The main reforms of perestroika in the USSR 1985 1991. Prehistory. Introduction of democratic freedoms
Perestroika was a fatal event for many residents of the country, which radically changed their lives. Therefore, its prerequisites, main causes, events and results should be briefly described.
Prehistory of the era of perestroika
Spring 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at that time he was a little over 50 years old. The country was on the verge of a deep crisis - an arms race, a slowdown in production in all areas, corruption, people's disappointment in the ideas of communism, alcoholism among a large part of the population, power was in the hands of already elderly managers, and so on. The Secretary General understood the need for change and therefore said that « It's time for everyone to change."Hence the name of this period of time.
Mainreasons changes can be called:
1
.Low level of efficiency from the management system in the country;
2
.Introduction of sanctions against the USSR;
3
.The military operation in Afghanistan, which has been going on for about 6 years;
4.
Falling oil prices.
The restructuring lasted 6 years and took place in 3 main stages:
Stage 1 (1985 -1988), when the anti-alcohol program came out, the fight against corruption began, the cadres in the upper management strata were rejuvenated, and glasnost was proclaimed - coverage of the negative. But with all this, there was no clear plan for transformation, moral values were undermined, and national interests were often neglected in favor of Western ones.
Stage 2 was the period from 1988 to 1989. At this time, censorship was finally softened - a step was taken towards the democratization of the population, the formation of prerequisites for the development of entrepreneurial activity began - cooperatives, private labor activity were allowed, freedom of creativity and the development of art began. also in 1989
In the same year, troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and attempts were made to improve relations with the United States, that is, in fact, the USSR ceases to support the socialist regimes of other countries. The negative aspects include the low combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the fall in the authority of the ruling party, the Chernobyl disaster, the spread of pornography, drug addiction, that is, the decline in the morals of young people and interethnic conflicts (clashes in Kazakhstan in 1986 and so on).
At stage 3 (June 1989 - September 1991) all processes in the country have ceased to be manageable. The CPSU party loses its power and a struggle among the factions begins. During this period of time, a huge number of opposition movements are born and develop. A parade of sovereignties is taking place - countries began to secede from the Soviet Union. Also was abolished 1977 constitution years and the financial situation of the population has deteriorated markedly. The outflow of scientists, prominent figures abroad began.
Thus, The main goals of the restructuring were:
1
.Democratization of the USSR, the introduction of publicity;
2
.Normalization of relations with other countries;
3
.Rejuvenation of personnel in the management system;
4
.Increasing the efficiency of the economy through the introduction of some market elements.
It is difficult to say what has been achieved from this. The USSR broke up into a number of independent and sovereign states, the ruling party was liquidated, there was a catastrophic drop in the standard of living of the population and radical economic and political reforms were carried out to stabilize the state of the country in the future. A positive result can only be called an attempt to democratize society and introduce market instruments, which in the future, after the collapse of the USSR, began to be applied everywhere.
In March 1985, M.S. became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - N.I. Ryzhkov. The transformation of Soviet society began, which was to be carried out within the framework of the socialist system.
April 1985 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was proclaimed a course towards accelerating the socio-economic development of the country (the policy of "acceleration"). Its levers were to be 1) the technological re-equipment of production and 2) an increase in labor productivity. It was supposed to increase productivity at the expense of labor enthusiasm (socialist competitions were revived), the eradication of alcoholism ( anti-alcohol campaign - May 1985) and combating unearned income.
The "acceleration" led to some revival of the economy, but by 1987, a general reduction in production in agriculture began, and then in industry. The situation was complicated by the huge capital investments needed to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 1986) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
The country's leadership was forced to make more radical changes. From the summer of 1987 perestroika proper began. The program of economic reforms was developed by L. Abalkin, T. Zaslavskaya, P. Bunich. The NEP became a model for perestroika.
The main content of the restructuring:
In the economic sphere:
1. There is a transfer of state enterprises to self-support and self-sufficiency.
2. Since the defense enterprises were not able to operate in the new conditions, a conversion - the transfer of production to a peaceful track (demilitarization of the economy).
3. In the countryside, the equality of five forms of management was recognized: state farms, collective farms, agro-combines, rental collectives and farms.
4.To control product quality has been state acceptance was introduced.
5. The directive state plan was replaced by a state order.
In the political sphere:
1.Intra-party democracy is expanding. Internal party opposition emerges associated primarily with the failures of economic reforms. At the October (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee B.N. Yeltsin.
2.At the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, a decision was made to ban uncontested elections.
3. The state apparatus is being substantially restructured. In accordance with the decisions of the XIX Conference (June 1988), a the new supreme body of legislative power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the corresponding Republican conventions. The permanent Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the republics were formed from among the people's deputies. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. became the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Gorbachev (March 1989), Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR - B.N. Yeltsin (May 1990).
In March 1990, the post of president was introduced in the USSR. M.S. became the first president of the USSR. Gorbachev.
4. Since 1986, a policy of "glasnost" and "pluralism" has been pursued”, i.e. in the USSR, a kind of freedom of speech is artificially created, which implies the possibility of free discussion of a range of issues strictly defined by the party.
5. The country is starting to take shape multi-party system.
In the spiritual realm:
1. The state weakens ideological control over the spiritual sphere of society. Free previously banned literary works are published, known to readers only by "samizdat" - "The Gulag Archipelago" by A. Solzhenitsyn, "Children of the Arbat" by B. Rybakov, etc.
2. Within the framework of "glasnost" and "pluralism", "round tables" are held on certain issues of the history of the USSR. Criticism of Stalin's "personality cult" begins, the attitude to the Civil War is being revised, etc.
3. Cultural ties with the West are expanding.
By 1990, the idea of perestroika had practically exhausted itself.. Failed to stop the decline in production. Attempts to develop a private initiative - the movement of farmers and cooperators - turned into the heyday of the "black market" and the deepening of the deficit. "Glasnost" and "pluralism" - the main slogans of perestroika - to the fall of the authority of the CPSU, the development of nationalist movements. Nevertheless, since the spring of 1990 the Gorbachev administration has been moving on to the next stage of political and economic reforms. G . Yavlinsky and S. Shatalin prepared the program "5oo days", providing for relatively radical economic transformation with a view to a gradual transition to the market. This program was rejected by Gorbachev under the influence of the conservative wing of the CPSU.
In June 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a resolution on a gradual transition to a regulated market economy. Provision was made for gradual demonopolization, decentralization and denationalization of property, the establishment of joint-stock companies and banks, and the development of private entrepreneurship. However, these measures could no longer save the socialist system and the USSR.
Since the mid-1980s, the disintegration of the state has actually been planned. Powerful nationalist movements emerge. In 1986, there were pogroms of the Russian population in Kazakhstan. Interethnic conflicts arose in Fergana (1989), in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan (1990). Since 1988, an armed Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict began in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1988-1989 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova get out of control of the center. In 1990 they officially declare their independence.
June 12, 1990 The First Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR adopts the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation.
The President of the USSR enters into direct negotiations with the leadership of the republics on the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. To give legitimacy to this process in March 1991, an all-Union referendum was held on the issue of preserving the USSR. The majority of the population spoke in favor of preserving the USSR, but on new terms. In April 1991, Gorbachev began negotiations with the leadership of 9 republics in Novo-Ogaryovo ("Novoogarevsky process").
By August 1991, they managed to prepare a compromise draft of the Union Treaty, according to which the republics received much greater independence. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 22.
It was the planned signing of the Union Treaty that provoked speech by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (August 19–August 21, 1991), which tried to preserve the USSR in its old form. The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the Country (GKChP) included the vice-president of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov.
The GKChP issued an arrest order B.N. Yeltsin, elected on June 12, 1991 President of the RSFSR. Martial law was introduced. However, the majority of the population and military personnel refused to support the GKChP. This sealed his defeat. On August 22, the members were arrested, but the signing of the treaty never took place.
As a result of the August coup, M.S.'s authority was finally undermined. Gorbachev. The real power in the country passed to the leaders of the republics. At the end of August, the activities of the CPSU were suspended.
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk, S.S. Shushkevich) announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - the “Belovezhskaya Accords”. On December 21, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the CIS.
Conversation with Doctor of Economics Hegumen Philip (Simonov)
April 23, 1985 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev announced plans for broad reforms aimed at the comprehensive renewal of society, the cornerstone of which was called "acceleration of the country's socio-economic development."
And exactly 30 years ago, on October 15, 1985, the next Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered and approved the draft of the main directions of the economic and social development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period up to 2000. Thus was given an official start to the new economic course, known as "perestroika".
The consequences of numerous "reforms" and "transformations", begun in those years and continued in subsequent years, affect to this day. About what kind of economy they “rebuilt”, what they wanted to come to and why it turned out “as always”, what transformations our country really needed, what the “experience” of those years can teach and what each of us Orthodox should do, we talk with the abbot Philip (Simonov), Doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation, Head of the Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.
Father Philip, they talk about two types of economic systems: command-administrative and market. What is their fundamental difference? What are the pros and cons?
First, let's say a few words about a certain commonality that unites these two concepts. This commonality lies in the fundamental economic illiteracy of those who introduced these terms for political reasons, then picked up and used them in the framework of the political struggle, and those who conveyed these concepts - perfect historical and political economic rubbish - to our time.
Any sane person, even without a higher economic education, not to mention academic degrees and titles, when talking about something, usually finds out its main characteristics. That is, trying to answer the question "what is it?", finds out, which it is what are its characteristics that make it exactly that, and not something else.
Therefore, speaking of the "market economy", one immediately wants to ask: which is it a market economy?
After all, the market existed and mediated exchange both in slave-owning antiquity, and in the stadially incomprehensible East, and in feudal Europe, and in early capitalism, and at its later stages.
Public figures who abandoned political economy as a science because of its "dark Soviet past" and threw the term "market economy" into society as the main idea of a bright future, acted very politically and economically themselves: they used this meaningless term to fight for power, but no one was told what kind of "market economy" they were talking about.
Everyone thought that it was socially oriented, with the preservation of the achievements that society already had (free education and health care, full employment, an 8-hour working day with a 41-hour working week, etc.), and with the acquisition of those preferences, which the market gives (private business initiative, growth in management efficiency, quality improvement based on competition, etc.).
But this is exactly what, as it turned out, no one guaranteed. Because what happened was what happened: the complete violation of the rights of workers, rampant "gangster capitalism" in the spirit of the era of primitive capital accumulation based on the unproven dogma "the market will solve everything", the emergence of a system of almost feudal "feeding" and other delights that fit perfectly into a "market economy" - provided that no one gave an exact definition of this phenomenon. What has grown has grown.
Now about the "command system". Don't you feel the economic inferiority of the term itself? It's not the language of economics, it's pure politics! By the way, no one has given a scientific definition of this term either - because it is simply impossible from the point of view of theory.
Economics does not talk about a “market” and “command” economy, but about systems of directive and indicative planning
In science, however, there was a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of systems of directive (as in the USSR) and indicative planning - the latter was the basis for the sectoral development of the countries of post-war Europe. On the basis of indicative planning, Gaullist France, for example, created its own competitive aerospace industry. Is this not an indicator of the effectiveness of the method? By the way, the intersectoral balance model, on which the Soviet model of planning and forecasting was based, was developed by the American economist of Russian origin, Nobel laureate Vasily Leontiev. It’s now that we realized it, we adopted the unreadable law “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”, only the system of this strategic forecasting over 25 years has been so destroyed that there is not only no one to calculate this intersectoral balance, but there is no one to teach how to calculate it.
At the same time, the main problem was the limits of application of one or another model, which, in essence, determines the effectiveness of both. In short: is it possible to plan production to the maximum range, or are there still some boundaries beyond which the inefficient use of the resources of the economy begins?
The Western world limited itself to indicative planning, within the framework of which it was planned not to produce (in natural units), but the resources necessary for the development of this production - those sectors that are recognized as priorities for the economy at the moment. At the same time, a combination of public and private financing was envisaged: the state made initial investments in priority sectors for itself, setting a certain development vector, and private capital, having this benchmark, joined the investment process, increasing its efficiency.
The domestic economy, even in the conditions of that strange “market”, the transition to which began under Gorbachev, could not abandon the dogmas of directive planning “from above” (at the same time, enterprises did not participate in the process of preparing the plan, but received ready-made planning targets from the center), despite even to the fact that it began to very clearly demonstrate its shortcomings against the backdrop of an increase in the well-being of the population and a corresponding increase in demand: a “deficit economy” arose, under the sign of which all the Gorbachev years passed. Let us leave aside the question of how much this deficit was the result of objective factors and how much it was man-made, consciously organized. It's not about that. The question is that the government of that time failed to ensure the effective implementation of that speculative intersectoral balance that the State Planning Committee worked on in its last years; failed to combine their own ideas about the standard of living of the population of the country with the ideas of this same population; failed to separate the economy from the ideology (as China did, for example).
The idea that “all of us, comrades, apparently need to rebuild” was first expressed by Gorbachev in May 1985. But even earlier, in 1983, in the leading party magazine Kommunist, the then Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yu.V. Andropov set the task of accelerated "progress of the productive forces", which was subsequently exploited by Gorbachev under the amorphous slogan of "acceleration".
In essence, it came down to three streams of situational reform measures that were little linked to each other: « publicity» (which was reduced to chewing through the media of the negative moments of Soviet history and life, without developing any significant concept of the further development of society as a result) - « cooperation» (to which we must add the epic of creating joint ventures with foreign capital, which ended, in general, ingloriously and did not make a significant contribution to economic growth; apologists for "perestroika" say that it was through cooperation and joint ventures that "elements were introduced into the socialist economy" market," - but these elements existed before them, but what cooperation really introduced into the economy was elements of the wild market, "gray" schemes, raiding, consumer deception - all that flourished later, in 1990- years) - « new thinking» (emphasis - M.S. Gorbachev) in foreign policy (in fact, it meant the rejection of the ideological imperative in diplomacy and a certain "thaw" in relations with the West).
The reforms imposed by the IMF were designed for the economies of developing countries. They were not applicable to the developed economy of Russia
Ultimately, for the Soviet Union, all this resulted in an uncontrolled increase in borrowing on the world loan capital market, where at that time they were very willing to give "credits under Gorbachev", entering into an external debt crisis and receiving an IMF stabilization program (such a program since the 80s The twentieth century was carried out in all countries that fell into the "debt spiral"), the condition for financing under which were those "reforms" that destroyed the country's economy. And not only due to some malicious intent (although 1991 in the West was quite reasonably perceived as a brilliant victory in the Cold War, with which, however, they could not figure out what to do for a long time), but also because, according to the usual Western laziness, this program, the foundations of which were developed for developing countries, was not designed for a developed economy, and neither those who set the tasks nor those who thoughtlessly carried them out understood this.
The simplest example: "agrarian reform", according to the stabilization program, implies the elimination of large inefficient land ownership (such as pre-revolutionary landowners), the formation of small peasant (farm) farms on the basis of actually confiscated land and then their cooperation with the prospect of creating an agro-industrial complex capable of meeting the country's needs for food. This model is valid, for example, for the Upper Volta.
But in the former USSR did not have large landownership of the landowner type. But were cooperation and agro-industrial complex. Nobody noticed this.
As a result, large landed cooperative property was disbanded, and in its place was formed exactly what can be compared with inefficient landlord latifundial land ownership, which does not give a marketable product. Former arable fields and fodder territories - those that are not built up with cottages - have been overgrown with undergrowth for 25 years, farmers have failed, and now we have to restore agriculture and cooperation - this word, by the way, was banned throughout the 1990s, even articles have not been published on this topic. And now our Ministry of Agriculture is planning to start a reform already like the Upper Volta, in order to mix the consequences of the stupidity that, under the dictation of the IMF, was committed in the 1990s: to return unused agricultural land to the state land fund and find an effective way to ensure the restoration of their productive potential.
The people have always called it: "A bad head does not give rest to the legs."
On the whole, for the USSR, “perestroika” meant in fact a complete rejection of the political, economic and ideological model that the CPSU adhered to in the post-war period, in Lenin’s language (which was sharp on labels): opportunism and revisionism. With quite predictable consequences: "cooperation" (or rather, those capitals that arose on its basis and, naturally, showed their political ambitions) removed Gorbachev from the domestic political arena, and "glasnost" finally buried him as a politician, along with the USSR destroyed by his hands.
What were the results of "perestroika"? Were the set goals achieved? Is it fair to say that this led to the collapse of the USSR?
“Perestroika” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator
Actually, I already answered this question. "" could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator, who tried to sit on all chairs at once: improve socialism and directive planning to preserve, and introduce the capitalist market into this economic system, and did not while implementing the ideas of self-financing, to be both the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the President - and all in one bottle. Actually, there were no scientifically based goals - there were some impulsive good wishes “between Lafite and Cliquot”, to which the Academy of Sciences frantically tried to give a scientific appearance.
And when there is no real - not situational, but scientifically substantiated - development goal, from which the tools to achieve it follow, there can be no positive result by definition.
What changes did the Soviet Union really need? And what does the experience of the last decade of the existence of the Soviet Union teach us in terms of the organization of economic life?
I must say that the "Kremlin elders" of the last Soviet period did one big stupidity: they considered the whole people stupid.
Let me explain. I started traveling abroad on official business in the late 1980s. Yes, everything was good and beautiful there. In general, decently than we have under Gorbachev. But there, in prosperous Vienna, for the first time I saw homeless people with carriages, in which all their meager belongings were placed. People who, in no less prosperous London, spent the winter sleeping under bridges in cardboard boxes, for whom Vladyka Anthony (Bloom) urged them to collect at least something at Christmas that would make them feel the joy of the birth of Christ. People who rummaged through garbage cans in search of food.
If the "elders" did not consider the Soviet people headless idiots, they would allow them to freely travel abroad - not on tour packages accompanied by the KGB, but freely, simply by taking a visa. We are not idiots, we, besides jeans and street cafes, would see something else that would make us understand: tourism should not be confused with emigration. We knew full well that we were never in danger of becoming homeless or unemployed. We understood that we do not have to pay for education, and our education is such that our reports at international conferences were listened to with attention. We understood that we did not need to pay at the clinic or hospital, that we had already paid for it in the form of income tax.
And now we understand that you have to pay for everything - but where to get it? Right now, in a crisis, according to polls, people no longer have enough money for food, the share of expenses for these purposes in total expenses is growing, someone is already getting into savings, and the quality of food is deteriorating. And it is impossible to compete for wages, because, unlike in Europe, we do not have normal trade unions that would respond to the needs of the working people, and would not satisfy their own needs.
In a healthy society, the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds
Here we are talking about church charity, we are working to help the poor and the homeless - but this help in itself is an indicator of the unhealthy of society, because in a healthy society there should not be socially unprotected strata, and the task of ensuring social protection (including ensuring full employment of the population) the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds received from the population as taxes. And if the Church, which does not have a tax source of income, is forced to take on the function of social protection, performing it at the expense of voluntary donations (that is, in fact, re-taxation of the population: after all, taxes have already been paid to the state, and we have the right to expect the state to fulfill its social functions, as soon as it exists in this connection), this means that the state does not fulfill its constitutional functions, and society does not control it.
As for the experience of the “decline and fall of the USSR”. Then there was a lot of talk about the Chinese model - but, unfortunately, no one really bothered to either study this model in detail or justify the possibility of using its elements in the conditions of the Soviet economy: some looked with lust at the West, others - forward "back to Lenin ”, the economy, meanwhile, was suffocating from an inefficient management model, and where, under the guise of a “socialist market”, the management model changed (initially at the micro level, then, with the folding of organized groups, already at a higher level), the processes of primitive capital accumulation began with cruelty late medieval and early modern times.
No real model was proposed based on its own economic complex, taking into account its features: the Central Committee of the CPSU, which actually ruled the country, rewrote old dogmas "from congress to congress", and the scientific world tried - through meditation - to discover "new content" in them. Some “unknown forces” also intervened: I remember well how in one of the working groups on Staraya Square they prepared a draft decree on foreign economic activity, got excited and argued, finally did it by night and went home - and the next morning they read in the newspaper “ True” text, where all our thoughts were spelled out “exactly the opposite”… By whom? And for what?
There can be only one conclusion: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it.
Thus, there can be only one conclusion from this negative experience: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it, and not today or tomorrow (“and after us even a flood”; “yes, we drink pits, morning we will die" - 1 Corinthians 15:32), but for years to come. If we talk about the economy, there should be a development model consciously chosen as a goal with known characteristics, determined scientifically, and not “from the wind of our own head” (too often we are guided not by economic reality, but by our own ideas about this reality); directions, methods and tools for achieving the set goal should be determined, ensuring, among other things, the stability of the national economy to internal and external stresses that no one has canceled, no matter how much we would like to; finally, there must be the right people who would not tell pleasant tales made up of their own ideas about reality, but would work effectively for this goal, and not against it.
Otherwise, we will constantly encounter unpleasant surprises for ourselves: it suddenly turns out that we do not have self-sufficiency in food, then we suddenly realize that some industry has collapsed, and as a result, rockets are falling, then it turns out that the level of education has dropped to zero (by the way, according to polls, almost half of the respondents, in connection with the abolition of school astronomy, are now sure that the sun revolves around the earth), otherwise an insight will suddenly happen, from which it will become clear that the world community was just flirting with us like a cat with a mouse: they showed PR candy wrappers (like the notorious myth about the "G-8", which in practice never ceased to be the "G-7"), but in fact they pursued the old policy of ousting a competitor from the market. And the number of such discoveries can multiply to infinity.
What economy should be in Russia? What should we strive for? What potential for the development of the economy, if I may say so, is inherent in Orthodoxy, its ethics?
Effective, that is, ensuring the growth of the produced national income and its distribution and redistribution to achieve development goals - and not individual sectors, industries or industries, but the entire economic complex of the country.
Based on scientific and technological progress, without which we will be doomed to trail behind world development.
Socially oriented, as it should be, the economy of the “welfare state”, which is spelled out in our Constitution, that is, satisfying the basic legitimate needs of the population - not some part of it, but all citizens, since we are so fond of talking about “civil society”.
Diversified, that is, tuned to meet a wide range of national needs and various areas of national security.
Integrated into the world economy not as a raw material appendage, but as an equal partner in the emerging global division of labor.
Life will show what place Orthodoxy can take in this system. The economy is a non-confessional phenomenon. Religious ethics (and this is the only and most important thing that faith can offer to participants in the economic process) begins to work when organizational processes begin to operate: in the organization of the production process and everything connected with it (rest time, disability, pensions, etc. .), as well as in the organization of distribution, exchange and consumption of the produced product (in a general sense). How fair will these organizational processes be, how focused on the apostle indicated uniformity(see 2 Cor. 8, 14), how prepared a person will be for this justice in the process of education and upbringing - all this is not only not indifferent to religious ethics and its bearers, but is also an open field for influence.
And then everything will depend on how much we ourselves, the bearers of religious ethics, are not indifferent to all these problems, how much we ourselves are rooted in Christ's teaching, how much it is not external and temporary for us (that is, existing only when we enter from the world into church walls in order to, as they say now, “satisfy one’s religious needs”), but internally, experienced and assimilated, which has become not even a part of life, but life itself, insofar as we ourselves are “not strangers and not aliens, but fellow citizens saints and their own to God” (Eph. 2:19).
Those who are God's own cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality.
See how this “own” sounds in Greek: οἰκεῖοι (ikii). Those who inhabit God's οἶκος (ikos), who - their God, οἰκεῖοι, domestici, His household, those cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality. They are like members Houses, by virtue of their rights and obligations, by all means participate, in their measure, in its creation and organization - economy.
And what other participation does the Master of the house expect from us, if not evidence, do not preach the Gospel of His beloved Son - "not the letter, but the spirit, because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life" (2 Cor. 3: 6), - "even to the ends of the earth" (Acts 1: 8).
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By the mid-1980s, the USSR found itself in a deep economic, political and social crisis.
Labor productivity in the USSR in 1986 was one third of the US, in agriculture - less than 15% of the US level. In terms of the volume of goods and services consumed per capita, the USSR occupied 50-60th place in the world.
According to official figures, in 1989, 41 million people in the USSR had an income below the subsistence level - 78 rubles. In the USA, where the poverty threshold is an annual income of $ 11,612 for a family of 4, in 1987 there were 32.5 million people (A joke was widely circulated at that time - there is nothing in the USSR, but everything is cheap, everything is in the West, but very expensive). In terms of infant mortality, the USSR was in 50th place in the world, after Mauritius and Barbados, in terms of average life expectancy - in 32nd place.
In March 1985, after the death of K. Chernenko, the youngest member of the Politburo M.S. was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Gorbachev. In April 1985, under his leadership, the next Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, from which the period of major political, economic, ideological and social upheavals in the largest country in the world begins. This period lasted 7 years and went down in history as "Perestroika". There are four distinct periods in the history of perestroika.
- Stage 1 - March 1985-January 1987. This stage was held under the slogans - "acceleration" and "more socialism."
- Stage 2 - 1987-1988 The slogans "more democracy" and "glasnost" became the leitmotif of this stage.
- Stage 3 - 1989-1990. The period of "confusion and vacillation". It is characterized by a split in the former camp of perestroika, a transition to an open political, national confrontation.
- Stage 4 - 1990-1991 This stage was marked by the collapse of the world socialist system, the political bankruptcy of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR. At the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1985, a course was proclaimed to "accelerate the socio-economic development" of the USSR on the basis of the advanced development of mechanical engineering.
In 1986, an innovation appeared in economic life - state acceptance (state acceptance). It was assumed that the acceptance of finished products of enterprises would be carried out by a state commission independent of enterprises. The results were very deplorable (at the end of 1987, 15-18% of industrial output did not pass state acceptance).
In the social sphere, several campaigns were launched: the total computerization of schools, the fight against drunkenness and alcoholism, and unearned income.
Particularly wide resonance was caused by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism" issued in 1985. The result of its implementation was a sharp increase in the price of vodka and a reduction in the time for the sale of alcoholic beverages in stores. The results were not long in coming, huge queues appeared in stores for alcohol, people switched to moonshine (in 1987, 1.4 million tons of sugar or the annual budget for its consumption by Ukraine with 50 million people was spent on making moonshine). Drunkenness has gone off the streets and into the family.
In the political field, the 27th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1986, limited itself to calls for the improvement of socialist democracy. The failure of all undertakings was revealed already at the beginning of 1987.
In January 1987, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, which marked the beginning of significant changes in the economic and political life of the USSR, which can rightfully be called reforms.
The development of economic reforms was determined by two trends: the expansion of the independence of state enterprises and the expansion of the scope of the private sector of the economy. In 1986, the Law on Individual Labor Activity was adopted, which legalized private entrepreneurial activity in 30 types of production of goods and services, mainly in the field of handicrafts and consumer services. In the USSR, for the first time in many decades, officially permitted "private traders" appeared.
In 1987, the Law on the State Enterprise was adopted, according to which state enterprises were transferred to self-financing, self-sufficiency and self-financing, could independently conclude supply contracts with partners, and some large enterprises were allowed to enter the foreign market.
In 1988, the Law "On Cooperation in the USSR" was adopted. Finally, in 1989, land leases were allowed for a period of 50 years.
All these concessions to "capitalism" were carried out according to the principle - one step forward, two steps back. Private traders and cooperators were heavily taxed (65%); by 1991, no more than 5% of the able-bodied population was employed in the cooperative sector; in the countryside, 2% of the land and 3% of livestock were in the hands of tenants.
In the political field, in parallel, M. Gorbachev introduced a new concept into the political lexicon - glasnost, by which sweetness understood "healthy" criticism of existing shortcomings, greater awareness of the population and some weakening of censorship. The main permitted object of criticism was "Stalinism", the main ideal was "a return to the Leninist norms of party and state life." As part of this campaign, party leaders N. Bukharin, A. Rykov, G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev were rehabilitated.
Previously banned works by Grossman, Platonov, Rybakov, Dudintsev, Pristavkin, Granin, Mandelstam, Galich, Brodsky, Solzhenitsyn, Nekrasov, Orwell began to be published. Koestler. The programs “The Twelfth Floor”, “Look”, “The Fifth Wheel”, “Before and After Midnight” appeared on television.
In 1987, the first political changes began, at first timid and half-hearted. The January Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU sanctioned such innovations in the social and political life of the country as alternative elections for heads of enterprises and secret voting in the election of secretaries of party committees.
The 19th All-Union Party Conference (summer 1988) initiated political reforms proper. At the conference, M. Gorbachev proposed to extend alternative elections to the party apparatus, to combine the post of first secretary of the party committee with the post of chairman of the Council of People's Deputies. And, most importantly, at the conference, despite the resistance of part of the party apparatus, the idea of creating a new, two-level system of the highest representative power of the USSR and creating the post of President of the USSR was approved. This reform led to the establishment of a new system of representative power and executive power:
Representative power -> Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Executive power -> President of the USSR
At the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, held in 1990, M. Gorbachev was elected the first and last President of the USSR.
In 1988-1989, with the adoption of a whole package of laws: on the press, on public organizations, on state security in the country, etc. the political climate in the country was significantly liberalized, which, in turn, sharply intensified political life in general and the activities of various kinds of "informal" organizations, in particular. Since 1989, the concepts - the market, political pluralism, the rule of law, civil society, new thinking in foreign policy have been firmly established in the political lexicon.
The elections of deputies to the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in 1989, the work of 1-3 congresses clearly showed that the country entered a period of open confrontation between various political forces, which took place against the backdrop of a deepening economic crisis. Social tension was aggravated by systematic shortages of certain goods: in the summer of 1989 - sugar, detergents, in the autumn of 1989 - the tea crisis, in the summer of 1990 - the tobacco crisis.
In the spring of 1990, the government of N. Ryzhkov presented to the public a program for the transition to a market, which provided for an increase in prices for a number of goods. The people reacted to it by sweeping away everything that still remained on the shelves.
In contrast to the program of the Council of Ministers, in the summer of 1990, the 500 Days plan was published, developed under the leadership of S. Shatalin - G. Yavlinsky. The plan provided for during this period to create conditions for the transition to a market economy.
Finally, in the fall of 1990, M. Gorbachev proposed to the Supreme Council his own compromise program for the transition to a market economy, which also did not work. The crisis was growing. M. Gorbachev's authority in the country began to decline rapidly.
The years 1988-1991 were also marked by fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. As a result of M. Gorbachev's three meetings with US President R. Reagan, agreements were reached on the destruction of medium and short-range missiles, and in 1988 the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.
In September 1991, an agreement was reached to stop the supply of Soviet and American weapons to Afghanistan. In the same year, the USSR took the side of the United States in condemning the aggression of Iraq (its longtime ally) against Kuwait, established diplomatic relations with Israel and South Africa.
At the end of 1989, within almost one month, the communist parties lost power (mostly peacefully) in the countries of Eastern Europe. Impressive proof of the USSR's rejection of its former foreign policy was the refusal of the Soviet leadership to suppress these revolutions by force. Thanks to the support of the USSR, the unification of Germany and the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which became a symbol of totalitarian socialism, became possible.
After Chernenko's death in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. By that time, the USSR was already on the verge of a deep crisis, both in the economy and in the social sphere. The efficiency of social production was steadily declining, and the arms race was a heavy burden on the country's economy. In fact, all spheres of society needed to be updated. The difficult situation of the USSR was the reason for perestroika, as well as changes in the country's foreign policy. Modern historians distinguish the following stages of perestroika:
- 1985 - 1986
- 1987 - 1988
- 1989 - 1991
During the beginning of perestroika from 1985 to 1986. there were no significant changes in the organization of government of the country. In the regions, power, at least formally, belonged to the Soviets, and at the highest level, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But, during this period, statements about publicity and the fight against bureaucracy were already heard. Gradually, the process of rethinking international relations began. The tension in relations between the USSR and the USA has significantly decreased.
Large-scale changes began somewhat later - from the end of 1987. This period is characterized by unprecedented freedom of creativity, the development of art. Authorial journalistic programs are broadcast on television, magazines publish materials promoting the ideas of reforms. At the same time, the political struggle is clearly intensifying. Serious transformations in the sphere of state power begin. So, in December 1988, at the 11th extraordinary session of the Supreme Council, the law “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution” was adopted. The law made changes to the electoral system by introducing the principle of alternativeness.
However, the most turbulent was the third period of perestroika in the USSR. In 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. In fact, the USSR ceases to support socialist regimes on the territory of other states. The camp of the socialist countries is collapsing. The most important, significant, event of that period is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany.
The party is gradually losing real power and its unity. A fierce battle between the factions begins. Not only the situation in the USSR, but also the very foundations of the ideology of Marxism, as well as the October Revolution of 1917, are criticized. Many opposition parties and movements are being formed.
Against the backdrop of a tough political struggle during this period of Gorbachev's perestroika, a split begins in the sphere of the intelligentsia, among artists. If some of them were critical of the processes taking place in the country, then the other part provides comprehensive support to Gorbachev. Against the backdrop of political and social freedom unprecedented at that time, the volume of financing, both art and science, education, and many industries is significantly reduced. Talented scientists in such conditions leave to work abroad, or turn into businessmen. Many research institutes and design bureaus cease to exist. The development of knowledge-intensive industries slows down, and later stops altogether. Perhaps the most striking example of this can be the Energiya-Buran project, within the framework of which a unique reusable space shuttle Buran was created, which made a single flight.
The material situation of the majority of citizens is gradually deteriorating. Also, there is an aggravation of interethnic relations. Many cultural and political figures are beginning to say that perestroika has become obsolete.
The consequences of perestroika are extremely ambiguous and multifaceted. Undoubtedly, the receipt by society of social and political freedoms, publicity and the reform of the planned distribution economy are positive aspects. However, the processes that took place during the period of perestroika in the USSR in 1985-1991 led to the collapse of the USSR and the aggravation of interethnic conflicts that had been smoldering for a long time. The weakening of power, both in the center and in the regions, a sharp decline in the standard of living of the population, undermining the scientific base, and so on. Undoubtedly, the results of perestroika and its significance will be rethought by future generations more than once.
