Spanish foreign policy after the First World War. Spain and Russia during the First World War. Rise to power of the right

HISTORY: ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SPANISH NEUTRALITY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

I.Yu. Mednikov

Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (119334, Moscow, Leninsky Prospekt, 32A), Russian State University for the Humanities (125993, Moscow, Miusskaya Square, 6.

The article is devoted to a little-studied problem - Spanish neutrality during the First World War. The historical significance of Spanish neutrality is considered in the international context, as well as in the context of the internal political, economic and social development of Spain itself. Spain was one of the few major European states that remained neutral throughout World War I. At the same time, despite the fact that the Spanish governments that changed during the years of the conflict declared strict neutrality, it was actually more benevolent towards the Entente countries, and by the end of the war, Spain became its “neutral ally”.

Benevolent relations with the future winners, as well as a broad humanitarian campaign organized under the patronage of the Spanish King Alfonso XIII, allowed Spain to take a more prominent place in the post-war system of international relations. She became, for example, one of the non-permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, neutrality in many ways negatively affected the development of social, economic and political processes in Spain, and in this regard it was strikingly different from those European countries that more effectively used the advantages of wartime, especially the Scandinavian states.

The author believes that if in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, neutrality during the First World War created the foundations for further development and prosperity, then in Spain it strengthened social stratification, deepened ideological demarcation and exacerbated social contradictions, which largely negatively affected the tragic turns Spanish history throughout the 20th century.

Keywords: History of Spain, neutrality, diplomacy.

Centenary of the First World War 1914-1918 contributes to the growth of research and public interest in the history of this conflict, many aspects of which are still poorly understood. One of the "blank spots" in the history of the First World War is the issue of neutrality, the history of neutral countries, their interaction with the belligerents and the impact of the war on their development. An example of this is Spain, which was one of the few major European states that remained neutral throughout the war. In 2000, the famous Spanish historian M. Espadas Burgos noted that “the impact of the First World War on Spain is still one of the chapters in the history of our century that needs to be studied, and as a result, one of the chapters that has accumulated more all clichés and falsifications". After 14 years, this statement has not lost its relevance.

In Spain itself, insufficient attention is paid to the study of this period. In generalizing works and textbooks on Spanish history of the XX century. the reader is unlikely to find a separate chapter entitled, for example, as "Spain and the First World War or "Spanish Neutrality in World War I". Various information on the history of foreign policy, economic, social and political development Spain for 1914-1918. usually fit into a broader chronological framework, whether it be the period of the Restoration (1874-1923) or the reign of Alfonso XIII (1902-1931). Thus, the years of war and neutrality, as it were, are not for the Spaniards separate period their stories. This historiographic tradition, in my opinion, is due to two factors:

Firstly, the weak attention of Spanish historiography to international issues and to “non-Spanish” history;

Secondly, the extreme lack of historical research on Spanish neutrality.

However, the First World War had a major impact on Spain and its subsequent history. At the same time, the historical significance of Spanish neutrality can be considered in two planes: on the one hand, in the international context, that is, how the non-participation of Spain in the war influenced its development and how it affected the international position of Spain after the Treaty of Versailles; on the other hand, in the context of the internal political, economic and social development of Spain itself.

So, did the Spanish government have an alternative to a neutral course in 1914? Could she enter the war on the side of the Triple Alliance or the Entente? As for the Triple Alliance, the relations of Madrid with its main participants in the late XIX - early XX century. cannot be prioritised. Right-

yes, Spain in 1887 secretly joined this alliance: on May 4, she exchanged notes with Italy, which contained the obligation of Spain not to conclude any agreements with France regarding North Africa. In addition, the parties promised to keep each other informed of any changes in the status quo in the Mediterranean. However, this exchange of notes did not lead to any serious consequences in the future. Bismarck did not want a direct alliance between Germany and Spain, and the latter remained disappointed with the behavior of the "allies" in 1898, when neither Berlin, nor Vienna, nor Rome could provide effective assistance to Madrid in the war against the United States.

Spanish diplomatic relations with England and France developed quite differently. In the 19th century, a concept of this relationship developed, which for Spanish diplomacy was to join these two powers if they act together and distance themselves if Paris and London take opposite positions. The first experience of such "accession" took place in 1834, when the Quadruple Alliance was concluded between Spain, Portugal, France and Great Britain, aimed at strengthening liberal regimes in Europe.

It was in the 19th century. the ideological foundations of Spanish neutrality are being laid. Having finally lost its American possessions in the 1820s, Spain turned into a second-rate power, its influence on world politics was sharply reduced, it found itself on the periphery of Europe. With regard to the main international clashes and events of that time (the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the unification of Italy and the unification of Germany, the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871), Spain tried to maintain neutrality. The unwillingness to take part in military-political alliances with the great powers, in major European and international conflicts was explained by the economic and military weakness of Spain, the lack of political stability (revolutions, frequent changes of governments, the so-called Carlist civil wars) and the desire to preserve their remaining colonies. This feature of Spanish foreign policy - balancing between conscious neutrality and forced passivity in the international arena - will become a tradition.

The restoration of the monarchy in 1874 was accompanied by the establishment of internal political stability, but isolationism remained the basis of Spain's foreign policy. Of course, we are not talking about complete international isolation: Spain at that time maintained active diplomatic and trade relations with many countries. Spanish historians to designate the foreign policy of the Restoration era use

they use a special term - "recogimiento", which can be translated as "solitude", "detachment", "immersion in oneself", "isolation".

As a result, in the turbulent years of the last third of the 19th century, when the great world powers began to redistribute the rest of the world, Spain found itself in international "loneliness". On the one hand, she could not independently protect her remaining overseas possessions - a "tidbit" for more developed and powerful powers. On the other hand, the Spaniards rightly feared any alliance with a more powerful state in order to preserve the fragments of the empire. Indeed, for such an alliance, “protection” and “protection”, one would have to take on obligations that hardly correspond to the interests of the Spaniards themselves, or even pay with the same colonies. In the event of a real military conflict, weak Spain could hardly count on the effective help of a strong "ally" who would primarily defend its interests. This international "loneliness" and lack of allies had a negative impact during the war of 1898 against the United States, which for Spain ended in a catastrophic defeat and the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands.

It was after the "catastrophe of 1898" that Spanish politicians began to realize the need to find strong allies capable of guaranteeing Madrid's sovereignty over the remaining Spanish possessions. At the same time, mainland Spain and the Balearic and Canary Islands that belonged to it were of great strategic importance in the Western Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the zone of the Strait of Gibraltar - an extremely important region from a trade and military point of view, in which Great Britain and France showed the greatest interest. Spain's rapprochement with these countries was also facilitated by the "Moroccan question".

The Moroccan Sultanate at that time was one of the few states in Africa that retained its independence. Spanish interests in Morocco were reduced to the preservation of their enclaves - Ceuta and Melilla. France, on the other hand, sought to expand its influence in North Africa, but was afraid of a negative reaction from Great Britain: the British would hardly like it if another great power took control of the southern coast of the Strait of Gibraltar. As a result, the French decided to offer the Spaniards a division of Morocco, in which its northern coastal part, where the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were located, would pass to Spain, and the rest of Morocco to France.

Around Morocco, a triangle of interests of Madrid, Paris and London arose. As before, Spain, despite own interests in the region, tried to distance itself from solving the problem, in which the UK and France clearly appeared as opponents. When the tension between these powers

disappeared after the establishment of 1904 "cordial consent", Spain hastened to join them. The secret part of one of the three Anglo-French agreements signed in 1904 secured British claims to Egypt and French claims to Morocco. At the same time, the interests of Spain on the northern coast of the Sultanate were recognized. Now, however, France has become less accommodating. In subsequent secret Spanish-French agreements on the division of Morocco, the territory intended for Spain was invariably reduced until the official creation in 1912 of a Moroccan protectorate, divided into two zones of influence.

This solution to the "Moroccan issue" intensified the contradictions between the emerging military-political blocs, which resulted in two Moroccan crises. During crises, Spain steadfastly supported the Anglo-French Entente. In 1907, Madrid, London and Paris exchanged identical notes in which they promised to inform each other of any change in the status quo in the Mediterranean and the part of the Atlantic Ocean that washes the shores of Europe and Africa. In order to protect their possessions and maintain the status quo, the parties were ready to agree on a joint line of action. These notes, known as the "Cartagena Agreements", brought Spain out of international isolation and became the culmination point in its rapprochement with the Entente.

However, this rapprochement did not result in the country's formal accession to the Triple Entente. The last attempt by Spain to become a full member of the Entente dates back to 1913. This issue was discussed during secret Spanish-French negotiations during the official visits of Alphonse XIII to Paris and President of the French Republic R. Poincaré to Madrid. On the eve of these negotiations, the Spaniards tried to enlist the support of Russia. During a conversation with the Russian Ambassador F.A. Budberg, Alphonse XIII expressed "the wish that Spain could join, with the benevolent assistance of Russia, the group of powers of the Triple Entente, so as not to be left alone in the event of major international clashes." The Russian Emperor Nicholas II, having read the report of the ambassador, which reported on this conversation, wrote on it: "This should be taken seriously." However, only in St. Petersburg seriously considered the accession of Spain to the Entente. After consultations with the French, Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov wrote in his instructions to Budberg: “Spain itself, of course, is not large enough for an alliance with it to be considered a valuable acquisition. Under certain conditions, he could even turn out to be a source of unnecessary worries due to the need to provide assistance to a weak ally, hardly

able in turn to render some equivalent service.

Nevertheless, Sazonov suggested that Spain conclude a formal alliance with Great Britain or France, believing that "Spain joining the side of the group of powers to which Russia belongs is in our interests." However, during the negotiations between Alphonse XIII and R. Poincaré, no alliance was concluded between Spain and France. A verbal agreement was only reached that, in the event of a European war, France could count on the most benevolent neutrality of Spain.

Militarily weak Spain, the great powers did not consider either a valuable ally or a dangerous adversary. She could not enter the war on the side of Germany and attack France due to the logic of her entire pre-war foreign policy aimed at rapprochement with the Entente (Madrid had no agreements with the Central Powers, and the Moroccan protectorate was guaranteed by the French and British). In the event of a speech against France, Spain would be forced to fight in all directions:

In the north and in Morocco - with the French during the blockade of the Strait of Gibraltar by the English fleet;

At sea and in Gibraltar - with the British;

In the west - with the Portuguese.

Of course, this could not be decided in

Madrid. On the other hand, Spain could not become a full-fledged ally of the Entente. And the point is not only that in this case it would become its weak link. Compensation in the impending war was supposed to be at the expense of the enemy, and Spain, intending to join the Entente, asked for "freedom of action" in Portugal, and as a result of the war, it could demand a review of the status of British Gibraltar and expand its zone in Morocco by including Tangier in it. That is, Spain could count on compensation for participating in the war only at the expense of its own potential allies, who were absolutely not ready for this. Therefore, Madrid had to accept the foreign policy course imposed on it by Paris and London. As the Spanish historian A. Niño noted, Spain's neutrality in the European conflict "was not only the result of the Spanish decision, but also the result of the interest of the allies in supporting it."

Spain was not ready for war; Spanish participation in it did not meet the interests of the Triple Alliance or the interests of the Triple Entente. Therefore, in the event of a major European war, Spain had to declare neutrality. Immediately after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, on July 30, 1914, Gaceta de Madrid published

forged a declaration of Spanish neutrality in this conflict. On the same day, the head of the conservative government of Spain, E. Dato, told Foreign Minister Marquis de Lema that war was inevitable, adding: “We will publish a declaration of neutrality immediately after the declaration of war by the countries involved in the conflict.” The Marquis de Lema asked if the declaration of neutrality would reflect Spain's "special" relationship with Western countries. Dato replied that there were only two positions: belligerent or neutral.

But although the declaration subsequently published proclaimed strict neutrality, the Spanish government did not forget about the "special" relations that connected it with France and Great Britain. Even before the formal declaration of neutrality, Madrid assured the French government that the latter could withdraw its troops from the Pyrenean border. France immediately transferred the 18th Corps, guarding the Pyrenees, to Alsace. The Spanish border garrisons were withdrawn away from the Portuguese border, deep into the Tagus Valley. Considering that Portugal was closely connected with England, Madrid by this action showed its sympathy and loyalty to London.

August 1, 1914 Germany declared war on the Russian Empire. Soon, the main members of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente broke off diplomatic relations and declared war on each other. Europe was rapidly sinking into the chaos of general war. On August 3, when Germany declared war on France, Alphonse XIII and the Marquis de Lema were in San Sebastian. The king urgently returned to the capital and, at a cabinet meeting on August 5, stated that Spain could only move along the path of neutrality, benevolent to the countries of the Entente. Nevertheless, in a declaration adopted by the Spanish government and published on August 7 in the Gaceta de Madrid, the Spaniards were ordered to observe "the strictest neutrality."

The Dato government maintained strict neutrality despite increased German pressure in the early months of the war. On October 15, 1914, the German ambassador M. von Ratibor offered Alfonso XIII "freedom of action" in Portugal, but this offer was not accepted. The Entente knew about these negotiations. Both warring parties did not seek to include Spain in the war, but wanted to enlist her tacit support, which was important from a strategic point of view. When Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente in May 1915, Spain lost much of its importance. Surrounded on all sides by allies, she not only could not enter the war on the side of Germany, but also pursue a pro-German foreign policy, even if the Spanish

the government has made this decision. It was possible to move only towards the Entente.

This is what the liberal Prime Minister A. de Figueroa y Torres, Count de Romanones, who replaced Dato, was striving for. He was appointed head of government on December 9, 1915, and immediately told reporters that Spain would steadfastly observe, as it had done so far, strict neutrality towards the belligerent powers. His government confirmed strict neutrality in the spring of 1916, after Portugal entered the war on the side of the Entente. Nevertheless, Romanones was a prominent supporter of the Entente and constantly appealed to Spain's sense of national pride, which was hurt by the incessant attacks of German submarines on Spanish merchant ships.

After Germany declared "unlimited submarine warfare", relations with the Reich began to noticeably worsen. In February 1917, the Spanish police, with the assistance of French intelligence, arrested German agents in Cartagena, who were found not only to have propaganda materials in support of the Central Powers, but also explosives intended for sabotage and assassination attempts in France. True, Alphonse XIII assured Ratibor that this incident would not affect the friendly attitude of Spain towards Germany, and that the ambassador himself was beyond suspicion of having connections with German spies.

In early April 1917, Romanones sent a stern note to Germany about the sinking of Spanish merchant ships. She became one of the reasons for his resignation. A letter from the former prime minister to the king was soon made public, calling on him to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The fall of Romanones was perceived by Ratibor as his personal victory over the "enemy" of the Reich. On April 19, 1917, a new government was formed, headed by another liberal leader, M. Garcia Prieto, who confirmed Spain's intention to remain a neutral country. However, due to the internal political crisis, the government did not last even two months. On June 11, 1917, E. Dato, a conservative and supporter of strict neutrality, again became prime minister.

The "unrestricted submarine war" unleashed by Germany had a negative effect on Spanish trade. German submarines sank Spanish merchant ships. During the war years, Spain lost several dozen ships, approximately 20% of its merchant fleet. These losses were only partially compensated by Germany. In 1918, she handed over six of her ships to Spain. As a result of attacks on neutral Spanish ships and Allied ships, several dozen Spaniards died. The greatest resonance in Spanish society was caused by the tragic death of the famous composer E. Granados. French passenger ship Sussex,

on which Granados was returning after a triumphant tour of the United States, was torpedoed by a German submarine on March 24, 1916. On that day, 80 people died in the waters of the English Channel, including Granados and his wife.

Despite the loss of the Spanish fleet from German submarines, Spain still did not break off diplomatic relations with Germany and did not declare war on her. Berlin explained the sinking of the Spanish ships by chance, because the Germans did not want to give a reason for Spain to enter the war. The Spaniards feared even greater losses in the event of a declaration of war on Germany. The neutrality of Spain suited both warring parties and was beneficial to the Spaniards themselves. Maintaining a formally strict neutrality, Spain was getting closer and closer to the Entente.

The pro-Entante course was generally characteristic of the new government of Garcia Prieto, who replaced Dato on November 3, 1917. On December 6, a trade agreement with Great Britain was ratified, negotiations on which had begun even under Romanones. The agreement provided for the importation of English coal into Spain in exchange for Spanish iron ore needed for the British war industry. On March 7, 1918, a trade agreement was signed with the United States, according to which Spain supplied pyrites, lead, zinc, copper, as well as food and other goods for the American expeditionary forces. In response, the United States supplied Spain with cotton needed for the Catalan textile industry, oil and other goods. Negotiations were also underway to conclude a trade agreement with France. Under the economic and diplomatic pressure of the Entente, Spain turned by the beginning of 1918 into its "neutral ally".

On March 22, 1918, the leader of the conservatives A. Maura returned to power in Spain, heading the so-called "National Government", which included both conservatives and liberals. The portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs went to Dato, a supporter of neutrality, but Romanones entered the government as Minister of Justice, insisting on breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. On November 9, 1918, Romanones was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government of García Prieto. Two days later, an armistice between Germany and the Entente was signed in the Compiègne Forest. On December 5, 1918, Romanones, retaining his ministerial post, again headed the government, and on December 14, the ambassador of the defeated Reich was officially asked to leave Madrid. On January 9, 1919, the entire staff of the German embassy left Spain. More than a year and a half ago, Ratibor contributed to the resignation of Romanones, but it was Romanones who managed to get rid of Ratibor as the German ambassador to Spain.

Throughout the war, Spain, as a neutral state, acted as an intermediary and defender of the interests of several belligerent powers that broke off diplomatic relations. In addition, along with the Red Cross, Madrid launched a wide-ranging mediation and humanitarian campaign, in which King Alfonso XIII became an active participant. Immediately after the outbreak of the First World War, a special office was established in the royal palace, which, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish diplomats who were abroad, dealt with:

Gathering information on missing foreign nationals and on the situation of prisoners of war;

She helped to transfer money, medicines, letters and various things to prisoners and relatives who found themselves on opposite sides of the fronts;

Participated in the exchange of prisoners of war and the repatriation of wounded military and civilians;

She petitioned for the mitigation of sentences and the abolition of the death penalty for prisoners, among whom were Russian citizens.

Thanks to the largely successful humanitarian work of this office and Alfonso XIII himself, in war-torn Europe, the Royal Palace of Madrid began to be called the "Temple of Mercy." The humanitarian campaign, carried out during the First World War under the patronage of the Spanish crown, was widely known and contributed to the growth of Spain's prestige in the international arena.

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919 without the participation of Spain, although during the war Madrid repeatedly offered mediation in peace negotiations. In "gratitude" for the friendly attitude towards the victorious Entente, Spain, along with Brazil, Greece and Belgium, became one of the four "non-permanent" members of the Council of the League of Nations, established according to the Treaty of Versailles. Spain's participation in the League of Nations reflected the positive changes in its international position after the First World War, although it remained a minor European power. Be that as it may, Spain's neutrality in the First World War, in many respects benevolent to the future victors, proved to be a more successful foreign policy line than its neutrality in the Second World War. In the second case, Spain was more closely connected with the defeated Germany and Italy, which led to the almost complete international isolation of the Franco regime.

As we can see, the Spanish neutrality in the First World War was generally positive for the post-war position of Spain in the international arena, but its influence on the internal development of the country was not the same.

numeral. Many Spaniards were divided into fierce supporters of the Entente (Antantophiles) and fans of the Central Powers (Germanophiles). The American historian D. Meeker called the disputes between the Spanish antantophiles and the Germanophiles a "civil war of words", which, in his opinion, was an omen of a real civil war that broke out in Spain in 1936. Germanophilism dominated the Spanish army, among church hierarchs, conservatives and Carlists. Most of the intelligentsia, socialists, republicans and liberals were in favor of the Entente. At the same time, left-wing political forces opposed the proclaimed strict neutrality, seeing in it a manifestation of hidden Germanophilia, and criticized not only the policy of the government, but also the king himself for following this course.

The war had a huge impact on the economy of neutral Spain. It had mixed consequences for agriculture. The export of oranges has sharply decreased (they were not essential goods). The production and export of wine and olive oil, on the contrary, increased. As for wheat, although there was a slight increase in the harvest, its prices grew even faster: at the end of the war, it cost one and a half times more than in 1914. At the same time, the prices of bread rose, which, moreover, became scarce on the domestic market .

Spanish industry during the war years was in a better position than agriculture. The demand of the belligerent powers for raw materials needed for the needs of the war industry was constantly growing. The increase in demand was followed by an increase in prices for exported goods. Inflation stimulated the expansion of production, and Spain, rich in mineral deposits, experienced a real economic boom during the war years. Coal mining, iron and steel production increased sharply. Economic growth was observed in the textile and paper industries.

The wartime economic boom had and reverse side. The growth of food exports and constant inflation led to the fact that agricultural products, including essential goods, became scarce not only in cities, but also in the countryside. The advantages of wartime enriched entrepreneurs, merchants and financiers, but practically did not touch the majority of the population. Although the nominal wages of workers gradually increased, this increase did not keep pace with the rate of inflation. The real wages of workers in different specialties and regions fell by 20-30%. In a country where, according to the Spanish historian M. Tunon de Lara, "the rich became even richer, and the poor - even poorer", social conflicts were inevitable.

As a result, in the summer of 1917, Spain faced a serious political crisis, in which three phases are usually distinguished: the intervention of the military (the movement of the so-called “juntas of defense”), the convening of the “Parliamentary Assembly” in Barcelona and the general revolutionary strike. The first "protection juntas" arose as early as November 1916. These were officer unions, uniting mainly infantrymen who were dissatisfied with the deterioration of their financial situation and the favoritism that reigned in the elite troops of the Spanish army. Fearing the growth of opposition sentiments in the army, the military ministry ordered the juntas to stop their activities, but they refused. On May 26, 1917, members of the Barcelona "junta of defense" were arrested. When it became obvious that most of the army was in solidarity with the arrested juntas, they were released, the officers' unions and their charter were recognized by the government.

On July 19, 1917, in Barcelona, ​​at the initiative of the Catalan Regionalist League, an unofficial assembly of the Parliament, which was dissolved in the spring of that year, took place. True, at the very beginning of the meeting, the assembly was dissolved by the Civil Guard. According to one version, the parliamentarians threatened to organize a general strike in Spain if the government did not comply with their demands. In August 1917 this threat became a reality. On August 13, a general strike swept through Madrid, Barcelona, ​​Oviedo, Bilbao, other major cities in Spain, as well as the industrial zones of Valencia, Catalonia, Aragon and Andalusia. Strike

was brutally suppressed by the civil guard and the army, which until recently itself threatened the regime.

The explosion of social discontent in 1917 reflected the socio-economic changes that were brewing in the depths of Spanish society. The growing labor movement will still manifest itself in the post-war years. The belief spread among the military that the only way to end the chaos reigning in the public life of Spain was a military dictatorship. Opposition forces continued to strive for political power, and the regime once again showed rigidity and inability to evolve towards democratization. Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the significance of the crisis of 1917, because the political regime survived, the opposition remained fragmented and disunited, and it did not come to a real social revolution.

Neutrality in many ways negatively affected the development of social, economic and political processes in Spain, and in this respect it was strikingly different from those European countries that more effectively used the advantages of wartime, especially the Scandinavian states. If in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, neutrality created the foundations for further development and prosperity, then in Spain it strengthened social stratification, deepened ideological demarcation and exacerbated social contradictions, which to a large extent negatively affected the tragic turns of Spanish history throughout the 20th century.

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Mednikov Igor Yurievich - junior researcher at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the International Educational and Scientific Iberian Center of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Email: [email protected]

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPANISH NEUTRALITY DURING THE FIRST

Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, 119334, Moscow, Leninski prospect, 32A.

Abstract: The article deals with an insufficiently studied problem, Spanish neutrality during the First World War. The author analyzes its historical significance in the international context, as well in the context of political, economical and social evolution of Spain. Spain was one of the few major European Powers that maintained its neutrality throughout the First World War. Although all Spanish governments during the conflict declared strict neutrality, it was, in actual fact, benevolent towards the Entente Powers, and by the end of hostilities Spain turned into "neutral ally" of Entente. This benevolence towards the future winners and a wide humanitarian campaign supported and headed by the King Alfonso XIII enabled Spain to improve her position in the postwar system of international relations; Spain became one of the non-permanent members of the League of Nations Council. Nevertheless the Spanish neutrality had a negative impact upon the social, political and economic evolution of Spain. The social stratification was increased, the public opinion was deeply divided and the social conflicts were aggravated, which significantly affected the further evolution of the Spanish society.

Key words: Spanish history, neutrality, the First World War, international relations, diplomacy.

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11. Lacomba J.A. Ensayos sobre el siglo XX español. Madrid, 1972.

12. Maker G.H. A civil war of words: the ideological impact of the First World War on Spain, 1914-1918, Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923 / Ed. by H.A. Schmitt. Charlottesville, 1988. P. 1-65.

13. Niño A. Política de alianzas y compromises coloniales para la "Regeneración" internacional de España, 1898-1914 (Capítulo primero), La política exterior de España en el siglo XX / Eds. J. Tusell, J. Aviles, R. Pardo. Madrid, 2000. P. 31-94.

14. Pando J. Un Rey para la esperanza: la España humanitaria de Alfonso XIII en la Gran Guerra. Madrid, 2002.

15. Tuñón de Lara M. La España del siglo XX. 1914-1939. 2-a ed. P., 1973.

About the author

Igor Yurievich Mednikov - scientific researcher of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the Center for the Iberian Studies of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Email: [email protected]

Mountain peak

Why didn't Spain participate in World War I?

Spain had been losing influence in the Americas for the previous 100 years and the Spanish-American War had recently taken place. So how could Spain remain neutral?

Why can't Spain find a place in the Central Powers?

Answers

TED

In addition to Tom's answer, you have to ask yourself which side they came from. There is nothing really useful in terms of the territory they could get from Germany or Austria-Hungary, since both were on the other side of Europe.

If they had entered the other side, they could have gained useful territory from France. However, the French troops were generally considered to be of much higher quality than the Spanish, and the Piranean Mountains would prove to be a very tough defensive line to break into. To make matters worse, they would quickly find themselves in a two-front war, as Portugal was a longtime British ally, and would no doubt have been involved if England had done so (as happened 100 years ago at the start of the peninsula). War

I believe that the main reason for Spain's neutrality was their unique experience in the Peninsular War. This was the last time Spain allied itself with a major power, and that major power used the alliance to stab Spain in the back. The war that followed was bloody and fought almost entirely on Spanish soil with Spanish blood. We get the term "guerrilla warfare" from this conflict. When the smoke cleared, winners and losers went home and tabulated their gains or losses, but Spain was in ruins economically, socially and emotionally. So you can see where the Spaniards would be less inclined to join an alliance on a whim.

Finally, the country was still living through its humiliation in the Spanish-American War (known as "The Calamity" in Spain) a decade and a half ago. Their government at the time was a kind of bizarre attempt to secure a form of British constitutional monarchy, but without any real democracy. No wonder he had as much real popular support as people had real votes (au: almost none). I suspect it was quite clear to everyone that it was not stable enough to start a foreign war, and in fact it fell on its own about a decade after the end of World War I.

Tom Ay

There were two power blocs: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, Russia). Spain was not part of any of them and had no reason to support one side or the other (later Italy changed sides).

Spain was lucky to be outside the main areas of hostilities: France, Belgium, Poland, the Balkans, western Russia. He had no reason to fight.

The US remained neutral until 1917, so Spain had no reason to side with the Central Powers on that basis. She also had no other common interests with them.

Russell

Nobody goes to war, damn it. +1

TED ♦

@ Russell - Well... you could bet that Italy did.

Dan Neely

@TED ​​Portugal would be a better example than Italy. They had no reason to intervene other than that Britain was a traditional ally and felt it honored to help.

Tom Ay

@WS2: I wrote "Italy later switched sides" (as she did during World War II). But she was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary until the outbreak of the First World War. Most people forget this fact, so I keep reminding them. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_Alliance_(1882) First line: "The Triple Alliance was a military alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy." Even your own reference admits: "Nominally allied with the Central Powers of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance, Kingdom of Italy..."

Basque_Spaniard

Spain was not ready for war in the Great War. It has been in the process of modernizing the country since the first industrial revolution reached Spain at this time.

Spain does not have the ability to build tanks or even aircraft, as shining example you can bring the Spanish-American War. Spain has always had good soldiers, but for a moment great war it had rather outdated technology compared to some European countries or even the USA.

The Spanish army and air force were modernized in the 1920s thanks to strong links with English companies established in the late 19th century and early 20th century on the Spanish north and southwest coasts.

Spain was better prepared for World War II than for World War I, but the civil war devastated its economy until the US arrived in the 50s.

Basque_spaniards

Even though Spain couldn't enter ww1, it was almost like entering a war.

At the moment the Entente entered into cordial relations between France and Great Britain, a secret agreement was concluded regarding Spain in the event that Italy should enter Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Spain before the start of ww1 tried to make a new deal to improve the size of the armada with 5 battleships and several cruisers and destroyers, and she needed permission from Britain.

Spain agreed that if Italy joined the Central Powers, it would provoke an intervention.

The agreement was drawn up in: 1. Great Britain accepted Spain to improve the armada. 2. 10 Spanish divisions to support France on the Italian border. 3. 5 naval divisions to carry out an amphibious landing in Italy.

Spain was obliged to intervene. However, Italy first declared neutrality, but later joined the Allies. Thus, the secret clause entente cordiale was not used.

The position of Spain in relation to the allies was a question of Morocco. France and Spain concluded an agreement on the division of the country, but Great Britain did not like Germany, but advocated a Spanish-French agreement that weakened Germany's position. This German involvement was poorly received by Spain.

Basque_Spaniards

Spain lagged behind other powers mainly because of the civil wars that took place before 1874. Spain later tried to recover. The military investment was only up to the US.

However, all Spanish-made equipment appeared only at the beginning of the 20th century.

Spain tried to modernize its army and navy. An example of the first modern Spanish battleship or first submarine was built in 1888. In correct terms, Spain had 8 years of delay compared to other powers.

It was not only a comparison with the fleet. The tank industry began in the 1920s during the Rif War (which used foreign tanks), while Britain began serious tank development during World War I. Not to mention that the same thing happened in the aircraft industry that the first all-Spanish fighter was made in the 1930s after the Rif War (foreign fighters are made under license from CASA). In the Reef War (1911-1927), Spain doubled its military budget to win the war.

The Spanish had two prominent major aviation companies (CASA and HA). The former produced transports and small surveillance aircraft in early times. While the second was the main fighters of the company.

Fighters HA (Hispano-Aviación): HS-32 and HS-34 (30s), HS-42 and HS-43 (40s), HA-56 and HA-60 (Spanish-German fighters were based on them, made in 45-59, which were forced to use in the Ifni war), HA-100 (modern Spanish evolution of HS-42 and HS-43, made in 51-53), HA-200 and HA-220 (the first Spanish advanced jet fighters did in 60-69). In 1971, CASA merged with HA to create the C-101 (70s and evolution of previous ones).

Tanks: Trubia and its improvements (1925-1938), Verdeya and its improvements (1938-1954), During 1954-1970 were the main American used tanks, the Spanish-French AMX-30 (1970-2002) and the Spanish-German leopard . 2 (2003-now)

CGCampbell

What does ASR mean?

TED ♦

White I appreciate the increase in votes my answer gets every time you create a new answer with a new account, perhaps your own case would be better served by simply editing one of your old answers to be better? Just a thought.

ASR

Spain was far away and did not care about the territorial-ethnic swamp in the Balkans, which provoked the war.

There was also no intense rivalry with other Western powers such as France-Germany.

No irredentism or disputed lands as a future price for the war effort.

Last but not least, the financial effort to equip the army for the Spanish–American War meant that defense spending in the early 20th century was negligible compared to other powers (even Bulgaria or Romania).<>(We are neutral because we can't be otherwise) A senior official deserved to comment.

All this sums up the Spanish Realpolitik during the war years.

user14394

Spain fought... and funded... "European" wars against " Ottoman Empire"throughout the centuries. Wisely they asked for money first in the 20th century. Even Franco was not "no mas" for Otto-men. Also don't forget Romania. "It's far from Spanish Morocco", not to mention the Azores, where there is currently a US nuclear submarine buried I think two 747s ended up there by accident too What are the chances?

Basque_Spaniard

With a disastrous war against Napoleon and then a civil war, Spain was not ready. Spain Before Alfonso XII came to power, it was a very unstable country. the period 1874-1920 was to rebuild and reset industrialization. This is not to say that the Spanish-American War was called the "Disaster of 1898".

In terms of population, Spain's growth is half that of the rest of Europe. Spain achieved doubling its population in 60 years, while the UK took just 30 years.

XIX. The century for Spain was a century of great decline, which did not recover with much work in the periods 1874-1975. a century of recovery (the Civil War and the first period of the Franco regime were a slowdown of almost 20 years).

In this part of our presentation, we will analyze the main vectors of relations between Spain and Russia during the First World War - in 1914-1918.

It should immediately be noted that the relationship between the two countries during the First World War, somewhat intensified. It can also be noted that the Russian embassy in Madrid, largely unexpectedly for Russian diplomats, found itself to some extent at the center of European politics. Let's consider this in more detail.

After August 1914, Spain, which declared its neutrality in the war, turned out to be one of the few countries capable of performing mediatory functions between the warring parties. The Russian embassy in Madrid often negotiated through the secretariat of King Alphonse XIII with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the issue of the exchange of prisoners. The analysis of cases for the protection of Russians in enemy territory became one of the main activities of the diplomatic mission during the war years. Khvostov V.M. History of diplomacy. In 2 t. Moscow: Pravda, 1963. - T.2. S. 238.

Thus, key element Russian-Spanish relations during the First World War became close humanitarian cooperation, which had a beneficial effect on the fate of many of our compatriots.

The outbreak of the First World War turned into a tragedy for millions of Europeans. The fatal shots in Sarajevo that claimed the life of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand echoed across the continent, disrupting the natural course of life in most countries of the Old World. Ibid., p. 240.

In the first months of the armed confrontation, tourists who spent the summer abroad and unexpectedly found themselves in enemy territory suffered the most. Even ten days before the tragic events, none of them even thought about the danger of an imminent war. Volkov G.I. Political history Spain of the XX century - M., 2008. S. 110.

24 Russia and Spain. Documents and materials. 1667-1917. T 2. - M.: AST, 1997. S. 168.

Spain declared its neutrality in the pan-European conflict already on August 7 (a week after the start of hostilities).

The royal decree, adopted at the suggestion of the Prime Minister E. Dato, obligated all subjects of Alphonse XIII to observe strict neutrality in accordance with the laws and principles of international law. At the same time, Spain assumed the mission of protecting the citizens of the warring countries who found themselves in the territory of the enemy. From that time until almost the end of the war, the Spanish embassies in Berlin and Vienna represented the interests of Russia. Solovyov Yu.Ya. Memoirs of a Diplomat. 1893-1922. - M.: Harvest, 2003. S. 287.

In the first days of the war, the Russian Foreign Ministry organized an information desk at the Spanish Embassy in Petrograd about Russians who remained on the territory of enemy countries. Through the same structure, money transfers were later made to compatriots who fell into a difficult situation: relatives of people stuck in Germany or Austria-Hungary could send them up to 300 rubles a month. Ibid., p. 289.

As M. Rossiysky notes: “Employees of the Spanish embassies in Berlin and Vienna issued this money to the recipients. Only on the first day of the operation of this channel, more than 45 thousand rubles were received from Petrograd on the accounts of both embassies” Ibid., p. 290. .

The Spanish ambassador to Berlin, Luis Polo de Bernabe, the ambassador to Vienna, Antonio de Castro y Casaleis, and the envoy to Brussels, the Marquis de Villalobar, were very zealous about their obligations. The diplomats of King Alphonse helped the return of the Russians with everything they could. Thanks to their support, many of our compatriots, who experienced many difficulties and hardships along the way, still managed to break through home through neutral Sweden and Russian Finland. Solovyov Yu.Ya. Memoirs of a Diplomat. 1893-1922. - M.: Harvest, 2003. S. 244.

The Spanish king took an active part in the work in the humanitarian direction. With his personal secretariat, Alphonse XIII ordered the creation of a Prisoner Assistance Bureau, which during the war years managed to find and repatriate 21 thousand prisoners of war and about 70 thousand civilians of different nationalities. A considerable number of them were our compatriots. The Russian embassy in Madrid often negotiated through the secretariat with hostile states on the issue of the exchange of prisoners. The analysis of cases for the protection of Russians in enemy territory became one of the main activities of the diplomatic mission during the war years.

Thanks to the responsible attitude of Alfonso XIII to the humanitarian obligations undertaken, the Spanish embassies in Berlin and Vienna turned over the years of the war into coordinating centers of work aimed at alleviating the plight of Russian prisoners of war, as well as rescuing innocently convicted Russian citizens. The most difficult situations were controlled personally by the king. Often, his intervention ensured the success of activities on the outcome of which a person's life depended. This was most clearly manifested in the case of the release of a Russian priest who spent 22 months in an Austrian prison. Ibid., p. 247.

Another episode is also known, demonstrating the concern of the Spanish king for Russian prisoners of war. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a tradition in many European armies to transfer individual military units under the symbolic patronage of friendly foreign monarchs. The Spanish king in the Russian army also had such a “patronage unit” - the 7th Olviopol Lancers Regiment. Alphonse XIII managed to achieve privileged conditions of detention for Russian soldiers and officers from his “sponsored” unit Mednikov I.Yu. who were in the Austro-Hungarian captivity. Spain during the First World War - M., 2007. S. 187. .

In 1917, Alphonse XIII made attempts to facilitate the sending abroad of the family of the last Russian emperor, who was under arrest after the February Revolution. The king even shared his plans in this regard with the ambassador of the Russian Provisional Government A.V. Neklyudov. Russia and Spain. Documents and materials. 1667-1917. T 2. - M.: AST, 1997. S. 192.

Diplomatic representatives of tsarist Russia and the Provisional Government repeatedly expressed their gratitude to Alfonso XIII for his concern for the rights of Russian prisoners and internees. Unfortunately, the long-term activity of the king for the benefit of our compatriots has not yet been properly covered by either Spanish or Russian experts studying the history of bilateral relations, and remains generally little known to the general public of our countries.

In quotation marks, it is worth noting about another aspect of Russian-Spanish relations of that time, which was not entirely positive from the point of view of the monarchical government of Spain. We mean the vector that the Russian revolution betrayed to the labor movement in Spain Quoted from: Volkov G.I. Political history of Spain of the XX century - M., 2008. S. 126-128. .

In 1917, the semi-anarchist and semi-socialist trade unions called for the first nationwide strike to protest rising prices and the appointment of King Alphonse XIII to the Conservative cabinet. Strikes began in Barcelona and Madrid and soon spread to Bilbao, Seville and Valencia. The Spanish economy was paralyzed. The army marched out and swept away the strikers. Hundreds of workers were killed and strike leaders were imprisoned.

After the military upsurge in industry ended, thousands of workers were left without work. Mindful of the success of the Russian revolution, the anarchists resumed the street struggle. Martial law was again introduced in Barcelona Volkov G.I. Political history of Spain of the XX century - M., 2008. S. 134. .

Anti-army sentiments prevailed among the masses. To top it all off, 15,000 soldiers were killed during another attempt to conquer Morocco. The investigation into the events in Morocco led to the fall of the government of Garcia Prieto, a former monarchist who, under the influence of the course of events, became a liberal and came to power.

Terrorism intensified against the church and the army: the Cardinal Bishop of Zaragoza was killed, but the government did not succumb to the demands of the army to apply more severe measures to the protesters. In September 1923, the Barcelona garrison rebelled. This was followed by numerous mutinies throughout the country, and the civil government fell. With the blessing of King Alfonso XIII, power in Spain passed to the captain-general of Barcelona, ​​Miguel Primo de Rivera.

After the October Revolution, Spain withdrew its ambassador from Russia. In early January 1918, diplomat Yu.Ya. Solovyov sent a personal note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, in which, "in view of the fact that the Spanish government does not recognize the government existing in Russia," he declared that he considered his mission in Madrid ended. Russia and Spain. Documents and materials. 1667-1917. T 2. - M.: AST, 1997. P. 194. Shortly thereafter, the Russian representative received a farewell audience with Alfonso XIII and already on February 1 left Spain. Solovyov Yu.Ya. Memoirs of a Diplomat. 1893-1922. - M.: Harvest, 2003. A 15-year pause has come in Russian-Spanish relations.

Thus, based on the study of Russian-Spanish relations during the First World War, we can draw several intermediate conclusions of our work:

Relations between the two countries during the First World War, somewhat intensified. It can also be noted that the Russian embassy in Madrid, largely unexpectedly for Russian diplomats, found itself to some extent at the center of European politics. This is due to the fact that Spain, which has declared its neutrality, has largely taken on mediating functions between the warring powers, representing in a number of cases the interests of ordinary Russians;

A key element of Russian-Spanish relations during the First World War was close humanitarian cooperation, which had a beneficial effect on the fate of many of our compatriots. At the same time, Spain assumed the mission of protecting the citizens of the warring countries who found themselves in the territory of the enemy. From this time until almost the end of the war, the Spanish embassies in Berlin and Vienna represented the interests of Russia;

Diplomatic representatives of tsarist Russia and the Provisional Government repeatedly expressed their gratitude to Alphonse XIII for his concern for the rights of Russian prisoners and internees;

Another aspect of Russian-Spanish relations of that time is connected with the vector that the Russian revolution betrayed to the labor movement in Spain. The semi-anarchist and semi-socialist trade unions in Spain have noticeably stepped up their activities, inspired, first of all, by the successes of the Russian revolution. It can be assumed that the social and revolutionary movement in Spain, which unfolded under the influence of Russian revolutionary ideas, led to the transition of Spain to a military dictatorship, which took place in 1923.

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Geographical position Spain is located in the south-west of Europe and occupies approximately 85% of the territory of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as the Balearic and Pitius Islands in the Mediterranean Sea, the Canaries - in the Atlantic Ocean. Under the control of Spain are the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (in Morocco) and the islands of Velez de la Gomera, Alusenas and Chafaranas. Total area: 504,750 sq. km. land - 499,400 sq. km. water - 5,350 sq. km. Spain has land borders with France - 623 km, Portugal - 1,214 km, Andorra - 65 km, the English colony of Gibraltar - 1.2 km, with Morocco (Ceuta) - 6.3 km, (Melilla) - 9.6 km. The total length of the border on land: total - 1,919.1 km, coastline - 4,964 km. In the east and south, the country is washed by the Mediterranean Sea, in the west - by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Spain is located at the crossroads of important sea and air routes connecting Europe with the African and American continents and occupies a strategic position along the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain stands out from other European countries. Its position at the crossroads of Europe and Africa, the Christian world and the world of Islam, the closed Mediterranean and the boundless Atlantic left an indelible mark on the entire face of the country. There is always room for surprise! That is why Spain is one of the world's largest centers of tourism and recreation. Tourists are attracted mainly by ancient cities and sunny beaches. Few people know that after Switzerland, Spain is the most mountainous country in Europe: mountains occupy 90% of its territory. And the Pyrenees are not the highest mountains in Spain. The southeast of the country is occupied by the Cordillera Betica - a system of mountain ranges and ranges, second only to the Alps in height. The highest point - Mount Mulasen - is located near Granada. This is the southernmost part of Europe where snow remains in summer! Despite the fact that the Iberian Peninsula is surrounded on almost all sides by the sea, the climate of the country is determined not so much by the ocean as by the mountains that protect it from external influences. In Spain, the vertical zonality of the climate is very noticeable: you can shiver from the cold, wrapping yourself in a warm shawl high in the mountains and watching how, somewhere far below, children are splashing in the warm waves of the gentle sea. Spain is multifaceted, each time it appears before you differently, unexpected, but always excitingly interesting. Why this country is called Spain, no one will say now, even the Spaniards themselves. In ancient times, this land was inhabited by Iberian tribes, after whose name the entire peninsula from the middle of the first millennium BC began to be called Iberia. The Greeks called this country Hesperia, the Land of the Evening Star. After the division of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern, the Western was officially called "Hesperia". From the 2nd century BC e., that is, from the time of the penetration of the Romans into Spain, the country was called "Hispania". Some historians suggest that "Hispania" is a corruption of "Hesperia". But who can say this with certainty now? Socio-political situation Spanish bourgeoisie late XIX - the beginning of the 20th century was not particularly courageous, not least because of its weakness. In the country, it was stifled by feudal reaction, in world markets (even in its own colonies, where, formally, foreigners were not allowed, but where they were smuggling on a large scale), places were already occupied by Anglo-French capital. As a consequence of the lack of decisive leadership, the bourgeois revolutions of the period 1808-74. were distinguished by half-heartedness, ended in defeats and the loss of most of the revolutionary gains. At first, the bourgeoisie was indecisive because of its weakness, then, when it built up its muscles, it became indecisive because it was afraid of the radicalization of the growing proletariat, which was increasingly rising up in the struggle. As a result, the bourgeois transformations of the 19th century bore the stamp of a compromise between the Spanish bourgeoisie and the feudal nobility, the monarchy and the church. Spain entered the era of imperialism, retaining feudal vestiges that were extremely difficult to eliminate, since the bourgeoisie, fearing the proletariat, preferred an alliance with landlord, monarchist and clerical circles, which imposed the need to preserve the privileges of the allies, while the development of capitalism required their liquidation. The growing crisis required the leadership of the proletariat even to solve bourgeois problems, which, in the conditions of the world crisis of capitalism, which began with the war in 1914, gave it the opportunity, relying on the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, to try to solve the problems of the socialist revolution. Monarch of Spain Alfonso XIII (r. 1902-1931) had a reactionary military-religious upbringing, an unwillingness to give up his power in favor of the bourgeois-democratic reforms that were so necessary for the country. Alphonse XIII sinned with Germanophilism and was an ardent admirer of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, whom he tried to imitate in everything. The famous Spanish novelist Blasco Ibanez wrote about them (about Wilhelm and Alphonse): “Two comedians of different origin and age, claiming to play the same role. Their character is identical: the same love of acting, the same passionate desire to attract attention, interfere in everything, manage everything, make speeches, the same confidence that they sign the most brilliant manifestos in the world. The same love of dressing up: at two o'clock in the afternoon Alphonse XIII is in the uniform of an admiral, at three o'clock he is a hussar of death, at four o'clock he is a lancer. Every hour of the day it appears in a new form.” in 1898, Spain was embroiled in an unwanted war with the United States, which “in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization and in the name of protecting endangered American interests” took away from Spain most of its colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, etc. The loss of the colonies hurt the economic interests and pride of the Spanish bourgeoisie. The backward economy deprived her of the opportunity to have a modern army. The fleet, also far from modern, was destroyed by the Americans, and the construction of a new squadron was started only in 1908 under the law on the navy. Thus, Spain lost any opportunity to wage colonial wars away from its own territory. Meanwhile, the division of the world was coming to an end. However, this did not lead to a revolution, but the defeat was perceived as a national catastrophe. The need for reforms was felt not only by the opposition, but also by the ruling circles. Representatives of national culture and political parties were looking for ways to overcome the economic backwardness of the country. The “Generation of 98” had a huge impact on Spain in the first third of the 20th century, i.e. the period when the immediate conditions of the armed conflict of 1936-1939 were ripening. Spain did not participate in the First World War; therefore, capitalist contradictions were not revealed here to the same extent as in the warring countries. Moreover, not participating in the war and receiving orders from the Entente countries, she used her position to boost the national economy, and even improve the living standards of certain categories of workers, which, however, did not stop the revolutionary upsurge even before the end of the war. The end of the First World War changed the situation, once again revealed the weakness of the Spanish economy: wanting to heal the economy destroyed by the war, the world powers covered their markets with prohibitive duties, Spain's share in world trade turned out to be even lower than before the war. If in 1918 positive trade balance exceeded 385 million pesetas, then in 1920. the foreign trade balance became sharply negative, its deficit exceeded 380 million pesetas. The revolutionary uprisings of the working people, the terror of the anarchists, the setbacks in the colonial war in Morocco aggravated the old sores of Spanish society even more. However, the social conflict did not have time to gain full momentum - capitalism still had some reserve of time and energy. He was able to cope with the revolutionary movement quite easily. The disunity and disorganization of the workers, not least due to the prevailing influence of anarchism, had an effect, as well as terror, which weakened the leadership of workers' organizations in a period when the economic upsurge associated with the world war had not yet ended, i.e. when social contradictions have not reached their highest point. The relatively liberal dictatorship of General Primo de Riviera, established on September 13, 1923 as a result of a coup d'etat (which, however, received the support of King Alfonso XIII and the Spanish society), gave capitalist Spain a few more years of "prosperity" behind a high wall of customs duties. The last one was put to an end by the world economic crisis of 1929-1933, which pushed the country towards reformism. In January 1930, the dictator who had headed the Spanish government since 1923, General Primo de Riviera, in response to the proposal of King Alfonso XIII to resign, completely unexpectedly submitted, and in February 1931 the Constitution was restored in the country. In April, municipal elections were held, in which the supporters of the monarchy were defeated. The victorious Republicans called on Alfonso XIII to abdicate. In response, the king left the country, but refused to formally abdicate. A coalition government of socialists, liberals and republicans came to power with the participation of several monarchists. Spain was proclaimed a republic. A program of moderate reforms was outlined, the implementation of which, however, was immediately complicated by the conflicts of the new regime with the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and the opposition of anarchists and communists, on the other. Soon, however, the new regime exhausted itself. The republic, with its meager reforms, did not satisfy the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry, whose demands became ever more insistent, and who increasingly turned their attention to the example of the October Revolution in Russia. She was not satisfied with the reaction, which was dissatisfied with even the smallest infringement of its privileges and which was not satisfied with the inability of the republic to stop the growth of the revolutionary movement. Republic 1931-1936 became the field in which two irreconcilable class interests matured, two irreconcilable class and political groupings, which inevitably had to collide in a fierce bloody battle for annihilation, during which Spain had to determine the path of its further development, throwing out bourgeois democracy as completely unsuitable instrument for that era. In July 1936, the Spanish fascists and other right-wing forces, led by Generals E. Mola and F. Franco, rebelled against the democratic government of the Popular Front, which had arisen by the mid-1930s. in Spain. The Popular Front was an attempt to rally all democratic forces in the face of the threat of a fascist dictatorship. However, participation in these fronts of radical left groups, including communists, undermined their unity. The communists sought to use the popular front not so much to fight fascism as to establish their own dictatorship. Although the origins of the conflict were rooted in a hundred-year-old dispute between traditionalists and proponents of modernization, in Spain in the 1930s. it took the form of a clash between fascism and the anti-fascist Popular Front bloc. This was facilitated by the internationalization of the conflict, the involvement of other countries in it. Prime Minister J. Giral appealed to the French government for help, Franco appealed to A. Hitler and B. Mussolini. Berlin and Rome were the first to respond to the call for help, sending 20 transport aircraft, 12 bombers and the Usamo transport ship to Morocco (where Franco was then stationed). By the beginning of August, the African army of the rebels was transferred to the Iberian Peninsula. On August 6, the southwestern grouping under the command of Franco began to march on Madrid. At the same time, the northern group under the command of Mola moved to Caceres. A civil war began, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and leaving ruins behind. Germany and Italy, openly taking the side of Franco, generously supplied the rebels with weapons and troops. They sent Franco a large contingent of military instructors, the German Condor legion and a 125,000-strong Italian expeditionary force. On the other hand, in October 1936, the Comintern initiated the creation of international brigades, which gathered anti-fascists from many countries under their banners. To fight the Nazis, weapons were also sent to Spain (including tanks, aircraft, heavy guns). Other European countries and the United States declared that they consider the civil war that began in Spain to be its internal affair and therefore do not intend to interfere. The military conflict was aggravated by the creation of two different types of statehood: a republic, where from September 1936 to March 1939 the government of the Popular Front, headed by the socialists F. Largo Caballero and J. Negrin, was in power, and an authoritarian regime in the so-called. the national zone, where the entire legislative, executive and judicial power was concentrated in his hands by General Franco. Traditional establishments prevailed in the national zone. In the republican zone, the land was nationalized, and large industrial enterprises and banks were confiscated and transferred to the trade unions. In the national zone, all the parties that supported the regime were united in April 1937 into the "Spanish Traditionalist Falange", led by Franco. In the republican zone, the rivalry between socialists, communists, and anarchists resulted in open clashes, right up to the armed putsch in May 1937 in Catalonia. The fate of Spain was decided on the battlefields. Franco until the end of the war was never able to capture the capital - Madrid. In the battles of Jarama and Guadalajara, the Italian corps was defeated. The unfavorable outcome for the Republicans of the 113-day "battle of the Ebro" in November 1938 predetermined the outcome of the civil war. On April 1, 1939, the war in Spain ended with the victory of the Francoists. The following figures speak convincingly about the result of the bloody, destructive civil war of 1936-1939: about 1 million people died during the war; at least 500 thousand Spaniards were forced to leave their homeland, fleeing the revenge of the victors. According to the estimates of the prominent Spanish economist Roman Tamames, in 1939-1940. agricultural production was only 21% of the pre-war level, and industrial - 31%. In 192 cities and towns, up to 60% of all buildings were destroyed, 250,000 apartments were completely destroyed, and another 250,000 could not be used. The country has lost almost half of the rolling stock of railways, 30% of the ships of the merchant fleet, more than 70% of vehicles. The incomes of the bulk of the working people at the end of 1939 fell to the level of 1900. It took the country more than 10 years to eliminate only the material damage caused by the war. The Francoists brought down the most severe terror on their real and potential opponents. All political parties supporting the republic, such as the Spanish Communist Party (CPI), the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), various republican parties, leading trade union organizations, were banned. About 2 million Spaniards passed through prisons and concentration camps in the first post-war years. The historical position of Spain at the beginning of the 20th century. was an agro-industrial country, relatively backward by Western European standards. The development of capitalism during the formation of its monopoly stage took place with the preservation of the remnants of feudalism, in the conditions of the preservation of the monarchy, the dominance of latifundists (big landowners) in the countryside and the merging of the financial and industrial elite with the landed aristocracy. The unified financial-landlord oligarchy relied on an alliance with the Catholic Church and foreign capital, which predominated in modern industries. The delay in the development of capitalism did not allow the peoples of the Iberian Peninsula to merge into a single nation with a single language and culture. Of the country's 24 million population, 7 million were national minorities. Basques, Catalans and Galicians continued to oppose the Spaniards, largely retained their language and serious (at least for the first two) separatist or autonomist sentiments. 2 million people were employed in industry and transport - 22% of the working population of Spain. Industrial enterprises were distributed extremely unevenly throughout the country. Large modern enterprises were concentrated mainly in Catalonia, Asturias, the Basque Country. At the same time, a significant part of Spanish industry barely emerged from the manufacturing period. Ilya Ehrenburg during his trip to Spain at the end of 1931. he describes the economic contrasts of the country before him in this way: “The electrical station “Saltos del Duero” is being built near Zamora. It will be “the most powerful station in Europe”. An American city grew up on the rocky shores of Duero: dollars, German engineers, civil guards, strikes, blueprints, numbers, one and a half million cubic meters, energy abroad, new stock issues, fires, roar, cement plants, outlandish bridges, not twenty, but twenty first century. One hundred kilometers from the electric station, one can find villages where people not only have never seen an electric light bulb, but where they have no idea of ​​an ordinary chimney, they are swarming in a fumes so ancient that it is easy to forget about the passage of time altogether. The main part of modern enterprises was under the control of foreign capital. By 1930 direct foreign investment in the Spanish economy reached 1 billion dollars. Among the foreign capital invested in Spanish industry over several decades in the most profitable sectors of the economy, the most important were: Belgian (0.5 billion francs) invested in railways and tram lines, French (3 billion) - in mining, textile and chemical industry, Canadian - in hydroelectric power plants in Catalonia and the Levant, British (5 billion), which controlled the entire metallurgy of the Basque Country, shipbuilding and, together with Rio Tinto, copper mines, American, which controlled, in particular, telephone networks and electricity generation in in some regions (as Traction Light Electric Power controlled 9/10 of the electricity production in Catalonia), and finally, the German ones, connected with the production of electricity in the Levant and trying to infiltrate the metallurgy. In general, however, Spanish industry could not successfully compete with the industry of the advanced countries, especially with the onset of the Great Depression, when the customs barriers protecting the markets of the latter became especially high. On the world market, Spain could mainly offer agricultural products and its subsoil. The process of concentration of production in Spain was slow. Only the metallurgy of the Basque Country gave us an example of a large modern capitalist industry. In Catalonia, the textile industry, which plays a leading role there, has been largely dispersed among small enterprises. The pace of development of the Spanish economy was quite high under the dictatorship of Primo de Riviera. However, the global economic crisis interrupted this recovery. In Spain itself, the crisis continued until the outbreak of World War II. If we take the period of the Great Depression itself, then the decline in production, compared with other countries, was not so great: in 1932 it amounted to 10% compared to 1929 (compared to more than 50% for the USA and Germany). But for Spain, with its backwardness and poverty, this was enough to bring the misery of the working people to an extreme. Moreover, the economic recovery did not resume later. In March 1936, i.e. the day after the election victory of the Popular Front, the index of industrial production was only 77% of the pre-crisis level. The level of stock quotation in 1935 fell to 63% in relation to the same 1929. The peseta fell by 35% in 1931 in relation to 1929, by another 10% in 1932 and remained practically unchanged until 1936. The mining industry was especially affected: iron ore production fell from 6559 thousand tons in 1930 to 1760 in 1933, rising in 1936 to 2633, copper ore - from 63.7 thousand tons in 1929 to 30 in 1934 and 1935, the extraction of manganese ores decreased to almost zero, pyrite - 3867 thousand tons in 1929 to 2286 - in 1935. Things were better with coal mining: 7120 thousand tons in 1930, falling to 5932 in 1934, and rising to 7017 in 1935. But Spanish coal could not compete in price with English. To avoid undesirable consequences for citrus exports (of which the UK was the main buyer), the country was forced to regularly import English coal in order to balance the trade balance. Accordingly, metallurgical production also decreased: steel production decreased from 1003 thousand tons in 1929 to 580 in 1935, copper, respectively, from 28.5 to 10.8 thousand tons. etc. etc. Shipbuilding experienced a severe crisis. In 1929, 37 ships were launched, in 1931 - 48, in 1932 - 11, in 1933 and 1934 - 18 each, in 1935 - only 3. The situation in the energy sector (2433 million kW - in 1929, 3198 - in 1934) and in construction. The consequence of the crisis was ever-increasing unemployment. If in December 1931 it was 400 thousand people, then in December 1933 it was 600 thousand. On the eve of the war, in June 1936, it crossed the line of 800 thousand people. The situation was aggravated by the return of emigrants, mainly from Latin America - about 100 thousand people during the 30s. The situation in agriculture was more encouraging. In general, it gave 2/5 of the national income. The production of grain, rice and corn remained at the same level or increased. The total catch of fish (marine) increased by a third. The area where oranges were grown has increased by half compared to 1926. During the years of the Republic, the export of oranges reached a record level, amounting to more than 20% of all Spanish exports. True, the latest increase was also a consequence of a decrease in exports of a number of other products. So the export of wine and olive oil amounted to in the mid-30s. only a quarter of the 1930 level. It cannot be said that the republic did not try to change anything. There were many projects, and a number of them were implemented. Energy in their implementation was invested by the Minister of Finance, and then the Minister of Public Works, Indalecio Prieto. Dam building, irrigation and afforestation have contributed to the development of agriculture and the growth of electricity generation. Railways were electrified, the construction of the railway tunnel under the Sierra de Guadarrama, begun by Primo de Riviera, was completed, many highways were reconstructed, etc. On the whole, however, the republic's attempt to modernize the economy has been a complete failure. The old social system interfered with this goal. What was needed was a new one (or, at least, a radically updated one), which would not only direct human and financial resources accordingly, but also be able to unite a society (including by force), torn apart by economic and social conflicts that paralyze the implementation of these tasks . Spanish phalangism, which came to power as a result of a military putsch led by General Francisco Franco, sought to establish its own, specific version of the fascist, totalitarian regime in the country. He was characterized by the same extreme nationalism, chauvinism, which distinguished other fascist movements. Large industrialists and landowners secretly fed the Falangists with their monetary donations, for which the latter, having come to power, protected the interests of their patrons in every possible way. The power of the punitive apparatus of the state turned against those who did not want to submit to the fascist dictatorship. A cruel dictator turned out to be at the head of the regime, capable of drowning his own people in blood with the help of soldiers and bayonets of the “friendly” armies of the fascist “axis” states. When creating his own state, Franco inevitably had to turn to the experience of his “colleagues”. The nationalist slogan of the revival of “great Spain” helped him “process” the masses. As you can see, the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Spain was facilitated by economic upheavals and, as a result, the growing struggle of workers to improve their economic situation. Under these conditions, the inability of the ruling bourgeois-liberal elite to find a way out and neutralize the situation, threatening an explosion of popular indignation, was revealed with particular clarity. The democratic forces failed to offer worthy resistance to fascism. The offensiveness and viability of fascism were underestimated by both the liberal-bourgeois representatives of the ruling class and the left parties. A generalizing analysis of the conditions for the formation and strengthening of the fascist regime in Spain makes it possible to single out four stages of its development. First stage. Coming to power during the period of exacerbation of the general crisis that engulfed all spheres of the life of the state: political, economic, social. The rapid establishment of public order through the harsh suppression of those who disobey the regime. Streamlining the economy, accompanied by a fall in unemployment and inflation, through targeted state regulation. The transformation of the leaders of political movements that came to power into dictators. At this stage, everyone is outwardly satisfied. Those who are dissatisfied are forced into silence, repressed or emigrated from the country. Second stage. Intoxication with state and military power. Transition to the preparation of territorial expansion. Polishing the idea of ​​national superiority. The final rejection of the principles of democracy. Third stage. Complete reprisal against internal dissent under the slogan of the unity of the nation (party) in the face of external threats. Encroachments on the territory of neighboring states, unleashing a war. Fourth stage. overvoltage internal forces and resources. The emergence of internal contradictions of the regime. And as a result, the collapse of the regime - during the life of the dictator or immediately after his death.