Forcing the river Vistula. Vistula-Oder operation. General situation on the fronts
The myth of the Vistula-Oder operation
One of the main myths of the Vistula-Oder operation is that, at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill, the start time of this operation was postponed from the originally scheduled January 20 to January 12, 1945, in order to help the Anglo-American troops who were in a difficult situation due to the offensive Wehrmacht in the Ardennes.
But, as evidenced by the documents and, in particular, the plan for the concentration of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front approved by Zhukov on December 29, 1944, the offensive was originally scheduled for January 8, 1945, but due to bad weather, which limited aviation operations and adjustment of artillery fire, it had to be rescheduled. In the same way, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to launch an offensive on January 10, but it started on the 13th.
The 1st Ukrainian Front went forward on January 12 instead of the 9th, and the 2nd Belorussian Front on the 14th instead of January 10th. Churchill's message, which reported that "very heavy fighting is going on in the West", and spoke of the "alarming situation when you have to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative", was sent only on January 6. It contained a request for information about Soviet military plans, but nothing more. Stalin, on the other hand, decided to pretend that the Red Army was ready to accelerate its upcoming offensive for the sake of the Allies, and on January 7 answered Churchill: “We are preparing for the offensive, but the weather is now not favorable for our offensive. However, given the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire Central Front no later than the second half of January. In fact, the Soviet command was in a hurry to advance because it was too risky to keep large forces, including tank armies, inactive for several days on the bridgeheads across the Vistula. They were pulled up to the bridgeheads with a focus on the initial timing of the offensive - January 8-10. The enemy could detect the concentration of troops and inflict losses on them with the fire of his artillery, which was shooting through the bridgeheads. Therefore, the attack began when the forecasters gave a favorable weather forecast. Clear weather was promised on January 14, but they were mistaken. The good weather was established only on the 16th and lasted only a few days.
In fact, the plans for a general offensive by the Soviet fronts began to be developed as early as the end of November, and were finally approved by the Headquarters on December 22, that is, even before the messages to Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill. And even then, the offensive in Poland and East Prussia was supposed to begin on January 8-10. Therefore, Stalin, knowing full well that the offensive should begin in the region of January 10-12, but not on the 20th, openly bluffed when he wrote to Churchill. But already on January 5, that is, before Stalin's answer to Churchill, shock groups of fronts, including tank armies, concentrated on the bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. To keep such a grouping for 15 days on relatively small bridgeheads, shot through by enemy artillery, was not only risky, but, most importantly, absolutely pointless.
And the messages of Roosevelt and Churchill, sent to Stalin on December 24, were by no means panicky. The leaders of England and the United States only wanted to know the plans of the Soviet command. Roosevelt said: "The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period when we need to talk about the next phase." Churchill also wrote about the same: "I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are."
The Vistula-Oder operation was carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev. Both fronts numbered 2,203.7 thousand people, 33.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 5 thousand combat aircraft. The German troops of Army Group "A" of General Josef Harpe who opposed them numbered no more than 400 thousand people with 6 thousand guns, 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, and about 600 aircraft. They could not resist the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet troops.
Guderian stated in his memoirs: “We expected that the offensive would begin on January 12, 1945. The superiority of the Russians was expressed by the ratio: in infantry 11:1, in tanks 7:1, in artillery pieces 20:1. If we evaluate the enemy as a whole, then we could talk without any exaggeration about his 15-fold superiority on land and at least 20-fold superiority in the air.
Guderian on December 25, 1944, during a meeting with Hitler, tried to convince him to stop offensive operations on the Western Front in order to transfer divisions from there to the Eastern Front and create reserves to repel the expected Soviet offensive in Poland. However, Hitler not only did not return the divisions from the Western Front at that moment, but even transferred the 4th SS Panzer Corps, located north of Warsaw, to Hungary to try to unblock Budapest, which, of course, weakened the defense on the Vistula. By that time, the Fuhrer had already decided, in the event of the failure of the Ardennes offensive, to try to hold first of all the "Alpine fortress", where the last oil fields and refineries in Hungary and Austria remained. For the entire Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht had only 12.5 divisions in reserve.
During the Vistula-Oder operation, it was planned to deliver two main strikes: from the Magnushevsky bridgehead by troops in the direction of Poznan and from the Sandomierz bridgehead by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front - to Breslau (Wroclaw). In addition, Zhukov's troops from the Pulawy bridgehead delivered an auxiliary strike in the general direction to Radom, Lodz.
In itself, the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes contributed a lot to the success of the Soviet offensive on the Vistula, since the most combat-ready German divisions, including tank divisions, were transferred to participate in the Ardennes offensive, and the Eastern Front was weakened.
Already on the first day of the offensive, the German defenses on the Vistula were broken through. On January 17, Harpe was removed from his post and replaced by General Scherner. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 100 km in four days.
On the 1st Belorussian Front, on January 16, the 69th Army and the 11th Tank Corps captured Radom by storm. Parts of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies and the 1st Army of the Polish Army liberated Warsaw on January 17, the garrison of which preferred to retreat so as not to be surrounded.
On January 19, units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies approached Breslau, and the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Krakow. Under the threat of encirclement by the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the German troops left Silesia, and Breslau was surrounded. In the period from January 23 to early February, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder on a wide front. Having forced the river in the areas of Olau (Olav) and northwest of Oppeln (Opole), they captured and expanded the bridgehead on its western bank in the area of Steinau and Breslau.
On January 19, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front liberated Lodz. On January 22, Zhukov's troops were already near Poznan, and after another 4 days they overcame the Mezeritsky fortified area on the move, which the enemy did not have time to occupy with sufficient forces. By February 3, the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder and captured a bridgehead on its western bank in the Kustrin area, clearing the right bank of the river from the enemy. Occupied by a strong German garrison, the Polish fortress of Poznan held out until February 13, 1945, when it was taken by the forces of the 8th Guards Army.
In the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops, according to official figures, lost 43.5 thousand killed and missing and 150.7 thousand wounded and sick. Data on irretrievable losses, most likely, are underestimated by at least three times. There is no reliable data on the losses of German troops. It is only known that in the period from January 1 to January 20, 1945, the Red Army took 67,776 prisoners, most of whom were on the front of the Vistula-Oder operation, and a smaller part - on East Prussia.
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12.1 3.2.1945, during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev) broke through the defenses of the German troops of Army Group A, from 26.1 Center (General ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
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January 12 to February 3, 1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev) broke through the defenses of the German troops of Army Group A, from January 26 ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Vistula Oder Operation II World War, Great Patriotic War ... Wikipedia
Vistula-Oder operation 1945- VISLO-ODER OPERATION 1945, strategic. come. operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian. and 1st Ukr. fr., held on 12 Jan. 3 Feb. with the assistance of the troops of the lion. wing of the 2nd Belorussian. and right. wing of the 4th Ukr. fr. The goal is to defeat him. fash. group… … Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia
Come. operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian: (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov), 1st Ukr. (Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev) and right. wing of the 4th Ukr. (Army General I.E. Petrov) fronts Jan. 12. Feb 7 on the territory Poland, between pp. Vistula and Oder; component… … Soviet historical encyclopedia
The strategic offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and the 1st Ukrainian (Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev) fronts on January 12 February 3 during the Great Patriotic War 1941 1945; ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
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Books
- Victorious 1945. Vistula-Oder offensive operation, Portuguese Richard Mikhailovich. The book tells about one of the largest strategic offensive operations of World War II - the Vistula-Oder. As a result of its implementation, the Soviet troops, having provided assistance ...
- The Victorious 1945 Vistula-Oder Offensive, Portuguese R., Runov V. The book tells about one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Second World War - the Vistula-Oder. As a result of its implementation, the Soviet troops, having provided assistance ...
The Vistula-Oder offensive operation went down in history due to the scale of strategic tasks. It was a litmus test that showed the whole world that the Red Army at that time was the strongest and most combat-ready. The liberation of Poland and a large part of Czechoslovakia, and then access to the Oder, 70 km from Berlin - this is not the whole list of goals achieved. But first things first.
General situation on the fronts
The German war machine was no longer the same force and threat as at the beginning of the war. A series of crushing defeats on the Eastern Front forced the Germans to go on the defensive. And now the Red Army, which had qualitatively changed for the better over the years, was imposing its own initiative. The severity of the threat posed by the Soviet troops is indicated by scarce numbers. Of the 314 divisions and 8 brigades of the German troops, at least 198 divisions and 6 brigades were allocated to resist the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The Germans desperately resisted, but gradually fears and doubts made them hate the Fuhrer for dragging Germany into a meat grinder. The landing of the allies in Normandy also did not add optimism. The operation “Watch on the Rhine”, undertaken by the Wehrmacht troops, was only an attempt to stabilize the Western Front and give time to further strengthen the “Siegfried Line”, and then concentrate maximum efforts to repel the Soviet threat.
The myth of saving the allies under the Ardennes
The furious propaganda that has long fallen upon a simple man in the street, and from both sides, leads away from the truth. On the one hand, they demonize Stalin and reduce the heroic role of the Red Army, slyly forgetting to talk about the far-reaching plans of the United States to use the atomic bomb, including against the Soviet Union. In such a situation, the most decisive measures were needed to save the already long-suffering people from an even greater nightmare. And on the other hand, the "cheers-patriots" tell a version about the worthlessness of the allies and their pleas and requests for salvation under the Ardennes. This version is much more interesting, as it makes the cheeks swell even more important from their own exclusivity and invincibility. The facts point to a third version. Understanding this key historical event brings us closer to the answer to the question: "Why did the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation start ahead of schedule?"
"Watch on the Rhine"
From the very beginning, this operation, undertaken by the troops of the Wehrmacht, was of an adventurous nature. Its main task was to inflict local defeat on the Allied forces in order to give Germany the respite that she needed like air. The strengthening of the Soviet Army inspired anxiety, and it was not possible for the German command to fight on two fronts. For these purposes, 5.6 and 7 tank armies were allocated. They were supposed to, according to the idea of the Germans, and crack the defenses of 4 infantry and 1 go to the Meuse River, and then hit 3 main directions: Liege, Brussels and Antwerp. But in solving these problems there were too many unknowns, where one had to rely on chance. The success of the operation could be ensured by several conditions: the capture of captured fuel, the weather and rapid movement. The underestimation of the American soldiers and ultimately led to the collapse. As for the requests for help, which, according to some historians, took place, such claims are untenable. You can easily verify this for yourself by reading the correspondence between Churchill and Stalin, since these letters are freely available. The Vistula-Oder offensive operation solved other problems. The enemy remained strong and as yet undefeated, continuing to oppress other peoples. And it was possible to end this war only in Berlin.
The First Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts were huge. They included 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies. Over five thousand aircraft, seven thousand tanks and 37 thousand guns and mortars. About one and a half million manpower. The Red Army received new technology. Soviet pilots almost completely controlled German airspace. The level of skill and tactical art has also increased significantly. In Poland, during the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, the Red Army demonstrated a brilliant example of blitzkrieg. I. S. Konev and G. K. Zhukov were appointed to command the fronts. Assistance was provided by K. K. Rokossovsky, I. E. Petrov, as well as the Pole General S. G. Poplavsky (commander of the Polish armed forces).
Number of troops from the German side
They had three armies, which included 28 divisions and 2 brigades - a little over 400 thousand people, about 5 thousand guns and mortars, over a thousand tanks and assault guns, and about 600 aircraft. was pretty beat up. At the end of the war, the entire male population aged 16 to 60 was subject to general mobilization. The Germans switched to defensive actions and were clearly losing strategically, since the attacking side almost always imposes its initiative.
The first miscalculations of the Germans
1944 Vistula-Oder strategic operation. The reasons for the postponement of the date of the offensive in Soviet historiography are the request of the allies for support and bad weather conditions. The assertion of Soviet historians (for propaganda purposes) that the alleged Soviet troops launched an offensive without waiting for the completion of preparations can be challenged. There are two proofs of this: the surviving correspondence between Winston Churchill and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, as well as the plan for the concentration of the 1st Belorussian Front, approved by Zhukov. Date of approval - December 29, 1944. By the beginning of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, the Red Army had the Sandomierz, Magnushevsky and Pulov bridgeheads, concentrating its troops on them. The Soviet command proceeded from considerations that the Germans would know the direction of the main attack. However, it was so obvious. best suited for this role. Therefore, it was logical to break into the German defenses on a broad front. The emphasis was on the strength and surprise of the first strike. Difficulties were added by weather conditions: it was impossible to fully use artillery and aircraft. The Germans, following Hitler's instructions, pulled up reserves, and that was theirs. major mistake. The work of the Soviet artillery exceeded all expectations: both the first echelon of defense and rather large reserve forces found their death.
The history of the Vistula-Oder operation has 23 days. Starting an offensive with a front width of about 500 kilometers, at the end of the operation, Soviet troops expanded the front to 1,000 kilometers. The pace of the offensive was about 25 kilometers, and this was the first time for the Red Army. Aviation worked at the maximum of its forces, providing cover, transporting cargo and bombarding the enemy. At the end of the supply operation, the supplies went a little wrong, but this did not prevent the Red Army from carrying out the assigned combat missions. During the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, interactions between various branches of the armed forces were perfectly demonstrated. The students have surpassed their teachers. If we compare the offensive operations of the German troops in 1939 and the Soviet ones in 1945, the differences are striking. The Germans were opposed by a much weaker Polish army. Soviet troops fought an enemy that until recently was considered the best in the world. The success of the Soviet troops was due to the initiative of the forward units. The persecution of the enemy was carried out almost around the clock, the Nazis were not given the opportunity to regroup and put up serious resistance. Changed the tactics of using tanks. Previously, their use was massive, but now they were crushed to a company to support rifle battalions.
Losses on both sides
During the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, Soviet troops lost about two percent of their personnel. If we reveal these figures in more detail, then people who heroically gave their lives, health, lost friends and relatives emerge behind them. The irretrievable losses of the 1st Belorussian Front amounted to 17,032 people. Sanitary losses - 60,310 people. The 1st Ukrainian Front permanently lost 26,319 people, 89,564 people were hospitalized. The 1st, consisting of 90,900 fighters, lost 225 people killed and 841 wounded. The losses of the Germans as prisoners alone amounted to over 150,000 people. 35 divisions were completely destroyed, and 25 divisions were missing from 50 to 70% of the personnel.
On the way to Berlin
The results of the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation were of great importance in the defeat of fascist Germany. Berlin loomed ahead. Behind are liberated territories and saved lives. The final defeat of Hitler was not far off. This operation greatly helped the armed forces of Great Britain and the United States. The liberated territories slowly but surely began to restore pre-war life and statehood. The Vistula-Oder offensive operation forced the Western partners to think, who cherished the hope of starting a war with the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany. Churchill's famous speech, which, in fact, marked the beginning of the Cold War, was still ahead.
Conclusion
The causes and consequences of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation still cause a lot of controversy due to interference in the study of this historical period of ideology. But in history, the most important thing is facts and evidence. One thing is beyond doubt: the heroism and courage of the Soviet soldiers made it possible to extinguish the plague of misanthropy and obscurantism in the face of the fascist regime in Germany. Any political speculation on this subject is inappropriate. Unfortunately, so far only Russia has taken a clear position, declaring that it will not allow trampling on the peace and memory of the great Soviet soldiers.
Vistula-Oder operation |
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Interfluve of the Oder and the Vistula, Germany |
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Red Army victory |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Georgy Zhukov |
Joseph Harpe |
Ivan Konev |
Ferdinand Schörner |
Opponents |
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THE USSR: 2,112,700 37,033 guns and mortars 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns 5,047 aircraft |
About 400,000 4103 guns 1136 tanks 270 aircraft |
THE USSR: 43,251 killed and missing, 115,783 ambulances, 159,034 total |
The number of killed and wounded is unknown 150 thousand captured |
Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation- the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops on the right flank of the Soviet-German front in 1945. Started January 12th and ended February 3rd. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov) and the 1st Ukrainian Fronts (Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev).
During the Vistula-Oder operation, the territory of Poland west of the Vistula was cleared of German troops and a bridgehead on the right bank of the Oder was captured, which was subsequently used in the attack on Berlin. The operation entered the military history of mankind as the most rapid offensive - for 20 days, Soviet troops advanced at a distance of 20 to 30 km per day. During this time, they overcame 7 fortified enemy lines and 2 large water barriers.
Disposition on the eve of the offensive
By January 1945, the German army was in a critical position. There were heavy battles in Hungary and East Prussia, the Wehrmacht gradually retreated on the Western Front. During the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the Soviet army captured the strategically important for Germany Ploeshty oil region (Romania). Allied bombing caused serious damage to German industry. The Air Force was practically destroyed and manpower reserves were exhausted. Despite this, in December 1944 the Germans launched a major offensive on the Western Front, Operation Watch on the Rhine, which was the last attempt to change the course of the war. By the end of December 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure, and on December 25, American troops went on the offensive. Diverting forces to the Western Front, the German command was forced to simultaneously transfer reinforcements for the defense of Koenigsberg to East Prussia and near Budapest, which was surrounded by Soviet troops. As a result, the front along the Vistula in Poland, which had been stable since the beginning of September 1944, was weakened.
The Soviet command planned to launch an offensive in Poland on January 20, to crack the enemy's defenses in a sector with a total length of 480 kilometers, using the Sandomierz, Magnushevsky and Pulawy bridgeheads. Since the Allied forces were fighting hard in the Ardennes, the Soviet headquarters agreed to postpone the operation and launch an offensive between January 12 and 15.
Side forces
By January 1945, 3 German armies (28 divisions and 2 brigades) of Army Group A (from January 26 - Army Group Center) were in front of two Soviet fronts - approx. 400 thousand people, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1200 tanks and assault guns, 600 aircraft. In addition to continuous lines of defense, the Germans created several fortified areas, the largest of which were Modlin, Warsaw, Radom, Krakow, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Poznań, Breslau and Schneidemühl.
In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies: a total of 1.5 million people, 37,033 guns and mortars, 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,047 aircraft. The offensive began in conditions of overwhelming superiority in forces and means.
Operation progress
The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive early in the morning on January 12, delivering the main blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on January 14 from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads.
The writer Anthony Beevor, in his book The Fall of Berlin, wrote of the first day of the operation:
Since, by order of Hitler, the tank reserves were advanced to the front line in advance, they were within the reach of Soviet artillery fire, suffered serious losses already in the first period of the offensive and could not be involved in accordance with pre-developed defense plans, being drawn into battle to cover the gaps, formed in the battle formations of the German troops.
On January 13 and 14, to the north - in East Prussia - an offensive was launched by the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of General Chernyakhovsky and the 2nd Belorussian Front (General Rokossovsky) (see East Prussian operation (1945)).
Hitler decided to suspend all active fighting on the Western Front and return to Berlin from his headquarters in Ziegenberg only on January 15, on the fourth day of the successful Soviet offensive, despite the urgent requests of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Guderian. In the early days, Hitler refused to consider proposals for the transfer of reinforcements to the Eastern Front, but, returning to the capital, he ordered the transfer of the Great Germany Corps from East Prussia to the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Kielce, 170 km south of Warsaw.
Meanwhile, the 47th Army, operating on the extreme right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was bypassing Warsaw from the north. On January 16, the headquarters of Army Group A (commanded by Colonel General Josef Harpe) reported to the command of the Wehrmacht ground forces that the city could not be held due to the small number of garrison (several battalions). Guderian issued an order that the command of Army Group A was allowed to independently decide on the continuation of the defense of Warsaw. Hitler, having learned about this, became furious and demanded that the order be canceled, but radio communication with the garrison had already been interrupted.
On January 17, Soviet troops liberated Warsaw, in the battles for which the units of the Human Army (commander - Brigadier General Sigmund Berling) who were part of the 1st Belorussian Front, took an active part. On the same day, Colonel General Josef Harpe and the commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army, General von Lutwitz, were removed from command of the troops.
Anthony Beevor:
By January 18, the main forces of Army Group A were defeated, the enemy defenses were broken through on a 500-km front to a depth of 100-150 km.
On January 19, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered German territory in Upper Silesia, and the troops of the left wing of the front liberated Krakow.
The German command began the transfer to the border areas of part of the forces from the interior of Germany, from the Western Front and other sectors of the front. However, attempts to restore the broken front were unsuccessful. On January 20-25, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front overcame the Wart and Poznan defensive lines and surrounded the 60,000-strong enemy garrison in Poznan. January 22 - February 3, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads on its western bank in the areas of Steinau, Breslau, Oppeln and Kustrin. At the same time, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front occupied part of southern Poland and northern Czechoslovakia and advanced to the upper reaches of the Vistula. Fights began for Breslau, where the German group resisted until the beginning of May.
Results
As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, 35 enemy divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their personnel, about 150 thousand people were taken prisoner. Soviet troops leveled the front and reached the distant approaches to Berlin. Significant enemy forces ended up in boilers in Poznan and Breslau. The inability of the Germans to effectively conduct military operations on two fronts and the inevitability of the coming Allied victory became obvious. The restoration of Polish statehood began - the national administration was restored in the liberated territories.
The total losses of the Soviet armies amounted to about 160 thousand people, of which about 44 thousand were irretrievable.
Notes
- ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 250 Received December 24, 1944. PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
- ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 257 Posted January 15, 1945. PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr. F. ROOSEVELT
- ^ Anthony Beevor, "The Fall of Berlin", ch. 2
Having lost Lvov and Stanislav, the Nazi command began to take urgent measures to stabilize its defenses on the Vistula and in the Carpathians. The enemy attached particular importance to the defense at the turn of the Vistula River.
Despite the exceptionally difficult situation in Belorussia, the Nazi command concentrated significant reserves against the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the end of July and the first half of August, seven divisions from the Southern Ukraine Army Group were transferred to the Northern Ukraine Army Group, including three tank divisions, seven infantry divisions from Germany, three infantry divisions from Hungary and the command of the 17th Army, whose troops were defeated in the Crimea. In addition to these 17 divisions, six brigades of assault guns, several separate tank battalions armed with new super-heavy tanks of the "King Tiger" type, and other units were pulled up to the Vistula, in the Sandomierz area.
However, these forces could not seriously change the situation. For 18-19 days of the operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced to a depth of 200 kilometers in a strip whose width reached 400 kilometers. These successes, as well as the victories of the Soviet troops in Belarus, contributed to the further development of the offensive. In the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the end of July decided that the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were to force the Vistula on a wide front from Warsaw to the mouth of the Wisloka River, capture several bridgeheads on the opposite bank for a subsequent offensive to the borders fascist Germany.
On July 27 and 28, the Headquarters ordered the 1st Ukrainian Front to rapidly develop the offensive in westbound, to prevent the enemy from taking up defenses on the Vistula, to force the river on the move and seize a bridgehead in the Sandomierz area. For the successful crossing of the Vistula, it was proposed to concentrate the main forces on the right wing of the front, transferring the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies to the Sandomierz direction from the Przemysl region. It was planned to cross the Vistula no later than the beginning of August. The troops of the center of the front were to reach the line of the river Visloka - Sanok, and the left wing - to seize the passes through the Carpathian ridge in the directions of Humenne (40 kilometers south of the Radoshptsky pass), Uzhgorod, Mukachevo. With the same directive, the Stavka ordered the front commander to keep in mind an offensive from the Sandomierz bridgehead in the Czestochowa and Krakow directions, as well as the exit of the troops of the left wing of the front through the Carpathian passes into the Middle Danube Lowland.
In accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters, the front commander decided to launch an offensive and on July 28 set new tasks for the armies.
The 3rd Guards Army was ordered to reach the Vistula by the end of July 28, force it on the night of July 29, seize bridgeheads on the Zembozhin-Konary front, capture Sandomierz and take Ostrovets and Opatow with strong forward detachments. On July 29, the right-flank formations of the 13th Army were to reach the Vistula at the Sandomcr - the mouth of the Wisloka River, by the morning of the next day, cross the river and seize bridgeheads on the Konary - Polanets front. The left-flank formations of the army were to liberate the city of Rzeszow. The 1st Guards Tank Army was tasked on June 29 to strike in the direction of Maidan - Baranow, to cross the Vistula on the move and by the morning of August 1 to reach the area of the settlement of Bogoria.
The next day, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was given the task of reaching the Baranow area and, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 13th Army, crossing the Vistula. Forcing the Vistula on the move was a great difficulty: its width in the Sandomierz region reaches 200-250 meters, its depth is more than two meters. It was planned to advance the second echelon of the front to the Sandomierz direction - the 5th Guards Army, commanded by Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov. The troops of the center and the left wing of the front were to continue the offensive, capture the cities of Debica, Sanok, Sambor, Drohobych, Borislav, Dolina and capture the passes through the Carpathians.
In connection with the new tasks assigned to the troops of the front, political bodies instructed party and Komsomol organizations to widely promote the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which proposed to bring to the attention of the soldiers of the front that “fighters and commanders who distinguished themselves in forcing the Vistula will receive special awards with orders up to the awarding of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Since the troops were to operate on the territory of Poland, the political department of the front sent to the political agencies of the formations and in part materials for reports and conversations on the topics: “Modern Poland”, “On Soviet-Polish Relations”. At the same time, it was proposed to intensify work among the Polish population, focusing on explaining the policy of the Soviet Union towards Poland.
Having received a new combat mission and regrouped, the 1st Ukrainian Front continued to develop the offensive on July 28 and 29. On the afternoon of July 29, the vanguard divisions of the 3rd Guards and 13th Armies, as well as the advance detachment of the 1st Guards Tank Army, reached the Vistula on the Annopol-Baranow front and, after reconnaissance of the opposite bank of the river, began to cross it. The troops of the 3rd Guards Army, interacting with the cavalry-mechanized group of General Sokolov, on July 30 captured three small bridgeheads north and south of Annopol. But due to the unsatisfactory organization of the forcing, these bridgeheads were not further expanded.
The troops of the 13th and 1st Guards Tank Armies crossed the Vistula more successfully. The 350th and 162nd Rifle Divisions, in cooperation with the forward detachment of the 1st Guards Tank Army, crossed the Vistula near Baranow. During the crossing, soldiers and officers of all branches of the military showed exceptional perseverance, courage and bravery. Parts of the 350th Rifle Division, commanded by Major General G. I. Vekhin, acted boldly and decisively. A group of scouts of the 416th separate reconnaissance company of this division, under the command of Sergeant V.M. In the afternoon of July 29, units of the 1178th Infantry Regiment of this division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Barbasov came to the Vistula north of Baranow. The 2nd rifle battalion of captain A.I. Yakushev began to cross over to the shore occupied by the enemy using improvised means and fishing boats. The Nazis fired furiously at the daredevils. But the courageous warriors, under the cover of fire from the units of their regiment, reached the opposite shore and took possession of a small bridgehead.
Colonel-General N.P. Pukhov, who commanded the 13th Army, wrote in his memoirs: “The forcing of the Vistula took place so rapidly that in some cases the boats of the retreating enemy and the same boats, or even rafts, simultaneously swayed on the waves of the river our avant-garde units."
On July 30, by the end of the day, units of the 350th Rifle Division and the advance detachment of the 1st Guards Tank Army expanded the captured bridgehead to 12 kilometers along the front and up to 8 kilometers in depth. On July 30-31, they began to reach the Vistula in the area north of Baranow and cross over to the bridgehead of the formation of the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies. The enemy sought to counterattack to eliminate the bridgehead of the Soviet troops on the western bank of the river. At the same time, enemy aircraft began to strike at the crossings and disable them, making it difficult to transfer our troops and military equipment to the bridgehead.
In connection with the high activity of enemy aviation, the Military Council of the front adopted a special resolution on improving the organization of air defense of the crossings. In early August, fighter aviation divisions were relocated to the Vistula, anti-aircraft artillery units and formations were brought up. As a result of their actions, the activity of fascist German aviation dropped sharply.
The engineering troops rendered great assistance to the armies in forcing the Vistula. Despite the powerful bombing strikes by enemy aircraft, they managed to ensure the continuity of the crossing. The company of the 20th pontoon-bridge battalion under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant Kh. A. Russkikh, especially distinguished itself. For 16 hours, the company on three ferries transported troops and military equipment to the bridgehead. During one of the air raids, the ferry of the senior lieutenant of the Russians was wrecked, and the company commander himself was wounded. But he was evacuated to the hospital only after a new ferry was assembled. The pontoons of the 6th pontoon-bridge brigade under the command of Colonel Ya. A. Berzin acted quickly and in an organized manner. By August 1, in the band of the 13th Army, there were 24 ferries at the crossings, of which 2 ferries with a carrying capacity of 50-60 tons and 9 with a carrying capacity of 16 tons. Soldiers and officers of two corps, 182 tanks, 11 armored personnel carriers, 55 guns, 94 vehicles were transported on these ferries. Thanks to the clear organization of the crossing, as well as the bold and decisive actions of the Soviet troops, by the end of August 1, the captured bridgehead was expanded to the Kopshivnitsa - Staszow - Polaniec line.
The rapid advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Vistula, forcing it on the move and seizing a bridgehead in the Sandomierz area were of great operational importance: the enemy lost a very advantageous defensive line, and our troops got the opportunity for a further offensive in Poland.
The fascist German command, not having sufficient reserves, was unable to organize strong resistance in the first days of the crossing of the river by the Soviet troops. Only at the beginning of August, fresh enemy divisions began to arrive in the Sandomierz region, and he immediately made attempts to liquidate our bridgeheads, destroy the troops that had crossed over, or push them back beyond the Vistula. Fierce fighting unfolded simultaneously on both banks of the river. Having concentrated a strong grouping of troops on the eastern bank of the Vistula near the city of Mielec, on August 1 the Nazi command moved it in a sharp wedge from the mouth of the Wisłoka River to Baranow. At the same time, a grouping of two infantry divisions attacked Baranow from the Tarnobrzeg area. Enemy aircraft carried out raids on our bridgeheads and crossings.
Enemy counterattacks posed a serious threat to the Soviet troops, since the crossings from the flanks were covered by relatively insignificant forces. The most dangerous was the Mielec group, which on August 3 reached the southern approaches to Baranuv. Engineer and artillery units and the 70th mechanized brigade of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were involved in the defense of the city and the crossings. Thanks to the courage and steadfastness of the Soviet soldiers, the onslaught of the Nazis was held back.
Many soldiers and officers distinguished themselves in these battles, especially the commander of the 1st tank company of the 229th separate tank regiment, Senior Lieutenant M.V. Kopytin. As a result of the counterattack, on August 3, the enemy surrounded the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the brigade in the village of Zhshuv. M. V. Kopytin, on his own initiative, decided to go to the aid of the battalion with five tanks. Having made a bold maneuver, the tank company with well-aimed fire at the enemy helped the battalion to get out of the encirclement. In this battle, the brave tankers destroyed 5 tanks, 2 assault guns, 1 armored personnel carrier and more than 100 enemy soldiers and officers. The company itself did not suffer any losses.
For courage and courage in forcing the Vistula and repelling enemy counterattacks on September 23, 1944, a large group of officers and soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Front was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among the heroes were Sergeant V. M. Sobolev, Senior Lieutenant M. V. Kopytin, Captain A. I. Yakushev, Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Barbasov, Colonel Ya. A. Berzin. On the same day, for exemplary performance of command assignments, skillful leadership of troops and personal courage shown in the battles near Lvov and during the crossing of the Vistula, the deputy commander of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, Colonel I. I. Yakubovsky and the commander of 53 th Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel V. S. Arkhipov.
In order to defeat the enemy grouping, which was striking from the Mslets area, and to expand the bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula, the front commander decided on August 4 to bring into battle the second echelon - the 5th Guards Army. By August 3, this army concentrated in the Yezhov-Maidan-Sokoluv area. On August 4, the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the Army, in cooperation with the 9th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, struck at the flank of the enemy's Mielec grouping. In the course of intense fighting, the enemy was driven back across the Wisloka River. By the end of August 6, our troops liberated Mielec, forced the Wisloka and captured bridgeheads on the left bank west of this city. The main forces of the 5th Guards Army, having crossed the bridgehead on August 6-7, began to develop an offensive in cooperation with the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the direction of Osek - Busko-Zdroj. On August 8, they reached the line of Shidluv - Stopnitsa - Nowy Korchin. Their further advance was halted by counterattacks by the approaching fresh enemy divisions.
Until the end of August, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, repulsing the enemy's continuous counterattacks, fought for the expansion of the Sandomierz bridgehead. It should be noted that on August 4, the front commander ordered the troops in the bridgehead to resume the offensive in order to defeat the main forces of the 4th German Panzer Army and expand the bridgehead towards Sandomierz. The attack began the next day. But our troops, severely undermanned and short of ammunition, achieved only marginal success.
In an effort to eliminate the bridgehead and restore the defenses along the Vistula, the fascist German command continued to reinforce the 4th Panzer Army. By August 10, it had concentrated a large grouping in the area of Khmilnik, consisting of four tank divisions, one motorized division, and several infantry brigades. With this grouping, the enemy intended to strike at Baranow, go to the Vistula and dismember our troops in the bridgehead, and then destroy them piece by piece. At the same time, enemy troops were to launch strong counterattacks from the Opatuwa area. However, the enemy's counterattack did not take our troops by surprise, since the front command, having guessed the enemy's intention, strengthened this section of the bridgehead. The lines occupied were equipped in engineering terms. In addition, the command planned to transfer the 4th Tank Army from the Sambir area and one rifle corps of the 3rd Guards Army to the bridgehead, as well as to reinforce the 5th Guards Army with the 31st Tank Corps.
On August 11, the enemy tank group launched a counterattack on Staszow at the junction of the 13th and 5th Guards armies. Fierce fighting continued for two days. Soviet troops, firmly holding the lines, destroyed the manpower and equipment of the enemy. Success in defensive battles was facilitated by the close interaction of all branches of the armed forces. At the cost of heavy casualties, the enemy managed to penetrate our defenses only 8-10 kilometers. Further attempts to develop a strike in the direction of Baranuv were shattered by the steadfastness of Soviet infantrymen, artillerymen and tankers. Then the fascist German command decided to change the direction of the counterattack. Having concentrated the main forces in the area west of Stopnitsa, the Germans launched a new counterattack on August 13. In the course of stubborn battles from August 13 to 18, the enemy pushed the troops of the 5th Guards Army 6-10 kilometers and captured Stopnets. The further offensive of the Nazis in this direction was also stopped. The enemy's counterattack was repulsed by the timely transfer to the bridgehead of the 4th Tank Army and into the zone of the 5th Guards Army - the 31st Tank Corps.
Simultaneously with the repulse of the counterattack in the area of Stopnitsa, the troops of the front resumed the offensive in order to expand the bridgehead. On August 14, the 13th and 1st Guards Tank Armies struck from the Klimontow area in the general direction of Ozharów, and the 3rd Guards Army from the bridgehead south of Zavikhost to the west. On August 17, our troops surrounded parts of two enemy infantry divisions northwest of Sandomierz and liberated Sandomierz on August 18.
The fascist German command was forced to stop attacks in the area of Stopnitsa and transfer its tank divisions to the area of Ozaruwa, from where a new counterattack followed on August 19 in a southerly direction. On this day, the enemy tank divisions managed to connect with their grouping, surrounded northwest of Sandomierz, but their attempt to develop a strike on Sandomierz was unsuccessful.
The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought on the Sandomierz bridgehead until the end of August 1944. With the liberation of Sandomierz, the bridgehead was significantly expanded - up to 75 kilometers along the front and 50 kilometers in depth. The main forces of the front concentrated on it.
In the battles for the Sandomierz bridgehead, the troops of the front were supported by a specially created aviation group consisting of three aviation corps. She struck at the enemy's tank groups and fought against his aircraft.
Soviet pilots carried out the tasks of command with great skill, showing courage and bravery. On August 22, a communist pilot of the 106th Guards Fighter Regiment of the 11th Guards Aviation Division, Senior Lieutenant A.I. Voloshin, paired with Junior Lieutenant A.I. From the very first attack, he shot down an enemy plane. But soon Voloshin's plane also caught fire. On a burning car, a brave pilot rammed an enemy plane, shot it down and, having flown to the front line, landed at the location of his troops
The actions of the pilots of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, commanded by Colonel A. I. Pokryshkin, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, were distinguished by courage and decisiveness. Recalling his actions in this operation, the former commander of the 2nd Air Army, S. A. Krasovsky, writes: “There was a lot of new and original in the fighting of Pokryshkin and his subordinates. The famous Pokryshkin formula "height, maneuver, fire" became the law in the combat work of the 9th Guards Fighter Division.
The following figures also speak of the large-scale operations of the front's aviation and the high skill of Soviet pilots during the battles for the bridgehead. During August, the 2nd Air Army made more than 17 thousand sorties and carried out up to 300 air battles, in which about 200 enemy aircraft were shot down. Heroism and high flying skills were the hallmarks of many pilots of our Motherland. On August 20, the country celebrated Aviation Day for the fourth time during the war years. On this day, the Soviet government awarded the illustrious pilot Colonel I. Pokryshkin with the third Gold Star medal for exemplary performance of the command's combat missions and heroic deeds. At the same time, Major A. V. Vorozheykin, Captain I. N. Kozhedub and Lieutenant Colonel N. V. Chelnokov were awarded the second Gold Star medal, and twelve pilots, including Yu. A. Akaev, A. Budaragin, P. A Galkin, VN Evgrafov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the tense struggle for the Sandomierz bridgehead, the troops of the center and the left wing of the front continued to advance on Debica and to the passes through the Carpathians, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy defending on natural lines. The troops of the center (60th, 38th armies and the mechanized cavalry group of General Baranov) slowly moved to the west. By the end of August, they reached the Rubey G. Dutsin - Debica - east of Krosno.
In liberating Poland, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought over two hundred kilometers from the Western Bug to the Vistula. The Polish population greeted the Soviet soldiers with a feeling of deep gratitude for getting rid of the fascist yoke. Rallies often spontaneously arose in towns and villages. Jan Velbemsky, a peasant from the Gorodishche village, said at the rally: “Finally, we have waited for our release. We have now seen the Red Army ourselves and convinced ourselves of the lies of the Germans, who intimidated us with the Russians. Polish patriots helped the Soviet soldiers with everything they could: they repaired roads and bridges, caught those hiding in the forests German soldiers. The working people of Poland rendered especially great assistance to the troops of the front during the crossing of the San and the Vistula. In the Baranow region, peasants helped Soviet soldiers build rafts, assemble boats, and build crossings across the Vistula. The workers of one of the factories brought to the crossing Construction Materials. Another group of workers built 20 boats on their own initiative. When fierce battles flared up to expand and hold the Sandomierz bridgehead, the Polish partisans behind the Vistula launched active military operations on enemy communications. Bridges flew into the air, military echelons of the enemy flew downhill. Partisan detachments of the Kielce Voivodeship blew up 129 railway trains with troops and military equipment, destroyed 48 bridges on railways and highways.
While the troops of the front were fighting on the territory of Poland, gangs of bourgeois nationalists began to show activity in the western regions of Ukraine. The command of the Nazi troops supplied them with weapons and ammunition, hoping in this way to undermine the rear of the Red Army. On the instructions of the Nazi command, the nationalists killed party and Soviet workers, tried to disrupt the conscription into the Red Army and grain procurement, raided rear facilities and garrisons of Soviet troops, and committed sabotage on front-line communications. In August, they blew up several railway bridges and trains with military supplies. On August 19, the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to conduct an operation to eliminate nationalist gangs and establish firm order in the rear of the Soviet troops. To help the troops of the NKVD, one cavalry and two motorcycle regiments were allocated to protect the rear. As a result of the operation, carried out from August 22 to September 7, 36 armed gangs, numbering 4315 people, were liquidated.
Due to the fact that the main forces of the front were intended for operations in the Sandomierz direction, and the offensive in the Carpathians required special training, equipment and weapons for the troops, special methods of command and control, on July 30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to form the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the troops new operating group. So the 4th Ukrainian Front arose again. His administration was transferred from the Crimea to the area of Stanislav. On August 5, the Front included the 1st Guards and 18th Armies, the Directorate of the 8th Air Army, as well as aviation, tank, artillery and other formations and units. Colonel General I.E. Petrov was appointed commander of the front, Colonel General L. Z. Mekhlis was appointed a member of the Military Council, and Lieutenant General F.K. Korzhenevich was appointed chief of staff.
The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, continuing the offensive in a southwestern direction, were to clear the Drohobych industrial region of the Nazi invaders and thereby complete the liberation of Ukraine, capture the passes through the Carpathians in order to further reach the Middle Danube lowland.
The Nazi command sought to withdraw its troops from the Stanislav region, organize defense in the foothills of the Carpathians, hold the Drohobych region and prevent the advance of Soviet troops to the passes through the Carpathians. To do this, in the first half of August, three infantry divisions and the command of the 3rd Army Corps were transferred from Hungary to the Drohobych region, a mountain rifle division from Romania, as well as the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps of the 1st Tank Army, consisting of two divisions. All six divisions were included in the 1st Hungarian Army, which fought defensive battles in the area. With the arrival of reserves, enemy resistance increased significantly.
The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, operating in rugged and wooded terrain in the foothills of the Carpathians, slowly moved forward. On August 5, the 1st Guards Army occupied the city of Stryi, and on August 6, having overcome the swampy area northeast of Drohobych, stormed this regional center of Ukraine. On August 7, Sambir and Borislav were taken. With the liberation of these cities, as well as some other settlements, the entire territory of Soviet Ukraine, with the exception of insignificant sparsely populated areas located near the passes through the Carpathian Range, was cleared of Nazi invaders.
Taking into account the increased resistance of the enemy and the great fatigue of the troops, the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front turned to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for permission to suspend the offensive in order to pull up the rear, replenish the troops and prepare them for action in the mountainous wooded area. On August 15, the Headquarters ordered the 4th Ukrainian Front to temporarily go on the defensive and begin preparing an offensive operation in the Carpathians. By this time, the troops of the front had reached the Sanok-Skole-Nadvirnaya-Krasnoilsk line. A new offensive was scheduled to begin on 28 August. But on August 26, this decision was canceled: the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in Romania, which began on August 20, was successfully developing, which made it possible for the Red Army to reach the Middle Danube Lowland from the southeast. This was supposed to dramatically change the situation and facilitate the offensive of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front through the Carpathians.
Having successfully completed the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of August 29, went over to the defensive at the achieved lines.
The victory of the Soviet troops in the western regions of Ukraine was of great military-political and strategic importance. As a result of the successful implementation of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the troops of the 1st and the 4th Ukrainian fronts created during the offensive completed the liberation of Soviet Ukraine. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, together with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, liberated a significant part of Poland's territory east of the Vistula. An important result of the hostilities of the 1st Ukrainian Front was the crossing of the Vistula and the formation of a vast bridgehead in the Sandomierz region, which could serve as a "springboard" for a new decisive offensive towards the southeastern border of Nazi Germany.
In the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated one of the four strategic enemy groupings on the Soviet-German front - the Northern Ukraine Army Group. 32 divisions were defeated and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. In the battles for the liberation of the western regions of Ukraine, Soviet soldiers increased the glory of the Red Army, showed high combat skills, and showed mass heroism. More than 123 thousand soldiers and officers were awarded government awards, and 160 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The completion of the liberation of the Ukraine and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the near approaches to Czechoslovakia hastened the hour for the deliverance of the peoples of this country from Nazi oppression. The victories of the Red Army and the major defeat of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the Czechoslovak and Polish peoples.
The successful operations of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the western regions of Ukraine and southeastern regions of Poland were facilitated by the favorable general military-political situation in the summer of 1944. The operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began during a powerful offensive by Soviet troops in Belarus, which forced the enemy to weaken the grouping in the region of Lvov and thereby facilitated the actions of the troops of the front. At the same time, the victorious offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the defeat of a large enemy grouping between Polesie and the Carpathians led to some weakening of the enemy forces in Romania. This helped the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in the liberation of Soviet Moldavia and Romania.
The Lvov-Sandomierz operation was one of the major offensive operations of 1944. Unlike other strategic offensive operations of that year, it was carried out by the forces of one front and was characterized by a large scope, a variety of forms of military operations, a skillful transfer of efforts from one direction to another, and skillful use of all types of troops and aviation, encirclement and destruction in a short time of a large enemy group.
The most important feature of the military operations of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was the crossing of such large rivers as the Western Bug, San and Vistula on the move. The success of the forcing in all cases was achieved by the surprise entry of troops to water barriers, the timely provision of advanced units with standard-issue crossing facilities and the use of local and improvised means, the simultaneous crossing on a wide front, the capture and retention of bridgeheads.
Armored and mechanized troops played an important role in the operation. Their rapid advance, close interaction with the infantry and aviation ensured the encirclement in short term an enemy grouping in the Brod area, an exit of front troops on enemy communications west of Lvov, and a rapid offensive towards the San and Vistula rivers.
The Lvov-Sandomierz operation was carried out in an atmosphere of complete air supremacy by our aviation, the main efforts of which were directed to support rifle and tank formations. During the operation, the 2nd and 8th Air Armies carried out 48,100 combat sorties. In addition, long-range aviation made 1,529 sorties.
The maneuverable nature of the operation required intensive and flexible work of the operational and military rear. In July-August, more than 140 thousand wagons with military equipment, food and ammunition were delivered to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. However, the supply of materiel to the troops was complicated by the slow pace of restoration of the railways. In this regard, the main burden of transportation fell on vehicles, the paths of which stretched for 200 or more kilometers. Medical institutions ensured the evacuation of the wounded and the provision of assistance to them during the operation.
Significant assistance to the troops of the front was provided by Soviet and Polish partisans, who interacted well with each other. They struck at enemy communications, destroyed the enemy's manpower and military equipment, disrupted the work of his rear.
After the liberation of the western regions of Ukraine, the local party and Soviet bodies were faced with the task of restoring Soviet orders and laws, raising the masses to revive the ruined national economy. The expulsion of the invaders was a great and joyful event in the life of the working people of the Western Ukrainian regions. Immediately after getting rid of the fascist oppression, the bulk of the population, actively supporting the activities of local party and Soviet bodies, joined the work to restore industry, Agriculture and cultural institutions. However, the solution of these problems was associated with serious difficulties. They were explained by the fact that during the three-year German occupation, the population was systematically poisoned with poison from the willow of fascist and bourgeois-nationalist propaganda. This found "its expression in the manifestations of nationalism of various shades, in rapacious tendencies and sometimes in the facts of an unscrupulous attitude towards social work" of a certain part of the population. The situation in the western regions of Ukraine was also complicated by the actions of nationalist gangs, which prevented the restoration of normal life. Gangs in a number of cases disrupted the events of Soviet organs, attacked Soviet and party workers. Under these conditions, ideological and political work among the masses acquired special significance. An important role in its improvement was played by the implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 27, 1944 "On shortcomings in political work among the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR."
For the strengthening of Soviet power and the normalization of life in the western regions of Ukraine, the return to the peasants of the land taken from them by the fascist invaders was of great importance. It was an act of great political importance. He contributed to the rallying of the working peasantry and the complete isolation of the kulaks, the social support of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.
In mid-October 1944, during the renewed offensive in the Carpathians, the Red Army completely liberated Soviet Ukraine from the Nazi invaders. This largest historical event was devoted to the solemn meeting of the party, Soviet and public organizations Kyiv. N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, delivered a report. He congratulated the Ukrainian people on the great victory and emphasized that the people of Ukraine "owe their liberation to our Bolshevik Party, which was and remains the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the German invaders."
