school and college. Naturally, in the spirit of the times, he had to participate in the denunciation of "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that Kirponos always, as they say, "knew the measure" - where were the real opposition to the Soviet course, and where were accidentally suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of an intercessor. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unreserved supporter of Stalinist policies, of course, also played a role in his subsequent meteoric military career. Especially when you consider that in the late 1930s. many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their positions had to be replaced by someone.

Soviet-Finnish war and promotion

Meanwhile, the military-political situation on the Soviet borders deteriorated significantly. In the northwestern direction, the Soviet Union came into conflict with Finland. On November 28, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact was denounced, and on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops stationed on the Soviet-Finnish border were ordered to go on the offensive. The official reason for the start of hostilities was the shelling of Soviet territory from the territory of Finland. An impressive Soviet group of troops was concentrated against Finland, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for competent and talented commanders began to be felt, in connection with which the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR turned to the practice of transferring top commanders from other military formations and military educational institutions to the active army. In December 1939, division commander Mikhail Kirponos, who at that time was head of the Kazan Infantry School, received a new appointment - commander of the 70th rifle division, which was part of the 7th army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, who actually had no real experience in commanding military formations, except for a short-term participation in the Civil War, was given high confidence and, as it were, opened up opportunities for further career advancement in the event of successful command of the entrusted rifle division.

The Seventh Army was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. By November 1939, it included, in addition to the army headquarters, the 19th and 50th rifle corps and in their composition the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th rifle divisions, three tank brigades, six RGK artillery regiments, three RGK high-capacity artillery battalions. The army air force included the 1st and 68th light bomber, 16th high-speed bomber and 59th fighter aviation brigades, consisting of 12 aviation regiments and 644 aircraft.

The 70th Rifle Division, which was to be commanded by Commander Kirponos, was part of the 19th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army and included three rifle regiments (68th, 252nd and 329th regiments), two artillery regiments (221 th Light Artillery Regiment and 227th Howitzer Artillery Regiment), 361st tank battalion, 204th chemical tank battalion. In February 1940, the 28th tank regiment on the T-26 was included in the division. November 30, 1939 the division entered the territory of Finland. Kirponos, who took over the division on December 25, 1939, replaced its previous commander, Colonel Fedor Aleksandrovich Prokhorov. To the credit of the latter, we can say that he prepared his fighters perfectly and the division was considered one of the best in the army. Under the command of Kirponos, on February 11, 1940, she began participating in the breakthrough of the famous "Mannerheim Line". From February 11 to February 14, division units occupied part of the field fortifications of the Karhul region, on February 17 they participated in the "battle for the islands", on February 21-23 - in the capture of the island of Liisaari (Northern Berezovy). On February 26, the division was transferred from the 19th Rifle Corps to the 10th Rifle Corps. Its fighters managed to occupy part of the Koivisto (Kiperort) peninsula, Pukinsaari (Goat) and Hannukkalansaari (Maisky) islands.

On February 29, the division was transferred to the 28th Rifle Corps, as part of which it participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then for the island of Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky). The most famous feat of the division was the crossing at night on the ice of the Vyborg Bay. Having made a six-day raid behind enemy lines, in March 1940 the division occupied a bridgehead on the northern coast of the bay and took control of the Vyborg-Khamina road. This throw of the division played a crucial role in the assault on Vyborg, which could not but be ignored by the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252nd Rifle and 227th Howitzer Artillery Regiments were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner. On March 21, 1940, the division commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and received the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The successful command of the 70th Rifle Division, which showed its prowess and combat skills in the Soviet-Finnish war, became the “finest hour” of division commander Kirponos, literally and figuratively. It was from this time that his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-lived, ascent through the steps of the command posts of the Red Army began. Prior to that, Kirponos led a military school for five years, and within four years he rose only one rank. But the feat of the 70th Infantry Division contributed to the fact that the divisional commander was noticed. In April 1940, a month after crossing the Vyborg Bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49th Rifle Corps, which was part of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, already in June of the same year, two months after his appointment as corps commander, Kirponos was waiting for the next colossal promotion - he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. On June 4, 1940, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the military rank of "lieutenant general" (in connection with the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army).

Kyiv Special Military District

However, Mikhail Kirponos also did not stay long in the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District. Already in February 1941, less than a year after his appointment to the LVO, Kirponos was appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. On February 22, 1941, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military rank of Colonel General. Appointment to the Kiev Special Military District shows that the high command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful leadership of units of the 70th Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish War that they saw him as a promising commander capable of well preparing the troops of a strategically important districts and effectively command them.

Apparently, Stalin, appointing Kirponos as commander of the most important military district in the defense system of the western direction, hoped that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district for the coming war, without arousing suspicion from the enemy. After all, Kirponos during the years of the Civil War had a wealth of experience in participating in the partisan movement - first commanding his own rebel detachment, and then serving in the Shchors division. The command of a partisan formation requires that creativity of thinking, versatility, and the ability to make decisions independently, which the commanders of regular army units sometimes lack. Moreover, Kirponos had to combine not only military and political leadership, but also the functions of an administrator and a supplier. In general, it should be noted that there was no mistake in choosing Kirponos for the post of commander of the district - the colonel-general really corresponded to the hopes placed on him in his personal and professional qualities. Although, nevertheless, the new commander had one drawback - too little experience in commanding active combat units.

In fact, if you do not take into account the time of participation in the Civil War in the Shchors division, and later in the Soviet-Finnish war, most military service Mikhail Petrovich fell on military pedagogical activity - he held various positions in military educational institutions. General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov also drew attention to this shortcoming, from whom Kirponos took command of the Kiev Special Military District: “I was glad that the Kiev Special Military District went to such a worthy commander. Of course, he, like many others, did not yet have the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border district, but life experience, diligence and natural intelligence guaranteed that a first-class commander of the troops would develop from Mikhail Petrovich ”(Quoted by: Meretskov K. A. In the service of the people, St. Petersburg, 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized a promising commander in Kirponos and was convinced that the colonel-general would be able to fully reveal his military leadership talent, delving into the nuances of commanding the district.
Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, who at that time served as the head of the operations department - deputy chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District with the rank of colonel, recalls the appointment of Kirponos as commander of the district: “Shortly after his arrival, the new commander walked around the headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to quickly get acquainted with the state of affairs, with people. He also visited us, in the operations department. His lean, fine figure was tightly fitted by a carefully pressed tunic. A golden star of the Hero gleamed on his chest. Pale, clean-shaven face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows hung over large blue eyes. Dark, thick hair carefully parted. Only a slight gray hair at the temples and deep folds in the corners of the lips betrayed that this youthful man was already under fifty ”(Quoted from: Bagramyan I.Kh. This is how the war began. M., 1971).

Commander Kirponos paid much attention to the issues of combat training of troops. Understanding perfectly well that Germany is the most likely enemy of the Soviet Union, the command of the Red Army paid great attention to the preparation of military units and formations of the Kyiv Special Military District. First of all, the task was to work out actions in the event of an enemy tank attack. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on improving the training of their own tank units. Thus, the district commander, Colonel-General Kirponos, was the most frequent guest in mechanized corps, where he tested the ability of crews to control tanks, and tank units - to act in a coordinated manner in battle.

In addition to combat training, the construction and equipping of fortifications in the border areas remained the most important area of ​​activity for the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems that were typical for the entire Red Army in the pre-war period. First of all, we are talking about weak armament and a shortage of personnel in units and formations. According to the memoirs of I.Kh. Bagramyan, only in the Kiev Special Military District there were not enough 30 thousand military personnel. And this is despite the fact that military schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year period of study, courses for junior lieutenants were created to accelerate the training of command personnel. As for the provision of troops with weapons and equipment, there was a lack of communications and special equipment, vehicles everywhere. It was not possible to make up for all this overnight - the country's national economy was already working at its limit.

War

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among the first to receive their blow were the military units and formations that were part of the Kyiv Special Military District. On the day the war began, the Kiev Special Military District was transformed into the Southwestern Front. Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. The troops of the Southwestern Front numbered 957 thousand soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12.6 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft. Hitler's Army Group "South" was concentrated against the Southwestern Front, numbering 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 9.7 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft. That is, at first glance, the Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in manpower, but also in weapons. However, in reality the situation looked different. First, almost immediately after the start of the war, Army Group South received reinforcements from 19 divisions, and Hungarian, Romanian, Italian and Slovak troops also joined it. The Southwestern Front did not receive reinforcements in such quantities, and the state of its technical fleet, although at first glance superior to the German one in terms of the number of tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces, left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were stationed in close proximity to the border, while the enemy hit Army Group South with the entire "fist" at once, securing a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops in the border area and leveling the capabilities of the troops of the Southwestern Front by more than late stages of hostilities, since they entered the hostilities one by one and, accordingly, could not use their advantages in a larger number of personnel.

On June 22, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered Colonel General Kirponos to ensure the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops with the forces of the 5th and 6th armies and take Lublin. In itself, this task seemed difficult, but Kirponos had no choice but to try to complete it. Opposite points of view emerged in the front command. Corps Commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin, a member of the Front's Military Council, advocated the immediate execution of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters on a counteroffensive. The opposite position was held by the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev. He understood that the troops of the front simply would not have time to concentrate to deliver a retaliatory strike and suggested organizing a defense, holding back the enemy for as long as possible in order to create fortified areas in the inner territories of the district.

Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos came up with a slightly different idea - he proposed to strike at the base of the German group directed at Kiev by the forces of three mechanized corps and rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th armies. The task of the counterattack would be the complete destruction of the enemy’s vanguard and the maximum containment of the 1st Panzer Army, commanded by General Ewald von Kleist (the tank army included five Wehrmacht panzer divisions). However, the offensive strike of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. Interaction between mechanized corps was not established. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with mechanized corps of the front. Finally, the 34th Panzer Division was surrounded and was able to break through to its own, only having lost all its tanks. Speaking about the causes of organizational miscalculations, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the lack of practical experience of General Kirponos in leading large military formations. Indeed, in fact, before becoming commander of the district, he commanded only a rifle division, which, moreover, did not have tank units in its composition. Accordingly, Kirponos had no experience in organizing the interaction of mechanized units (See: Burkin P.V. General Kirponos: the experience of historical and anthropological research).

However, to a certain extent, the troops of the Southwestern Front still managed to significantly impede the enemy's advance towards Kyiv. Although the counteroffensive plan failed, the Soviet troops stopped the Wehrmacht units 20 km away. west of Kyiv. This forced the Nazis to change their offensive tactics. The command of the Wehrmacht temporarily refused to storm Kyiv and sent all its forces to the left flank of the front. The enemy pushed the 6th and 12th Soviet armies to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the Southwestern Front. In the Tarashchi region, a retaliatory offensive by the 26th Army was conceived, but in the end it was suppressed by the enemy. The Wehrmacht pushed back the 26th Army to the northeast, after which the position of the Southwestern Front worsened even more. Enemy formations came close to Kyiv. The High Command demanded the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On August 8, Kirponos organized a counterattack on enemy positions, throwing all the forces at his disposal - the 175th, 147th rifle divisions that participated in the defense of Kiev, the reserve 206th and 284th divisions, the 2nd and 6th airborne brigades. On August 9, the 5th Airborne Brigade and the Kiev People's Militia entered the battle. As a result, the Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kyiv. By August 16, the enemy was driven back to their original positions by the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops. The defense of Kyiv played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, significantly slowing down the advance of the enemy troops deep into Soviet territory and forcing the Nazi command to change the trajectory of the movement of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, for a whole month, which was of great importance in the conditions of the war, the Nazi offensive towards Moscow was delayed.

Since the Nazi troops were redirected from Moscow to the south, the main task was to retreat from near Kyiv. Kirponos himself, and marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this. However, Stalin did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops. As a result, by September 14, the 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet servicemen died in encirclement or when trying to break through it. The troops of the Southwestern Front were divided and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to the farm Dryukovshchina, which is 15 km. southwest of Lokhvitsa, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached with escort forces. Here they were attacked by units of the Nazi 3rd Panzer Division. The artillery commander of the 5th Army, Major General Sotensky, and officers of his headquarters were taken prisoner. The total strength of the headquarters column at this point was about a thousand people, including approximately 800 commanders - generals and staff officers, as well as a commandant's company.

The column withdrew to the Shumeikovo grove. The column included the commander of the front, General Kirponos, the chief of staff of the front, Tupikov, members of the Military Council of the front, Burmistenko and Rykov, the commander of the 5th Army, Potapov, and other top commanders of the front. Parts of the Wehrmacht attacked the Shumeikovo grove in three directions. The battle lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in the leg, then fragments of a mine hit him in the chest, which is why he died. The subordinates buried the front commander here, on the territory of the grove. The chief of staff Tupikov, a member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and many other commanders also died in the battle. The commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, was taken prisoner.

In December 1943, the remains of Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos, Hero of the Soviet Union, were reburied in Kyiv in the Botanical Garden. A.V. Fomin, and in 1957 - moved to the Park of Eternal Glory. General Kirponos did not fully manage to reveal his, of course, present military talent. He died at the very beginning of the war, catching its most tragic moments - the retreat of Soviet troops, the occupation of a huge part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, we can say with confidence that General Kirponos made a colossal contribution to the defense of the country from the aggression of Nazi Germany. Detaining the German troops near Kiev, he delayed the attack on Moscow, making it possible to consolidate the forces of the Red Army in the defense of the Soviet capital. Despite all those mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, which many modern historians pay attention to, General Kirponos honorably walked his path as a Soviet soldier and died on the battlefield, in battle, without surrendering to the enemy. It remains only to bring to the end of the article the words from the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel General Kirponos: good and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... "(Moskalenko K.S. In the south-western direction. M., 1975).

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A little more than a day has passed since the "sudden" attack. June 23, 1941. 9 a.m. Southwestern Front

Catastrophe

The decision to launch a counterattack against the German troops of Army Group South was made at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front yesterday, around midnight. In fact, the entire leadership of the front - Kirponos, Purkaev and Bagramyan - considered this counterattack premature and dangerous. But one could hardly argue with General of the Army Zhukov, who arrived at Yugo-Zapadny on Stalin's personal order. Moreover, Zhukov acted in accordance with the already received DIRECTIVE No. 3.

Zhukov's opinion was supported by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, who arrived with him, a member of the military council of the front, and also by Commissar Nikolai Vashugin, who, after the failure of the counterattack, still had the conscience to put a bullet in his temple

On that tragic evening of June 23, 1941, apparently, for Zhukov, and for Khrushchev, and for Vashugin, as well as for everyone present in the office of Commander Kirponos, the most important thing was to immediately begin to fulfill Stalin's order. The attitude towards the leader and his orders in those days was best expressed by the future "whistleblower of the cult of personality" Khrushchev: “All the peoples of the Soviet Union see in Stalin their friend, father and leader. Stalin - friend of the people in its simplicity. Stalin is the father of the people in his love for the people. Stalin - the leader of the peoples in his wisdom of the leader of the struggle of the peoples.

Zhukov, vested with the powers of Stalin, ordered the front commander to immediately begin to implement DIRECTIVE No. 3. Zhukov recalls: “... I suggested to Kirponos that he immediately give a preliminary order to concentrate mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the main grouping of armies“ South ”, which broke through in the Sokal area ...”

DIRECTIVE No. 3 ordered to use the forces of the 5th and 6th armies and at least five mechanized corps, out of eight available to the front, to launch a counterattack in the South-Western direction. The task, therefore, was to concentrate these forces in the shortest possible time and bring them into battle at the same time. But it was precisely this task, according to Baghramyan, that was impossible in the current situation. Most of the mechanized corps were already involved in battles with the advancing enemy and could not be used for a counterattack. Others were initially deployed far from the border: the 9th - near Novograd-Volynsk, the 19th - in the Zhitomir region, and the 24th - in the Proskurov region. To advance to the lines of the counterattack, these corps had to march from 200 to 400 km. So, in reality, we could only talk about the 8th mechanized corps under the command of Lieutenant General Dmitry Ryabyshev, especially since this corps was equipped with a significant number of tanks of a new design. The avant-garde of Ryabyshev's mechanized corps entered the assigned concentration area near Brody on June 23, 1941, at dawn. And at 9 o'clock in the morning, Zhukov arrived at Ryabyshev's command post.

“Just not to be late with a counterattack!”

Ryabyshev's command post was hastily set up in a tent in the middle of a dense pine forest. By the way the general looked, by his face and by his clothes, it was clear that the 8th mechanized corps had already managed to make a difficult path during these first days of the war.

According to Zhukov's memoirs, that morning near Brody, he was sure that the head division of the corps, led by Lieutenant General Ryabyshev, had passed from its quartering point in Drogobych to Brod, about 150 kilometers. But Zhukov was wrong. In fact, the path that the division had traveled was already about 500 kilometers. The fact was that as early as June 22, 1941, after a "sudden" attack, Kirponos, without specific instructions from Moscow, on his own initiative, began to push mechanized corps to the West - to the border. As Brigade Commissar Nikolai Popel, deputy corps commander for political affairs, testifies, the first order to advance was brought from the army headquarters on June 22, 1941 at 10 o'clock in the morning. The order instructed the corps to move to the West and concentrate by the end of the day in the forest near Sambir, 80 kilometers from Drohobych. Having made a forced march to Sambir and not having time to turn off the engines of the tanks, the tired fighters were forced to set off again on a new order - to the northeast. During the night, on the march, Ryabyshev's corps received several more orders, and changed direction several more times. So, when at 9 o'clock in the morning in the forest near Brody Zhukov met with Ryabyshev, the 8th mechanized corps had already managed to cover more than one hundred kilometers.

Zhukov recalls: “From the appearance of the commander and the headquarters commanders, it was not difficult to guess that they had made a difficult journey. They very quickly moved from the Drohobych region to the Brody region, everyone was in high spirits.

Looking at Ryabyshev and the headquarters commanders, I remembered the glorious 11th tank brigade and its commander, the brave brigade commander Yakovlev, I remembered how bravely the fighters of this brigade smashed the enemy near Mount Bain-Tsagan on Khalkhin Gol. “Yes, these people will fight no worse now,” I thought.

That's what Army General Zhukov was thinking at that hour - about Khalkhin Gol, about the tank brigade of the brave brigade commander Mikhail Yakovlev, which then, in August 1939, having traveled about 70 kilometers across the open steppe, single-handedly entered into battle with the enemy. Zhukov, by his own admission, then knew that without the support of the infantry, the brigade would suffer heavy losses and deliberately "went for it." Yakovlev's tanks burned like torches. More than half of the vehicles lost brigade and more than half of the personnel. In the same place, on Khalkhin Gol, Yakovlev died the death of the brave.

But the death of people never bothered Zhukov.

She does not bother him even now. Lieutenant-General Ryabyshev showed Zhukov on the map where and how his divisions were located, reported on the state of the materiel and the mood of the people.

According to Zhukov, Ryabyshev told him: “The corps needs a day to fully concentrate, put in order the material part and replenish supplies ... During the same day, combat reconnaissance will be carried out and corps management will be organized. Consequently, the corps can enter the battle with all its might on the morning of June 24 ... "

But the Southwestern Front in 1941 is not Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

And the tank group of Field Marshal Paul Ludwig von Kleist is not the 6th Japanese Army. Zhukov knows that the forces and means of one 8th mechanized corps are not enough for a powerful counterattack on the Nazi tank armadas, and nevertheless decides to carry it out.

Zhukov: “... Of course, it would be better to launch a counterattack together with the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, but, unfortunately, they go to their starting areas late. The situation will not allow us to wait for the full concentration of the corps.”

The decision was made - without waiting for the full concentration of mechanized corps, to launch a counterattack, introducing tank divisions into battle as they approach, in parts.

"Toward the War"

But if Zhukov, fearing "to be late with a counterattack", really hoped that the 8th mechanized corps would be able to join the battle on the morning of June 24, then he simply failed to appreciate the complexity of the process of concentrating troops in the situation that developed after the "sudden" attack.

The corps of Lieutenant General Ryabyshev included two tank divisions, a motorized division and a motorcycle regiment. A total of 932 tanks, about 350 armored vehicles, about 5,000 vehicles, 1,500 motorcycles, 150 guns and about 32,000 personnel. All this bulky armored colossus, tank after tank, car after car, went to the West, leaving behind the smell of burning and clouds of dust.

And to meet her, to the East, there was a war.

Brigadier Commissar Nikolai Popel recalls: “Towards the tanks from Przemysl, trucks were moving in a continuous line. In the trunks, on suitcases, on somehow assembled and tied knots, sat women and children. Frightened, confused, unexpectedly homeless, many have already become widows or orphans.

Rare car without wounded. Through the clumsily made bandages, blood appeared in brown spots. Some are unconscious, others are in tears, others are silent, petrified in misfortune.

The roar of the tanks could not drown out the growing roar of the artillery cannonade. We were moving towards the war, and its ominous signs became more and more clear. The zone of effective fire of long-range enemy batteries began ... "

The speed with which the mechanized corps moved was much less than planned, and every hour it decreased. During the day, a multi-kilometer column of armored vehicles was bombed and machine-gunned by Luftwaffe fighters. At night, the column was forced to move with the headlights off in pitch darkness. The unrested drivers fell asleep at the wheel for the second day. Tanks moved into ditches, collided with each other.

Upon receipt of each new order requiring a change in route, the entire column had to be deployed.

The main forces of the 8th mechanized corps concentrated in the Brody area not by June 23, as expected, but only by midnight on June 24, and the counterattack had to be postponed to June 25, 1941.

Ryabyshev recalls: “By 24 hours, the main forces of the corps ... were mainly concentrated in the Yavorov area. The combat mission set by him: by the end of June 24, concentrate - the 34th TD in the Radzivilov area, the 12th TD - in the Brody area, from the morning of 25.06 be ready for an attack on Brody -Berestechko…”

Popel recalls: “Now no one doubted: from here, from the dense, summer-like fragrant pine forest near Brody, we have no other way but to the enemy ... There is no evidence that the Nazis are waiting for our counterattack. Perhaps because we are not rich in information about the forces and intentions of the fascist command, or perhaps the self-confident enemy, who was already approaching Dubno, simply did not allow the Russians to dare such recklessness.

But the Russians dared!

On the Western Front

So it was in the South, and in the Western direction leading through Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow, the situation was even more catastrophic.

After all, it was Moscow - the capital of Bolshevik Russia - that was Hitler's main goal. As noted in Hitler's "Directive No. 21", the capture of Moscow would testify to the "decisive political and economic success" of the entire campaign and "will inevitably lead to the cessation of Russian resistance." However, Hitler adhered to the same tactics in relation to other capitals of the states of Europe he captured - Prague, Warsaw, Paris. The consequence of this tactic, which justified itself, was the concentration of the most powerful Army Group Center in the Western direction, under the command of Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock, a participant in the Polish and French campaigns, and the appointment of the outstanding tank war theorist, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, as commander of one of the tank forces operating here. groups.

According to a plan carefully worked out by the German General Staff, the tank and motorized formations of the Center group, with the support of bomber aircraft, were to quickly reach the Minsk region and surround the troops of the Western Front. And then, without dealing with individual groupings of Soviet troops remaining in the rear, immediately cross the Western Dvina and Dnieper and continue the offensive on Smolensk and, further, on the Bolshevik capital.

The troops of the "Center" group were to resist the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western Front. But in that pre-dawn hour, June 22, 1941, the first echelons of these armies were in places of permanent cantonment or "on maneuvers", without live ammunition and shells. The border was covered only by border detachments, artillery and machine-gun battalions, which occupied some nodes of the fortified areas, and engineering units that carried out construction work in this area. Having received the first Stalinist directive with a warning about a possible "sudden" attack by Germany, the front commander Pavlov at three o'clock in the morning ordered the units of the first echelon of cover to occupy long-term firing points. But the time has already passed!

Parts of the first echelon began to advance to the border only from 6 o'clock in the morning. And, entering the battle in parts, just as it happened on the Southwestern Front, they were not able to stop the advance of the Nazi tank wedges. The situation was further complicated by the complete absence of anti-aircraft artillery, located 400 km from the border, and the death of hundreds of aircraft destroyed by the Luftwaffe in the first hours of the war. Colonel Leonid Sandalov, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, draws a terrible picture of the situation of Soviet troops on the Western Front: "Only at 6 o'clock[am] the command of the army received an order from the district: “In view of the mass military actions that have been identified by the Germans, I order: to raise troops and act in combat. Pavlov, Fomin, Klimovskikh.

But the troops of the army have been fighting heavy battles since 4 o’clock.”

The command of the 4th Army, however, tried to put into action the army COVER PLAN RP-4, but after the start of the fighting, this plan no longer corresponded to the situation.

Colonel Sandalov: "The command of the army is no independent decisions, except for bringing the troops on alert, in the first hours of the war did not accept. And after making sure that the war had begun, it tried to put into practice the decisions taken before the war according to the RP-4 plan, which in no way corresponded to the prevailing situation.

The gathering of troops in the areas provided for by the cover plan, for their subsequent advancement into the designated defense zones, became impossible in the situation that had developed. The attempts of the troops to reach their assembly areas due to large transitions, during which they suffered heavy losses, were unsuccessful, and therefore it turned out to be impossible to organize defense and resist along the line of the fortified area being created.

As Sandalov testifies, the deployment of troops in the Western Military District, just like the deployment of troops in the Southwestern, did not allow for the operational concentration of troops after a "sudden" attack - in the midst of a war.

Sandalov's testimony is unequivocally confirmed by the text of the cover plan for the Western District, approved by People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko and signed by Commander Pavlov. This detailed plan spans 19 pages and includes 27 different appendices, maps, diagrams and tables. In accordance with the plan, the concentration of the 24th and 100th rifle divisions of the district is carried out by echelon, first by road, and then also by rail. The divisions should arrive in the designated concentration areas on the third day of mobilization!

For the transportation of people and horses, motor transport regiments are allocated to division commanders: the 24th division - 865 vehicles of various brands, and the 100th division - 1409 vehicles! The concentration of the other divisions of the district proceeds similarly.

Such a terrible picture is hard to imagine! Tens of thousands of vehicles, crowded with people and horses, under the bombs of the Luftwaffe, are moving to the areas of concentration assigned to them, perhaps already captured by the enemy!

Stalin's DIRECTIVE No. 2 got to the headquarters of the 4th Army to Major General Alexander Korobkov only at 6 pm, 14 hours after the "sudden" attack. Only at 6 pm did Major General Ivan Khabarov, assistant front commander, arrive at Korobkov's command post in Zaprudy and bring Pavlov's order signed by the chief of staff of the Klimovskikhs.

FROM THE ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE WESTERN FRONT

Commander of the 4th Army

The commander of the ZapOVO ordered: “Resolutely destroy the bands that have broken through and are breaking through, for which, first of all, use the Oborin corps ... In relation to actions, be guided by the" red package "..."

An extract from DIRECTIVE No. 2 was attached to the order: “The troops must use all their strength and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.

From now on, until further notice by the ground forces, do not cross the border.”

At 6 pm, Moscow was still ordering Major General Korobkov's troops "not to cross the land border." Meanwhile, German tank divisions had already invaded Soviet territory to a depth of 25-30 kilometers! The pace of the offensive of the German army was so rapid that they surprised even the Nazi command.

FROM "WAR DIARY" FRANP HALDER

The morning report for June 23 and the final operational reports for June 22 received during the night give grounds for concluding that an attempt at a general enemy withdrawal should be expected.

The command of Army Group North even believes that such a decision was made by the enemy four days before our offensive.

In favor of the conclusion that a significant part of the enemy forces are much deeper in the rear than we thought, and now partly withdrawn even further, the following facts speak: on the first day of the offensive, our troops advanced with battles to a depth of 20 km, then - the absence of a large the number of prisoners, the extremely small amount of artillery operating on the side of the enemy, and the detected movement of enemy motorized corps fromfront to the rear, in the direction of Minsk ...

And four days later, on June 26, 1941, the 2nd tank group of Guderian and the 3rd tank group of Goth were already 20 kilometers from Minsk, completing the coverage of the capital of Belarus in steel pincers and threatening Smolensk and Moscow. The current situation forced Stalin on June 25, 1941, even before the pincers were closed, to order Pavlov to carry out a "forced withdrawal of the 3rd and 10th armies." And on June 26, 1941, Stalin sent Voroshilov to the Western Front.

The causes of the catastrophe were reported to Voroshilov by General Pavlov and Marshal Shaposhnikov, who, as is known, had been at Pavlov's headquarters since the afternoon of June 22, 1941.

FROM ADJUTANT VOROSHILOV'S DIARY

GENERAL MAJOR SHCHERBAKOV

Station Polynskiye Khutora

Voroshilov: Tell me, how could it happen that in a week of war a large part of Belarus was handed over to the enemy, and the troops were brought to the brink of disaster?

Shaposhnikov: Our failures can be attributed to a number of reasons...

But the decisive, immediate reason: the district troops were not warned in time about the impending German attack, and therefore were not put on alert, which predetermined the course of events unfavorable for us in the future.

Pavlov: Our density at the border was such that it could be pierced anywhere. As for the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense on bringing the troops to combat readiness, received by the district headquarters a few hours before the German attack, it does not practical value no longer had.

The troops in the border zone were taken by surprise, and most of the divisions were ordered to advance to the border when the German invasion had already begun ...

Shaposhnikov: As shown by the nature of the enemy’s actions in the morning and throughout the day on June 22, the Germans, apparently, were well aware of the deployment of our troops and the places of the most important objects, as evidenced by the first bomber strikes on large headquarters, airfields and the location of rifle divisions and mechanized units ...

If Shaposhnikov is left on his conscience, at least a strange criticism of "not bringing the troops to combat readiness", the reasons for which he - Stalin's main strategic adviser - were undoubtedly well known, as well as the reasons that "the Germans were well aware of the deployment of our troops "- in general, the picture he painted corresponded to reality and was in fact catastrophic.

And perhaps Stalin understood this better than anyone.

"Scapegoats"

Army General Pavlov probably said too much to Voroshilov. He, in fact, with amazing accuracy, named four main causes of the disaster: the density of troops on the border was such that it could be pierced anywhere; the directive to put the troops on alert was received just a few hours before the attack; the troops received the order to advance when the invasion had already begun and, finally, the Germans were well aware of the deployment of Soviet troops and the locations of the most important military installations.

All the causes of the disaster listed by Pavlov, independent of the actions of the front command, were the result of orders from Moscow. Pavlov really said too much and with this he signed his own death warrant. Moreover, Stalin needed to shift the blame for the catastrophe from himself, and the figure of General Pavlov was ideally suited for the role of a "scapegoat".

Army General Dmitry Pavlov, Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded three Orders of Lenin for his heroism in battle, a week after talking with Voroshilov, on July 4, 1941, he was arrested and tried by a military tribunal for cowardice, the collapse of command and control and unauthorized abandonment of military positions .

On July 22, 1941, the tribunal sentenced Pavlov to death, and on the same night he was shot. Together with the commander, the chief of staff, Major General Klimovskikh, the chief of communications, Major General Grigoriev, and the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Korobkov, were shot. And these were not the last victims - from the first days of the war to October 10, 1941, according to the verdicts of military tribunals, 10,201 servicemen were shot, of which 3,321 people were in front of the ranks.

Stalin recalls Zhukov

On that very tragic day, June 26, 1941, when Guderian and Goth were already 20 kilometers from Minsk, Stalin apparently realized the extent of the catastrophe that had occurred. Having given the order to withdraw the troops of the Western Front, he set about organizing the defense of Moscow.

And, above all, the leader recalls Zhukov from the Southwestern Front.

The stay of the hero of Khalkhin Gol there is already useless anyway - the retaliatory strike, in the version as it was conceived and planned, could not be carried out anyway.

According to Zhukov “... On June 26, Stalin called me at the command post of the Southwestern Front in Ternopil and said: “A difficult situation has developed on the Western Front. The enemy approached Minsk. It is not clear what is happening with Pavlov. Marshal Kulik is unknown where. Marshal Shaposhnikov fell ill. Can you fly to Moscow immediately?“

- Now I will talk with comrade Purkaev about further actions and leave for the airfield.

So, after spending three days on the Southwestern Front and failing to organize a STRIKE IN RETURN, Zhukov flew to Moscow. And, as evidenced by an impartial entry in the “Notebook for recording persons received by Stalin”, at 15:00 he was already in the Kremlin.

And on the Southwestern Front, a hopelessly belated and obviously doomed retaliatory strike began.

Oncoming tank battle

On June 26, 1941, at exactly 9 o'clock in the morning, the mechanized corps of Lieutenant General Ryabyshev entered the battle with the von Kleist tank group that had broken through northeast of Lvov.

This day can be called the day of the beginning of the STRIKE BACK only conditionally. Instead of the planned powerful concentric strike, an oncoming tank battle broke out in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle. In this tank battle, one of the largest in the history of wars, more than 4,000 of the most modern tanks simultaneously participated from both sides. On the left flank of the Kleist tank group, from Lutsk and Rivne to Dubno, the 9th mechanized corps under the command of Major General Konstantin Rokossovsky, the 19th under the command of Major General Nikolai Feklenko and the 22nd under the command of Major General Semyon Kondrusev . And on the right flank from Lvov - the 4th mechanized corps of Major General Andrey Vlasov and the 8th Lieutenant General Ryabyshev. According to the original plan, Ryabyshev's corps was supposed to support the 15th mechanized corps of Major General Ignat Karpezo. But the 15th was in combat for the third day and suffered heavy losses. To help Ryabyshev, Karpezo could put up only one 10th Panzer Division, and even that was not at full strength. Rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th armies of the front and front-line aviation were also supposed to take part in the counterattack, but air cover was weak, and this significantly complicated the situation.

Recalls Lieutenant General Ryabyshev: “... the blows of the suddenly appeared enemy aircraft were especially tangible. In large groups of 50-60 aircraft, the enemy bombed the battle formations of the formation almost without hindrance. Our planes were not in the air."

And yet, a completely unexpected counterattack by the Soviet troops surprised the German command. The main "surprise" for the Nazis was the new Soviet tanks, the secret of the existence of which was carefully concealed all the pre-war months. These were tanks of a completely new design - the giant seven-meter KV-1 and KV-2, each of which weighed about 50 tons and was armed with a cannon and three machine guns, as well as light - 26-ton T-34 tanks, with almost impenetrable sloped armor and incredible, for those times, a huge speed of 55 kilometers per hour. German anti-tank guns turned out to be powerless against these monsters, armor-piercing shells did not pierce the armor, but simply bounced off it. Despite the heavy backfire, the Soviet tanks seemed to be invulnerable, and continued to move towards the Germans, instilling real horror in them.

Popel recalls: "OurKBshook the imagination of the Nazis. Not only those who met them on the battlefield, but also those who judged the war according to reports and reports.

The Nazi troops, quite unexpectedly for them, were drawn into protracted battles, and the movement of Army Group South was slowed down. On the morning of June 26, 1941, in the report of the headquarters of the armies "South", the first mention of the delay in the advance of von Kleist appeared.

FROM "WAR DIARY" FRANZ HALDER

June 26, 1941, 5th day of the war. Army Group South is slowly advancing, unfortunately suffering significant losses. The enemy acting against Army Group South has a firm and energetic leadership. The enemy is constantly bringing up new fresh forces from the depths against our tank wedge ...

On the same day, in the evening, Halder writes: “On the front of Army Group South, the enemy, as expected, with significant forces of tanks, went on the offensive on the southern flank of the 1st Panzer Group. Progress was noted in certain areas.

June 29, 1941 Sunday, 8th day of the war. Results of operational reports for 28.6 and morning reports for 29.6: “At the front of Army Group South, heavy fighting is still going on. On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Group, the 8th Russian Panzer Corps wedged deep into our position and entered the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. This wedging of the enemy, obviously, caused a big mess in our rear in the area between Brody and Dubno ... "

And on the same day, in the evening: “On the front of Army Group South, a kind of battle unfolded in the area South of Dubno ...

It can be assumed that in recent days the enemy has brought against Army Group South all his tank formations located south ofPinsk swamps, and their names (we have them were designated as cavalry divisions and motorized brigades) are completely at odds with the data we had ... "

Hitler was seriously concerned about the situation in the south. To repulse the counterattack, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, had to pull up the rear and bring more and more divisions into the battle.

However, the combat capabilities of the armed forces of the South-Western were already practically exhausted. The troops participating in the battle suffered huge losses, and most of the tanks were lost - hit, blown up by the crew, or simply abandoned. The famous 8th mechanized corps of Ryabyshev was fragmented, and part of it, under the command of Brigadier Commissar Popel, surrounded in Dubny, lost all of its 238 tanks and escaped from the encirclement only at the end of July 1941.

Tens of thousands of fighters and commanders laid down their lives in this unequal battle. The commanders of both Ryabyshev's tank divisions - the 12th and 34th - Major General Mishanin and Colonel Vasiliev, were killed. The commander of the 22nd mechanized corps, Major General Kondrusev, was mortally wounded. And the commander of the 15th, Major General Ignat Karpezo, who received a shell shock, was even buried alive and only by a lucky chance was dug up and evacuated to the rear.

Finally, on June 30, 1941, Moscow received an order to stop resistance and withdraw the troops of the Southwestern Front to the line of the old fortified regions, along the 1939 state border.

FROM THE "DIARY" OF HALDER

July 1, 1941, 10th day of the war. The enemy retreats with exceptionally stubborn battles, clinging to every line.

The failure of Stalin's "Retaliation"

The BACK STRIKE, on which Stalin placed so many hopes and which was supposed to serve as the beginning of the victorious offensive of the Red Army, suffered a terrible catastrophe.

By granting the right to deliver the FIRST STRIKE to the enemy, the opposing side always takes a risk. FIRST IMPACT - it always "hurts"!

And yet, the STRIKE BACK strategy, even regardless of the "political dividends", can lead to a purely military victory. One of the greatest military historians of the 20th century. Sir Bassil Liddell-Gart, speaking about the advantages of choosing the STRIKE PUNCH strategy, cites as a metaphor the statements of two famous boxers - the English Dames Mace, nicknamed "Mace", and the American Charles McCoy, nicknamed "Kid". Based on his vast experience, the world heavyweight champion, "Mase" advised young boxers "to achieve victory, give the opponent an opportunity to rush and strike first." And the Kid, known for his cunning, recommended: "holding back the attacking enemy with one hand, strike with the other."

The tactics of the highly experienced boxer "Kid", who used insidious provocative techniques in battle, were often used by Stalin, no less experienced in politics and no less insidious. But the retaliatory blow inflicted by Stalin's hand failed.

And one can, of course, refer to the fact that in June 1941 the German army already had more than two years of experience in warfare and considerable experience in tank warfare. You can refer to the fact that the Nazi generals were professionals, that the Nazi soldiers were well trained, disciplined and well-armed. You can refer to the fact that the communication of the Germans worked perfectly, that the actions of the German military units were coordinated. One can, of course, say that the failure of STRIKE BACK was due to the fact that Stalin in 1937 beheaded the Red Army, and the precocious Stalinist generals had neither serious academic training nor sufficient experience. It can be said that tanks of new designs began to enter the troops only in recent months, and young tankers have not yet had time to master them. We can say that there was not enough transport for the infantry, that there was no fuel, that there was not even enough ammunition. You can't list everything!

And, of course, all these factors should have influenced and influenced the actions of the Red Army on all fronts and, in particular, influenced the effectiveness of the RETURN STRIKE, which turned out to be belated and too weak in such conditions. As you know, preparations for a RETURN STRIKE began 24 hours after the "surprise" attack, after the troops received DIRECTIVE No. 3. By this time, the Nazi tank armadas had already managed to penetrate deep into Soviet territory, and most of the Soviet mechanized corps had already been involved in cruel disparate fights with the enemy. And those who had not yet joined the battle were deployed at a considerable distance from the border and went to the concentration area late and in parts.

So main reason The tragic failure of Stalin's STRIKE BACK most likely resulted from the too well orchestrated "surprise" German attack, the deployment of Soviet troops, and the famous series of three directives that gave Hitler the opportunity to unhindered continue the aggression he had begun.

STRIKE BACK did not bring Stalin an immediate easy victory over Germany. But, at the same time, the catastrophe that occurred in the first days of the war on all fronts brought him political victory, which became the key to his further historical military victory.

Professor Boris Shaposhnikov in his book "The Brain of the Army" quotes one of the famous leaders of Italian liberalism, Francesco Saverio Nitti: “War and battle are two different things. Battle - a purely military fact. war - mainly a political act. War is not decided by military action alone.

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The catastrophe of the Southwestern Front

At the end of August, most formations of the Southwestern Front were defending mainly along the banks of the Dnieper, continuing to hold the Kiev bridgehead with the troops of the 37th Army, and the German command sought to create as many of its bridgeheads as possible on the left banks of these rivers. The Germans were able to ensure the crossing in seven places, which caused serious concern of the Military Council of the South-Western Direction, Headquarters, and the General Staff. Unfortunately, our headquarters were not able to determine which of them would be used for the offensive in the future, and which only diverted attention, forces and means. So, the bridgehead near the village of Derievka near Kremenchug on the front of the 38th Army, from where the main forces of the 1st Panzer Group then rushed to our rear, was not defined as the main threat.

It turned out that the fate of Kyiv was decided hundreds of kilometers from the capital of Ukraine. The fiercest battles unfolded north of the city, but their detailed consideration is beyond the scope of our topic. We only note that, on the one hand, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command reacted to the retreat to the east of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, heavy and not very successful battles with the enemy troops of the Central Front and the possible formation of a gap at their junction. As a result, the Bryansk Front (BrF) was created, headed by General A.I. Eremenko, whose main task was to defeat the enemy strike force, led by General G. Guderian. An important role in our plans was assigned to aviation: the aviation group was replenished, the Reserve Air Group N 1 (RAG-1) (commander Colonel D.M. aircraft), a plan was prepared for the combat use of the Air Force to defeat the enemy. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership was unable to foresee the further development of events, clearly did not expect such energetic maneuvers by the enemy over a wide area.

The results of the air raids of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet "cauldron" in Kyiv

Despite the development of plans for the interaction of aviation with ground forces, this issue could not be satisfactorily resolved, which became one of the main problems. effective use Air Force in the operation of the Bryansk Front. Not too successfully coped with his new duties, deputy. Air Force Commander General I.F. Petrov, who was instructed by the Headquarters to unite under his command all aviation in this direction. Over the past two summer days, our Air Force carried out 1,433 sorties on the Bryansk Front, losing 42 aircraft, but by this time the ground forces had not had time to prepare an offensive. The active operations of tank and rifle formations, which began on September 4, had practically no air support due to bad weather and losses incurred. In a word, Stalin and the General Staff expected much greater success from the actions of our aviation in the fight against Guderian's motorized divisions.

In part, our failures were due to intelligence blunders, including aviation. The commander of the Bryansk Front repeatedly demanded "systematic reconnaissance to reveal the regrouping and concentration of enemy troops", "deep reconnaissance and reconnaissance on the flanks", etc., but the aviators did not reveal the plans of the enemy. How else can one explain the lines from the report of the Commander of the Air Force of the BrF, General F.P. Polynin, where it is stated that under the influence of powerful blows from our pilots, "Guderian's group was forced to turn sharply south to the region of Novgorod-Seversk" ?!

Several crews of Yak-4 aircraft from the 316th rape, as well as the bomber crews involved for this purpose, could not warn the command of the South-Western Front in advance about the impending danger in the form of Kleist’s tank formations “hanging” on the left flank, and determine the main bridgehead for concentrating enemy tanks on the left bank of the Dnieper. Nevertheless, as General M.D. Gretsov, “from August 24, albeit belatedly, the front headquarters systematically set tasks for the air force headquarters to reveal by air reconnaissance what was being done in the north (at the junction with the Bryansk front) and in the south, in the Kremenchug (Perevalochnaya) area. However, the dimensions of the huge danger brewing on both flanks of the South-Western Front were not revealed by air reconnaissance.

Indeed, there were no disturbing reports from our air scouts for a long time. And only on August 28, dangerous movements of large motorized columns of the enemy were discovered. After that, part of the South-Western Front Air Force was switched to fighting the enemy advancing at the junction of the South-Western and Bryansk fronts, in the Konotop and Chernigov directions, although the main actions of our aviation were still aimed at supporting the formations of the central sector of the front. It seems that even in the last summer days, the tone of the reports of the intelligence departments of the headquarters did not correspond to the danger of the situation.

According to the German staff officer K. Uebe ( K. Uebe), the personnel of the Soviet intelligence units, above all, lacked flexibility. Encountered on the route with adverse weather conditions, dense German defenses or other difficulties, the crews either interrupted the mission and returned to the airfield, or carried out their work too hastily.

Based on interrogations of captured Soviet crews, the Germans concluded that visual observations gave the Russians a very approximate picture, and the high-quality processing of photographs turned out to be too challenging task and not carried out professionally. In both cases, the results obtained were not properly processed. The enemy concluded: "Soviet long-range air reconnaissance either discovered the operational movements of German troops too late, or did not find them at all."

What kind of forces did the opponents have? The SWF Air Force was weakened by previous battles, and after the disbandment of the 18th hell and the transfer of the 44th and 64th IADs to the SWF Air Force, there were 208 combat aircraft on September 1 (146 fighters, 51 bombers, 5 attack aircraft and 6 reconnaissance aircraft). According to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, the combat and strength of this grouping did not correspond to the complexity of the tasks ahead. In addition, only 163 serviceable vehicles remained in the six divisions listed above. True, by attracting the main aviation forces of the Kharkov Military District to this direction (units of the 49th, 75th and 76th air divisions, not counting individual regiments under the general command of Colonel P.O. Kuznetsov), as well as a group of TB-3 ships (from it formed the 325th tbap) managed to somewhat strengthen the air forces of the front.

This aviation group, which had good logistical support in the form of huge stocks of aviation equipment in the Kyiv region and to the east, was unable to play a significant role in the first ten days of September. Apparently, the main reason was that the command was not ready for an extremely unfavorable development of events, did not have time to quickly concentrate forces and resources, although bad weather also noticeably interfered with the active operations of our Air Force.

The enemy had up to 250 combat aircraft in the 5th Air Corps at the beginning of September (of which a little more than 100 fighters), having received some replenishment in the materiel the day before. Of the total, less than half of the machines were in good condition. True, at the end of the summer of 1941, various units of Germany's allies were under the command of the 4th Air Fleet or again arrived. However, the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians acted noticeably to the south, and only the Slovaks took an insignificant part in the battles in the Kiev area. As far as is known, two of the three fighter squadrons were used here ( stihaci letka) "brothers-Slavs". Despite the archaic material part (very outdated Czech biplanes Avia B-534), the Germans attracted allies to patrol from the Belaya Tserkov airfield from the end of August, which reflected the degree of tension by the enemy of all available forces.

If, in assessing the serviceable material part, and even more so the combat-ready crews, a certain advantage was on the side of the Soviet Air Force, then the Germans had an absolute advantage over the sector of the 38th Army. Indeed, they entrusted support to the 2nd Panzer Group, which was rapidly advancing south and the 2nd Field Army, which was fighting for the crossings on the Desna, to the 2nd Air Corps of the 2nd Air Fleet and concentrated the efforts of only 5- th air corps, placing fighters at the airfields of Mironovka (near Alexandria) and Signaevka (southwest of Cherkasy), dive bombers in Schastlivaya (southwest of Kremenchug), and bombers in Kirovograd, which made it possible to provide effective support to the crossing troops of the 17th Army and 1st th tank group.

The surviving documents of the headquarters of the Air Force of the South-Western Front and the operational reports of the headquarters of the front allow us to restore some details of the use of Soviet aviation, for example, on the night of September 1 and during the next day. Parts of the 16th garden from the airfield hub Verteevka (29 fighters and 3 attack aircraft) supported the 5th army, destroying enemy troops in front of the 15th sk of this army in the areas of Sulichevka, Roishche, Sednev. Similar tasks were performed by the 62nd bad (12 bombers) from the airfield hub Ivanitsa.

The other 12 bomber crews from the 19th bad supported the troops of the 37th army on its right flank in the area of ​​​​the Okunin bridgehead at night and during the day, conducted reconnaissance along the roads to the Fastov, Belaya Tserkov, Rzhishchev line and monitored enemy crossings in the Kiev-Cherkassy section. 39 fighters of the 36th IAD were also operating here from airfields near Brovar; they bombed and stormed the enemy at Gornostaypol, Ivankov, Dymer. Also the 37th Army, but its left-flank formations in the Rzhishchev area were supported by the 17th Garden (8 fighters and 6 bombers), which simultaneously covered its airfields near Pyryatin and the march of the 41st Rifle Division to Pereyaslav.

In front of the front of the 38th Army (the left wing of the Southwestern Front), the 15th Garden (19 fighters, 14 attack aircraft, 16 bombers) destroyed the enemy from the Chernobay airfield hub, striking in the Kremenchug, Derievka area. On this day, five reconnaissance officers of the 316th rape (from the Golubovka airfield near Priluki) carried out tasks by order of the front headquarters in the Novgorod-Seversky - Glukhov region, fixing the current situation in the left wing of the Bryansk Front and at the junction with the Southwestern Front. (Information about the actions of the 63rd garden was not received.).

In total, the forces of six divisions and one regiment carried out 179 sorties during the day and 25 at night. Analyzing the work done by the aviators, one can come to the conclusion that aviation in these and previous days delivered tactical strikes of small force on a wide front. Despite the fact that almost all air divisions were in the hands of the commander of the air force of the front, General F.A. Astakhov, there were no massive actions in any direction. Most likely, the Germans made fewer sorties that day, but they used their forces more purposefully, concentrating the efforts of the 5th Air Corps southeast of Kremenchug.

In fact, the von Greim grouping was opposed in this direction by only the 15th garden, which had about 60 aircraft different types. In addition, in the first ten days of September, half the time, the connection of General A.A. Demidov either did not operate at all due to bad weather, or was redirected to another direction. Successful attacks by pilots of the 45th and 211th bap under the cover of the 28th iap, which were carried out on September 6, hit the enemy units on the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Unfortunately, the troops did not suffer, which continued to accumulate and concentrate on the other side, waiting for the crossing.

Captain F.M. Fatkulin was one of the most productive pilots of the 44th Iad. The picture was taken in the winter of 1941-42, when the pilot was promoted, awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Lenin

However, certain countermeasures to increase the impact on the enemy in the Kremenchug direction from the air were taken. In response to the appeal of General F.A. Astakhov, the 14th garden returned to the headquarters of the Air Force of the Spacecraft on September 7 to the South-Western Front, which became involved in combat work and now consisted of three air regiments (254th IAP, 43rd BAP, 232nd Cap), numbering 59 aircraft. A few days later, the division also included the 55th bap and the 230th bap, which had newly arrived from the rear. Some other air regiments managed to replenish the materiel.

Probably, the Soviet leadership believed: not everything is lost yet, our aviation, if not stopping with its strikes, then, in any case, will slow down the rapid advance of the enemy’s motorized mechanized groups across Ukraine towards each other east of its capital. During negotiations with the Front Commander on the night of September 11, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov stated, referring to aviation intelligence data, that only small enemy groups had leaked into our rear, which had already been partially destroyed by aircraft. In the morning, Stalin once again called General M.P. Kirponos and at the end of the conversation demanded, "Don't give up Kyiv, don't blow up the bridges." On the same day, on behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, he signed directive N 01856 on the redeployment of the aviation group of I.F. Petrov to the Kharkov region, which he ordered "to continue to serve the South-Western Front, for operations mainly against enemy groups in the Konotop, Putivl, Romny, Sumy regions and to cover the Kharkov region."

But it was too late to fix anything; crushing our defenses, Guderian's tanks rapidly rushed south. On the evening of September 14, units of the 3rd TD of the 2nd Panzer Group, advancing from Konotop, met in the Lokhvitsa area with units of the 16th TD of the 1st Panzer Group, moving from Kremenchug, closing the encirclement. (A report from the Soviet Information Bureau, shortly before the tragic events, indicated that both of these German tank formations had been defeated by the Red Army.) Soon our higher headquarters in a very significant area east of Kiev lost control over the development of the situation. In particular, when the headquarters of the SWF Air Force lost the ability to manage aviation formations, most of its functions were transferred to the headquarters of the SWF Air Force and General F.Ya. Falaleev, who were in Poltava. They tried to organize air operations to support the troops that had taken up new defense lines and to provide all possible assistance to those who found themselves in the enemy's ring. The measures to evacuate to the east by transport aircraft (TB-3 and PS-84) the flight crew (at that time the South-Western Front Air Force had at least 200 "horseless" crews) and technical staff ended in failure - due to poor communications at night, the planes could not land, and during the day, such landings were considered too dangerous.

Approximately 10 days later, the Germans reported the capture of 380 thousand Red Army soldiers and commanders, hundreds of destroyed or captured aircraft and tanks, thousands of guns and mortars. Subsequently, the number of our prisoners in German sources increased to 665 thousand people. For a long time, the true results of the final phase of the Kyiv defensive operation were concealed in Soviet literature. Probably Marshal K.S. Moskalenko was the first among our military leaders in 1975 to call the completed battle a misfortune of a stunning scale. The 5th, 26th, 37th armies, most of the forces of the 21st and 38th armies, as well as a number of units of front-line subordination, along with the command of the South-Western Front, were surrounded.

Above the "Kyiv cauldron". September 1941

The headquarters of the 5th Air Corps noted their efforts in encircling and destroying this group. The report states that from September 12 to September 21, 1422 sorties were carried out in bad weather, 600 tons of bombs were dropped, 23 tanks, 2171 vehicles, 52 trains, 28 locomotives, 1 bunker were destroyed, fire was suppressed by 6 anti-aircraft batteries. In air battles, 65 aircraft with red stars were shot down and 42 burned on the ground. Their losses amounted to 26 aircraft destroyed or seriously damaged and another 5 - slightly injured. 37 aviators were killed, missing or injured. Of these, 8 people crashed over the rear zone of the 26th Army on September 13, when two Ju88s from II / KG54 collided near Lubna in bad weather.

Lesser losses were suffered by units of the 2nd Air Corps, which these days operated on a very wide front from Kalinin and Torzhok in the north to Chernigov and Konotop in the south. Fulfilling the instructions of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe on interaction with the 5th Air Corps, from the airfields of Seshcha, Orsha, sites south of Gomel, the formations of General B. Lerzer (B. Loerzer), primarily SKG210 and KG3 (without Group III), also began to strike on the right flank and rear of the Southwestern Front. The main efforts were still directed to support the 2nd Panzer Group. On some days, the crews performed up to 80 - 100 sorties in this operational direction, flying around the clock; at times they reached Belgorod, Bogodukhov, Kharkov. So, on the night of September 15, in the Tomarovka area (25 km northwest of Belgorod), the crew of Captain Pomozkov’s TB-3 from the 325th tbap was attacked by “a bomber of an unidentified type and set on fire in the air, and then exploded; several pilots, including the commander, were able to use parachutes ”(most likely, the ship was shot down by the“ Messerschmitt ”-“ hunter ”from II / SKG210).

It is impossible not to say a few words about the German anti-aircraft gunners. In particular, the 104th anti-aircraft regiment of Colonel G. Lichtenberger (G. Lichtenberger) from the 1st anti-aircraft corps (2nd air fleet) was in the forefront of Guderian's tankers, repelling both attacks by Soviet attack aircraft and bombers, and hitting Soviet direct fire tanks. From German reports, it followed that on September 16, some units covered the relocation of the headquarters of the tank group from Konotop to Romny, while others, together with the infantrymen, detained the Soviet units breaking through to the east, before the main forces of the 4th and Das Reich of the German tank divisions approached.

While individual Soviet formations tried to provide organized resistance to the advancing enemy, real chaos began in the rear. “Huge masses of military, army and front-line transports, automobile and horseback, hospitals and infirmaries began to rush about,” noted A.V. Isaev. - At first, they poured from south to north and from north to south, and then they all rushed to the Piryatin area, where an impenetrable crowd formed, which was a target for German bombers (not only them, but also other types of aircraft. - Approx. Aut.). According to eyewitnesses, the cars went to Piryatin in five rows. In contrast to the frontier battle, no one rushed into the field or forest during bomber raids. The movement was stopped only in order to throw into the ditch the cars that had lost their ability to move, and those in which the drivers were killed. The mass of cars from horizon to horizon became one of the circles of hell through which many soldiers and officers of the Southwestern Front had to go.

The blame for the defeat lies with a number of top military and political leaders of the country: M.P. Kirponose, A.I. Eremenko, N.S. Khrushchev, B.M. Shaposhnikov, M.A. Purkaev and, of course, on I.V. Stalin. The desire to keep the Kyiv region at all costs, the underestimation of the threat from large enemy groups on the flanks, the insufficiency of retaliatory measures led to a tragic ending, which we will not analyze in detail here.

In our reports of that time, for a long time, events east of Kyiv were passed over in silence. For several days, the Soviet Information Bureau reported on stubborn battles with the enemy on the entire front. On the evening of September 17, the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters allowed the commanders of the Southwestern Front and the 37th Army to "leave KiUR, the city of Kyiv and retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnieper River." A day later, an official report appeared about the battles, "especially fierce near Kiev." The communiqué on the abandonment of the capital of Ukraine followed only on the evening of September 21 and made a depressing impression on many Soviet citizens.

After the enemy reached our rear communications, the regiments and divisions of the Air Force found themselves in a better position than the ground troops. From 16 to 19 September, almost all air divisions were relocated behind the line of the newly created front. The last to leave the Kyiv area was the 36th Iad, which had been fighting over the city on September 20th. One way or another, but most of the flying units managed to keep the main composition, which can be seen in the example of the 92nd IAP. In early September, the commander of the unit, Major S.S. Yachmenev received an order: to leave the Malaya Maiden airfield and relocate to Boryspil (also in the encirclement). The situation became more complicated every day, but the pilots were able to safely fly to a new location. The second relocation to the Kharkov air hub was also completed successfully.

But the technical staff, moving in cars, was cut off by the enemy in the Yagotin area. When it became known about the encirclement of the main grouping of the South-Western Front, mechanics, gunsmiths, specialists from various ground services withdrew to Piryatin. Based on the situation that had arisen, the commander of the Air Force of the front ordered that all the remaining aviators be united into a consolidated regiment, which was headed by the commander of the Air Force of the 5th Army, Colonel N.S. Skripko. The battalion, made up of the technical staff of the 92nd IAP, was given the task: under the command of the division commander-16, General V.I. Shevchenko to break through in the direction of Kharkov.

“In these battles, the personnel showed courage and devotion to the Motherland,” the unit’s documentary history says. “Although they were only armed with rifles, pistols, bottles of combustible mixture, seven tanks were set on fire (one of them remained on the battlefield), six motorcycles, a car in which headquarters documents were seized.”

Not everyone was lucky. In the battles, the military commissar of the regiment, battalion commissar Bogdanov, was killed, who was crushed by a tank caterpillar, six junior commanders were injured. Most of the personnel were able to get through to their own from the environment, including half of the people - with weapons in their hands. There were already pilots at the assembly point near Kharkov, who safely flew from Boryspil at night on U-2 planes to Kharkov, seating four (three in the cockpit and one on the chassis) in each "corn plant". On September 30, the regiment, which retained its personnel core, was sent to Rostov-on-Don for reorganization.

The local population at the German airfield. Woman with two children standing next to Fi156

As follows from the previous story, the aviators of the 15th Garden played a big role in the defense of Kyiv and the Right Bank. But in the most critical days of the battle in the first ten days of September, the pilots practically did not act due to bad weather conditions. Circumstances forced the redeployment inside the encirclement on 9 September. Some self-reconnaissance sorties revealed a serious threat to the new base, but the division's leadership did not take timely action, believing that their tanks were approaching.

“The enemy did not leave time to clarify the situation,” recalled F.F. Archipenko. - German bombers flew in, tanks reached the border of the airfield, their fire was corrected by Hs126. It was a tragedy... At the time of the attack on the airfield, we were on its northern outskirts, which saved us from death. Because of the funnels, the planes could not take off, and the tanks shot them at point-blank range.

It is difficult to estimate the total losses of Soviet aviation. Undoubtedly, they would have turned out to be significantly larger if it were not for the selfless work of the technical teams created earlier in various air divisions. But the latter were far from always able to cope with the tasks of collecting and evacuating various property. In order N 0217 dated October 14, 1941, the commander of the Air Force of the spacecraft, General P.F. Zhigarev noted that on the South-Western Front "due to the lack of vehicles and technical means, when retreating to other airfields, 180 aircraft to be restored, 98 engines, machine guns - 102, special vehicles - 51" were destroyed.

And how many combat aircraft had to be simply abandoned ?! It is even harder to talk about the loss of many aviators, primarily from among the technical staff, who did not have the opportunity to fly to the mainland. So, the 146th IAP lost 80 people, mostly technicians, mechanics, minders, who went missing. For some time it was believed that they shared the fate of Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos and many employees of his headquarters, having died in battle, Major General of Aviation G.I. Thor and Lieutenant General of Aviation F.A. Astakhov. Thor's life really ended tragically: he was captured and after about a year and a half was tortured by the Nazis in a concentration camp. Astakhov was able to withdraw from enemy-controlled territory in early November (see Appendix 1).

According to the memoirs of N.S. Skripko, who met Astakhov in Voronezh, stood in front of him "a bearded man dressed in a tattered striped jacket, torn trousers, broken boots, the soles of which were attached with wire and ropes." Nikolai Semenovich kept silent about one thing: being in the enemy rear, the former commander of the Air Force of the South-Western Front buried his party card, which in those years could have had the most disastrous consequences. However, even here Fyodor Alekseevich was lucky, who was spared the repressions; soon he was appointed to command the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, and subsequently was awarded the military rank of "air marshal".

The divisional commissar I.S. broke out of the enemy ring. Galtsev and Chief of Staff General Ya.S. Shkurin. Colonel N.S. Skripko, just like Falaleev, who later became an air marshal, spoke in detail about his misadventures behind enemy lines, which ended, in the end, safely. The columns of several mixed headquarters, moving mainly at night, crossing numerous rivers, being regularly attacked by small units of enemy bombers, stubbornly strove to meet their troops. People literally fell off their feet from fatigue when they met their cavalrymen in the village of Lyutenki, not far from Kharkov. The former Air Force commander of the 5th Army turned out to be one of about 10,000 people who managed to escape capture.

We will try to estimate the losses of the SWF Air Force in the Kyiv defensive operation. As already noted, by August 10, for various reasons, we missed 1,833 aircraft. Of this number, 1050–1100 combat vehicles were lost before 7 July. According to operational reports, from August 11 to September 26, combat and non-combat losses amounted to about 350 aircraft. In total, from July 7 to September 26, 1941, the recorded loss of the Front's Air Force exceeded 1,100 aircraft. According to the most conservative estimates, another 200 aircraft of various types were abandoned during the retreat. In addition, many DB-3f bombers from the 4th DD air corps were killed in this direction. However, this formation, which was subordinate to the High Command, operated not only on the Southwestern Front, but also on the Southern and Crimean Fronts, and also participated in raids on Romanian facilities. According to the headquarters of the 5th German Air Corps, their fighters shot down 229 DB-3f during the entire Kiev defensive operation, and judging by our sources, this number needs to be halved (in some cases, the facts of aircraft crashes are not confirmed, in others the German pilots were mistaken in determining the type of machines, taking DB-3f, say, for Ar-2). Thus, during the defensive operation, our side lost at least 1400-1450 aircraft.

According to military historian I.V. Timokhovich, who collected statistical data on the actions of the South-Western Front Air Force and long-range bomber aviation of the High Command in this operation (work from July 7 to September 9, 1941 was taken into account), most sorties - 43.1% of the total, were spent on supporting troops. Another 40.2% of all sorties were sent to fight for air supremacy, 6.3% - to conduct reconnaissance, 10.4% - to solve other tasks.

Thus ended the air defense of Kyiv - both a tragic and heroic page in our history. As can be seen from the above material, the aircraft of both sides took an active part in the battle and suffered heavy losses. Soviet soldiers on the ground and in the air were able to detain the enemy at the turn of the Dnieper for several months, which contributed to the disruption of the blitzkrieg - Hitler's plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union.

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    Created on June 22, 1941 (as a result of the transformation of the Kyiv Special Military District) as part of the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies. Subsequently, at different times, the 3rd, 9th, 13th, 21st, 28th, 37th, 38th, 40th, 57th, 61st combined arms armies and 8th I am the air force. In the first days of the war, the troops of the front repulsed the blows of the superior forces of the fascist German army group "South" on the southwestern borders of the country (Border battles of 1941), inflicted heavy damage on the enemy in a tank battle near Dubno, Lutsk, Rovno and delayed his advance, in mid-July, they stopped the enemy near Kiev (Kiev defensive operation of 1941). In the 2nd half of July - early August, in cooperation with the Southern Front, an attempt by the Nazi troops to defeat the Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine was thwarted. In September - November 1941, under the blows of superior enemy forces, they retreated to the line east of Kursk, Kharkov, Izyum. In December, the front, with the forces of the right wing, carried out the Yelets operation of 1941, during which it advanced 80-100 km, liberated the cities of Yelets and Efremov, and in January 1942, together with the troops of the Southern Front, carried out the Barvenkovsko-Lozovsky operation of 1942, during which it troops, advancing 100 km, captured a large bridgehead on the right bank of the Seversky Donets. After the Battle of Kharkov in 1942, the front was abolished by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. His department headed the troops of the newly formed Stalingrad Front. The troops (9th, 28th, 38th and 57th Armies) were transferred to the Southern Front, and the 21st Combined Arms Army and the 8th Air Army became part of the Stalingrad Front.
    The Southwestern Front was re-created by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 22, 1942 as part of the 21st, 63rd (1st Guards, later 3rd Guards) combined arms armies, 5th Tank Army, 17th air army. Subsequently, at different times it included the 5th Shock, 6th, 12th, 46th, 57th, 62nd (8th Guards) combined arms armies, 3rd tank army, 2nd I am airy. In November 1942, the troops of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad and surrounded the 330,000th enemy group (the Battle of Stalingrad 1942-43), and in December 1942, with the assistance of the Voronezh Front, carried out the Middle Don operation of 1942 and finally thwarted the enemy’s plan to release the enemy grouping surrounded near Stalingrad. In January 1943, part of the front took part in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk operation and, in cooperation with the Southern Front, launched an offensive in the Donbas direction. The troops of the front crossed the Seversky Donets on the move, and, advancing 200-280 km, by February 19 they reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk, however, as a result of the enemy’s counteroffensive, by the beginning of March they retreated to the river. Seversky Donets. In August - September 1943, the Southwestern Front, in cooperation with the Southern Front, carried out the Donbass operation of 1943, as a result of which the Donbass was liberated. In October, the troops of the front carried out the Zaporozhye operation of 1943, liberated Zaporozhye, and liquidated the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper. On October 20, the front was renamed the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
  Commanders:
Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich (06/22/1941 - 09/20/1941), Colonel General
(09/30/1941 - 12/18/1941), Marshal of the Soviet Union
Kostenko Fedor Yakovlevich (12/18/1941 - 04/08/1942), lieutenant general
Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich (04/08/1942 - 07/12/1942), Marshal of the Soviet Union
(10/25/1942 - 03/27/1943), lieutenant general, from December 1942 colonel general
Malinovsky Rodion Yakovlevich (03/27/1943 - 10/20/1943), colonel general, from the end of April 1943 army general.
  Members of the Military Council:
Rykov E. P. (June - August 1941), divisional commissar
Burmistenko M. A. (August - September 1941), secr. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine
Khrushchev N. S. (September 1941 - July 1942), secr. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine
Gurov K. A. (January - July 1942), divisional commissar
Zheltov A. S. (October 1942 - October 1943), corps commissar, from December 1942 lieutenant general
  Chiefs of Staff:
Purkaev M. A. (June - July 1941), lieutenant general
Tupikov V. I. (July - September 1941), Major General
Pokrovsky A.P. (September - October 1941), Major General
Bodin P. I. (October 1941-March 1942 and June-July 1942), major general, from November 1941 lieutenant general
Bagramyan I. Kh. (April - June 1942), lieutenant general
Stelmakh G. D. (October - December 1942), Major General
Ivanov S. P. (December 1942 - May 1943), major general, from January 1943 lieutenant general
Korzhenevich F.K. (May - October 1943), major general, from September 1943 lieutenant general
Literature:
Year 1941. Southwestern Front. Memoirs, essays, documents.// - 2nd ed., Lvov, 1975.  |