Smolensk offensive operation. The liberation of Smolensk as it was a year. Liberation timeline
Its code name "Suvorov" is a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin (Colonel General A. I. Eremenko) and Western (Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky) fronts, carried out on August 7 - October 2 in order to defeat the left wing of the army group " Center", liberate Smolensk and prevent the transfer of German troops to the southwestern strategic direction.
The main blow was delivered by the armies of the Western Front (31A, 5A, 10 Guards A, 33A, 49A, 10A, 50A, 68A, 21A, 1VA, 2 Guards TC, 5 MK, 6 Guards CC) in order to defeat the enemy in the Yelnya areas and Spas-Demensk. In the future, his troops were to move towards Roslavl in order to help the Bryansk Front advancing in the Roslavl direction in the fight against the powerful German group deployed against it. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, together with the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (4 ud. A, 43A, 39A, 3VA, 3 Guards. KK) had the task of hitting the enemy in the areas of Dorogobuzh, Yartsev, Dukhovshchina and then liberate Smolensk. This plan was called "Suvorov I".
The German command believed that the liberation of Smolensk by the Red Army would create favorable starting positions for it for subsequent operations in the Minsk region. In order to prevent this, the Wehrmacht troops for a long period of stay here created a strong defensive line in the Smolensk direction (the central part of the "Eastern Wall") of 5 - 6 lanes (with a total depth of 100 - 130 km), saturated with wire barriers, minefields, pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, gouges, blockages and others. In addition, the natural conditions of the combat area favored the defense - a wooded area with large swampy areas.
In an effort to stop the Red Army at any cost, the German command in the first half of August transferred up to 13 divisions to the Smolensk direction from Orel, Bryansk and other sectors of the front. The Smolensk operation included four front-line operations. On the morning of August 7, the troops of the shock group of the Western Front went on the offensive, starting the Spas-Demenskaya operation.
The fighting immediately took on a protracted character, accompanied by continuous counterattacks and stubborn German resistance. The troops of the front advanced 30-40 km in 14 days, liberated more than 530 settlements, including Spas-Demensk (August 13). On August 28 - September 6, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelninsko-Dorogobuzh operation, during which they liberated Yelnya (August 30) and Dorogobuzh (September 1).
On September 14, the troops of the Kalinin Front resumed their offensive, and on September 15, the offensive of the Western Front, carrying out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov and Smolensk-Roslavl operations, respectively. In their course, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's defenses, liberated Yartsevo (September 16), Demidov (September 22), Smolensk and Roslavl (September 25), advanced 130 - 180 km.
As a result of the Smolensk operation, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts advanced 200-250 km westward in a strip 300 km wide, liberated Smolensk and part of the Kalinin region from the invaders and entered the borders of Belarus. This significantly moved the front line away from Moscow, ensured the collapse of the "Eastern Wall" in the upper reaches of the Dnieper and created a threat to the northern flank of Army Group Center. 7 divisions were defeated and 14 enemy divisions suffered a heavy defeat. The German command was forced to transfer 16 divisions to the area of operation from other directions, including from the central one, which contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Kursk and the conduct of operations to liberate the left-bank Ukraine.
The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to: irretrievable - over 107.6 thousand people, sanitary - 34.3 thousand people. The troops acted courageously and purposefully, showed courage and military skill. Particularly distinguished 73 formations and units of the Western and 16 - Kalinin fronts received the honorary names of Smolensk, Demidov, Roslavl and others. Many formations and units were awarded orders, tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded military awards.
1943 Liberation timeline
March 6 - Gzhatsky (now Gagarinsky) district
March 8 - Sychevsky district
March 9 - Temkinsky district
March 12 - Vyazemsky and Ugransky districts
March 15 - Holm-Zhirkovsky district
March 20 - Novoduginsky and Safonovsky districts (by March 20, the front line was established near Safonov)
August 30 - Elninsky district
August 31 - Safonovo
September 1 - Dorogobuzhsky district
September 16 - Yartsevsky district
September 19 - Dukhovshchinsky district
September 20 - Velizh district
September 21 - Demidovsky district
September 23 - Pochinkovsky district
September 25 - Smolensk and Roslavl region
September 23 - 25 - Smolensk region
September 26 - Ershichsky, Monastyrshchinsky, Khislavichsky districts
September 27 - Krasninsky, Shumyachsky districts
September 29 - Rudnyansky district
According to the materials of the Research Institute (military history) of the VAGSh of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to liberate Belarus in the autumn of 1943. How did Generals Sokolovsky, Bulganin, Pokrovsky, Gordov carry out this decision...
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to liberate Belarus in the autumn of 1943. How did Generals Sokolovsky, Bulganin, Pokrovsky, Gordov carry out this decision...
There are two extreme dates in the history of the liberation of Belarus from German troops, the existence of which is little remembered in Minsk on the eve of the official celebrations on July 3.
First date - September 23, 1943. On this day, the troops of the 13th Army of the Central Front under the command of N.P. Pukhov, the first regional center of Belarus was liberated - the village of Komarin in the Polessye (now Gomel) region.
Last date - August 29, 1944. In the accepted historiography, she marks the end of the Belarusian operation (code name "Bagration").
Recall that on July 28, 1944, the formations of the 61st Army of General P.A. Belov with the assistance of the troops of the 70th and 28th armies of generals V.S. Popova and A.A. Luchinsky was liberated from the last regional center of Belarus - the city of Brest. A simple comparison of the pace of the offensive advance of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army can be made on the example of this last segment of Minsk - Brest. It took the Germans 6 days to overcome 345 kilometers in 1941. Soviet soldiers in 1944 advanced from Minsk to Brest for 25 days.
And what actually happened in the period of more than 11 months - between September 23, 1943 and August 29, 1944? Why did the Soviet command torture the liberation of a small area of Belarus for so long?..
On these anniversary days, the official Belarusian propaganda in every way repeats the name of the offensive operation of the summer of 1944: "Bagration". It sounds beautiful. However, it should be said that in 1943 the forces of the Western and Kalinin fronts carried out an operation with an even more sonorous name: "Suvorov" (Smolensk).
Before the start of this symbolic operation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. arrived in the front zone. Stalin. From the memoirs of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky:
“... Did I.V. go to the fronts? Stalin? I know only one of his trips. It was in the early days of August 1943 during the preparation of the Smolensk operation. Then the Commander-in-Chief visited the command posts of the Western and Kalinin fronts, where he met with the commanders of these fronts, army generals V.D. Sokolovsky and A.I. Eremenko. The trip took two days. I don't know anything about Stalin's other trips to the front. I don't think they were."(Vasilevsky A.M. The matter of all life. 1973. P. 131)
One can guess that in 1943, Stalin finally decided to testify to his direct leadership of front-line operations and chose the Suvorov as a promising historical event. But the result turned out to be generally local.
Who, except for a narrow circle of military historians, knows today about this operation? And who dares to loudly ask the question: how exactly did Suvorov become effective for the liberation of Belarus?.. Recall: on September 25, the Russian cities of Smolensk and Roslavl were liberated. Finally, on September 28, the Germans were driven out of the Belarusian Mstislavl, a small regional center in the east of the Mogilev region.
This was the end of the matter - since October 2, 1943, the Smolensk operation ("Suvorov") is considered completed in Soviet historiography. The Red Army pushed the Germans back 135-145 kilometers and reached the Velizh-Rudnya line, east of Gorki, to Dribin and further along the Pronya River, where went on the defensive.
I leaf through the 1947 bestseller “Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. short biography”And I don’t find any mention that Comrade Stalin personally planned the Suvorov operation on the spot. In general - nothing about this operation.
And how was it really? Could Stalin, with his maniacal stubbornness, refuse to fight for the Belarusian territories in the autumn of 1943? ..
Modern Belarusian historians Ivan Basik and Aleksey Litvin line up the facts and state the following:
“Even during the Smolensk operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on September 20, 1943 set the task for the Western Front: by the time the left wing of the front captured Smolensk, take Pochinok, Roslavl and reach the line of the river. Sozh - Hislavichi - Shumyagi; in the future, the main grouping will advance in the direction of Orsha and October 10–12, take the Orsha - Mogilev area. The total depth of the upcoming operation was to be 160–210 km. But already in the last days of September, the Headquarters demanded: after occupying the Orsha-Mogilev region, continue the offensive in the direction of Borisov-Molodechno and reach the Dokshitsy-Dolginovo-Radoshkovichi line, and later liberate Vilnius. At the same time, the Kalinin Front was ordered no later than October 9-10, 1943 take Vitebsk, later - Riga, and Central Front - Minsk.
In accordance with the plans of the Stavka, it was envisaged to defeat Army Group Center with simultaneous cutting blows on the flanks and in the center, liberate Belarus and go to the borders of East Prussia and the Baltic states.
However, as subsequent events showed…(chapter "Liberation of Belarus" in the work "Belarus during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945” of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, 2005)
However, these events were very bad. Historians are forced to use the following characteristics:
“The unsuccessful actions of the troops of the Western Front were very dissonant with the grandiose successes of the Soviet troops in the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine(Kyiv was liberated on November 6, 1943, and Belarus, in comparison with Ukraine, looked like a poor relative, who is given a piece of loaf at the latter's wedding. - S.K
.), when the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, therefore, very little was written about the combat operations of the front in the autumn of 1943 - in the spring of 1944. And only since the beginning of the 1990s, this problem has become more widely covered in historiography (the works of V.I. Fesenko, I.V. Timokhovich, M.A. Gareev, etc.)”.
It seems that the modern reader can easily find the works of famous authors Fesenko, Timokhovich and Gareev in libraries in the CIS. We here, after the author's signature to this article, will do in documentary applications a gift to those readers who are interested in a deep study of the events related to the liberation of Belarus.
We offer not the streamlined arguments of historiographers, but genuine documents of 1944. They were published in Minsk in a scientific collection with a circulation of only one hundred copies. (Belarus in resolutions and orders State Committee Defense of the USSR. 1944–1945 NARB, 2008.) and therefore only a few people are familiar with them. The Internet allows to overcome this limiting factor in the use of primary sources.
Let's read the documents that are directly related to the 65th anniversary of the Liberation of Belarus, which is being celebrated today, and think together.
DOCUMENTARY APPENDICES
Decree of the State Defense Committee
On shortcomings in the work of the command and staff of the Western Front
Approve the report of April 11, 1944 of the commission composed of Comrade GOKO member. Malenkov (Chairman), Colonel General Comrade Shcherbakov, Colonel General Comrade Shtemenko, Lieutenant General Comrade Kuznetsov and Lieutenant General Comrade Shimonaev on shortcomings in the work of the command and headquarters of the Western Front and approve both general and organizational conclusions commission (see the appendix - report of the commission).
Comrade Stalin
By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Extraordinary Commission, consisting of a member of the GOKO comrade. Malenkova (Chairman), Colonel General Shcherbakov, Colonel General Shtemenko, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov and Lieutenant General Shimonaev checked the work of the headquarters of the Western Front and, on the basis of this check, established the following:
I. Unsatisfactory fighting Western Front over the past six months
Starting from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, the Western Front under the command of Army General Sokolovsky conducted eleven operations in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions, namely:
Orsha operation October 12-18, 1943
Orsha operation October 21-26, 1943
Orsha operation November 14-19, 1943
Orsha operation November 30 - December 2, 1943
Vitebsk operation December 23, 1943 - January 6, 1944
Bogushev operation January 8-24, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 3-16, 1944
Private operation in the Orsha direction February 22-25, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 29 - March 5, 1944
All these operations ended unsuccessfully and the front did not solve the tasks set by the Headquarters. In none of the listed operations was the enemy's defense breached, even to its tactical depth, the operations ended, at best, with a slight wedging into the enemy's defenses with heavy losses of our troops.
The offensive in the Orsha direction on October 12-18 ended with a wedging of 1-1.5 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 5858 people, wounded - 17 478 people. In total - 23 336 people.
Offensive in the Orsha direction on October 21-26 - advance from 4 to 6 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 4787 people, wounded - 14 315 people. In total - 19 102 people.
Offensive in the Orsha direction on November 14-19 - advance from 1 to 4 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 9167 people, wounded - 29 589 people. In total - 38 756 people.
Offensive in the Orsha direction November 30 - December 2 - wedging from 1 to 2 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 5611 people, wounded - 17 259 people. In total - 22 870 people.
Offensive in the Vitebsk direction December 23 - January 6 - advance 8-12 km. The enemy retreated to a previously prepared line. Our losses: killed - 6692 people, wounded - 28 904 people. A total of 35,596 people.
The offensive on the Bogushevsky direction on January 8-24 - wedged 2-4 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 5517 people, wounded - 19 672 people. In total - 25 189 people.
Offensive in the Vitebsk direction on February 3-16 - an advance of 3-4 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 9651 people, wounded - 32 844 people. In total - 42 495 people.
A private operation in the Orsha direction on February 22-25 did not give any result. In this operation, units of the 52nd Fortified Region themselves were surrounded and, with heavy losses, their original position was restored. Our losses: killed - 1288 people, wounded - 4479 people. In total - 5767 people.
Offensive in the Vitebsk direction February 29 - March 5 - advance from 2 to 6 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 2650 people, wounded - 9205 people. In total - 11 855 people.
The offensive in the Orsha direction on March 5-9 was not successful. Our losses: killed - 1898 people, wounded - 5639 people. In total - 7537 people.
Offensive on the Bogushevsky direction on March 21-29 - wedging from 1 to 3.5 kilometers. Our losses: killed - 9207 people, wounded - 30 828 people. In total - 40,035 people.
In these unsuccessful operations, in the period from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, only in the areas of active operations, the front suffered losses in killed - 62,326 people, wounded - 219,419 people, and in total killed and wounded - 281,745 people . If we add to this the losses on the passive sectors of the front, then for the period from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front lost 330,587 people. In addition, during the same time, 53,283 sick people were admitted to hospitals from the troops of the Western Front.
In the above operations from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front used up a very large amount of ammunition, namely: 7261 wagons. During the year, from March 1943 to March 1944, the front used up 16,661 carloads of ammunition. During the same time, that is, in a year, the Belorussian Front used up 12,335 wagons, the 1st Ukrainian Front - 10,945 wagons, the 4th Ukrainian Front - 8463 wagons, and each of the other fronts used up ammunition less than the listed fronts. Thus, the Western Front used up much more ammunition than any other front.
The unsuccessful actions of the Western Front over the past six months, the heavy losses and the high consumption of ammunition are not due to the presence of a strong enemy and insurmountable defenses in front of the front, but exclusively unsatisfactory leadership on the part of the front command. The Western Front in carrying out all operations has always had a significant superiority in forces and means over the enemy, which makes it possible, of course, to count on success.
For individual operations, the ratio of forces is as follows:
Our forces. For the operation, 19 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 8 rifle divisions, in the 2nd echelon - 11 rifle divisions, a tank corps, a cavalry corps, 12 artillery brigades, 20 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 tank brigades, 6 tank and self-propelled regiments. There were 134 tanks in total. The artillery density was from 150 to 200 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. Two infantry divisions, three to five artillery regiments and about 30 tanks. Subsequently, they were brought up: one front, two md and 3-4 artillery regiments.
Our forces. For the operation, 11 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 8 rifle divisions, in the 2nd echelon - 3 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 13 artillery brigades, 19 artillery regiments of the RGK, 2 tank brigades, 3 tank and self-propelled regiments.
There were 172 tanks in total. Artillery density was from 115 to 260 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 4 infantry divisions, one SS brigade, 6-7 artillery regiments and up to 60 tanks.
Orsha operation November 14-19, 1943
Our forces. For the operation, the following were concentrated: 32 rifle divisions, of which 18 in the 1st echelon, 14 in the second echelon; tank corps, 16 artillery brigades, 23 RGK artillery regiments, 4 tank brigades, 7 tank and self-propelled regiments. There were 410 tanks in total. Artillery density was from 120 to 260 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 4 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions, SS brigade, up to 12 artillery regiments. There were about 70 tanks in total.
Orsha operation November 30 to December 2, 1943
Our forces. For the operation, 34 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 24 rifle divisions, in the 2nd echelon - 10 rifle divisions, 13 artillery brigades, 24 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 tank brigades, 10 tank and self-propelled regiments. There were 284 tanks in total. Artillery density was from 120 to 170 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 43 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions, up to 10 artillery regiments. There were about 200 tanks in total.
Our forces. For the operation, 11 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which 5 in the 1st echelon, 6 in the 2nd echelon, a tank corps, 10 artillery brigades, 4 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 tank brigades, 5 self-propelled artillery regiments. There were 147 tanks in total. The artillery density was 110 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 2 infantry divisions, up to 5 artillery regiments and about 60 tanks. By the end of the operation, three more infantry divisions were thrown up.
Our forces. For the operation, 16 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 11, in the 2nd echelon - 5 rifle divisions and one battalion, a tank corps, 12 artillery brigades, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 6 tank brigades, 8 self-propelled artillery regiments. There were 295 tanks in total.
Enemy forces. 4 infantry divisions, parts of 2 motorized divisions, up to 9 artillery regiments and up to 130 tanks.
Our forces. For the operation, 16 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 9 rifle divisions, in the 2nd echelon - 7 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 15 artillery brigades, 9 artillery regiments of the RGK, 2 tank brigades, 2 self-propelled regiments. There were 129 tanks in total. The artillery density was from 115 to 140 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 5 infantry divisions, up to 9 artillery regiments and about 140 tanks. Subsequently, about 2 infantry regiments were thrown up.
Our forces. For the operation, 15 rifle divisions were concentrated, of which in the 1st echelon - 13 rifle divisions, in the 2nd echelon - 2 rifle divisions and sbr, 7 artillery brigades, 10 artillery regiments of the RGC, 6 tank brigades. There were 87 tanks in total.
Enemy forces. 5 infantry divisions, 10 artillery regiments and about 90 tanks.
Orsha operation March 5-9, 1944
Our forces. For the operation was concentrated: 8 rifle divisions, of which in the 1st echelon - 3, in the 2nd echelon - 5 rifle divisions, 3 artillery brigades, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 1 tank brigade, 2 tank regiments. There were 80 tanks in total. Artillery density was 100 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 1 infantry division, three artillery regiments and up to 35 tanks.
Bogushev operation March 21-29, 1944
Our forces. For the operation, it was concentrated: 9 rifle divisions, of which in the 1st echelon - 6 and in the 2nd echelon - 3 rifle divisions, 10 artillery brigades, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 5 tank brigades, 4 self-propelled regiments. There were 73 tanks in total. Artillery density was from 100 to 150 barrels per 1 km of the front.
Enemy forces. 2 infantry divisions, up to 5 artillery regiments and up to 40 tanks.
Thus, the Western Front in all ongoing operations had a clear superiority over the enemy in terms of forces and means. Despite this, all operations ended unsuccessfully and the front did not move forward since October.
As a result of the stagnant situation on the Western Front and the advance of neighboring fronts, an extremely unfavorable outline of the front line was created for us in the Smolensk-Minsk direction. The enemy in this direction has a ledge in our direction up to 150 kilometers deep.
This position makes adverse effect on neighboring fronts, makes it possible for the enemy to have his own aviation in the triangle of Lepel, Mogilev, Minsk and to influence it in the shortest directions along the rear of the Baltic and Belorussian fronts. From the side of the Western Front, the enemy is closest to Moscow.
II. Major deficiencies in the work of artillery
In the operations carried out, our artillery, despite its concentration in large quantities and superiority over enemy artillery, did not suppress, both during the period of artillery preparation and during the battle, the enemy's fire system. Often, artillery fired at an empty place, did not fulfill the orders of the infantry, lost interaction with it, and sometimes even fired at its own infantry. The infantry went on the attack on the unsuppressed enemy fire system, suffered huge losses and did not move forward. The fire activity of our artillery, and especially the counter-battery, in all periods of the battle was inferior and did not meet the requirements for it.
In the 33rd, 31st and 5th armies, there were repeated cases when artillery fired on areas (squares) given by the army artillery headquarters, but in fact there were no targets in these squares, and the artillery fired at an empty place, and our infantry was shot at by firing squads. enemy points from other areas.
In the operation of the 33rd Army on December 23, 1943, at the observation posts of some artillery regiments there were not officers, but ordinary soldiers. Not everywhere were observers in the first echelon of the infantry. As a result of this, the 199th division was fired upon by its own artillery. In the same artillery, it came to the point that direct-fire guns fired at their infantry.
During the offensive of the 33rd army on February 3, in a number of divisions, the interaction of artillery with infantry was not organized. So, for example, the 144th Rifle Division advanced on Pavlyuchenko, and the artillery supporting it fired west of Pavlyuchenko. At the same time, during the advance of the 222nd Rifle Division, the artillery supporting it was silent.
The unsatisfactory work of the artillery of the Western Front is evidenced by many testimonies of captured Germans.
The commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Comrade Sokolovsky, the former member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General Comrade Bulganin, and the Commander of the Artillery of the Front, Colonel General of Artillery, Comrade Camera, are guilty of not revealing major shortcomings and errors in the work of artillery. Complacency, swagger and arrogance reign among artillerymen. Artillerymen do not reveal their mistakes and shortcomings, do not study them, but try to cover them up. Until recently, the front and the armies did not issue orders on shortcomings in the actions of artillery and did not indicate measures to eliminate them. As a result of such an incorrect attitude of the front command to the matter of commanding artillery, gross errors and shortcomings in the actions of artillery were repeated in each operation.
During the period of preparation for the operation, artillerymen at all levels conduct exceptionally poor reconnaissance of targets and do not reveal the enemy's fire system. Due to ignorance of the targets, artillery cannot conduct aimed fire at specific targets, but, as a rule, conducts ineffective fire at areas. In the same period, artillerymen slowly deploy reconnaissance bodies, reconnaissance is carried out by passive observation, and observation posts that are mobile and advanced to the front line of the enemy's defense are little used. Senior artillery commanders and their staffs personally do almost no reconnaissance, and their functions in this most important issue are limited to collecting and fixing information from lower and less qualified authorities, moreover, incoming information is not checked. Reconnaissance is especially poorly conducted during an infantry offensive. The reconnaissance agencies are not assigned specific lanes and sectors of observation, and therefore the attention of the scouts is scattered throughout the field and they are engaged in pointless observation of the battlefield, and not in the search for enemy firing points. In many artillery units, reconnaissance units are kept understaffed, with non-combat units being fully staffed. Aviation is poorly used for the purposes of reconnaissance and fire correction, and observation balloons are not used at all.
Artillery fire, as a rule, is planned at the highest headquarters, without taking into account specific data on the enemy's fire system, as a result of which it is planned not according to targets, but according to areas. Executors of fire missions on the ground are very rarely assigned. In many cases battery and battalion commanders receive schemes that do not correspond to the actual position of the targets. Such planning and bringing tasks to the attention of the executors leads to firing at an empty place and thus does not ensure the suppression of enemy firing points. During the period of preparation of an operation, the higher artillery staffs take most of the time allotted for preparation for their planning work. As a result of this, there is almost no time left for the lower artillery units, especially light ones, to work out tasks on the ground and organize interaction.
Artillery preparation is carried out according to the template. The beginning of the artillery preparation was indicated by a volley of RS, then a period of destruction was carried out, and at the end - an artillery raid along the front line. The enemy got used to this pattern and, knowing the order of fire, skillfully kept his manpower in shelters. Due to the fact that, during the period of artillery preparation, our artillery, as a rule, fired on squares and did not suppress the enemy’s fire system, our infantry met the enemy with organized fire of all kinds, suffered heavy losses and in many cases from the very beginning could not move forward.
Since the beginning of the offensive, artillery escort of the infantry has been poorly organized. As a rule, communication and interaction of infantry with artillery and mortars is lost during this period. The targets detected and interfering with our infantry are either not suppressed at all, or suppressed with a great delay. Excessive centralization of artillery, when the infantry moves forward, in the hands of the commanders of rifle divisions and above, deprives the battalion commander of the means of suppression and the ability to respond to the situation. Mortarmen are especially poorly educated, in a number of cases they simply evade contact with the infantry, linger in the rear, as a result of which the mortars hit anywhere. There are few radio stations in the lower level and they are not provided with food, although there are enough radio stations in the front to provide the advancing troops. Direct fire guns, despite their abundance in infantry combat formations, are used poorly and ineptly. The subordination of these weapons is uncertain, they often do not have specific goals. Direct-fire guns often lag behind the infantry and, as a result, sometimes hit their own. Self-propelled guns are used ineptly and do not give the desired effect. The fight against enemy self-propelled guns is not organized and is not planned by anyone. Fire control in the dynamics of combat is weak. Due to ignorance of the goals, the senior commander is powerless in determining fire tasks for his subordinates. Artillery headquarters, as a rule, are located at a great distance from observation posts, and, consequently, are excluded from artillery fire control.
Counter-battery and counter-mortar combat against enemy artillery and mortars is organized especially poorly, both during the period of artillery preparation and during the advance of the infantry. Our counter-battery and counter-mortar groups do not suppress enemy artillery and mortars, as a result of which the infantry advance is held back by strong enemy artillery and mortar fire, and it suffers heavy losses, as evidenced by the fact that in some operations the percentage of shrapnel wounds reached 70-80%. The fire of counter-battery artillery groups, due to poor knowledge of the targets and the lack of adjustments, is not very effective. Long-range artillery is accustomed to firing at squares, it shoots badly at the signs of a gap, and does not know how to transfer fire quickly and accurately. Counter-mortar groups do not know how to suppress enemy mortar batteries, they shoot poorly and not accurately.
There is almost no control over the execution of fire missions. The performer is not asked the results of the fire, he is only responsible for its timely opening. This situation gives rise to irresponsibility among the officers of the artillery.
III. Shortcomings in planning and preparation of operations
When planning operations, there were facts of incorrect grouping of front troops, which was indicated to the front command by the Directive of the Headquarters of 10/15/43 No. 30225. This directive stated:
“The troops of the Western Front did not fulfill their task - to capture Orsha by 12.10 - and are engaged in protracted, inconclusive battles, leading to a loss of time, effort and means. This is due to the incorrect grouping of front troops.
The main grouping, up to half of all rifle divisions of the front with most of the reinforcements, was created in the center of the front.
This grouping, in case of its successful advancement, will rest against the river. Dnieper and thus the further development of its offensive will be limited. At the same time, the right wing of the front can advance without forcing the river. Dnieper and has the ability to clear the Dnieper by hitting the flank and rear of the enemy troops defending on the Dnieper.
Contrary to the prevailing experience of the war, the command of the Western Front in some operations organized a breakthrough in very narrow sectors: in the Vitebsk operation on December 23 - on a 6 km front, in the Orsha operation on March 5 - on a 5 km front. This allowed the enemy to concentrate destructive flanking fire and, in combination with small counterattacking reserves, to exclude the possibility of advancing our infantry and inflict heavy losses on it.
The front headquarters was removed from the planning of operations and recorded only the course of events developing according to army plans. The front headquarters does not have any planning operational documents on the operations carried out. All operations carried out were planned only in the armies and were verbally approved by the front commander. As a result, the front headquarters did not submit its proposals to the command for planning and conducting operations and did not exercise proper control over the implementation of the decisions of the command.
As for the preparation of operations, here too there were major shortcomings that adversely affected the outcome of the operation.
The regrouping of troops and preparation for operations were carried out without proper secrecy and misinformation of the enemy, as a result of which surprise was lost in almost all operations and the operations proceeded in conditions of readiness of the enemy to meet our offensive, although formally no documents were issued by the front and everything was allegedly stored in the strictest secrecy.
In some operations, rifle divisions and reinforcements were brought into battle on the move. In the operation of the 5th Army on February 22-25, on the night of February 21, the 184th Rifle Division surrendered its defense sector to the 158th Rifle Division and by the morning of February 22 it reached its initial position for the offensive and from 8.00 of the same day, after a 10-minute artillery attack, went on the offensive and , of course, was not successful. In the operation of the 33rd army on February 3-16, the 222nd, 164th, 144th and 215th divisions received 1,500 reinforcements each on the eve of the offensive and brought them into battle the very next morning. The officers who arrived for replenishment received their units in their original position, and a few hours later led them on the offensive.
When preparing operations, the higher headquarters take for their work most of the time allotted for preparation, and there is almost no time left for reconnaissance, working out tasks by lower units on the ground and organizing interaction.
IV. On the wrong formation of battle formations during the offensive
In most operations carried out by the front of the army, especially the 33rd army, they advanced in deep echeloning of their battle formations and created an excessive density of manpower, thereby violating the order of Headquarters No. and the rest of the battalions stood at the back of the head. Under these conditions, the strike force of the division was not used simultaneously, but was expended in parts and the firepower was frozen. All this led to heavy losses even before the troops entered the battle, and having suffered such losses and being under continuous fire, the units lost their combat capability even before the battle.
V. About the shortcomings in the use of tanks
As you know, the experience of the war showed that large tank formations should be used to develop success after breaking through the main defensive line of the enemy.
Contrary to the experience of the war and the instructions of the Headquarters on the use of tank formations, the command of the Western Front, which it has 2 Guards. The Tatsinsky tank corps was thrown at the undisrupted enemy defenses, as a result of which the tank corps could not move forward and suffered heavy losses. In the operation on the Orsha direction on November 14-19, the tank corps was brought into battle when the infantry on the front of 3 km barely penetrated the defense to a depth of 2-3 km. In the operation of the 33rd army in the Vitebsk direction on December 23, the entry of the tank corps into battle was planned after the infantry had captured the river. Luchesa (18 km in the depth of defense). On this basis, the tank corps, when advancing the infantry in the first three days of the offensive to a depth of 8-10 km, was not brought into battle, and when the infantry was stopped by organized enemy fire from pre-prepared lines and the river continued to remain ahead. Luchesa, the tank corps rushes into battle and after the loss of 60 tanks, having not achieved success, is withdrawn behind the infantry battle formations. In the operation on the Bogushevsky direction on January 8, the tank corps was brought into battle, when the infantry had essentially no success. Having suffered up to 70% losses, the tank corps advanced 2-4 km along with the infantry and after that was withdrawn from the battle.
Thus, the constant desire of the front command to achieve a breakthrough of the defense by prematurely committing a tank corps to battle did not produce results and led to the fact that at present two tanks remained in the tank corps.
In tank brigades operating directly with infantry, exceptionally heavy losses are observed in all battles. The main reason for these losses is that the enemy's anti-tank weapons are not suppressed by our artillery fire and there is no interaction between tanks, supporting artillery and infantry.
VI. About the headquarters of the front
The headquarters of the Western Front is not fulfilling its role. The headquarters is impersonal, cut off from command of the front and from the vital tasks solved by the troops, and in essence it is some kind of statistical bureau that collects only data on the situation, and then with a delay. Questions of planning operations, organizing combat, and monitoring the implementation of decisions taken by the command have in fact been removed from the functions of the headquarters. For 4 months, the chief of staff and the entire headquarters are at a distance of about 100 kilometers from the location of the front command, and during this time the commander and chief of staff met no more than 3-4 times. With the commander at the VPU (although in this case this name does not fit) there is one colonel from the headquarters, who essentially performs the duties of an adjutant. Such a situation, unprecedented in practice, the front commander comrade. Sokolovsky considers it quite normal.
Not only the front commander brought the headquarters to such a position, but the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, who is afraid of responsibility and cannot independently make decisions even on a petty issue, is also to blame for this. Pokrovsky does not take any measures to rectify the abnormal situation that has arisen with the headquarters, he works formally and bureaucratically. The head of the operational department, Major General Chirkov, is an uninitiated worker and is not suitable for the role of head of the operational department of the front.
VII. On the state of intelligence
Intelligence on the Western Front is being carried out completely unsatisfactorily. The information it provides is often inaccurate. The intelligence department of the front headquarters does not direct the activities of the intelligence agencies of the armies, corps and divisions and has ruined human intelligence. The head of the intelligence department, Colonel Ilnitsky, presented dubious and exaggerated information about the enemy as reliable.
Military intelligence is not organized, it is carried out without a plan. Intelligence operations are poorly prepared and conducted. With large losses of scouts, on average up to 5 people per captured prisoner, military intelligence does not obtain the data necessary for command.
Reconnaissance in force is carried out aimlessly and is carried out without careful preparation and organization, often not provided with fire support, as a result of which most of all reconnaissance operations of the front troops ended unsuccessfully and with heavy losses.
There are major shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of search and reconnaissance operations, and especially in the rear of the enemy. The main task of the search - the capture of control prisoners - is not carried out in many cases. So, in December, in the 192nd rifle division, 23 reconnaissance operations were carried out in order to capture the “language”. Not a single prisoner was captured in these operations, and the losses of our reconnaissance groups amounted to 26 people killed and wounded. In the 192nd, 247th and 174th Rifle Divisions from January 1 to February 15, hundreds of search reconnaissance operations were carried out and not a single prisoner was captured. In 331st and 251st Rifle Divisions, scouts were repeatedly blown up in their minefields, since they were not told their location.
The surveillance service in the troops of the front is formally organized. Nobody directs this type of reconnaissance, the observation is carried out by untrained people and often turns into a pointless survey of the area, and there is no concrete observation of the enemy.
Headquarters instructions prohibiting the use of reconnaissance units in combat as ordinary infantry are systematically violated on the Western Front. So, in January 1944, in the 33rd Army, all reconnaissance units of formations and units participated in the offensive as linear units and were almost completely destroyed.
Particularly serious shortcomings occur in undercover intelligence. Undercover intelligence on the Western Front is littered with dubious people, conducted in a primitive and stereotyped way. The information obtained by this type of intelligence is often not confirmed and is often a source of disinformation.
The recruitment of agents is carried out without sufficient verification, not individually. Agents are often recruited by groups of people who have not been tested and do not have life experience. The number of agents often included politically dubious, unreliable people, who were recruited by the Germans immediately after they were thrown out.
The preparation of agents is disorganized and hurried, without proper training. Many agents, not receiving sufficient training, quickly failed. Elementary rules of conspiracy were violated. Large groups of agents communicated with each other and knew each other well. Thus, the reconnaissance groups of Khristoforov, Yurchenko, Kalni-Bolotsky and Sitnikov, intended to work behind enemy lines in different areas, with a total number of 28 people, were located together during the entire training, in one room. The equipment of agents sent behind enemy lines was often standard and made it easy to reveal our agent. Agents were sent to the territory occupied by the Germans in 1941 in 1942 and 1943. in clothes with a note about its production by Moskvoshvey in 1942 and 1943. The standard of their clothes, in the event of the failure of one agent, made it easy to reveal our other agents.
(Only at this point we will interrupt Malenkov’s report with our free comment. Remember the anecdote about the Soviet intelligence officer Isaev-Stirlitz, who, under the SS uniform, wore red shorts with a hammer and sickle? .. It turns out that in a real war it was almost the same. - S.K.)
The intelligence department of the front did not seek to introduce its agents into the headquarters and military establishments of the enemy. The work of agents proceeded along the line of least resistance and was limited to simple observation and collecting rumors among the local population. Communication between the intelligence department and its agents working in the rear is in a very bad state. Many agents have stopped sending reports solely because there is no power for radio stations. The intelligence department, having every opportunity to ensure the uninterrupted supply of power for radios to agents, treats this important matter carelessly and irresponsibly.
Aviation reconnaissance, although formally carried out, is not processed in a timely manner, the data received from aviation is not verified with other sources, and often is not communicated to the troops. Photographs and photographic plans get stuck in the higher headquarters and are not sent to the troops in a timely manner.
Radio reconnaissance, despite the large number of radio facilities, works poorly, very often gives absolutely incorrect data and misleads our headquarters.
The intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front is not coping with the tasks assigned to it. Overestimation of the enemy's forces, lack of planning in intelligence, isolation from the troops, inability to obtain the necessary information in a timely manner, to distinguish false from reliable, these are character traits in the work of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front.
The head of the intelligence department, Colonel Ilnitsky, with the connivance of the front command and the chief of staff of the front, systematically exaggerated the enemy's forces in front of the Western Front. This was expressed in an increase in the number of divisions and the strength of enemy divisions in front of the Western Front.
VIII. On the situation in the 33rd army during the command of Colonel-General Gordov
The 33rd Army occupied a central place in many operations on the Western Front, it was given significant reinforcements, the front command paid great attention to the army and considered Commander Gordov the best army commander.
 , Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General. Born on November 30, 1896 in the village of Matveevka, Mezelinsky district (Tatarstan). Member of the First World War, senior non-commissioned officer. In December 1917 he joined the Red Guard. In the years civil war commanded a company, battalion, regiment on the Eastern and Western fronts, participated in the liquidation of N.I. Makhno. After the war - in command and staff positions; in 1925–1926 he was an instructor in the Mongolian People's Army. Since 1927 - assistant commander of a rifle regiment, assistant head of the combat training department of the Ground Forces. From 1933 to 1935 - chief of staff of the Moscow military infantry school, then chief of staff of a rifle division. From 1937 he commanded a rifle division, from 1939 - chief of staff of the Kalinin military district, circle from 1940 - PriVO. During the Great Patriotic War - chief of staff (June - October 1941), then - commander of the 21st (August 1941 and October 1941 - June 1942). In July - August 1942 he commanded the Stalingrad Front. He made a number of mistakes that led to the enemy breaking through the outer defensive bypass of Stalingrad, for which he was relieved of command of the front. Subsequently, he commanded the 33rd Army (October 1942 - March 1944) and the 3rd Guards Army (April 1944 - July 1945). After the war, he commanded the troops of the PriVO. Shot in 1950. Rehabilitated in 1954.
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However, the facts show otherwise. Nowhere was the battle organized so badly as in Gordov's army. Instead of careful preparation of the operation and organization of the battle, instead of the correct use of artillery, Gordov sought to break through the enemy's defenses with manpower. This is evidenced by the losses suffered by the army. The total number of losses suffered by the 33rd Army is over 50% of the losses of the entire front.
Contrary to the instructions of the Headquarters, which forbade the use of special units in battle as ordinary infantry, Gordov often brought scouts, chemists and sappers into battle.
Among the most serious misdeeds of Gordov are the facts when Gordov sent the entire officer staff of the division and corps to the chain.
In his order dated September 4, 1943, addressed to the commander of the 173 division division, Colonel Zaitsev and the regiment commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Milovanov, Lieutenant Colonel Sizov, Major Guslitser, Gordov demanded: smoking submachine gunners out of their nests.
On September 4, 1943, Gordov ordered the Chief of Staff of the 70th Corps, Major General Ikonnikov: “Immediately send the entire command and control of the corps to the chain. Leave only the head of the operations department at the headquarters.
Such unacceptable actions by Gordov led to the disorganization of battle management and unjustified losses in the officer corps. Over the past six months, in the 33rd army under the command of Gordov, 4 division commanders, 8 deputy division commanders and division chiefs of staff, 38 regiment commanders and their deputies, and 174 battalion commanders were killed and wounded.
Gordov criminally violated the order of the Stavka on the prohibition of resorting to executions of commanders without trial or investigation. So, on March 6, on the orders of Gordov, Major Trofimov was shot without trial or investigation, allegedly for evading battle. In fact, as established by the investigation, Major Trofimov was not to blame.
During the hostilities, Gordov's control was reduced to swearing and insults. Gordov often resorted to threats of execution against his subordinates. This was the case with the commander of the 277th Rifle Division, Major General Gladyshev, and the commander of the 45th Rifle Division, Major General Poplavsky. According to a number of commanders who worked with Gordov, the inhuman attitude towards people, sheer hysteria tormented them so much that there were cases when commanders could not command their formations and units.
The front command passed by all these outrages in the actions of Gordov, did not correct him and continued to consider him the best army commander.
IX. About commanding the front
The main reason for the failure of operations on the Western Front is the unsatisfactory leadership of the troops on the part of the front command.
 (07/09/1897, Kozliki village, Belostok district, Grodno province - 05/10/1968, Moscow), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1946), Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). The son of a peasant. He was educated at military instructor courses (1918) and at the Military Academy of the Red Army (1921). In February 1918 he joined the Red Army. During the Civil War, in command positions, in 1919–20 he commanded cavalry divisions. Then he served at the headquarters of the Turkestan military district, commanded a group of troops in the Samarkand and Fergana regions, and led operations to eliminate the Basmachi. In 1922–30 he was chief of staff of a division, corps. In 1930–35 division commander, then chief of staff of the Volga, Ural and Moscow military districts. In February - June 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War, Chief of Staff of the Western Front (July 1941 - January 1942, May 1942 - February 1943), Western Direction (July - September 1941, February - May 1942), Commander of the Western Front (February 1943 - April 1944), Chief headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front (April - May 1945). In 1946–49 he was commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. In June 1952 - April 1960 Chief of the General Staff - 1st Deputy Minister of Defense. The ashes were buried in the Kremlin wall. Bust erected in Grodno.
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The command of the Western Front, instead of studying shortcomings and eliminating them, showed complacency, arrogance, did not reveal shortcomings, did not take into account mistakes, did not teach people, did not educate commanders in the spirit of truthfulness. The biggest shortcomings and mistakes were repeated in all operations. The reason for this is the unacceptable fact that the analysis of operations and the issuance of final orders on the shortcomings and results of hostilities on the Western Front were not practiced.
Despite the fact that one of the biggest shortcomings in the conduct of operations was the poor performance of artillery, this shortcoming was not eliminated and continued to be repeated. Artillery in all operations carried out by the front did not suppress the enemy's fire system and, consequently, did not ensure the advance of the infantry. The front command knew about the heavy losses in people, due to the poor work of artillery, about the enormous consumption of ammunition, and, however, did not take measures to straighten out the work of artillery.
The front command does not tolerate criticism; attempts to criticize shortcomings are met with hostility. Characteristic in this regard are the resolutions of General of the Army Sokolovsky on the report of an officer of the General Staff, which highlighted the shortcomings in the preparation and leadership of the operation carried out by the 31st Army on October 29, 1943. These resolutions are as follows:
"The price of the document is very negligible, even on a good market day."
“Lieutenant Colonel Nekrasov, apparently, did not think what he wrote. The person, apparently, is used to chatting in general.
"Lies!"
"Stupid lie."
"Lies".
"The writer does not understand the battle to break through the defense at all."
"Words and nothing more!"
Such an atmosphere has been created in the front and people have been brought up in such a way that they are afraid to raise questions about shortcomings before the front command. There were timid attempts on the part of individual commanders of the branches of the armed forces to point out the shortcomings in the actions of the branches of the armed forces and to analyze them in the order, but the front commander rejected such attempts.
The instructions of the command to eliminate the shortcomings were in the nature of oral, family instructions, which did not oblige anyone to anything. So, for example, the situation in Gordov's army did not change until he was removed by the Headquarters from the post of commander 33, although Comrade Sokolovsky assures that he gave verbal instructions to Gordov about eliminating the outrages that were happening in the army.
The front command did not submit reports to the Headquarters on the shortcomings and reasons for the failure of operations, and thus did not truthfully reveal either for itself or for the Headquarters the reasons for the front's failure to fulfill the tasks set by the Headquarters. The suppression of the real reasons for the failure of operations was in this case nothing but a form of deception of the Headquarters.
The front command was poorly versed in people, was not critical of their shortcomings. This explains the fact that Colonel-General Gordov was completely unreasonably considered the best commander of the army, and Colonel-General of Artillery Kamera is considered a good artilleryman, despite the fact that artillery did not fulfill its tasks, Colonel Ilnitsky is considered a good intelligence officer, and in fact the work of the reconnaissance department front is in ruins.
The front commander, Comrade Sokolovsky, is cut off from his closest assistants - the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and the heads of services, does not receive them for many days and does not resolve their issues. Some deputy commanders did not know about the tasks of their branches of service in connection with the ongoing operations, not to mention the fact that they were not involved in the development of operations. For example, the commander of the BT and MV, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Rodin stated:
“I have never been asked how best to use tanks. I am only a dispatcher and I send tanks to one or the other army. I learned the tasks of the tank troops in the armies or from subordinate tankers.
The front command does not promptly respond to the needs of the troops. As a result, for example, in some advancing divisions, especially in the 33rd Army, light machine guns accounted for one disc each, and one tape for an easel machine gun. This led to the fact that at the height of the battle, the machine gunners could not support the infantry, and most of the time they were engaged in stuffing disks and tapes. In a number of operations, the artillery lagged behind the infantry, due to the lack of traction for the guns. Meanwhile, in the front there is a sufficient amount of traction in order to fully provide the artillery of the advancing troops, it was only necessary for the front command to respond to the needs of the army and maneuver the means of the front in a timely manner. There were not enough walkie-talkies in the lower levels of artillery and infantry, as a result of which the interaction between infantry and artillery was disrupted. Meanwhile, in the rear and headquarters of the front and armies, there were enough radios to provide for the advancing troops. Due to the fault of the front command in November and December 1943, i.e., at the height of operations, serious power shortages occurred in many divisions. For some basic products (meat, fish, bread, cereals), the provision was no more than 5-7 daily dachas, taking into account the existing availability of products in divisions, armies and the front.
X. Conclusions
1. From October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front, despite the superiority in forces over the enemy and the high consumption of ammunition, did not move forward. All the operations carried out during these six months, through the fault of the front command, failed. The Western Front did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and was weakened as a result of heavy losses in people and equipment, which were the result of the inept leadership of the front command.
The Western Front is currently in need of reinforcement and assistance.
2. This situation on the Western Front was the result of the unsatisfactory leadership of the front command and, therefore, first of all, the unsatisfactory leadership of the front commander General of the Army Sokolovsky, the former member of the Military Council of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Bulganin and the current member of the Military Council of the Front General Lieutenant Mehlis.
The command of the Western Front was arrogant, critical of its shortcomings and mistakes was not and is not. Despite the failure of eleven large and small operations within half a year, the front command did not learn the lessons from this and did not truthfully report to the Headquarters about the situation at the front.
General of the Army Sokolovsky, as commander of the front, was not at the height of the situation.
Tt. Sokolovsky and Bulganin are primarily responsible for the fact that on the Western Front there was no proper education of command personnel in the spirit of truthfulness and intolerance to shortcomings.
The mistake of Lieutenant General Mekhlis, who is currently working as a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, is that he did not report to the Headquarters about the true state of affairs at the front.
3. Particularly serious shortcomings take place in the actions of artillery. Artillerymen on the Western Front do not reveal their mistakes, do not correct them, while the poor performance of artillery was the main reason for the failure of offensive operations. In this, in addition to the command of the front, the commander of the artillery of the front, Colonel-General of Artillery Camera, is primarily to blame. The mistake of the Chief Marshal of Artillery Comrade Voronov is that, while on the Western Front, he did not reveal major shortcomings in artillery and did not report to the Headquarters about the poor performance of artillery on the Western Front.
4. The headquarters of the Western Front is impersonal, cut off from the command and from the troops and needs to be strengthened. The current chief of staff, Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, is not coping with his duties.
5. The situation in the intelligence department of the front headquarters is completely unfavorable. The head of the intelligence department, Colonel Ilnitsky, requires a special check and must be replaced.
6. In the interests of the case, it is necessary:
a) remove Army General Sokolovsky from the post of commander of the Western Front, as having failed to cope with the command of the front, and appoint him chief of staff of one of the fronts. Appoint a new commander on the Western Front, capable of straightening out the state of affairs on the Western Front;
b) reprimand Lieutenant General Bulganin for being long time a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, did not report to the Headquarters about the presence of major shortcomings at the front;
c) strengthen the headquarters of the Western Front and warn the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, that if he does not correct his mistakes, he will be reduced in rank and position;
d) remove Colonel-General of the Chamber Artillery from the post of Front Artillery Commander with a demotion. Appoint a new artillery commander on the Western Front, capable of eliminating shortcomings in the work of artillery. Oblige Chief Marshal of Artillery Voronov to immediately take up the matter of eliminating major shortcomings in the artillery of the Western Front;
e) remove Colonel Ilnitsky from the post of head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front with a demotion and reduce him in rank to lieutenant colonel. Appoint an experienced and proven commander to the post of head of the intelligence department of the front headquarters. To oblige the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, to take all necessary measures to rectify the situation in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front;
f) taking into account the major mistakes of Colonel General Gordov in commanding the 33rd Army, as well as a number of his incorrect actions, for which he was removed from command of the 33rd Army, warn Gordov that if he repeats the mistakes he made in the 33rd Army, he will be reduced to rank and position. Report Gordov's shortcomings to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Zhukov, where Gordov currently works as commander of the 3rd Guards Army.
G. Malenkov
A. Shcherbakov
S. Shtemenko
F. Kuznetsov
A. Shimonaev
Order
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Based on the resolution of the GOKO dated April 12, 1944 No. 5606ss on the work of the command and headquarters of the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
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1. Remove General of the Army Sokolovsky from the post of commander of the Western Front, as he failed to cope with the command of the front, and appoint him chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
2. Lieutenant General Bulganin to be reprimanded for the fact that, being a member of the Military Council of the Western Front for a long time, he did not report to the Headquarters about the presence of major shortcomings at the front.
3. Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, Chief of Staff of the Western Front, to warn that if he does not correct his mistakes, he will be reduced in rank and position.
4. Colonel-General of the Artillery Chamber removed from the post of artillery commander of the Western Front and placed at the disposal of the artillery commander of the Red Army.
5. Colonel Ilnitsky removed from the post of head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front, reduced in rank to lieutenant colonel and assigned to another job with a demotion.
6. Colonel-General Gordov, who was removed from his post as commander of the 33rd Army, to be warned that if he repeats the mistakes he made in the 33rd Army, he will be reduced in rank and position.
1. Divide the Western Front in its current composition into two fronts: on the 2nd Belorussian Front as part of the 31st, 49th and 50th armies and on the 3rd Belorussian Front as part of the 39th, 33rd and 5th armies.
Form the Directorate of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the basis of the Directorate of the 10th Army. Complete the formation and accept the troops assigned to the front no later than April 25.
2. The current Belorussian Front is called the 1st Belorussian Front.
3. To appoint Colonel-General Petrov as commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 33rd Army; to appoint Lieutenant General Mekhlis as a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front; chief of staff - Lieutenant General Bogolyubov with his release from the post of chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
4. To appoint Colonel-General Chernyakhovsky as commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 60th Army; to appoint Major General Makarov as a member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Western Front; Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General Pokrovsky with his release from the post of Chief of Staff of the Western Front.
5. Appoint Lieutenant General Kryuchenkon as Commander of the 33rd Army with his release from command of the 69th Army.
6. The formation of two fronts and the distribution of divisions, reinforcement units, aviation, rear units, institutions and property of the Western Front between the two fronts to be carried out under the control of the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel General Shtemenko.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
For more than a month, the 3rd GKK stayed near Rossosh, and in early August it was sent to Rzhev, then even further north. The corps entered the active army on August 14. But they didn’t really have a chance to fight on the Kalinin Front - the cavalry was taken care of in order to bring it into the breakthrough when it forms.
The troops of the Kalinin Front during the Smolensk offensive operation (Fig. 13.) in August - early September 1943 wedged into the enemy's defenses for 6-7 kilometers, but could not develop success. The enemy had a well-equipped multi-lane defense here, overcoming which was complicated by the wooded and marshy nature of the terrain.
From September 1 to September 8, the 3rd GKK was withdrawn from the active army: at that time, preparations were made for its transfer to the south. On September 9, the corps was transferred to the disposal of the Western Front (commander - General of the Army V.D. Sokolovsky). From September 12 to 15, the horse guards marched south through the Safonovo and Dorogobuzh region, and turned west north of Yelnya. From September 15 to October 2, they were to actively participate in the Smolensk-Roslavl operation (Fig. 15.).
In these parts, from August 14 to early September, junior sergeant Lazarev Pyotr Gerasimovich, born in 1909, also fought. He served as the commander of the department of telephone operators in the 46th GKP of the 13th GKD, and died on September 9, 1943 in the Elninsky district of the Smolensk region. Lazarev P. G. was posthumously awarded the medal "For Courage", and was buried in the Lapinsky farm. Another fellow villager of my grandfather, Ogloblin Ivan Dmitrievich, born in 1896 (Fig. 22), died near Smolensk on September 17. For fearlessness and heroism - he was the first to break into the Nazi trenches, destroyed more than 10 Germans with two grenades and dragged his comrades with him - Sergeant Ogloblin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War II degree. He fought in the 1197th joint venture of the 360th SD, and was buried in the village of Alekseevka.
The fascist German command, in an effort to hold the occupied lines east of Smolensk and Roslavl, concentrated its main forces in this direction. The enemy had a strong defense (the central part of the "Eastern Wall"), which included 5-6 lanes with a total depth of 100-130 kilometers. The cities of Velizh, Demidov, Dukhovshchina, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl were turned into powerful fortified nodes.
In total, 44 divisions were concentrated on this sector from the German side: over 850 thousand people, about 8800 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and assault guns, up to 700 aircraft.
The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts occupied an enveloping position in relation to the enemy grouping and by the beginning of the Smolensk operation (August 7 - October 2) numbered 1253 thousand people, 20640 guns and mortars, 1436 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1100 aircraft.
From the front-line diary of the communications officer of the headquarters of the 6th GKD Guards, Senior Lieutenant Igor Antonovich Panteleymonov, born in 1915. "12.9.43
Today at 19.00 we went on the march. We walked 40 km. We stopped in the village of Dvorishche. Slept all day. At 19.00 again on the march.
We walked 35 km. We stopped in the village of Shelkino. Everyone slept in a heap, in a dugout. Tomorrow we go to battle (Fig. 14.).
Our aviation has been in the air since morning. Bombers, attack aircraft, fighters in groups of 40-50 ... in a continuous stream go to the West. The front is 25-27 km from us. ... a continuous roar of explosions: they are punching a hole for us. …
On September 16, 1943, they went into operation. We walked 20 km. We stopped in the village of Chaptsevo. Of course there is no village. Slept on stacks of straw. In the morning I went to the 5th GKD (Guards Cavalry Division. - Ed.) for communication. At 01.00 17.9.43 he left the 5th GKD for the front. The infantry cannot make a breakthrough in any way, they had to go on their own, the enemy stubbornly resists. The 17th and 24th regiments entered the battle, pushed the Germans a little. The 1st squadron moved to the western bank of the river. Volost, but then the order came to surrender the areas to the infantry and move back. Dropped off, left. And on September 19, 1943 they again went forward. The enemy retreated. We follow him. I'm moving from GCD 5. Our division goes behind - in reserve. Now I am sitting in the forest, 1-2 km ahead of me, the 17th and 22nd regiments are fighting. They have already crossed the river. Livn, but the enemy counterattacked with infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns and threw them back to the east coast.
Just arrived from the front line. It's hot there. Continuous fire does not allow to raise their heads. Still, the Germans are fighting desperately!
Received a letter from my mother. It is terribly difficult for her to live there. And there's nothing I can do to take her out of there! How to be? There are no letters from Mary. And they are unlikely to.
... 10 days did not keep a diary. There was absolutely no time. I don't get off my horse all day and night. All the time on the front lines. Now with one regiment, then with another. On September 26, 1943, at the crossing of the 23rd GKP (Guards Cavalry Regiment) through a swampy stream near the village of Drogan, he received a slight concussion.
This one is hard to forget!
In a deep ravine, illuminated by huts burning on both sides of the gully and stacks of bread, squadrons are crossing; noise, screams, the whistle of whips ... sometimes, covering all the noise, the voice of the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Zhigailov, is heard. Suddenly, very close, 1-1.5 km to our right, a cannon shot, another, a third, shells fall directly on the column descending into the beam. Continuous fire continued until the entire regiment crossed the beam and turned around to fight. Several killed, up to 20 wounded, a broken 76 m / m cannon - the result of the crossing. On September 29, 1943, our division reached the banks of the Dnieper near the village of Syrokorenino. I received the task: to cross to the right bank of the Dnieper and find our infantry. I took two scouts and went. Before dark, I swam across the Dnieper. Satisfaction below average! The water is like ice, and the width is quite solid - 80-100 meters. I swam across, if only the eyes were at night. Traveled about 3 hours, still found the damn infantry!
It’s even worse to cross back - it’s dark, cold!
On September 30, 1943, he left the village of Vinnye Luki for the village of Dukhatino to reconnoiter the route. To what stupidity our bosses sometimes reach! I left with a group of submachine gunners, followed by lodgers with sappers and signalmen, and after that they sent a patrol to find out if there was an enemy in Dukhatin or not!
Yesterday at 20.00 I received the task: to find the 5th GKD and get in touch with her, ... no one knew her whereabouts. The night is very warm, the rain is so fine, nasty ... I traveled until 3.00 - no division! He spat, drove into the first village that came across and went to bed, got up at 6.00 and by 8.00 had already found the division. At 11:30 I was at home. Now we have been taken out of the battle, we are waiting for the infantry to make a breakthrough. We live both boring and boring. I do not receive letters, I sent a letter to my mother, but I will not write to Maria until I receive from her. It is unlikely that there will be letters from her. And I won’t write either, it’s obvious that after the war we won’t have life with her.
Another 6 days have passed. The division was out of action. We are waiting for the infantry to break through the front so that we can enter it and be able to operate in the rear of the Germans. Yesterday, at a party meeting, I was noted as an excellent worker in the most difficult conditions of a combat situation. I really want to get to work in the operations department, but the chances of this are very small, because. The vacancies in this department have been completed. Yesterday, i.e. On 5.10.43 at 22.30 we set out from Dukhatino, where we had been standing since 30.9.43. We walked 30 km and stopped in the village of Nov. Kornilovka. The small village is all immersed in greenery, the only street lined with tall slender birch trees. Autumn. ... The weather is quiet, sunny, but it is already cool, so even during the day without an overcoat it is a bit cold. There are no letters. A few days ago I received a letter from my mother. Yes, it is very hard for her, but what can I do? I wrote to the NPO (People's Commissariat of Defense. - Ed.) A request to issue her a pass to enter Moscow, but so far there has been no answer. Maria doesn't seem to care about the pass, and I'm too far away to do anything. Maria still does not write. Obviously she doesn't need me. …
11.10.43
We are still in Nov. Kornilovka. Received a letter from Musi. Finally. The letter is good: she now realized how heartless her attitude towards me was. Maybe she will understand how much I love her and change her attitude. Now all the time I am occupied with the thought of how to transport Alla to Moscow, because today she is 5 years old! How big she must have become! I haven't seen her or my mother for two and a half years. Today I wrote to Musa, my mother and S. Tokarev. …
For a long time the infantry does not break through the front. Today, our aviation hangs in the air all day long. Gromov's 1st Aviation Army arrived here, at our site. Maybe she'll speed things up. We are intensively preparing to cross the Dnieper. Obviously, the operation will have to cross the Dnieper by swimming.
For the repeated exemplary performance of combat missions and the courage and courage shown by the guards, Senior Lieutenant I. A. Panteleymonov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
In the period from 20 to 26 September, the 6th GKD fought in the area of the railway (until 23.09) and the Roslavl-Smolensk highway east of Laptevo. The village of Laptevo and the farm Dolgomostye liberated the 23rd Guards Cavalry Regiment on September 23rd. But even after our breakthrough, the Nazis firmly defended some segments of this strategic important road. On the site where my grandfather fought, “the Germans sat down and fired from two heavy machine guns. The battery commander orders me to destroy these enemy firing points. I took a landmark, determined the distance, gave a command to my gunner (I was the mortar crew commander). I say: "6 mines of fugitives, fire on the enemy's machine gun!" - the machine gun choked. I give the command: “0.30 to the right on the second machine gun!” - and this machine gun fell silent. The Germans rushed to drape, I give the command: “According to the retreating enemy, the distance is such and such, fire!” And we were there, on the road, stuffed 65 Fritz. For this fight, I was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War II degree.
On September 26, the 23rd GKP occupied the settlements of Velichkovo and Oblozhnoye. At the last farm, the Germans really "looked over", and my grandfather distinguished himself. In order No. 9 / n 23 of the GKP 6 of the GKD of October 1, 1943, it is written: to award the medal "For Courage" to "31. The commander of the calculation of the 82-mm mortar of the mortar battery of the guards of the Red Army Alexei Mikhailovich Torgashev for the fact that in the battle of 26.9.43 for the settlement Oblozhnoe comrade. Torgashev, with the fire of his mortar, dispersed up to two platoons of enemy infantry and destroyed 10 German soldiers ”(See Appendix).
On September 27, the scouts of the 23rd GKP distinguished themselves near the Chernyshi farm, and on September 28, the fighters of the same regiment captured the crossing near the eastern outskirts of the Glubokiy farm.
From the memoirs of my grandfather: “We began to move on. Early in the morning, it was still dark, suddenly a sheepdog barked. The battalion commander says: "Comrade Torgashev, hit the barking dog." I replied: "There is a hit!" I give the command to the gunner: “6 minutes of runaways on the dog - fire!” The dog was silent. It was dawn, we drove up, we were told that the mortars had killed a German officer, horses and a dog. This officer turned out to be a staff worker who was carrying a full tarantula of documents. The regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Zhigailov drove up and asked:
Who was shooting?
I, the Red Army soldier Torgashev!
Well done, you got the language for us, it's very important. I am awarding you the medal "For Courage".
At different times and in different places, the regiments of the 3rd GKK crossed the Dnieper and grouped for the next march. On September 29, the 23rd GKP reached the banks of the Dnieper in the Syrokorenino area, but, according to the memoirs of the platoon commander of this regiment, Sergei Pavlovich Letuchev, born in 1918, “the Germans opened heavy fire from the right bank, there were many dead.”
The commander of the 23rd GKP of the Guard, Lieutenant Colonel N. N. Zhigailov, was awarded the Order of Suvorov III degree for successful offensive operations near Smolensk. From the award list:
“During the offensive of parts of the division from September 17-30 this year in the areas of the Smolensk region, the regiment under the command of Comrade. Zhigailova, successfully fulfilling a combat order, inflicted significant damage on the enemy in manpower and equipment.
September 23, 1943 in the battle near the farm. Longevity regiment with a swift sudden throw shot down the enemy, who had entrenched on the heights, took possession of the junction of the railway and the Smolensk-Roslavl highway in the area of hut. Putyatinka, having captured the Dolgomostye farm, at the same time 4 enemy firing points, up to 100 soldiers and officers were destroyed, trophies were captured - 1 car, 2 motorcycles and a large amount of ammunition.
On September 25, 1943, in the battle for the Belenka farm, the regiment, having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, captured the farm and threw the enemy back to the Lastovka River, at the same time cutting off the escape routes of the Nazis through the crossing, while 32 vehicles with ammunition were destroyed, 11 st. machine guns, up to 200 enemy soldiers and officers, 3 bunkers were broken and 23 enemy soldiers and officers were captured.
On September 26, 1943, the regiment, pursuing the retreating enemy, immediately knocked down the pr-ka from the hut. Drogan, under strong artillery fire, crossed the river. Whirlwind, mastered the hut. Tikhanovshchina and cut the Smolensk-Krasnoe highway, destroying 7 trucks, 2 motorcycles and up to 60 soldiers and officers. At the same time, 1 car, 2 motorcycles, 12 horses, 39 heads of cattle were captured.
During the period of the offensive, the regiment liberated up to 30 settlements.
From a letter to A.M. Torgasheva grandson O.A. Torgashov dated 18.04. 1986:
“Our 32nd division, which was the first to break into the city of Smolensk from the south, was given the name Smolensk. Then our regiment crossed the Dnieper east of Smolensk. I must say, without loss, at night, swim on horseback. (For comparison, when forcing the Dnieper in the Kyiv region, up to 75% of the personnel of the units died . – approx. Author).
From the front-line diary of Igor Panteleymonov:
« 20.10.43
Two days ago, on 10/18/43, Budyonny came to visit us. Preparations for his arrival were very intense. They made it clean and tidy. I, Chernov and the clerk did not sleep for almost two days - they made the scheme of the last operation. The scheme turned out to be huge - 11 m.
But they did it well."
On October 18, 1943, my grandfather recalled the following about the arrival of Budyonny (commander-in-chief of the cavalry) at the corps: “In addition to the usual review and check, a concert was arranged in front of the soldiers, during which Semyon Mikhailovich himself came out to dance. I remember that he was small in stature, but, despite his age (60 years), he was very mobile, lively, even started to squat. Before receiving a new order in early November, the corps was reviewed by the front commander, General Eremenko. They even arranged obstacle races.
“Our 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps received an order to make a forced march 300 km to the city of Nevel, Pskov Region, under its own power. We achieved this goal and became part of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General Baghramyan. We went there through the city of Velikiye Luki, all in ruins. Our corps helped liberate the city of Nevel, then in mid-November 1943 we were sent to the "sack" south of Nevel, and we entered Belarus.
With the capture of Nevel, at the junction of the German army groups "North" and "Center", the rocade (running parallel to the front) railway Dno - Novosokolniki - Nevel ceased to operate. The German command lost the ability to maneuver on its own. The Kalinin (since October 20 - the 1st Baltic) Front opened the way for a further offensive on Vitebsk and Polotsk.
The enemy sought to contain the offensive impulse of our armies, throwing additional forces near Gorodok, which was located between Nevel and Vitebsk: two infantry divisions from near Leningrad, five infantry and one tank division from the southern wing of Army Group Center. The enemy aviation grouping also intensified. As a result of stubborn fighting at the end of October, the Red Army liberated the first settlements of the Marchensky, Rudnyansky, Gazbinsky village councils of the Gorodok region.
SMOLENSK OPERATION 1943(code name "Suvorov"), a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, carried out on August 7 - October 2 in order to defeat the left wing of Army Group Center, liberate Smolensk and prevent the transfer of it. troops in the southwestern strategic direction.
The leitmotif of the actions of the Soviet troops was the call of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “Forward to defeat the German invaders and expel them from the borders of our Motherland!”
The troops were tasked not only to push the enemy back even further from Moscow, but also to liberate the ancient Russian city of Smolensk and open the road to Belarus. In this direction, the enemy was 200-300 km from Moscow and continued to threaten it and the entire Central Industrial Region of the country, and also closed the owls. troops the shortest routes to Belarus and the Baltic states.
The German command believed that the liberation of Smolensk by the Red Army would create favorable starting positions for it for subsequent operations in the Minsk region. To prevent this, the troops Wehrmacht for a long period of stay here, they created a strong defense in the Smolensk direction. boundary (the central part of the “Vostochny Val”) of 5–6 lanes (total depth 100–130 km), saturated with wire obstacles, minefields, pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, gouges, blockages, etc. In addition, the natural conditions of the area fighting favored the defense: wooded area, with large swampy areas.
At the end of July, the troops of the Kalinin (gen.-regiment. A.I. Eremenko) and Western (gen.-regiment. V.D. Sokolovsky) fronts together totaled approx. 1.3 million people, more than 20 thousand or. and mortars, approx. 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.1 thousand aircraft. On the Smolensk and Roslavl directions, they took up defense along the Velizh line east of Safonovo, west of Kirov and further to the southeast. The Army Group Center that opposed them (Gen.-Feldm. G. Kluge) had St. 850 thousand people, approx. 8.8 thousand op. and mortars, approx. 500 tanks and assault guns, up to 700 aircraft and supported by 6VF aviation.
To get acquainted with the situation in the Smolensk direction in early August, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. With the command of the Western, and then the Kalinin fronts, the plan of the operation, its preparation, operational camouflage, etc. were discussed.
Owls. the command planned to dismember it with strikes in several directions. group and crush it piece by piece. The main blow was delivered by the armies of the Western Front (31A, 5A, 10 Guards A, 33A, 49A, 10A, 50A, 68A, 21A, 1VA, 2 Guards TC, 5 MK, 6 Guards CC) in order to defeat the enemy in the Yelnya areas and Spas-Demensk. In the future, his troops were to move towards Roslavl in order to help the Bryansk Front advancing in the Roslavl direction in the fight against the powerful German deployed against it. grouping. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, together with the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (4 ud. A, 43A, 39A, 3VA, 3 Guards. KK) had the task of hitting the enemy in the areas of Dorogobuzh, Yartsevo, Dukhovshchina and then liberate Smolensk. This plan was called "Suvorov I". Subject to the successful development of the offensive of the Bryansk Front without the support of the Western Front, it was planned to turn the forces of the Bryansk Front to Smolensk (the plan was called "Suvorov II").
During the preparation of the Smolensk operation, the command managed to create strike groups of troops in the breakthrough areas that outnumbered the enemy. However, for the development of the operation in the armies there were no strong second echelons, and in the fronts - mobile groups. During the preparation of the Smolensk operation, camouflage measures were not sufficiently observed - this allowed the enemy to determine the areas of concentration of strike groups and advance additional reserves there in advance.
The Smolensk operation included 4 front-line operations. On the morning of August 7, the troops of the shock group of the Western Front went on the offensive, starting the Spas-Demen operation of 1943. The fighting immediately took on a protracted character, accompanied by continuous counterattacks and stubborn German resistance.
Already on the first day of the offensive, soldiers and officers showed heroism and courage. In order to seize the strong stronghold of the enemy at an altitude of 233.3, the command formed a special detachment from the soldiers of the 1st assault engineering brigade under the command of Major F.N. Belokony. On the night of August 8, the companies of the detachment, with the support of artillery, simultaneously stormed the heights from 3 sides. The detachment knocked the enemy out of the trenches, overcame the anti-tank ditches, broke into the dugouts and fortified at a height. The enemy suffered heavy losses, and the loss of the detachment amounted to 2 people. killed and 19 wounded. For courage and heroism, Major Belokon was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, most of the soldiers were awarded orders and medals.
The troops of the front for 14 days advanced to the depths. 30–40 km, more than 530 settlements were liberated, incl. Spas-Demensk (August 13). By the end of August 20, the offensive of Kr. The army was stopped by the enemy in positions prepared by him in advance at the turn southwest of Yelnya, Zimtsy. On August 13, 43A (Leutnant General K.D. Golubev) and 39A (Leutnant General A.I. Zygin) of the Kalinin Front launched an offensive from the area northwest and east of Dukhovshchina, which also met stubborn resistance from the enemy and , suffering heavy losses, in 5 days wedged into its defenses for 6-7 km.
Trying to stop Kr. army at any cost in the first half of August, the command was transferred to the Smolensk direction from near Orel, Bryansk, and from other sectors Soviet-German front up to 13 divisions. Under these conditions, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command gave the order to suspend the offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts in order to more carefully prepare a new strike.
August 28 - September 6, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelninsko-Dorogobuzh operation of 1943, during which they liberated the years. Yelnya (August 30), Dorogobuzh (September 1). Overcoming the growing resistance of the enemy, in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, the troops of the front crossed the river. Ustrom, Desna and Snopot, and by the end of September 6, entrenched themselves at the turn of the north-east of Yartsevo, west of Yelnya.
The Kalinin Front also stopped active hostilities in order to more thoroughly prepare for a further offensive. On September 14, the troops of the Kalinin Front resumed their offensive, and on September 15, the offensive of the Western Fronts, carrying out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov operation of 1943 and the Smolensk-Roslavl operation of 1943, respectively. troops broke through the enemy's defenses, liberated Messrs. Yartsevo (September 16), Demidov (September 22), Smolensk and Roslavl (September 25), advanced 130–180 km.
The troops were actively supported by aviation 3VA (General Lieutenant Aviation N.F. Papivin) and 1VA (General Lieutenant Aviation M.M. Gromov), a great help to the advancing Kr. the army was provided by the partisans of the Kalinin, Smolensk regions and Belarus. They, interacting with the troops of Kr. army, during the operation "Rail War", forced the invaders to refuse to transport troops along the railway. and country roads passing through the forests south of Bryansk (see also Partisan movement). “The situation with the partisans has become aggravated in such a way that the withdrawal of troops, especially on the southern flank ... becomes possible only as a result of stubborn battles of our units intended for this,” said the report of the headquarters of Army Group Center for September 28. On October 2, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the line west of Velizh, Rudnya, Dribin and further south along the river. Pronya, stopping the offensive on the orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
As a result of the Smolensk operation, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts advanced 200–250 km westward in the lat. 300 km, liberated Smolensk and part of the Kalinin region from the invaders. and entered the borders of Belarus. This significantly moved the front line away from Moscow, ensured the collapse of the "Eastern Wall" in the upper reaches of the river. Dnieper and created a threat to the northern flank of Army Group Center. 7 divisions were defeated and 14 enemy divisions suffered a heavy defeat. German the command was forced to transfer 16 divisions to the area of operation from other directions, incl. from the central one, which contributed to the successful completion Battle of Kursk 1943 and conducting operations to liberate Left-Bank Ukraine.
Owl losses. troops were: irrevocable - St. 107.6 thousand people, sanitary - 34.3 thousand people. The troops acted courageously and purposefully, showed courage and military skill. Particularly distinguished 73 formations and units of the Western and 16 - Kalinin fronts received the honorary names of Smolensk, Demidov, Roslavl and others. Many formations and units were awarded orders, tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded military awards.
Research Institute (Military History) VAGSh RF Armed Forces
This is a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, carried out on August 7 - October 2. Its goal was to defeat the left wing of Army Group Center, liberate Smolensk and prevent the transfer of German troops to the southwestern strategic direction.
Defeat as many enemy forces as possible
The victories won by the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk greatly influenced the situation on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of August 1943. The attempt of the Nazis to launch an offensive in the summer of 1943 in the Kursk region ended in complete failure. In just a few days, our fighters in a fierce battle not only overcame the powerful enemy offensive from the Orel and Belgorod regions, but also went on the counteroffensive. The Soviet army firmly held the strategic initiative in its hands: the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts dealt the enemy blow after blow. In this situation, it was very important to defeat as many enemy forces as possible by active actions in other directions in order not to allow the Nazis to use these forces to counter our offensive. These sectors of the front, first of all, included the western direction, which closely adjoined the area of the Kursk salient.
In order to successfully solve this problem, the Soviet High Command decided on a major offensive operation in the western direction. The command of the Western and Kalinin fronts was informed that our fighters, who would operate in the south-western direction, were opposed by the enemy over forty divisions. If they are not destroyed, he will be able to regroup these forces to the south, which will make it difficult for the Soviet troops to attack, inflicting the main blow.
Liberate Smolensk, open the road to Belarus
The task was not only to push the enemy back even further from Moscow, but also to liberate the ancient Russian city of Smolensk, as well as open the road to Belarus. In this direction, the enemy was 200-300 km from Moscow. The enemy threatened her and the entire Central Industrial Region of the country, and also closed the shortest routes to Belarus and the Baltic states for our troops.
The enemy believed that the liberation of Smolensk by the Red Army would lead to the fact that it would receive advantageous positions for military operations in the Minsk region. Taking this into account, the German command created a powerful defensive line in the Smolensk direction. It consisted of 5-6 lanes with a depth of 100-130 kilometers. There were wire fences, and minefields, pillboxes, pillboxes, as well as anti-tank ditches, gouges, blockages ... Played into the hands of the enemy and natural conditions: wooded areas and a large number of swampy places.
At the end of July, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts together numbered in their ranks about 1.3 million people, as well as more than 20 thousand guns and mortars, about one and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.1 thousand aircraft. The enemy - Army Group Center - had the opportunity to put into operation over 850 thousand people, 8.8 thousand guns and mortars, as well as about 500 tanks and assault guns and up to 700 aircraft. With the command of the Western and Kalinin fronts, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin, who came to the places where the battles were to unfold, discussed the plan of the operation and its preparation.
Smolensk offensive operation
The goal was strikes in several directions, first to dismember the Nazi group, and then to destroy it piece by piece. The main role here was assigned to the troops of the Western Front. The enemy was to be destroyed in the areas of Spas-Demensk and Yelnya. Next, it was necessary to move towards Roslavl - in order to help the Bryansk Front, which was advancing precisely in the Roslavl direction. And such help was urgently needed, because he was opposed by a large and powerful German group. The troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts were given the task of first inflicting powerful blows on the enemy in the areas of Dorogobuzh, Yartsevo, Dukhovshchina, and then liberating Smolensk. This plan was called "Suvorov I". In the event that the Bryansk Front would advance successfully without the support of the Western Front, it was planned to turn the forces of the Bryansk Front to Smolensk (the plan was called "Suvorov II").
Since the operation near Smolensk was planned very carefully, our command was able to create shock groups of troops in the breakthrough areas, which outnumbered the enemy both in manpower and in equipment. However, unfortunately, there were no second echelons in the armies. In addition, the weak side of our troops was insufficiently careful observance of the requirements of camouflage. The Nazis discovered the areas of concentration of enemy forces and pulled up additional reserves. The troops of the shock group of the Western Front went on the offensive on the morning of August 7. The fighting immediately turned into a protracted phase, the Nazis put up stubborn resistance.
At the cost of losses, we went to victory
Already the very first day of the battle showed examples of the courage of our fighters. For example, a detachment under the command of Major F.N. Belokony. On the night of August 8, the fighters, with the support of artillery, stormed Hill 233.3, a strong enemy stronghold. The enemy suffered heavy losses, the height was taken. Our fighters lost only two people killed and nineteen wounded. Major Belokon was awarded a high military award - the Order of Alexander Nevsky, and his fighters were awarded orders and medals. More than 530 settlements (including Spas-Demensk) were liberated by the fighters of the Western Front in just two weeks. During this time, they advanced to a depth of 30-40 kilometers.
However, further, unfortunately, the pace of the offensive stopped: on the line west of Yelnya, the enemy had strong positions prepared earlier. The soldiers of the Kalinin Front also suffered heavy losses. The Nazi command, seeking to stop the Red Army at any cost, redeployed 13 divisions from Orel and Bryansk, as well as from other areas of combat operations. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to suspend the offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts in order to more carefully prepare a new strike.
At the end of August, at the beginning of September
At the end of August and early September, in ten days, the troops of the Western Front took part in the Yelninsko-Dorogobuzh operation, as a result of which Yelnya and Dorogobuzh were liberated. The conditions for conducting military operations were very difficult (forests and swamps made it difficult for our forces to advance). But, nevertheless, overcoming the growing resistance of the enemy, the troops of the front forced the rivers Ustrom, Desna and Snopot. This allowed them to gain a foothold on the line west of Yelnya.
To overcome the resistance of the enemy, it was decided to prepare more carefully for a further offensive. And it started. On September 14, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts again entered into intense hostilities. In the course of two operations (Dukhovshinsko-Demidovskaya and Smolensko-Roslavlskaya), they broke through the enemy defenses and liberated the cities of Yartsevo, Demidov, Roslavl and Smolensk. The advance of our army was 130-180 kilometers.
Aviation provided significant support to our fronts. And, undoubtedly, the help of the partisans operating on the territory of the Smolensk, Kalinin regions and Belarus was very noticeable. Their active actions, which later historians will call the "Rail War", led to the fact that the invaders refused to transport military forces along railways and country roads. On October 2, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the line west of Velizh, Rudnya, Dribin and further south along the river. Pronya, stopping the offensive by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
Joint actions of the fronts
The successful execution of the Smolensk operation by the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts made it possible to advance 250-300 kilometers to the west, moreover, with a strip of 300 kilometers. The Smolensk region and part of the Kalinin region were liberated from the Nazis. Our troops entered the territory of Belarus. The achievement of success in the Smolensk operation was facilitated by the actions of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts, which pinned down significant Wehrmacht forces in the north-western direction, depriving the German command of the opportunity to strengthen troops in the central direction. The front line from Moscow was significantly pushed back. A threat was created to the northern flank of Army Group Center. 7 enemy divisions were defeated, and 14 suffered a heavy defeat. The Germans had to transfer to the area of operation 16
divisions from other sectors of hostilities. This contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Kursk and the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine. The losses of our troops were as follows: irretrievable over 107 thousand people, sanitary - 34.3 thousand people. The fighters demonstrated high dedication during the Smolensk operation. 73 formations and units of the Western and Kalinin fronts, which especially distinguished themselves in the course of hostilities, were given honorary names - Smolensk, Demidov, Roslavl ... Tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded military awards.
