Tactics and strategy of the European armies of the 18th century. Linear Tactics Linear Naval Tactics

Linear tactics on land were developed in connection with the equipping of armies with firearms and the increasing role of fire in combat. The troops for combat were located in a line consisting of several ranks (their number was determined depending on the rate of fire of the weapon), which made it possible to simultaneously fire from the largest number of guns. The tactics of the troops was reduced mainly to a frontal clash. The outcome of the battle was largely decided by the power of infantry fire.

Linear tactics in Western Europe originated in the late 16th and early 17th centuries in the Dutch infantry, where square columns were replaced by linear formations. It was introduced by the Dutch in the person of Moritz of Orange and his cousins ​​William Ludwig of Nassau-Dillenburg and John of Nassau-Siegen. Raising discipline in the army, as well as improving the training of officers, to which Moritz paid special attention, allowed him to build his army in 10, and later in 6 ranks. In the Russian troops, elements of linear tactics were first used in the battle of Dobrynich (1605). Full design linear tactics received in the Swedish army of Gustav II Adolf in the period Thirty Years' War 1618-1648, and then was adopted in all European armies. This was facilitated by an increase in the rate of fire of the musket and the improvement of artillery. The superiority of the linear order of battle over the old battle order of columns was finally determined in the battles of Breitenfeld (1631) and Lützen (1632), but at the same time negative sides linear battle formation: the impossibility of concentrating superior forces in the decisive sector of the battle, the ability to act only on open flat terrain, the weakness of the flanks and the difficulty of maneuvering the infantry, which made the cavalry decisive for the outcome of the battle. Mercenary soldiers were kept in close lines with the help of cane discipline, and when the formation was broken, they fled from the battlefield. Linear tactics received classical forms in the 18th century, especially in the Prussian army of Frederick William I, and then Frederick II, who brought the combat rate of fire of each line to 4.5 - 5 volleys per minute with the most severe drill (this became possible after innovations were made to the design guns - such as, for example, a one-sided ramrod). To eliminate the shortcomings of linear tactics, Frederick II introduced an oblique battle order (the battalions advanced in a ledge), which consisted of 3 lines of battalions with 3 ranks each. The cavalry was built in 3 lines. Artillery was placed in the intervals between battalions, light guns were introduced moving behind the cavalry, on the flanks and in front of the battle formation. A caret was used. Despite the innovations introduced, the linear tactics of the troops of Frederick II continued to be formulaic and inflexible.

A form of infantry specifically designed to use linear tactics was called line infantry. For about two centuries, line infantry constituted the bulk of the infantry of the countries of Europe.

Linear tactics were also used by some types of cavalry. At one time, heavily armed cavalry (reiters, horse grenadiers and cuirassiers) used linear tactics on horseback (“Reiter system”). Later, dragoons and lancers began to use linear tactics, being on foot in defense. Accordingly, the name "linear cavalry" moved from heavy cavalry to dragoons and lancers. Hussars in the 15th-17th centuries wore armor and often attacked in close formation, but later the hussars turned into light cavalry and stopped using linear tactics. The Cossacks never used linear tactics.

LINE TACTICS, methods and techniques of warfare, created under the influence of fireballs. weapons and actions in close. system and received the highest development in the XVIII century, in the era of Friedrich Vel. During the spread of fire weapons in tactics, a new doctrine appeared regarding the forms of use of troops (in particular, infantry) in battle. The emergence of this new combat factor made it possible to fight from a distance, to beat the prot-ka from behind the closures, without exposing oneself to the danger of direct cold blows. weapons. The temptation to fight from a distance gradually led to the unwillingness of both sides to get closer, which was expressed in all the battles of the 16th century. (excluding the battles at the Dre), which were in the nature of firearms. duels between armies. nearest the consequence of this was that the battles lost their character. means of tactics, and wars lasted for decades without leading to any results. The desire to return to the battle will decide. character initially led to an increase in pikemen in the army, and then to an increase in kav-rii, i.e., to the desire to solve the battle with a cold blow. weapons, bringing fire down to the role of a means to prepare-nago. Such attempts to return to sound principles soon failed again, due to the small number of people who wanted to serve in the pikemen and the high cost of maintaining the school. Then fans of firearms. weapons began to work in favor of giving fire the importance of a factor that decides the battle. Seeing the futility of a firefight from afar and the need to approach the enemy, they concentrated their efforts on creating and rooting such techniques and methods of combat, which would provide fire with the value not only of preparation, but also of a decisive means. This is possible b. reach only the extreme. the development of its action, i.e., its reduction to the limit. space To do this, I had to go to the rules. firing from lengths. thin lines of infantry, from deployment. building, and then to the exclusive use of this system in battle. T. arr. L.'s tactics were gradually worked out. Already Gustavus Adolphus (beginning of the 17th century) built his soldiers in 3 ranks and thus brought the fire to the point. results Full bloom and higher. the perfection of L. tactics reached in the era of Friedrich Vel. Since in this era the composition of the armies was unsatisfactory in morale. relation, due to the replenishment of troops according to the recruitment system, and therefore all the formations of the troops were given solidarity. form for the convenience of observing the soldiers, then the L. constructions, brought to life in tactics by the passion for firearms. weapons, poured into the form of lengths. closed lines. The small effectiveness of the guns then corresponded to the same somkn-sti. fire, which was used almost exclusively in the form of volleys. These two reasons (morally unreliable soldiers and the insignificant reality of a single fire) determined the final form of L. constructions in the era of Frederick the Great, in the form of clumsy. and immobile. closed. lines. (On the forms of building L. combat order and its tactical actions, see. History of military art). The weaknesses of Friedrich's L. tactics were revealed very quickly. The formations for the movement were stereotyped and not flexible, which was especially evident in the big. troops. the masses. The armies could only operate on the plains and not cross. to sweep; the full-length soldiers and close ranks of the advancing units provided excellent targets for shooting, and the troops carried a lot. losses, especially with the improvement of art-rii. The impact force of the weak deployed. lines, when invading the location of the channel, was the weaker, the greater the losses, despite the fact that they were followed by the 2nd line. That is why Friedrich W. intensified his attack. front wing. line. Long, non-rotating. lines of deployed b-news, built shoulder to shoulder, changing the front with difficulty and with weak fires. action towards the flank, became easy prey for the kav. attacks. Exercise in battles. L. order was carried out along the line, and the support of parts of the 1st line was carried out by parts of the 2nd line. The will of the chief was transmitted to the troops by commands. Everything was set in motion at the same time. The very movement of fighting. order was slow and for the success of tact. action was necessary strictly. alignment along the front and in the back of the head: about the lack of elements of battles. order is out of the question. L. tactics, cultivating fire as a decisive factor in the battle, ignored the rest. victory conditions: mobility battles. order, concentration of masses. efforts to decide. point and shelter from fire. A counterbalance to its weaknesses was a tactic that gave preference exclusively to the action of the cold. weapons and almost rejected firearms. action tactics shock, bayonet). Main its structure was columns. Its founders were: Folar (1669-1752) and Menil-Durand. The extremes of these two tactics. schools b. reconciled by marshals Broglio (1718-1804) and Rochambeau (1725-1805), who founded a new school known as perpendicular tactics, from which the current tactics have subsequently developed. Its essence is the recognition of the need for success in combat to combine cold actions. and fire weapons, but for the best. the use of both should be used for each of the corresponding formations: thin (deployment and shooter chain) - for fire and deep (columns) - for cold strikes. weapons. At the same time, the very structure of the troops has changed in essence: the components of the same organization. units (b-ns in a regiment, companies in a b-not) began to be built not all side by side, in one line, but echeloning one after another and thereby implementing the principle of command and support from the depth (perpendicular to the battle front. order , cm. Tactics). Dominating the battlefields for three centuries (the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries), L. tactics gradually gave way to new ones. techniques and methods of combat. And even in present. deep time (perpendicular) tactics have not completely freed themselves from lin. forms. So, before the publication of the systems. infantry mouth In 1908, in our infantry, the term "combat unit" existed and its special head was allowed, which combined exercises over the line of units performing strike preparation; before the publication of the orders. kav. mouth 1912, our k-tsa knew only L. battles. order, and only this charter introduced the battle to its "sections"; in modern Austro-Hungarian. the statute of formations. infantry services, ed. 1911) feature is the inclination to control along the line (there is still, m. Otc., a developed system of b-on). Finally, the ever-increasing improvement of firearms. weapons in present. time creates the danger of once again deviating to the extreme that characterizes the already condemned by the history of the military. lawsuit L. tactics, namely: more and more revealed a tendency to recognize fires. combat is a decisive factor in modern times. battles and neglect the rest. e-tami victory. Experience last. wars waged by modern weapon, as if confirming this view. At the same time, the validity is modern. fire forced to accept rare systems, which makes it possible to better use natural. and arts. closing. Gradually, against the general background and within the framework of the perpendicular (deep) tactics, some of its particulars are again reborn into forms of L. tactics, under the influence of the increased significance of fire. So, one has to reckon with L. forms in the shooter. chains. However, these partial rebirths, representing the inevitable concessions to the progress of firearms technology. weapons, can't change deep creatures. tactics as long as its fundamental foundations remain unshakable: control and support from the depths, independence and flexibility of the combat elements. order and until fire is given the importance of a factor deciding the battle.

Ushakov received his first combat experience during the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774. During these years, he sailed first on the Sea of ​​Azov, and then, as a commander of a small ship, on the Black Sea, where he first took part in hostilities.

Ushakov received his first combat experience during the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774. During these years, he sailed first on the Sea of ​​Azov, and then, as a commander of a small ship, on the Black Sea, where he first took part in hostilities. These voyages were for Ushakov an important stage in the improvement in naval affairs. Not satisfied with this, young Ushakov studied with great interest the rich experience of the Russian squadron's combat operations in the Mediterranean, especially in the Navarino and Chesme battles, as well as the actions of the Russian fleet in the Seven Years' War.

In 1776 Ushakov took part in the voyage from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea. From the end of May 1781, commanding the battleship Viktor, he sailed for a year in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the squadron of Admiral Sukhotin, the sending of which was due to the well-known declaration of Catherine II on armed neutrality. Soon after returning from this voyage, Ushakov took a direct part in the creation of the new Black Sea Fleet and was the first educator of the Black Sea sailors.

During this period, linear tactics dominated the sailing fleets of Western Europe. Its main principles were formulated at the end of the 17th century by the Frenchman Pavel Gost and set forth in his book, which appeared in 1697. These principles in a number of navies, and especially in French and English, were elevated to dogma, and in England they were even included in official instructions and regulations. The fleets were ordered to attack the entire line of the enemy at once, strictly observing the alignment in the ranks, and to fire only at the designated ship, not paying attention to the actions of the rest of the enemy ships and their own ships fighting nearby. At the same time, it was strictly forbidden for ships to go out of action in battles, and also to engage in battle with an enemy who had a numerical superiority in ships. All this fettered the initiative of ship commanders and squadron commanders, led to the stagnation of tactical thought, to stereotyped actions during naval battles. In addition, this predetermined defensive tactics, since each of the opponents was afraid to be in unfavorable conditions. There was no question of decisive battles. As a result, in the middle of the 18th century, the fleets of the Western European states experienced a pronounced crisis in naval tactics.

A different situation developed in the Russian fleet, where from the very beginning of the development of tactical thought, template and routine were alien to it. Peter I and subsequent Russian naval commanders brought a lot of new, original things to the tactics of the fleet. So, for example, the Gangut victory of Peter I (1714) was an example of a combination of military cunning and maneuver used when the Russian galley squadron met the Swedish naval fleet. The attack and destruction of the Swedish galleys by Russian galleys under the command of Golitsyn were also peculiar. sailing ships near Grengam (1720) It was completely different from the tactics of the fleets of Western European countries and the tactics of the outstanding Russian admiral Grigory Spiridov. In the Battle of Chesme (1770), along with the use of the battle line in the formation of the squadron (during the battle in the Chios Strait on June 24), he skillfully organized the maneuver of a specially detached detachment of ships, which provided (in the battle in Chesme Bay on June 26) artillery support for the fire attack, as a result of which almost the entire Turkish fleet was destroyed.

But if under Gangut and Grengam the basis of tactics was boarding (galleys against sailing ships), and under Chesma - an attack on the enemy at anchor, then Ushakov enriched tactics with a wide use of maneuver in a naval battle. In innovation, in the decisive rejection of outdated views on combat, in the courage of the search, was the creative power of Ushakov's art.

The novelty of Ushakov's tactics met with both open and covert opposition from the side of the reactionary representatives of the fleet, who cringed before foreign countries. But the results of the battles conducted by Ushakov were the best defense of his advanced tactical views. In the fight against the old, conservative views on the forms and methods of warfare, with the attempts of foreign naval officers who were in the service of the Russian fleet to implant the tactics of the Western fleets, Ushakov's tactics were more and more thoroughly introduced into the practice of combat operations of the Russian fleet.

Ushakov firmly remembered the warning of Peter I that when using the statutes "do not adhere to the rules, like a blind wall, because the rules are written there, but there are no times and cases." Ushakov's maneuvering tactics did not exclude the line as one of the elements of the battle order, but the line was not the only form of formation for him, it was entirely subordinated to maneuver. Ushakov combined the linear order with maneuvering and rebuilding into other battle formations and showed examples of the offensive tactics of the sailing fleet - covering the flank, dismembering the enemy formation, etc.

Each battle conducted by Ushakov contained new tactics that corresponded to the specific situation and conditions of hostilities. Already in the battle with the Turkish fleet near the island of Fidonisi in 1788, Ushakov proved himself to be an innovative naval commander.

On June 18, 1788, Russian troops besieged the Turkish fortress Ochakov. In early July, Suvorov was called to Ochakov from Kinburn, who was entrusted with the command of the left wing of the advancing troops. On the same day, June 18, a Russian squadron under the command of Voinovich left Sevastopol for Ochakov. The squadron consisted of two battleships, two 50-gun, eight 40-gun, one 18-gun frigates, 20 smaller sailing ships and two fireships.

The task of the Voinovich squadron was to prevent the Turkish squadron from assisting the enemy troops besieged in Ochakovo and to assist the Russian troops in every possible way, as well as to prevent the enemy squadron from reaching the shores of Taurida. Due to headwinds, the movement of the Russian squadron was greatly delayed, and it approached Tendra Island only on June 29. The Turkish squadron seen here consisted of 15 battleships, eight frigates, three bombardment and 21 smaller ships.

At dawn the next day, with a northerly wind, the Russian squadron went to approach the enemy, who had taken up the windward position, and lining up in the battle line on the left tack, prepared for battle, waiting for the enemy to attack (indecision typical of Voinovich). The Turkish squadron, approaching three and a half kilometers, entered the battle line. In the first hour of the day there was a calm, and the ships stopped. With the strengthening of the wind, the Russians again began to approach. Then the Turkish ships, taking advantage of the course (they had a copper sheathing), began to move away without accepting the battle. The Russians pursued the Turks, who were leaving for the Rumelian shores, while the Russian squadron sought to take a windward position. By evening, the Turks slowed down; the Russians also lowered their sails. With the onset of darkness, the fleets again dispersed.

On the morning of July 3, not far from the mouth of the Danube, near the island of Fidonisi, the fleets met again. The enemy still maintained a windward position. At 8 o'clock, the Russian squadron tacked and lined up in the battle line on the left tack, countertack in relation to the enemy. At 2 p.m., the enemy, taking advantage of the windward position, began to descend in two columns, of which the first, under the command of Gesen Pasha, attacked the Russian avant-garde, and the second rushed to the corde-battle and rearguard, trying to paralyze them and prevent their avant-garde from being able to help ( Ushakov). After 5 minutes, the battle began. Two ships of the line and two 50-gun frigates of Ushakov's avant-garde were attacked, while against each of these ships there were five enemy ships. Occupying an advantageous windward position, the Turks kept at such a distance that it made it impossible for the Russian 40-gun frigates with 12-pounder guns to conduct effective fire, due to which only advanced ships could successfully operate from the Russian side (i.e., the vanguard under the command of Ushakov) .

Despite the unfavorable conditions, the ships of the Ushakov avant-garde fired real and well-aimed fire at the Turks who attacked him, and after 40 minutes the enemy attack was repelled, and the line of his ships was upset. The flagship of the first column itself was forced out of line. An attempt by the enemy to cut off two of Ushakov's frigates, Borislav and Strela, also ended unsuccessfully. Ushakov, on the battleship St. Paul, taking advantage of the confusion of the enemy, himself went on a decisive counterattack and, adding sails, from close range inflicted great damage on the flagship of the Turks Kapudania, forcing him to turn back. When turning the enemy ship, the frigates "Borislav" and "Strela" fired at him with volleys from the whole side, while the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to respond in kind. Other ships of the Ushakov avant-garde supported the counterattack of their flagship with heavy fire on the upset Turkish column.

The battle continued until 4 p.m. 55 minutes, after which the enemy ships, having raised all the sails, hurried to leave the battlefield, while losing the shebeka sunk by the fire of Ushakov's flagship. The losses of Ushakov's vanguard amounted to only five killed and two wounded. The attack of the Ushakov avant-garde could have brought much greater results if not for the inaction of Voinovich, who did not support Ushakov and limited himself to only a rare skirmish with the far-distant ships of the second column of the Turkish fleet. Voinovich did not help Ushakov in the pursuit of the enemy leaving the battlefield. The battle was limited to a battle between the Ushakov avant-garde and the numerically superior first column of the Turkish squadron.

On July 5, the Turkish fleet appeared near Ak-Meschet. The Russian squadron patrolling here did not let the enemy in, and the latter was forced to retreat to Cape Kherson, from where on July 6 he turned into the sea and went to the Rumelian shores.

On July 1, 1788, Russian troops launched their first offensive against Ochakov. As a result of the successful actions of the Suvorov troops during the second half of the year, the Turkish fortress, which was considered impregnable, was taken on December 6.

The battle of Fidonisi is an example of the successful interaction of the squadron with the ground forces in operations against the seaside fortress (Ochakov). Ushakov, taking the initiative, contrary to the canons of formal linear tactics, enters into battle with superior enemy forces and strikes the main blow against the Turkish flagship (first column) with a bold counterattack.

In the battle of Fidonisi, Ushakov also violated other requirements of formal linear tactics, which ordered the flagship to be in the center of the line of his ships. Setting an example for the rest of the courts, Ushakov led the way. This favorite technique and in the future brought him continued success.

July 8, 1790 Ushakov held the battle of Kerch. The battle was preceded by the cruising of the Ushakov squadron off the Anatolian coast, which lasted from May 16 to June 5, 1790, about which Ushakov wrote: "... parts of the squadrons that left Constantinople this spring to seek their salvation, hiding under the fortresses ... Being at Sinop for three days, the city, the fortress and the ships were kept in a perfect attack, having a contented skirmish with them, all the time the cruising ships took the ones they came across and took them out near Sinop almost from under the very fortresses, merchant ships ... eight ships were taken, of which two were burned, leading out in front of the city at Sinop, and six were brought to Sevastopol ... ".

On the way back, on the night of June 1-2, Ushakov's squadron had a battle with the batteries of the Anapa fortress and Turkish ships stationed near Anapa. Ushakov reported to Potemkin about this battle: “Having launched all the rowboats, around midnight he pulled them against the enemy ships and began firing at them with cannonballs, bombs and brandskugels, but they fired fierce fire against us from all batteries and also firing with cannonballs, threw small bombs and karkazy, which, not reaching, were torn in the air, and many of the cores flew over our ships, and from us several brandskugels lay down and burned on the shore near the batteries, and the bombs exploded on them. Only the absence of firewalls in the squadron prevented Ushakov from completely destroying the Turkish ships. But this battle was not the main goal of the campaign. Ushakov had long sought to inflict such a blow on the Turkish fleet that would thwart the enemy’s plan to land troops in the Crimea. As early as July 30, 1789, Ushakov reported to Rear Admiral Voinovich, then commander of the Black Sea Fleet, about the preparation of a Turkish landing in the Crimea and that the enemy had designated Anapa as the point of concentration of forces, from where he planned to attack Yenikale and Kerch. Due to the unpreparedness of the Turkish ships, the planned landing in the Crimea did not take place at that time and was postponed to the campaign of 1790.

The need to replenish ship's stores and carry out a small Maintenance some ships forced the Russian squadron to temporarily leave for Sevastopol. By this time, Ushakov was appointed instead of the indecisive Voinovich, the commander of the ship fleet. On July 2, 1790, Ushakov again went to sea, holding the flag on the battleship "Christmas". His squadron included 10 battleships, six frigates, one bombing ship, one rehearsal ship, 13 cruising light ships, and two fireships. Before going to sea, an order was sent to all ships: "Announce to every one in the fleet that the fleet, glorified by victories over the enemy, should increase the glory of the imperial flag, demand from each performance of the post without sparing life."

Before going out to sea, Ushakov received information from observation posts located on the Crimean coast that the Turkish fleet was visible at Tarkhanov-Kut on June 28, then passed at a close distance from Sevastopol and Balaklava, after which it headed east. It was obvious that the Turkish squadron headed for Anapa to receive troops and, together with other ships stationed there, move to the Crimean coast for a long-planned landing. Assessing the current situation, Ushakov decided to leave the Sevastopol Bay to head to the Kerch Strait and take a position near Cape Takla, on the path of the most likely movement of the Turkish landing force. At the same time, some of the light cruising ships were sent by Ushakov for reconnaissance. At 10 am on July 8, a Turkish squadron consisting of 10 battleships, eight frigates and 36 smaller ships was seen from Anapa. The wind was moderate, blowing from the east-northeast. The Ushakov squadron, contrary to the routine rules of linear tactics, which required in such cases to fight not under sail, but at anchor, weighed anchor and, following under sail, lined up in the battle line. At about 12 noon, the Turks launched an attack on the Russian avant-garde, commanded by the captain of the brigadier rank G.K. Golenkin.

The vanguard repulsed the attack and with its fire confused the enemy. In view of the failure of the first attack, the commander of the Turkish squadron (Kapudan Pasha) put new ships into action to strengthen the attack against the Russian avant-garde. Then Ushakov ordered the frigates to leave common line building and form a reserve in order to use it at a decisive moment in the right direction. The rest of the ships of the center (corde battles) pulled up to the vanguard and began to assist him in repelling the enemy attack. By 2 pm the wind direction became north-north-east, which was beneficial for the Russians. Ushakov, taking advantage of this, approached the enemy at a shotgun shot, put all his guns into action and resolutely went on the offensive. Unable to withstand the fire of the Russians, the Turkish ships, which were in close proximity to the flagship of the Russian squadron, began to turn and leave the battle. Two Turkish ships, which received damage to the masts, went beyond the line of Russian ships. To cover these ships, Kapudan Pasha tried to pass the Russian system on a counter-course. The Russian ships, turning the tack, once again from close range fell upon the Turkish ships with their fire. and inflicted more damage on them. Ushakov, with particular energy, attacked the Turkish commander and his second flagship, who were trying to cover their most damaged ships. By 17:00, the enemy finally gave up resistance and, pursued by Russian ships, began to retreat. In an effort to complete the strike, Ushakov ordered to hastily line up in a battle line and pursue the enemy, not observing the usual designated places, and he himself took a place ahead of his ships.

As a result of a successful battle, the landing of Turkish troops in the Crimea was thwarted. Many Turkish ships were seriously damaged, and one messenger ship with a crew was sunk. The Turks lost many killed and wounded. On the ships of the Russian squadron, the losses amounted to 29 killed and 68 wounded. On July 12, Ushakov returned to Sevastopol with a victory.

Tactically, the battle of Kerch is characterized by Ushakov's pronounced desire for decisive offensive actions. Ushakov seeks to approach at the shortest distance, in order to use both artillery (bucket shot) and rifle fire and thereby inflict the greatest losses on the landing force on enemy ships. This battle is also characterized by the concentration of fire on the Turkish flagships in order to deprive the enemy of leadership and stamina. The withdrawal of frigates from the general formation deserves attention, as a result of which the maximum density of the squadron's linear forces was created and the effectiveness of artillery fire was increased, as well as a reserve of ships was formed at the disposal of the flagship. Finally, it should be noted that at the final moment of the battle, Ushakov, contrary to the requirements of formal tactics, in accordance with the situation, orders the ships to line up, not observing the assigned places, and himself becomes the head of the fleet.

Having made the necessary repairs after the battle of Kerch and having replenished ship supplies, Ushakov again began to prepare for a meeting with the enemy, whose ships again began to appear off the Crimean coast. Ushakov carefully watched their movement, receiving reports from posts, and sometimes personally leaving for the coast, from where the enemy was visible. At the same time, Ushakov received detailed information from Kherson from the commander of the Liman flotilla, De Ribas. who reported to Ushakov about all the Turkish ships seen in the region of the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. Painstakingly collecting intelligence data, Ushakov carefully prepared for the resumption of active searches for Turkish forces at sea. On August 6, Ushakov wrote to Kherson: “...Today 29 ships were seen ... It is very necessary to find out their enterprise in order not only to prevent, but also to take advantage of it ... Is it possible, dear sir, through any means from the Danube to find out where their main fleet is now, in which place, whether they are united in one place, or whether they will be squadrons, in order therefore to arrange our actions.

The next exit to the sea was allowed to Ushakov only after the completion of several ships in the port of Kherson, which were supposed to strengthen his squadron. Having received information about the readiness of these ships, Ushakov on August 24 ordered the withdrawal of both his squadron and the Liman flotilla. On August 25, 1790, Ushakov's squadron left Sevastopol and headed for the mouth of the Dnieper-Bug estuary, where it was supposed to connect with the Liman flotilla and the ships that left Kherson. Ushakov had 10 battleships, 6 frigates, 1 bombardment ship, 1 rehearsal ship and 17 cruisers. The Turkish squadron, consisting of 14 battleships, 8 frigates and 14 small ships under the command of Kapudan Pasha Hussein, was cruising off the northwestern coast of the Black Sea at that time.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on August 28, the Russian squadron discovered the Turkish squadron anchored between Tendra and Khadzhibey (Odessa). The appearance of Russian ships was completely unexpected for the Turks. Ushakov decided to use surprise and, without wasting time on rebuilding from marching order to combat, he ordered an immediate attack on the enemy.

The Turks, taken by surprise, despite their numerical superiority, hastily began to cut the ropes and at 9 o'clock in disorder rushed to sail towards the Danube. Occupying a windward position, Ushakov, at full sail, rushed in pursuit, intending to intercept the lagging enemy ships. The threat of capture by Russian sailors of the terminal Turkish ships forced Kapudan Pasha to turn back and cover the lagging ships. Having lowered into the wind, the Turkish fleet hastily lined up in the battle line. Continuing to attack the enemy, Ushakov also reorganized the squadron from marching formation to combat, and then, turning back, took a windward position and lay down on a course parallel to the enemy's course. At the same time, three frigates were ordered to leave the line of battle, form a reserve and be in the wind at the vanguard, in order to repel an enemy attempt to attack the vanguard if necessary.

At about 15 o'clock, Ushakov, having approached the enemy at a distance of a canister shot, started a battle with the whole system, especially attacking the enemy center, where the Turkish flagship ship was located. After an hour and a half of battle, the Turkish ships, having received significant damage and suffered losses in personnel, began to leave the battle line. The Russian ships intensified their fire even more and at about 17 o'clock brought the enemy into complete confusion. The Turks could not stand it and, turning through the gybe to the wind, began to disengage from the battle in disarray. When turning, they put their ships under the longitudinal volleys of Russian ships.

In an effort to completely defeat the Turkish squadron, Ushakov raised the signal "Drive the enemy", and he himself began to pursue the flagship of the Turks. The pursuit of the departing enemy ships continued until dark. At 22 o'clock Ushakov, having sent light ships to Ochakov, anchored. With the dawn of the next day, the Turkish fleet was again discovered not far from the Russian squadron. As Ushakov reported later in his report, the Turkish ships were moving in disorder in different directions.

Pursuing the enemy, the Russian squadron cut off two battleships damaged in battle, of which one, the Meleki-Bakhri, was captured, and the other, the flagship Kapudania, on fire, soon exploded. Turkish Admiral Seid-Ali and about 100 officers and sailors from the Kapudaniya were taken prisoner. During the hasty flight of the rest of the fleet to the Bosporus, the Turks lost another badly damaged ship of the line and several small ones. Losses in the personnel of the enemy amounted to more than 2 thousand people. The Russians lost only 41 people, of which 25 were wounded. The captured battleship "Meleki-Bakhri" after correction became part of the Black Sea Fleet under the name "John the Baptist".

The Liman flotilla, due to the headwind, was unable to connect with Ushakov before the battle. After the battle, she was instructed to take the captured ships to Kherson.

A feature of Ushakov's tactics in this battle was a sudden attack of the enemy without rebuilding from marching order to combat. Otherwise, the same methods were used as in the Kerch battle, i.e. the allocation of a reserve of frigates, rapprochement and battle at a distance of a canister shot, an attack on the flagships in order to disable them in the first place.

Soon after the Battle of Tendra, Ushakov, based on the combat experience of the last battles (near Kerch and Tendra), proposed to allocate a special group of ships to attack the enemy's flagships, which was approved by Potemkin. Such a group of ships was called the "Keyser flag" squadron.

Ushakov's tactical techniques cannot be considered apart from the whole complex of techniques used in each specific battle. So, for example, in the battle at Tendra on August 28-29, 1790, Ushakov’s attack on the Turkish squadron from the move would not have given an effect in itself without the timely formation of a battle line, allocation of a reserve and attacks on flagships, pursuit of the enemy, etc.

The saturation of each of the battles conducted by Ushakov with new techniques, their skillful combination with techniques already known before, clearly confirms with what exceptional speed he oriented himself in the situation and was able to take correct solution to what a high degree he possessed the Suvorov "eye".

In the second half of September 1790, when Russian troops were approaching the Danube, it was necessary to send a rowing flotilla from the Dnieper-Bug Estuary to the Danube. Ushakov personally developed a warrant for the passage of the flotilla, which was presented to its commander on September 28, 1790, and a plan for covering the flotilla from the sea from possible interference by the Turkish fleet. The general situation after the defeat of the Turkish squadron near Tendra was quite successful, but unfavorable winds did not allow the flotilla to leave the estuary for a long time, in connection with which Ushakov himself was delayed with the exit. Only on October 16, having received information about the exit of the flotilla, Ushakov went to sea. In his squadron there were 14 battleships, 4 frigates and 17 cruisers. On October 17, after a short stay in Khadzhibey, the Liman flotilla, consisting of 38 rowing vessels and a detachment of transports with a landing force (800 people), reached the mouth of the Dniester, where the next day it joined a flotilla of Zaporizhzhya Cossacks consisting of 48 boats and headed for the Sulinsky arm of the Danube. Here, the Turkish river flotilla (23 ships) and two coastal batteries (13 guns) blocked the way.

By decisive actions of the command of the Russian flotilla, this obstacle was quickly eliminated. The batteries were taken in battle by landing (about 600 people) landed from the ships of the flotilla, and the enemy flotilla, defeated in battle, having lost a floating battery and 7 transport ships with ammunition and food, hastily retreated up the Danube. Continuing to operate on the Danube, the Russian Liman flotilla occupied the Turkish fortress of Tulcha on November 6 and 7, and on November 13, the fortress of Isakcha. In battles with enemy flotillas located at these fortresses, a large number of Turkish ships, guns, ammunition and food were destroyed, burned and captured.

In accordance with the plan, Ushakov's squadron approached the Danube on October 21, when the rearguard of the Liman flotilla was already entering the mouth. Ushakov's task was to prevent the penetration of enemy reinforcements from the sea into the Danube and thereby ensure the successful operations of the Russian rowing flotilla allocated to help Suvorov. Ushakov remained at the mouth of the Danube until November 10, after which he went in search of the enemy to the Rumelian shores, and on November 14, 1790, when it became clear that the Turkish fleet could not interfere with the actions of the flotilla on the Danube, he returned to Sevastopol.

On November 18, the rowing flotilla began a systematic bombardment of Izmail and Turkish ships, which were under the protection of the fortress. Between November 18 and 27, the Russian flotilla destroyed 43 coasters, 45 transport ships, 10 boats, a schooner and more than 40 ferries.

Immediately before the assault on Izmail by the troops of the Suvorov flotilla (567 guns), together with the batteries of the island of Chatal, bombarded Izmail, and on the day of the assault took part in the capture of the fortress. It is known that Izmail was taken by a concentric attack of nine columns: six attacked from land and three columns, made up of troops, stormed the fortress from the side of the river.

The flotilla operated in the assault on Izmail in two lines: in the first line there were ships with landing forces, in the second - ships that covered the landing with the fire of their guns. On December 11, in the morning, the flotilla, under the cover of continuous fire from ship's guns, landed troops. His first column quickly took possession of the fortifications on the coast. The second column met stronger resistance, but still took possession of the enemy battery. The third column went ashore in the most difficult conditions, under heavy fire from the enemy redoubt. All three columns, after fierce fighting, united with the troops who stormed the fortress from land. On this day, all the fortifications were in the hands of the Russians. The assault on the city itself began, and among the detachments that were the first to break into the center of the city, there was a landing force landed from the ships of the flotilla.

The capture of Ismail by Suvorov and the actions of Ushakov during this period in the Black Sea theater were based on a single strategic plan. By defeating the Turkish fleet near Tendra and subsequent actions, Ushakov ensured the safe passage of the flotilla to the Danube and covered its operations from the sea during the period of direct advance to Izmail, which rendered a serious service to Suvorov's troops. The actions of the Liman flotilla near Izmail were highly appreciated by Suvorov and Potemkin.

The campaign of 1791 was marked by new successes of the Russian troops. With the support of the river flotilla, the city of Brailov was taken by storm. On June 28, Repnin's troops defeated an 80,000-strong Turkish army near Machin. With the loss of this army, the enemy lost his last reserves. Soon, the peace talks between Russia and Turkey, which had begun even earlier, resumed. The desire of the Russian government to conclude peace as soon as possible was due to the fact that Catherine II, frightened by the revolution that had begun in France, now saw the main content of her foreign policy in the fight against her. Turkey, having suffered heavy defeats on land, was no longer able to wage any effective war, but, relying on a still strong fleet, dragged out negotiations, trying to negotiate more favorable peace terms for itself.

The matter was accelerated by the brilliant victory of the Ushakov squadron over the Turkish fleet at Cape Kaliakria on July 31, 1791. In this battle, the Russians had 16 battleships, 2 frigates, 2 bombardment ships, a firewall and 13 light ships; the Turks have 18 battleships, 17 frigates and 43 light ships. Kapudan Pasha Hussein commanded the Turkish fleet.

On July 29, Ushakov's squadron left Sevastopol and headed for the Rumelian shores. At noon on July 31, Ushakov saw a Turkish squadron anchored near Cape Kaliakria. As under Tendra, Ushakov suddenly and swiftly attacked the Turkish squadron, without changing from marching order to combat. In order to take a windward position (the wind was north), Ushakov went between the coast and the Turkish squadron and, despite the fire of the enemy's coastal batteries, at 14 o'clock. 45 min. cut off the Turkish ships from the shore. The appearance of the Russian squadron and the attack of the Turkish fleet were so sudden and swift that part of the personnel sent ashore (it was a Muslim holiday) could not return to the ships. The enemy hurriedly cut anchors and retreated in confusion, trying to line up in the battle line. Continuously attacking the stunned enemy, the Russian squadron continued to be in the march formation of three columns. Kapudan Pasha managed to line up some of the Turkish ships in line on the right tack, but soon the enemy fleet changed lines on the left tack. At 15 o'clock. 30 min. Ushakov, attacking the enemy in the direction of the wind from the north-north-east, reorganized into a battle line parallel to the Turkish fleet.

The advance detachment of the Turks under the command of Said-Ali, forcing sails, tried to take a windward position. Then Ushakov on the ship "Christmas" went out of order and attacked the ship Said-Ali. In his report to Potemkin, Ushakov wrote about this moment of the battle: “At the same time, I noticed that Said-Ali, with the vice admiral’s ship of the red flag and other large and several frigates, being himself the advanced one, was in a hurry to separate forward, winning the wind, therefore, to prevent I chased after him with the ship "Christmas of Christ", following our line forward, and with a signal I confirmed to the fleet to fulfill the behavior and close the distance. Build the line of our fleet at the closest distance against the enemy and catch up with the advanced ship of Pasha Said-Ali, with a signal ordered the entire fleet to descend to the enemy at close range, and the ship under my flag "Christmas of Christ", approaching our advanced ship at a distance of half a cable, attacked it. The Said-Ali ship, having received severe damage in the hull and mast, went down to the wind. Then Ushakov attacked another flagship, which was forced to turn away with heavy damage. The strike on the flagships contributed to the rapid demoralization of the enemy squadron.

The stubborn battle, during which the Turkish ships (especially the flagships) received heavy damage, lasted more than three and a half hours. The decisive attack of the Russian squadron led to the fact that the Turkish ships mixed up in a heap and began to leave in disorder towards the Bosphorus. Ushakov organized the pursuit of the defeated Turkish fleet. About 20 o'clock. 30 min. due to the onset of darkness, the Turkish ships began to disappear from view. Soon the conditions for the pursuit of the Turks were extremely unfavorable, as a calm set in, which was then replaced by a favorable wind for the enemy. Only at 6 o'clock in the morning on August 1, the Russians again saw the Turkish squadron, moving towards Constantinople. Ushakov added as much sail as he could, trying to catch up with the enemy, but the intensifying stormy north wind and heavy seas prevented this. In addition, several ships of the Ushakov squadron were damaged in battle, and on the battleship "Alexander" a dangerous leak formed in the hull from hitting nuclei, which made it impossible to continue the pursuit in stormy conditions. Having sent several ships to cruise to the Rumelian shores, Ushakov approached Cape Emine with the fleet and began to repair the damage. Putting themselves in order, the squadron returned to Sevastopol. In his report, Ushakov wrote: "During the former 31 days of the battle, all the commanders of the ships and various ranks of the Black Sea fleet, the servants on it, with extreme zeal and unparalleled courage and courage, did their duty ..." In the same place, Ushakov emphasizes the role of reserves in this fight. Thus, a reserve of 24 bombardment ships and one frigate was used in the direction of the main attack, while the other reserve, consisting of small bombardment ships and a large number of cruisers, was used to pursue single enemy ships and destroy boats with Turks fleeing on them. The report says about this: "and during the cruisers sent from me in pursuit of the ships ... many enemy ships were driven ashore, flooded, and some were burned, the fleeing enemy people were beaten and drowned in a multitude ...". In this battle, Ushakov applied a new tactical technique - an attack from the coast, a technique that was then adopted by the English Admiral Nelson, using it seven years later in the battle of Aboukir against the French squadron.

Ushakov's victory at Kaliakria decisively influenced the course of the entire campaign. December 29, 1791 Türkiye hurried to make peace on favorable terms for Russia. According to the Peace of Yassy in 1791, the conditions of the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi agreement were confirmed, a new border of Russia along the Dniester was recognized, as well as the annexation of Crimea to Russia.

Showing great skill in naval battles, Ushakov with no less success carried out fighting associated with the blockade of the enemy coast, landings, attacking fortresses, etc. In them, as well as in naval battles, he was an enemy of inertia and routine. good example this is the siege and capture of the island of Corfu, which was considered an impregnable fortress.

Ushakov took possession of the fortress at a time when the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which had come to power in France, intensified its aggressive policy. French expansion was directed primarily against England, but at the same time it also threatened Russia and Turkey. Having received the Venetian possessions after the defeat of Austria - the Ionian Islands and several fortresses in Albania - Bonaparte tried with all his might to keep them behind him. In his report to the Directory dated August 27, 1797, he wrote: "The islands of Corfu, Zante and Kefalonia are more important to us than all of Italy together." Bonaparte primarily took into account the strategic position of the Ionian Islands, the mastery of which made it easier for him to move towards Egypt, Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Black Sea possessions of Russia. In addition, having established himself in the Ionian Islands, Bonaparte became a neighbor of Turkey and could exert strong political pressure on it. This is important to emphasize, because France already had quite a lot of influence in Turkey, and she was already leaning towards an alliance with Bonaparte against Russia.

It is quite understandable that these circumstances caused serious anxiety in the Russian ruling circles. The alarm increased even more when it became known that the French in Toulon and Marseille were intensively preparing for the implementation of active hostilities. A rumor spread that the French fleet under the Turkish flag would enter the Black Sea and begin hostilities against Russia. But soon the direction of French expansion in the Mediterranean was somewhat clarified. Abandoning active action directly against the British Isles, Bonaparte in May 1798 undertook his Egyptian campaign, the main goal of which was to capture Egypt and from there threaten British possessions in India. By their invasion of Egypt, the French committed direct aggression against Turkey, of which Egypt was a province at that time, and created a direct threat to the Turkish Empire, forcing the latter to ask for help from Russia.

The Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte also affected the interests of Russia. Having established their dominance in Egypt, the French could constantly threaten the Black Sea straits, and consequently, the Black Sea possessions of Russia. In addition, it was quite obvious that without the help of Russia, Turkey would not be able to protect the passages to the Black Sea.

Thus, French expansion in the Mediterranean created an extremely difficult military and political situation not only in the Mediterranean region, but throughout Europe. The complexity of this situation was aggravated by the fact that at that time a sharp internal struggle unfolded in Italy: the power of the Bourbons was overthrown, and the king of Italy was forced to flee and ask for help from the Russian Tsar Paul I. In this situation, Russia opposed France.

To participate in the war in the Mediterranean, a squadron under the command of Admiral Ushakov was allocated, which left Sevastopol on August 13, 1798, consisting of 6 ships, 7 frigates and 3 messenger ships. The ships carried 1,700 Marines. Upon the arrival of the squadron in the Dardanelles, a Turkish squadron consisting of 4 ships, 6 frigates and 14 gunboats entered into submission to Ushakov. On September 12, Ushakov sent 4 frigates and 10 gunboats under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Sorokin to blockade Alexandria and destroy the French batteries in Aboukir, since Nelson's English squadron after the victory over the French itself turned out to be so shabby that it was no longer able to solve combat missions and intended to leave for Sicily. On September 20, the Russian and Turkish squadrons left the Dardanelles. IN short term, from September 28 to November 5, Ushakov expelled the French from the islands of Tserigo, Zante, Kefalonia and Santa Maura. Following this, he undertook an effective blockade of the island of Corfu with the aim of capturing it.

Corfu has long been considered the key to the Adriatic Sea. For five centuries it was owned by the Venetians, who did a lot to strengthen it. After the capture of the island by Napoleon, French engineers significantly strengthened the fortifications of Corfu, turning it into an impregnable fortress. By the beginning of the siege of the fortress, she was armed with up to 650 fortress guns, a garrison of 3,000 people and a six-month supply of food. From the sea, the fortress was covered by two islands - Vido and Lazaretto; on the first of them there were powerful fortifications with a large number of artillery pieces.

In the twentieth of October, a detachment of captain 1st rank Selivachev approached Corfu, who, on the orders of Ushakov, began to implement the blockade. On November 9, Ushakov approached Corfu with the main forces. The squadron anchored south of the fortress. The allied fleet experienced an acute shortage of food. In addition, there were not enough landing troops to attack the fortress. The troops promised by Turkey did not arrive, and the receipt of reinforcements was delayed by lengthy negotiations.

Despite all the difficulties, Ushakov established a tight blockade of Corfu, depriving the French garrison of the opportunity to receive any outside help. In addition, in order to stop the attempts of the French to procure provisions for themselves by robbing local residents, a small landing force was landed on Corfu, and batteries were installed at the ends of the island. The battery, built on the northern side of the island, already in November 1798 began a systematic bombardment of the French fortifications.

On November 22, a schooner and two brigantines with food came to Ushakov from Sevastopol. On December 30, Rear Admiral Pustoshki arrived from Sevastopol with two new 74-gun ships. By January 1, 1799, Ushakov already had 12 ships, 11 frigates and several small vessels at his disposal. By 25 January additional forces had arrived.

The entire period of the siege of the island of Corfu, which lasted three and a half months, was full of numerous military clashes between the ships of the Russian squadron and the French ships stationed near the island. These duels of ships, as well as the systematic shelling of the fortress by Russian batteries, exhausted the enemy. However, a decisive assault on the fortress required concerted action by all forces. Meanwhile, the Turkish command did not fulfill its supply obligations and delayed sending the promised landing force, which put Ushakov in a difficult position.

Despite this, Ushakov actively prepared for the assault. Having studied the approaches to the island of Corfu, he correctly concluded that the sharp Vido was the key to the fortress. At the same time, he understood that it would be extremely difficult to take the heavily fortified island of Vido only by landing forces, but Ushakov firmly decided to take it. The general signal for the assault on the island of Corfu was to be given simultaneously with the assault on the island of Vido. On the eve of the assault, a council of admirals and ship commanders was convened, at which Ushakov announced his decision and plan of action.

Preparing for the assault, Ushakov conducted a series of exercises, during which he paid special attention to the manufacture of siege ladders and fascines and the ability to use them. Much attention was also paid to communication issues, for which a table of 130 conditional flag signals was developed.

The attack on Vido Island began on February 18, 1799 at 7 am. Frigates, sailing, opened fire on the batteries and coastal structures of the island. This was followed by a powerful fire on manpower and coastal batteries of the enemy and from the rest of the ships, which anchored according to the disposition. Several ships were assigned to a separate detachment with the task of bombarding the raid and counteracting any supply of reinforcements to the island of Vido. The same detachment was instructed to fire on enemy ships and frigates located on the western side of Vido Island.

Ushakov, on the ship "St. Pavel", accompanied by a frigate, personally checked the correct placement of ships according to the disposition, and then, approaching the distance of a canister shot to the largest battery, together with the frigate, destroyed it in a short time. By 11 o'clock the fire of the enemy batteries had considerably weakened. A signal was raised on the flagship: "to begin the landing." In total, more than 2,000 people were landed. Naval artillery fire continued during the landing. By 2 p.m. Vido Island was taken. Of the garrison, numbering up to 800 people, 422 people were taken prisoner.

At the same time, a general assault on the fortress of Corfu began. The troops landed on the island immediately rushed to attack the outer defensive structures of the fortress. The first attack was repulsed, and only when reinforcements were received, the second attack ended in success. The French commandant sent Ushakov a letter asking for a truce for 24 hours, during which he undertook to sign a surrender. The next day, the French General Chabot arrived on Ushakov's ship St. Paul, signing the terms of unconditional surrender.

The capture by Ushakov of the strongest sea fortress of Corfu was an unprecedented victory for that time. Ushakov again demonstrated high naval art, and Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities. The success of this battle was largely facilitated by the fact that Ushakov, having correctly assessed the situation, decided to attack Vido Island first from the sea and then from land, although this was contrary to obsolete traditions, according to which the fleet can only block coastal fortresses.

During the period of the siege and capture of the fortress of Corfu, Ushakov showed incomparably higher skill than the famous English admiral Nelson, who besieged the island of Malta and the much less powerful fortress on it, La Valetta, in the same period. If it took Ushakov only three months to capture Corfu, then Nelson spent more than a year on the siege of Malta. At the same time, he himself did not wait for the capture of Malta, leaving for England.

Having received the news of Ushakov's victory on the island of Corfu, Suvorov exclaimed: "Our Great Peter is alive! "- even now we see. Hurrah! To the Russian Fleet! .. Now I say to myself: why was I not even a midshipman at Corfu?"

After the capture of the island of Corfu, the combat operations of the Ushakov squadron were transferred to the coast of southern Italy. Suvorov, who commanded the allied Russian-Austrian armies at that time, suggested that Ushakov send a detachment of ships to the Adriatic coast of Italy to blockade Ancona, since the French ships stationed there could intercept Austrian transport ships and thereby threaten communications important for Russia's ally - Austria. At the request of Suvorov, in May 1799, Ushakov sent 3 battleships (one Turkish), 4 frigates (2 Turkish) and 5 small ships to the shores of Ancona, entrusting the command of this detachment to Rear Admiral Pustoshkin. Somewhat earlier, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Sorokin, another detachment was sent to Otranto, which included 4 frigates, 2 light ships and 4 gunboats. On May 9, this detachment landed on the east coast of the Apennine Peninsula (between Brindisi and Manfredonia) under the command of Lieutenant Commander Belli, which played an important role in the fighting of Russian troops in Italy. With a landing force, the number of which was increased to 600 people, Belli crossed the peninsula from east to west and, reaching the shore of the Tyrrhenian Sea (June 3, 1799), took part in the capture of Naples.

Ushakov at the end of June 1799 moved with the main forces of his squadron (10 battleships, 7 frigates and 5 other ships) to the coast of Sicily.

Having expelled the French from all of northern Italy, Suvorov in early August 1799 began to prepare for an attack on the Genoese Riviera. In terms of the attack on the Riviera, Suvorov gave the fleet a significant place. He wrote: "and the united fleet must be informed of our intentions and assist us both in covering water transports, and also in repairing others."

Being in Messina in early August, Ushakov received a letter from Suvorov in which the field marshal asked that a group of ships be sent to blockade Genoa in order to prevent the supply of supplies to the French army by sea.

Ushakov urgently sent a detachment of two battleships and two frigates to Genoa under the command of Rear Admiral Pustoshkin, who had previously operated near Ancona. Sorokin was now sent to Naples. Pustoshkin's detachment assisted Suvorov until the very end of his stay in Italy.

On September 13 and 14, the great commander fought his famous crossing of St. Gotthard and the Devil's Bridge. At this time, Ushakov's squadron continued to remain in Italy, actively preparing for a campaign against Rome. Ushakov personally developed a plan for this campaign. They formed a detachment of 820 grenadiers and 200 sailors of the squadron under the command of Colonel Skipor. The detachment was given 2500 people from the troops of the Neapolitan king. During the preparation of the campaign against Rome, the English Admiral Nelson arrived in Naples. Not wanting the Russians to take over Rome, the English admiral secretly sent a warship to the port of Civita Vecchia (near Rome) with a proposal to the French to capitulate before the Russians approached Rome. The terms of surrender proposed by Nelson were extremely beneficial to the French. So, for example, the French were not deprived of their weapons and they were not deprived of the right to conduct military operations again. The British promised to transport them to France on their ships. The French, of course, agreed to such a "surrender", especially since France could throw these troops against the allies on the Genoese coast. Ushakov was deeply indignant at this betrayal of the English admiral, but did not cancel the campaign against Rome. The ceremonial entry of Russian sailors into Rome, abandoned by the French under the terms of surrender, ended the actions of the squadron landing in the 1799 campaign. In 1800, Ushakov's squadron was recalled by Paul I to the Black Sea.

The strategy and tactics of Ushakov were subordinated to one goal - the destruction of enemy forces. Like Suvorov, Ushakov was always looking for a decisive battle. This gave his tactics a pronounced offensive character, and Ushakov's offensive maneuver tactics were fuller and richer than those of Western European admirals. Ushakov was never afraid to engage in battle with a numerically superior enemy. With all this, adventurism was alien to him, he never neglected caution.

Ushakov paid exceptionally great attention to the combat training of the squadron. Intense combat training, both in peacetime and in wartime, was the style of the admiral's daily work. In the most difficult days preceding the Battle of Kerch, Ushakov did not interrupt his studies on the squadron and, in his order of July 5, 1790, gave specific instructions to ship commanders on training gunners. The order spoke of the need to carry out daily exercises in rapid firing from cannons, to practice aiming guns, for which it was proposed to attach three gunners to each gun, changing them to perform duties in turn. On each ship, the commanders were required to arrange a personal examination of the gunners. To sum up the results of the artillery preparation, Ushakov planned to conduct a general exercise of the entire squadron with firing.

Ushakov achieved great success in organizing vigilant service on ships and in coastal fortresses, for which he widely used Peter's traditions - the exchange of prearranged signals when ships meet at sea and when ships approach fortresses. Ushakov paid much attention to organizing reconnaissance in the theater and studying the enemy.

The flourishing of naval art in Russia in the second half of the 18th century naturally coincided with the flourishing of all Russian military art during this period. From the moment of the organization of the regular army and navy under Peter I, the development of military art went in parallel with the naval art, expressing the growth of the regular armed forces of the Russian state. In this situation, Ushakov showed a correct understanding of the importance of the fleet for Russia and its place in the system of the armed forces.

This allowed Ushakov to become a great master of organizing the interaction of the fleet with the ground forces. Ushakov attached particular importance to the organization of regular formations of the ground forces (marine infantry) in the fleet. Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov devoted his entire life to the fleet. If, thanks to Rumyantsev and especially Suvorov, the Russian army not only preserved the glorious military traditions, but also significantly increased them, then in the fleet this merit belonged to Ushakov.

Ushakov did not lose a single naval battle, and he considered the stamina and courage of the squadron sailors to be the main factor in his victories. Ushakov himself tirelessly took care of the team and often spent his personal funds on food and the needs of the squadron during the period of interruptions in the supply of the squadron. The humane attitude towards the sailor and the well-thought-out system of educating the personnel of the squadrons in many respects made Ushakov related to Suvorov. Ushakov, like Suvorov, highly valued the moral qualities of Russian soldiers.

Suvorov and Ushakov's principles of education and training of army and navy personnel at that time found some support only among the most far-sighted representatives of the highest court nobility, such as, for example, Rumyantsev and Potemkin. They understood perfectly well that in order to fight external enemies, a strong army was needed, which could not hold on to only one stick drill. Potemkin and his like-minded people understood that only an authoritative commander could confidently lead personnel into battle. F.F. was such a chief in the fleet. Ushakov, who had great authority and earned the boundless trust and devotion of the squadron personnel.

The characterization of Admiral Ushakov's naval activities will be incomplete without mentioning his diplomatic abilities and political outlook, which he showed with particular force in the period 1798-1800.

Ushakov's activities in the Mediterranean were greatly complicated by the hostile attitude towards him on the part of the commander of the "allied" English squadron, Admiral Nelson. The latter sought to divert the Russians from Malta and the Adriatic Sea and send the Russian squadron to the Levant, thereby securing freedom of action against Malta and preventing the Russians from gaining a foothold in the Ionian archipelago. Nelson hoped in this way to release the English forces operating in the Levant, and direct them to strengthen the Maltese direction, which was more important for England during this period. Nelson tried to use any dishonest means to do this. On the one hand, he flattered Emperor Paul I as "Grand Master of the Order of Malta", sent him honorary reports and gifts. On the other hand, he constantly demanded from the commanders of his ships not to allow the hoisting of the Russian flag in Malta in any case, he tried to arouse distrust of the Russians on the part of the Turkish admiral, who acted together with Ushakov.

Ushakov did not succumb to the cunning tricks of the English admiral, he boldly and honestly expressed his disagreement to him and led a firm and consistent line aimed at protecting Russia's interests in the Mediterranean.

Naval art of Ushakov could have been even more developed if not for the numerous intrigues on the part of individual officials and soulless representatives of the bureaucratic autocratic regime.

Upon returning to his homeland, Ushakov did not receive real recognition from the tsar and the government. At the beginning of 1802, he was appointed commander of the Baltic galley fleet, which essentially meant the removal of the famous naval commander from military affairs, since the importance of the galley fleet at that time was becoming secondary. In 1807, Ushakov was completely dismissed, and ten years later, on October 4, 1817, he died in his estate in the Temnikovsky district of the Tambov province.

But Ushakov was not forgotten by the Russian people and the Russian fleet. His tactical skill was further developed in the combat activities of Ushakov's closest student and comrade-in-arms - Admiral Dmitry Nikolayevich Senyavin - and through him became the property of the "Lazarev school" and the famous Russian admirals of a later period in the development of the Russian fleet.

The memory of the naval commander is carefully preserved by the Russian people. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 3, 1944, the Order and Medal of Ushakov were established, which were awarded to many officers and sailors of the Soviet Navy, who distinguished themselves during the years of the Great Patriotic War in battles against the Nazi invaders.

Line tactics, theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat in linear battle formations with an even distribution of troops (naval forces) along the front, which existed in the 17-18 centuries (centuries) Developed in connection with equipping armies with firearms and increasing the role of fire in battle. The troops for combat were located in a line consisting of several ranks (their number was determined depending on the rate of fire of the weapon), which made it possible to simultaneously fire from the largest number of guns. The tactics of the troops was reduced mainly to a frontal clash. The outcome of the battle was largely decided by the power of infantry fire.

L. t. in Western Europe originated in the late 16th and early 17th centuries (century) in the Dutch infantry, where square columns were replaced by linear constructions. In the Russian troops, elements of L. t. were first used in the battle at Dobrynichakh (1605). The full design of L. t. received in the Swedish army of Gustav II Adolf in the period Thirty Years' War 1618-1648, and then was adopted in all European armies. This was facilitated by an increase in the rate of fire of the musket and the improvement of artillery. Gustav II Adolf increased the number of musketeers to 2/3 of his infantry, completely abandoned deep formations and switched to a formation of 6 or less lines. The superiority of the linear order of battle over the old battle formation of columns was finally determined in the battles of Breitenfelde (1631) and Lützen (1632), but at the same time, the negative aspects of L. t. were also revealed: the impossibility of concentrating superior forces in the decisive sector of the battle, the ability to act only on open flat terrain, the weakness of the flanks and the difficulty of maneuvering the infantry, due to which the cavalry acquired decisive importance for the outcome of the battle. . Mercenary soldiers were kept in close lines with the help of cane discipline, and when the formation was broken, they fled from the battlefield. Lightning received its classical forms in the 18th century, especially in the Prussian army of Frederick II, who brought the combat rate of fire of each line up to 2-3 volleys per minute with the most severe drill. To eliminate the shortcomings of the battalion, Frederick II introduced an oblique battle formation (the battalions advanced in a ledge), which consisted of 3 lines of battalions with 3 ranks each. The cavalry was built in 3 lines. Artillery was placed in the intervals between the battalions, on the flanks and in front of the battle formation. Despite the perfection that had been achieved, the L. t. of the troops of Frederick II continued to be stereotyped and inflexible. Russian commanders of the 18th century - Peter I, P. S. Saltykov, P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov, adhering to L. t., were looking for new ways of fighting. Peter I created a reserve in a linear order of battle, Rumyantsev began to use loose formation and squares. Suvorov, along with the linear battle order, introduced columns, used squares, loose formation, and a combination of all these forms of combat formation of troops. By the end of the 18th century L. t. exhausted its capabilities, the French, Russian, and then other armies switched to a new tactic based on a combination of columns and loose formation. (Cm. Military art. )

L. t. until the end of the 18th century. dominated also in the Navy (navy). Ships to guide sea ​​battle lined up, the outcome of the battle was decided by a frontal collision and simultaneous firing from the guns of most ships. At the end of the 18th century in the Navy (navy) they switched to a new one - maneuvering tactics, the foundations of which were laid by the Russian admirals G. A. Spiridov and F. F. Ushakov. (Cm. naval art. ) In modern conditions, the term "L. T." usually used when clumsy battle formations are meant, their lack of depth, even distribution of forces along the front, inability to maneuver with a change in the situation, etc.

I. I. Kartavtsev.

The military art of the European armies of the period under review was characterized by the dominance of linear tactics and the predominance in strategy of methods of maneuvering the struggle for communications. Russia was no exception to this rule. This fully applies to tactics, although some deviations from the general direction were found in the development of the strategy of the Russian army, as will be discussed below.

In Western Europe, linear tactics originated in the Dutch army at the beginning of the 17th century. In the Russian army, the first example of the use of elements of linear tactics was the battle of Dobrynich on January 21, 1605. An important stage in its formation was the tactics of the Swedish troops of Gustav II Adolf in the battles of the Thirty Years' War. The Swedish victories at Breitenfeld and Lützen (1631–1632) showed the clear superiority of this tactic over the deep columnar formations (tercios) of the infantry of their imperial opponents. Linear tactics finally took shape and became widespread at the beginning of the 18th century, after at the end of the previous century the flintlock was replaced by a flintlock and a bayonet was invented that was put on the barrel of a gun and did not interfere with shooting (unlike the previously used baguette, which inserted into the stem).

The objective basis for the transition to linear tactics as a new system of combat was the evolution of weapons, and above all infantry firearms. Such a position in its philosophical content was a manifestation of a general sociological law on the leading role of the development of tools of labor in the evolution of all other aspects of the life of society in relation to such a specific sphere of human activity as war.

The imperfection of infantry firearms led to the existence of the latter in the 16th-17th centuries in two forms: pikemen, whose main weapon was a pike, and musketeers, that is, arrows armed with heavy, bulky, slowly loaded matchlock muskets. While the firearms were not effective enough, the melee weapons of the pikemen were the protection of the musketeers from the enemy cavalry. A continuous, deep battle order was dictated by the desire for the combined use of both a large mass of people with cold weapons and musketeer infantry. The improvement of firearms - the lightening of the musket, the elimination of the bipod, the improvement of the matchlock - led to a change in this practice in the first half of the 17th century.

Deep formations did not make it possible to fully use the fire of their infantry and at the same time suffered unjustified losses from enemy infantry fire. The battle order of the infantry, formed by thin lines, became dominant. However, the parallel existence of musketeers and pikemen persisted almost until late XVII century, until finally the introduction of a flintlock and a bayonet made the shooters fully capable of independently repelling a cavalry attack and led to the unification of the infantry.

At the same time, the main tactical forms also developed: two or three lines of battle order, formed by infantry battalions in a deployed close formation, several ranks deep (the number of which gradually decreased over the 18th century), cavalry on the flanks of these lines, regimental artillery in the intervals between infantry battalions, field - in large batteries, relatively evenly distributed along the front.

Undoubtedly, linear tactics represented more effective method combat in comparison with the constructions of the previous period. But this system had one more function - linear tactics was the only possible form of combat control in the conditions of the predominance of mercenary armies in Europe at that time. Fighting in linear combat formations assumed a high level of preliminary training. In other words, linear tactics implied the strengthening of "regularity", that is, a professionally organized and trained army.

The patterns analyzed above were of a general nature, manifesting themselves in various national conditions. Naturally, the transition to linear tactics in Russia was based on the action of the same objective factors. However, its preservation in Russia, as well as the degree of penetration of its templates into the tactical arsenal of the Russian army, developed somewhat peculiarly: in the conditions of recruitment and partly organization characteristic of the Russian army, the dominance of linear tactics was not based only on one of the functions that it performed in armies of Europe.

The fact is that linear tactics turned out to be in the best possible way the transformation of a mass of soldiers recruited by force or deceit into a combat-ready army. Linear construction and linear combat made it easier for officers and non-commissioned officers to control the behavior of a soldier in battle. F. Engels, characterizing this system, quite rightly compared it with a "straitjacket". But only this was reliable, if we keep in mind the "human material" that was typical for the armies of Western Europe.

From the very beginning, linear tactics were inherent in some organic shortcomings. “Each squadron, battalion and gun had its own specific place in the battle order, which could not be disturbed anywhere or in any way disordered without this affecting the combat capability of the entire army ... if it was necessary to perform any maneuver, (I had to carry it out with the whole army ... "In other words, the extreme bulkiness and inflexibility of this kind of battle formation and the difficulty of managing it in battle were its first major drawback. The system itself gave rise to pedantry in its combat use.

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The features of the "human material" that was characteristic of the Russian army, in principle, created certain opportunities for gradually overcoming the negative aspects of the linear organization of the battle. It is impossible not to take revenge in this regard, that in the Russian army since the time of Peter I there was a different view of the meaning moral factor and a different way of creating and maintaining the morale of the troops than the Western European "straitjacket" of linear tactics. However, the process of bringing this method to perfection dragged on for a long time. In parallel with this process, another one developed - a critical understanding of the combat experience of troop operations in the canons of linear tactics. At the end of the century, they seemed to close together, which resulted in going beyond the limits of linear tactics. But this is in the future.

As for the middle of the century, in all the armies of Europe, not excluding the Russian, linear tactics determined the dominant direction of military affairs and the use of troops. "Regularity", persistently introduced by Peter I, could not have an expression other than linear tactics. On it were built the instructions of Peter I, according to which the Russian troops acted in the battles of the Northern War, and the exercise of the “Military Regulations” of 1716. This exercise, canceled in the 30s by Munnich, was restored on January 15, 1742, and was in effect until 1755, when new combat regulations were introduced - infantry and cavalry, which to a certain extent (especially infantry) deepened the most specific features of linear tactics.

In general, linear tactics was a natural stage in the development of military art, conditioned by the influence of objective factors. However, patterns gradually began to take shape in it, acquiring the character of canonical rules, the application of which was not always necessary. These features brought the tactics of the Western European armies to stagnation after the end of the Seven Years' War.

When analyzing and evaluating the linear tactics of the middle of the 18th century, it is necessary to approach separately the tactics of units and subunits of military branches and general tactics. Infantry battalions - tactical units - in the middle of the century fought in a deployed close formation, 3-4 lines deep. From the battalions constructed in this way with regimental artillery guns, in the intervals between them, infantry battle formation lines were formed. The indicated formation of the battalion was designed to use all available guns, create fire of considerable density and at the same time provide sufficient stability in the event of a bayonet fight.

Infantry fire of that time from a deployed close formation had a fairly significant efficiency. Mass fire remained effective at a distance of more than 300 steps. This is confirmed by the fact that Suvorov - a resolute opponent of useless "scare" fire - in one of the tactical instructions of 1799 demanded firing from a close formation from three hundred paces, therefore, the maximum distance of actual fire was at least fifty paces more.

The ballistic qualities of an infantry rifle at the end of the 18th century improved slightly compared to the middle of the century, but the data available in the literature suggest that there was no significant difference in the range of effective mass fire.

There are significant discrepancies in the literature regarding the rate of fire. For the period of the Seven Years' War, it can be assumed that well-trained infantry, when firing without aiming, as was required in Western European armies, could fire 2-3 volleys per minute (for the Prussians - 5). When shooting with aiming, this rate should be reduced to one and a half or a few more shots per minute. Even a cavalry attack on an undisrupted infantry front could be repelled by rifle fire and buckshot from regimental artillery. It was all the more difficult to expect success from a bayonet attack without a shot from the infantry of the advancing side on the infantry of the defending side, which was stationary and firing.

However, by the middle of the 18th century, an overestimation of the importance of rifle fire and an underestimation of the bayonet strike became noticeable in infantry tactics.

In the Western European armies, the main task of both tactics and infantry training was to obtain fire superiority over the enemy. In this case, the latter was achieved by increasing the rate of non-aimed fire.

In the Russian army, in which the high moral qualities of the soldiers eliminated the prerequisite indicated for the Western European armies for the weakening of the role of edged weapons and enthusiasm for fire tactics, it would be consistent to continue to adhere to the system that combined fire combat with a bayonet strike, which was successfully used by Russian troops in the battles of the Northern War. However, the Western European influence that penetrated Russian military art in the 30s of the 18th century deviated the development of Russian infantry tactics from this natural path. The infantry regulations of 1755 sharply emphasized the importance of infantry fire. “All the training of soldiers,” read the instruction of this charter, “means to load and shoot, and, moreover, how to use it with success in firing.” The presentation of the numerous methods of firing from a close formation almost completely obscured the significance of the bayonet strike. The positive aspect of the "Description of the Infantry Regimental Formation" was that, in contrast to Western European views, it required mandatory aiming. In fact, in the battles of the Seven Years' War, the Russian infantry did not always neglect the bayonet, but Negative influence The above requirement of the charter on the training of troops, and hence on combat practice, could not but affect.

The difficulties of an infantry attack, with the practice of using line formation for pure fire combat firmly rooted in the tactics of Western European armies, were obvious to some military thinkers in the West. In the 20s of the 18th century, the French military writer Folar proposed to attack in large close columns. This caused a long discussion, but had no practical consequences. In the battle of Rossbach in 1757, the French tried to use Folar's columns, but were defeated by Frederick, who used his "oblique battle formation".

Russian military thought and practice in this matter (but only in this) were somewhat ahead of Western European ones. In the Infantry Charter of 1755, a “dense”, i.e. closed (as opposed to open, intended for evolution), battalion column was introduced into the number of combat formations. Its main purpose, as indicated by the charter, was to "refraction the enemy's front."

Realizing that a bayonet attack in columns must be prepared by fire, the compilers of the Charter gave a number of recommendations on firing from a column (they occupy most of the chapter on columns - Chapter XIII of Part 2 of the Charter); the importance of the column as a purely shock tactical form was thus reduced. The "thick" columns of the Charter of 1755 did not remain only on paper, like the columns of Folar; in one of the battles of the Seven Years' War, they were successfully put into practice, as discussed below.

Unlike infantry tactics, which at the time in question had both positive and clearly negative features, there are no grounds for such an assessment with regard to cavalry tactics and methods of using this type of troops in battle. The main method of action for the cavalry, both in domestic and in Western European views, is a swift strike with melee weapons, and the battle formation is reduced to two or three lines of squadrons deployed in three lines.

The Charter of the Russian cavalry of 1755, based on the ideas of Frederick the Great, generally gave the right direction to the development of its tactics, emphasizing the importance of striking in close formation at a great gait. The charter indicated that "every action and strength of the cavalry, which happens with adventage and with the victory of the enemy, consists in the courage of people, in the good use of broadswords, in strong closing and a cruel blow through a strong jump."

For all the value of the cavalry as a means of attack, its combat capabilities were limited. The frontal attack of the cavalry on the infantry, not upset by the actions of other branches of the armed forces, as was said, had little chance of success.

Incomparably greater advantages had a cavalry attack on the flank, covering thin and slow-moving infantry lines. Such an attack for the latter was very dangerous. From this followed the typical arrangement of cavalry masses on the wings of the general battle order, which had become almost the rule. The side that managed to overturn one or both of the opposing cavalry wings of the enemy got a chance for a final victory.

A very large role was assigned to the cavalry not only in battle, but also in tactical support for military operations, in strategic reconnaissance, in raids on enemy communications, covering areas of concentration and location of the main forces. The actions of the light cavalry of all sides (hussars, pandurs and Cossacks, called "light troops", and dragoon cavalry) during the Seven Years' War provide a number of examples of the successful solution of such tasks.

In the wars of the 1930s and 1940s and at the beginning of the Seven Years' War, artillery played a secondary role compared to other branches of the armed forces. Later, during the Seven Years' War, its importance increased sharply, which in all European armies was caused by its numerical increase, and in the Russian army by qualitative improvement. By the end of the Seven Years' War, the number of guns reached 6–7 or more per thousand people - a norm that was achieved later only in wars early XIX century. However, in the Seven Years' War, as in the previous quarter of a century, artillery was predominantly a weapon of defense.

Artillery fire of medium and large calibers (from 6 to 12 pounds and above) - field artillery was a powerful combat weapon. It is not difficult to imagine the effectiveness of canister shots of such guns against close formations of infantry and cavalry. However, the mobility on the battlefield of these guns, due to the large weight, as well as the insufficient perfection of the undercarriage of the systems and the methods of their movement in the sphere of fire, was low. They could not accompany the infantry in the offensive, despite the extreme slowness of the advance of long infantry lines. The problem of increasing the mobility of field artillery was the main one in improving artillery weapons at the time in question. An important issue was the increase in the range of the actual grapeshot fire.

Until this basic problem was resolved, there was a need to have light artillery in the infantry units, which could move at the speed of the infantry battle formations - regimental artillery. In the Russian army, it was organizationally part of the infantry and dragoon regiments (four guns per two-battalion infantry regiment and two guns per dragoon). But due to this decision this species artillery turned out to be dispersed along the front in battle; massaging his fire was not feasible.

From this followed the usual principles for the use of field artillery for that time: its guns were reduced to several (most often three) large batteries, distributed relatively evenly along the front. During the defense, the firing positions did not change, and in the offensive they tried to move the batteries of field artillery forward behind the advancing infantry, but at best they managed (and even then partially) to take one more firing position and support the infantry, and more often they failed to do this either.

By the middle of the 18th century, it became clear both in Russia and in Western Europe that the heavy field artillery guns that existed did not meet the requirements of combat practice. A trend towards lighter guns emerged at the time in question in a number of Western European countries. However, only in Prussia and Russia this trend was carried out consistently in practice. It was especially important that it was carried out in artillery in organic connection with the desire to increase the effectiveness of fire and with attempts to find expedient forms of organization of the latter.

The artillery transformations of the 50s of the 18th century represented an outstanding phenomenon in the development of Russian military art and deserved great attention, since they contained beginnings that acted in one way or another as progressive elements of further complex development, and in addition, served as an indicator high level Russian military and military-technical thought of that time.

The transformations were carried out by a group of outstanding Russian artillerymen, which included generals I.F. Glebov, K.B. Borozdin, designers of artillery weapons M.V. Danilov and M.G. Martynov and other theorists and practitioners of artillery; the team was headed by Feldzeugmeister General P. I. Shuvalov.

The search for new types of guns that were conducted by these Russian gunners, on the one hand, along the line of increasing the effectiveness of grapeshot fire, and on the other hand, along the line of reducing the weight of guns, led in 1753-1756 to the creation of Shuvalov's (the so-called "secret") howitzers and unicorns. There is no need to dwell on the first of these types: the technical idea embodied in the Shuvalov howitzers (increase in the dispersion of buckshot horizontally by giving cross section oval-shaped bore), did not materialize.

"Unicorns", on the contrary, showed high technical qualities and combat value. These guns were elongated howitzers that combined the properties of howitzers and guns. By reducing the weight of the charge, it was possible to achieve a significant reduction in the weight of the gun compared to guns. 12-pound gun mod. 1734 had a trunk weight of 112 pounds and was transported by 15 horses; half-pound "unicorn" arr. 1760, intended to replace these cannons, had a barrel weighing 30 pounds and was transported by 5 horses. At the same time, the "unicorns" had a sufficient range of a flat shot, and the ability to fire at high elevation angles; they could fire buckshot, solid, explosive and incendiary shells.

Thus, a big step forward was made in the direction of lightening the guns. However, this was not tantamount to increasing the mobility of field artillery in combat. It was necessary to improve the undercarriage of the system and improve the way the guns were moved on the battlefield. Shuvalov and his collaborators worked on this problem as well. During the Seven Years' War, as the significance of these aspects loomed, "transport" teams were formed with field artillery, and later - two artillery fuselery regiments to ensure the movement of guns in battle manually on straps, as well as to cover them. New ways of moving guns were also developed. Thus, a number of measures have been taken to streamline organizational structure artillery, the introduction of furshtat teams into the composition of combat artillery units.

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Thanks to the transformations that took place in the 1750s, the artillery of the Russian army rose to a new stage of development, while ahead of the artillery of Western European armies. The results of the practical implementation of the listed artillery transformations in the battles of the Seven Years' War were, as shown below, very significant, although not all of their possibilities were fully used. It is important to emphasize that Shuvalov and his collaborators, in general, correctly identified the directions for further development in the key issues of the materiel, organization and tactics of artillery.

If the tactics of the infantry of this period reveal a combination of expedient sides and unnecessarily patterns, the tactics of the cavalry can be recognized as fully meeting the conditions and tasks of its use, and the shortcomings in the combat use of artillery were caused by objective factors, then the situation in general tactics must be assessed differently. It was precisely here that the striving of Western European (pre-Friedrich and post-Friedrich) military thought to introduce canonical rules and routines had the greatest effect, a trend that domestic military art did not escape to one degree or another.

It is necessary to pay attention to this difference between the nature of the tactics of the armed forces and the general tactics that developed at the time under consideration. In the future, as will be shown, while maintaining the forms of tactics of the combat arms, significant changes took place in general tactics.

We list the main, most typical provisions of the general tactics of the middle of the 18th century:

A. "Normal" order of battle: an infantry center formed by two, sometimes three lines of deployed battalions (the third line is incomplete), and cavalry wings.

B. Mandatory continuity of battle order: in any case, the first line must be continuous.

B. Uniform distribution of forces along the front.

D. Weakness or complete absence in the order of battle of the reserve.

D. An artificial and complex way of deploying from marching to battle formation (by entering).

E. The weakness of tactical pursuit, sometimes - a complete rejection of it.

The "normal" formation of battle order was based, as already mentioned, on rational considerations: to cover the flanks of the infantry lines with cavalry, to provide the latter with the opportunity to make the fullest use of its maneuvering properties; the shallow depth of the battle formation was the result of the desire to use as widely as possible weapon infantry. However, at the time under review, this type of battle formation acquired the character of a frozen template, often used without taking into account the specific situation. Characteristic in this regard was the practice of establishing "battle orders" designed for any conditions. Often did not adhere to this pattern and Frederick the Great, who won a number of major victories in three wars, retreated from him and PS Saltykov at Kunersdorf, which then brought him success.

The requirement for a continuous line of battle was perhaps the most serious defect in the line tactics of the mid-eighteenth century. It stemmed from the fear that gaps in the line of battalions would create gaps into which the enemy, and above all his cavalry, could burst. As the facts show, it was precisely this far-fetched rule that was first of all discarded in the course of the further progressive development of military art, and precisely in the Prussian army.

Refusal to dismember the battle formation created enormous difficulties in the offensive even on uncrossed terrain. Therefore, due to the difficulties of conducting an infantry attack, the offensive has now become the most "difficult" form of combat.

There is no need to prove that the uniform or almost uniform distribution of forces along the front was a significant shortcoming of the linear battle order. This deficiency could be greatly mitigated by the creation of a strong general reserve. But the Western European military art of that time, including Frederick II, this idea was completely alien. On the contrary, this commander was characterized by a pronounced desire to solve the battle with the first blow. It will be shown below that in the course of the Seven Years' War Russian military art revealed a different approach to this issue.

The method of deploying troops from marching order to combat, established in linear tactics, was associated with the provision on the continuity of the front. It was believed that the most natural way - deployment over the heads of the columns (the so-called deployed) - does not ensure the construction of continuous lines of battle formation: it was practically impossible to maintain the intervals between the columns approaching the battlefield so precisely that after their deployment, between the corresponding columns of the units would not work breaks. Therefore, they adopted the method of deployment by entry.

As a rule, the army formed two columns corresponding to the lines of battle order. Subunits (plutongs or divisions, etc.) moved at distances equal to the length of the unit's front. When approaching the line of deployment, the columns stretched along it, and then the units went to the front and thus lined up the lines of battle formation. The major disadvantages of this method are obvious. First of all, he demanded highly trained troops. Not surprisingly, the generally cautious Austrians, in order to avoid the difficulties of deployment, usually preferred to take up defensive positions in advance, thus transferring the initiative to the enemy. The same was observed in the Russian army.

The lack of perseverance in the pursuit or the complete rejection of it was probably the weakest point of the tactical system under consideration. None of the decisive victories of one side or the other in the Silesian and Seven Years' Wars ended in any effective persecution. In the Western European armies, they feared that after the victory the soldiers might rush to rob the convoy and the camp of the vanquished; therefore, after the successful end of the battle, efforts were directed to preventing disorder in the troops, especially in the infantry. As a rule, only light and dragoon cavalry were allowed to be used for tactical pursuit. With such a limitation of the forces allocated for the pursuit, significant results could not be expected from him.

To what has been said, it must be added that the canonical rules of linear tactics forbade occupying settlements for defense. It was believed that the soldiers, divided into small groups to occupy the buildings, would get out of the control of the commanders. The conduct of hostilities at night was allowed for the same reasons only in exceptional cases.

Finally, we note that marching movements were made very slowly. During the Seven Years' War in the Russian army, two geographical miles, i.e., about 15 kilometers, were considered the normal value of a daily march. For example, in the order of the commander of the Russian army A. B. Buturlin to march when speaking on winter quarters in 1760 it was said: “To have ordinary marches - 2 miles each” (!). Only in some cases this norm was slightly exceeded. The Prussians also managed then to make forced marches of 40–50 kilometers, which often gave Frederick the opportunity to beat his numerous opponents “crawling” from place to place in parts.

Under the conditions of this constraining, largely artificial tactical system, the Prussian king Frederick II managed to win a number of victories over his opponents in the Silesian and Seven Years' Wars (the Austrians, in one case the French and Russians), sometimes with a significant superiority of the latter in forces. By stubborn, albeit mechanically drilled, training, Frederick II achieved a relatively high tactical mobility of his troops, which allowed him to more or less successfully maneuver on the battlefield in an undivided battle order. Meanwhile, the Austrians behaved completely passively and this gave Frederick the opportunity to freely occupy the most advantageous position for the attack.

A typical technique of Frederick II was to strike the enemy in the flank, for which the Prussian king deployed his troops approximately perpendicular to the front of the defender. In passing, I note that if this maneuver created a real advantage for the Prussians, then the well-known "oblique battle formation" of their infantry (the battalion's concessional position in battle lines) was of no importance; it only made it easier to some extent to advance the lines during the offensive.

I emphasize that the successes of Frederick II were based on adherence to patterns, passivity and, moreover, on the low quality of the troops of his opponents (especially the infantry). Battles with the Russian troops showed that the tactics of Frederick II could bring decisive success only under limited conditions.

In the field of strategy, in contrast to tactics, the views held by the Russian armed forces throughout the 18th century did not, to some extent, coincide with the concepts that prevailed in Western Europe. The legacy of the Northern War played a positive role, when Russia's political goals were of a national, large-scale nature, and, accordingly, the Russian strategy was based on sound principles. However, in the middle of the 18th century, at the starting point of the progressive development that took place in the second half of the century, during the reign of Catherine, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between domestic and Western European strategic methods that manifested themselves in the campaigns of the Seven Years' War (although in some cases there were quite significant differences place). The reasons for this situation lay in the somewhat specific nature of the goals and directions of Russian policy in the Seven Years' War, which were not as progressive as those in the name of which the Northern War and the Russian-Turkish wars of the second half of the 18th century were fought.

What were the most typical features of the strategy of the European armies of the period under review? The political goals of the wars of the Western European feudal-absolutist states of the second half of the 17th - the first half of the 18th centuries were distinguished by their limitedness and deep inconsistency. Narrow dynastic interests, the intention to seize one or another territory, often not connected with the core of a given state either geographically or nationally, acted as the guiding motives of the parties entering into a military struggle.

The limited and sometimes inconsistent political goals led to the limitations of strategic methods. The achievement of such relatively small political goals without extreme effort seemed to be the most expedient way of waging war.

On the other hand, the military means available to the feudal-absolutist states of Western Europe were limited. The method of manning the troops adopted in these states (recruitment) did not provide the possibility of creating armed forces of large numbers and quickly replenishing losses during the war. War was a very expensive and burdensome business. Especially difficult was the restoration of trained personnel. The material means of waging war were limited by the low level of industrial and agricultural production of that time.

On this basis, a strategic concept was formed in Western Europe, in accordance with which the question of completely suppressing the enemy's resistance by destroying or defeating his entire army was not raised. Therefore, the battle was given the place not of a decisive act of war, but only one of the means of influencing the enemy. A decisive offensive deep into the territory of the enemy, posing a threat to the vital centers of his country, as a rule, was recognized as impossible due to a lack of forces and means. The method best suited to such a formulation of the strategic task was to seize the disputed territory (or other border region of the enemy country, which could be exchanged for the disputed one at the conclusion of peace) and hold it until the enemy was exhausted in attempts to return it. The actions of the defender were limited to repulsing, most often, a very shallow enemy invasion. I note that the tasks of mastering the territory were solved mainly by capturing the most important fortresses located on this territory. Thus, geographic features assumed paramount importance, and the battle was relegated to the background.

One of the reasons for underestimating the battles was the inability to "exploit" the victory. Under the conditions of linear tactics, energetic tactical pursuit, as a rule, was absent. Breaking away from the enemy still close to the battlefield, the defeated got the opportunity to recover and further increase the gap even further. At the same time, the winner was seized by the fear of moving away from their bases, while the pursued was approaching his own. Therefore, if the tactical pursuit was weak, then in most cases the strategic pursuit was completely abandoned. After all that has been said, one should not be surprised that the Western European military thought of that time did not regard the battle as a necessary decisive act of war.

Another major and difficult problem of the strategy was the issue of food and fodder supply. Its sharpness in European armies was intensified by the fear that soldiers, not receiving sufficient food, could turn to robbery, and this would lead to the decomposition of discipline (note that food allowance was one of the types of payment for a recruited soldier and his disobedience in this case even received some legal justification). Such a view, which was based on real considerations, was turned, by virtue of the dogmatism inherent in Western European thought of that time, into a strict requirement for the mandatory organization and maintenance of a continuous supply of the army from food and fodder stores. It was considered unacceptable to resort to the requisition of funds from the local population because of the fear that it could easily turn into robbery with all the ensuing consequences. The loss of army communications with stores was regarded as a situation close to disaster or even disastrous.

A supply system has developed, limiting the allowable distance of the army from the store to five daily marches (i.e., no more than 100-120 kilometers, based on the above-mentioned usual marching speeds); further progress required the laying of new stores, which took time. Such a norm was derived from the condition of the mandatory provision of troops with baked bread and the permissible duration of its preservation in summer time- 9 days. With some forcing, in some cases it was allowed to increase the indicated norm to seven transitions.

No less, if not greater, restrictions on the possibility of non-stop offensive operations were imposed by the difficulties of uninterrupted transportation of dry fodder (one should take into account the huge horse carts). Lloyd, one of the most prominent representatives of military thought in the middle of the 18th century, pessimistically stated: “... our armies in their state of the art they can maneuver only within a very limited circle and along a very short line of operation; they are incapable of causing either major upheavals or vast conquests."

The magazine supply system and the sensitivity of armies to disruption of communication with bases, on the one hand, the underestimation of the battle, on the other, led to the formation of one of the guiding ideas of the European strategy of the 17th-18th centuries - to achieve the solution of strategic tasks by maneuvering directed against enemy communications, without inflicting blows to his manpower.

The essence of maneuvering was to cover up one's own communications and take a position that threatened the enemy's communications, and ideally even reach his communications. In this way, it was possible to push back the enemy army and then take possession of the intended objects: fortresses, cities and territory. This path seemed to be "economical", devoid of risk, bypassing the shortcomings of tactics and the randomness of the battle; using it was thought to demonstrate the skill of a general.

In fact, this method of action usually led to fruitless trampling for many months in the border areas. The side, which managed to push back the enemy army by maneuvers, proceeded to siege and blockade of its fortresses; the former required a fairly considerable time, the latter an indefinitely long time. The enemy was returning to unblock his fortresses, followed by a new series of maneuvers, attacks on transports, mutual waiting in strong positions, etc.

Almost without exception, the campaign ended with the onset of the winter season with a retreat to the area of ​​​​the main bases, to "winter quarters". The reason for this was the lack of pasture for horses and the unwillingness to use the possibility of quartering troops when making marches (for fear of desertion). Thus, the wars dragged on for many years and, as a result, led to a much greater mutual exhaustion of the parties than could be the case with an energetic course of action aimed at a quick denouement.

To determine the essence, the main feature of the strategic scheme analyzed above, the term "cordon strategy" is sometimes used in modern Russian military history literature. It is difficult to agree with this. The cordon system - a linear dispersion of forces in small groups over a long distance - did not play the main role in strategy in the middle of the 18th century, although it was used in some cases. An example is the defense of a mountain line in Saxony by the Prussian corps of Prince Heinrich in 1758. As for the Russian army, the cordon system was almost never used in it, only sometimes cordon curtains were created to cover the winter quarters of the troops.

The mentioned individual cases do not give grounds to extend the name "cordon" to the entire strategic system of the Western European armies of the first half - the middle of the 18th century. The cordon deployment of forces became typical of Western European strategy only in the last decades of the 18th century (since the War of the Bavarian Succession of 1778-1779 described in the last chapters of this book).

The correct definition of the internal content of the Western European strategy in the middle of the 18th century is formulated as follows - "the method of waging war by carefully maneuvering on the flanks and communications of the enemy in order to push him back and take possession of a certain area without battles was called a maneuver strategy."

It seems that it is more logical to call this system of actions not a cordon, but a maneuver strategy.

From what has been said, however, one should not conclude that the European strategy of the middle of the 18th century generally rejected the dispersion of forces (of a non-cordon character). The division of troops deployed in one theater of operations into several groups, although not linearly extended along any lines, is found at the beginning of the Seven Years' War among the Prussians and especially among the Austrians. There are quite a few examples. We note one of them: at the end of July (old style) 1759, before the battle of Kunersdorf, the Austrian army of Daun consisted of seven independent groups, not counting the Laudon corps that joined the Russians.

Such is the tactics and strategy of the Western European and Russian armies on the eve of the largest military conflict of the middle of the 18th century - the Seven Years' War. In the course of it, significant changes took place in the military art of the Prussian and Russian armies, the essence of which can only be understood in connection with an analysis of hostilities.

Although the Russian infantry throughout the war acted in accordance with the regulations of the time, there were still some new moments in its tactics. For example, Rumyantsev's activities during the siege of Kolberg (1761) led to some new phenomena in Russian military art. As noted earlier, during this period, Rumyantsev created two light infantry battalions in the troops of the siege corps. The directive on their formation also gives instructions on the tactics of these units. In particular, Rumyantsev recommends that when pursuing the enemy, "let the best shooters be released in one line." Such a line, when operating on rough terrain, obviously turned into a loose formation by itself. The area most advantageous for the use of light infantry, the directive recognized forests, villages and "passes" (i.e. defile, cramped passages).

Light infantry existed in European armies before. The Austrian army had irregular militia-type infantry, recruited from the Slavic peoples that were part of the empire: Croats (Croats) and Pandurs. In the Prussian army during the Seven Years' War, several light infantry battalions ("fry battalions") were also created, designed to support light cavalry. The significance of this measure of Rumyantsev was that it was the starting point for the wide and systematic development in the Russian army of a new type of infantry (called the Jaeger) and a new method of conducting combat (loose formation), which will be discussed below.

Meanwhile, in the West, light infantry formations after the end of the Seven Years' War were transformed into ordinary line infantry, and loose formations up to the Great french revolution has not been developed. The latter is quite understandable: in the Western European armies it was considered unacceptable to leave soldiers to themselves in battle; it was believed that, leaving the observation of officers and non-commissioned officers, the soldiers would scatter or lie down and it would become impossible to control them.

It should be noted that some domestic military historians regard the above aspects of Rumyantsev's activities in the field of organization and tactics of the infantry as the beginning of the emergence of the tactical system "column - loose formation". However, the use in Rumyantsev's troops, according to his instructions, of one or another tactical form (column or loose formation) separately does not give grounds to talk about the development (even only at the design stage) of their combination, i.e., the introduction into practice of a new type of infantry combat formation . The loose system was recommended by Rumyantsev in an implicit form and only for specific conditions. There is no need to allow such a stretch, especially since this process actually took place in the Russian army, although later, which will be discussed in detail below.