On December 18, 1940, Hitler, in his infamous "Directive No. 21", consolidated the main provisions of the Barbarossa plan, an attack on the Soviet Union. It listed the "occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt" as the central condition for the continuation of " offensive operation on the capture of an important transport and military center, Moscow. This task was transferred to the ground forces, which were to conduct an offensive between the Pripyat swamps in the south and the Baltic Sea towards the Baltic.

Nine months later, in the first days of September 1941, the troops of Army Group North approached the suburbs of Leningrad. But it was no longer about the rapid capture of the city. Instead, Hitler ordered the city to be cut off from the outside world and left in his own care. What this meant specifically - starvation for three million inhabitants (of which 400 thousand children) and about 500 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who defended the city. The blockade lasted almost 900 days, until the end of January 1944. It claimed the lives of one million people among the civilian population.

With the change in the directive for Army Group North, it became clear that the course of the operation had taken a different turn. On the other hand, it unequivocally showed that the main motive of the offensive remained unchanged - to destroy the Soviet Union as a means of the "Jewish-Bolshevik worldwide conspiracy" through racial-ideological genocide on an unprecedented scale.

Of the three army groups that attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the North group was the weakest. It had only the so-called tank group (tank army) at its disposal, which, moreover, had fewer weapons than the Army Group Center, which was supposed to advance on Moscow.

The troops of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb very quickly realized what it meant to wage war in the expanses of the East. The supply routes stretched to the very outskirts, and some divisions were faced with the impossible task of controlling a front line one hundred kilometers wide.

It became clear that the planned blitzkrieg would not be realized within a few weeks, the offensive slowed down. In addition, it became clear that the Red Army, despite huge losses, still had sufficient reserves to give battle to the Wehrmacht and fight for every house. It was the greatest success of the Germans in the first months of the war, the conquest of Kyiv, that was to demonstrate this clearly. In addition, there was the task of supplying hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners, as well as the city, the logistics of which were completely destroyed.

Context

Leningrad is surrounded, Kyiv is taken, further - Moscow

ABC.es 05/24/2014

World War II through the eyes of Western media

06.11.2015

Leningrad, 1944 - the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht

Die Welt 01/31/2014

About the war 1939-1945

31.07.2019

Arbejderen: the collapse of Operation Barbarossa

Arbejderen 06/23/2016
The fact that German logistics was already practically unable to deliver the most necessary things to the front, and instead identified the conquered territories in the east, the granaries of Ukraine as the future food suppliers of the Third Reich, the Nazi regime came to a different solution. The famine was supposed to literally wipe out the second largest city in the Soviet Union, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution. In this sense, Hitler forbade his soldiers to enter the city even in the event of surrender. Namely - "for economic reasons", because otherwise the Wehrmacht will be "responsible for providing nutrition to the population."

After the allied Finnish army stopped the advance on the line, which until the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. marked the border, Leeb was faced with a lack of funds for a direct attack on the city. Instead of reinforcements, he received an order to send most of his tanks in support of Army Group Center for the planned attack on Moscow.

On September 21, a note from the Wehrmacht High Command was dated, which analyzed the serious consequences for the besiegers. Concerns were expressed about epidemics and waves of refugees, which would further aggravate the supply situation.

But above all, Hitler's headquarters worried about the morale of the Wehrmacht: it is a moot point whether our soldiers would have the courage to start shooting at women and children. In this regard, it was recommended to destroy Leningrad with the help of artillery and aircraft, and thereby drive the unarmed deep into the country. After the winter of 1941/1942, the fortified areas were to be left to their own devices, the survivors were to be sent inland or captured, and the city was to be wiped off the face of the earth by bombing.

These arguments clearly show that the strategy of famine was no longer military target, the goal was to destroy the city and its inhabitants with the help of genocide. And the fact that the Fuhrer's concern extended only to the moral side of his troops shows the nature of German warfare, says military historian Rohl-Dieter Müller.

The fact that these plans were not realized is due to the courage and willingness to bear the sacrifices of the defenders, as well as to the heartless rigidity of Stalin. He sent General Zhukov, whom he had previously dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff due to criticism against him, to the city with instructions to keep him by any means.

In the spirit of Stalin, who forbade any sentimentality, Zhukov explained to the soldiers that the families of all those who surrendered to the enemy would be shot, like themselves, if they returned from captivity. Half a million civilians were obliged to participate in the construction of fortifications. At the same time, the NKVD established a terrorist regime in the city that threatened death to anyone who was identified as an enemy agent, defeatist or counter-revolutionary.

Spy mania went so far that food reserves were not distributed, but were stored centrally in warehouses so that they could be better guarded. This made them an easy target for German bombers. The result was hungry winter, in which the daily ration was reduced to 125 g of bread, which consisted of half wood flour and cellulose. People ate bark, rats and cats. There was no electricity, no wood for stoves.

“People were so weak from hunger that they did not resist death, they died as if falling asleep. And the people lying nearby did not notice this. Death became a phenomenon that could be observed at every turn,” wrote the survivor. Only through Lake Ladoga did a minimal amount of supplies enter the besieged city, in which mountains of bodies lay on the streets, because no one had the strength to bury them.

Soldiers of the German 18th Army received military orders to hold the siege. Thus, the German military leadership under Hitler made them complicit in a terrible crime that was in the spirit of the ideology and logic of the war of annihilation.

Historians from Russia, Belarus, USA, Great Britain, Finland, Canada, Denmark shared information found in declassified archives different countries over the last 10 - 15 years. The participants still “on the shore” agreed: the conference is not public, but scientific, so we will do without political appeals and leave emotions - only facts.

- I was in the ranks of the People's Militia. More than 60 years have passed since then, but I can’t cope with the feeling of the strangeness of what was happening, - began Daniil Granin, the initiator of the conference, chairman of the board of the Likhachev Foundation (this organization, together with the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and with the support of the Konstantinovsky Foundation called a conference). - On September 17, 1941, my regiment left Pushkin by order and headed towards Leningrad. The space between Pulkovo and the city was filled with refugees and retreating units - it was a terrible sight. I was stunned that along the way we did not meet any fortifications, no barriers ... I got to the house, and waking up the next day, I thought that the Germans were already in the city - because access to Leningrad was open. At least in one area.

In the winter of 1941-1942, according to the writer, who at that time was in the fortified area near Shushary, it was not clear to him alone: ​​what was the enemy trying to achieve?

“The Germans knew perfectly well the state of our defense, but did not try to capture the city,” recalls Daniil Granin. - A fighting as if only to justify their presence here. Serious battles then went only near Sinyavin.

“Why was the city not taken back in August and September?”, “Why was the city blockaded?”, “Why was the city blockaded for so long?”- the participants tried to answer these questions “not in the way that was accepted in Soviet historiography”. As one of the conference participants noted, in the study of the causes and course of the Second World War, for some reason, we do not use the methods that are used in the study of the causes of the First World War.

“Hitler wanted to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth, but when the German troops approached the city, it turned out that it was impossible to enter it,” says Valentin Kovalchuk, Doctor of Historical Sciences. - There was an order: if offers to surrender come from the city, in no case should they be accepted. Of course, this caused dissatisfaction. German soldiers and commanders: we approached the city - and then what? In October, Hitler received an explanatory directive, so to speak: Leningrad could be mined, so it was impossible to send troops there.

Once upon a time, Valentin Kovalchuk, together with his colleague Gennady Sobolev, were the first to publish terrible data: about 800 thousand people died in besieged Leningrad with a population of 2.5 million - contrary to the official "632 thousand 253". Now historians believe that the dead were at least 750 thousand. Not counting those who died in the evacuation. Or on the road: at some stations they were removed from trains and buried by the thousands.

At one time, the Finnish historian Ohto Mannien was upset by this: the lack of detailed information about those who died in Leningrad - how many died not from hunger, but were executed for crimes? How many committed suicide?

“Initially, Hitler wanted to destroy Leningrad and Moscow, but in practice difficulties began: the country is large, there are many people, the danger of street fighting is great,” says Manninen. – Therefore, the decision was to block the city hard. Germany tried to shift the problem of governing Leningrad to Finland, but the Finns did not take on this burden and avoided direct action against the Russians. The task of the small country of Finland at that time was to prevent the Russian army from moving forward.

The British historian John Barber does not have enough numbers.

“It's bad that researchers usually focus on statistics: they find out the number of deaths - and that's it,” Barber regrets. – It is also necessary to study how people experienced this hunger – what could weaken it and what aggravated it. This is mainly about the distribution of food, and therefore the actions of the government, right or wrong.

On both sides

There were no German historians at the conference. As the organizers said, not for some reason - it just happened. Some were unable to attend due to illness.

Yuri Lebedev, chairman of the Reconciliation Center, author of the book On Both Sides of the Blockade Ring, tried to make up for the absence of the “German scientific side”.

Lebedev speaks German, and therefore there is no language barrier for him when working with German archives (“Unfortunately, our young historians do not delve into German archives simply because they do not know the language,” says Lebedev. “There are a lot of materials for dissertations there!”) . In addition, Lebedev is a military man, and, as such, finds only one answer to the question Why didn't the Germans enter the city? Yes, because there was an order from Hitler: do not take Leningrad.

- In Soviet historiography, the emphasis was on Hitler's plan to destroy Leningrad. And it was usually overlooked that this plan, however, did not provide for ground combat operations by the German army in Leningrad, - Yuri Lebedev notes.

According to Lebedev, the German command considered various ways: from blocking the city and exhausting it with hunger (especially since even before the attack on the USSR, the German Ministry of Food Supply stated that the problem of supplying Leningrad with food was unsolvable) to the option in which the population was released from the city (saving face in front of civilized countries).

Which option was chosen - everyone knows.

“Leningrad turned into a huge concentration camp, and the German 18th Army of the North group was destined for the role of overseers,” Lebedev stated. According to the historian and the military, this role was unfamiliar to the soldiers. They came to fight with an armed enemy, and not to watch the civilian population die of hunger. This alignment did not raise morale at all.

“You can’t make a criminal out of some army,” summed up the director of the Reconciliation Center. - Certain people are criminals.

An interesting study was conducted by the historian Alexander Rupasov, a senior researcher at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences: he traced the attitude of Leningraders to life as a value from a source that, it seems, was not taken before - the materials of the city prosecutor's office, which became military during the war.

In the summer and early autumn of 1941, the cases concerned mainly the purchase of antiques, gold, and escaped prisoners. Judging by the texts of the interrogations, as Rupasov says, the defendants did not cling to life: it will not get any worse. But a sharp change in the nature of affairs, according to Rupasov, occurred in the spring of 1942. The overwhelming majority of materials now concerned denunciations of neighbors and superiors.

For example. The guard of the artel on Nevsky Prospekt reported on her boss: she calls to surrender to the Germans. The boss defended himself: I was sick, I got hit by a tram, I got a head injury. And so the prosecutor's office did not consider it hard to ask the hospitals: did such and such a citizen with such and such an injury act at such and such a time. Answer: he did, and the citizen is likely to have schizophrenia, so one should not pay special attention to his statements. The case was closed.

Another case. The turn of 1942 - 1943. Leningraders believed that they would survive. In addition to the need for food, there was a need for some kind of sophistication: at least listen to music. The district police officer found in the apartment where two old women lived, a radio receiver, which had long been supposed to be handed over for reasons state security. And here - five-lamp. Crime? Yes sir. But the prosecutor's office took care: they ordered an examination of the radio receiver to find out whether it was possible to transmit the encryption with its help. The examination lasted two months. Answer: the receiver is good, acceptable for communication; however, all five lamps are burned out, so it cannot be used. The case is closed.

“There was no indiscriminate grasping of the hand,” the historian concludes, and as another indicative stroke, he cites an addition to one of the filed cases: “The case is closed due to the severe exhaustion of the accused.” The value of life has increased.

“Political control during the blockade: “total and effective” was the title of the report by Nikita Lomagin, a professor at St. Petersburg State University. After all, in historiography, among others, there is the concept of totalitarianism: they say that the victory was ensured not by heroism at all, but by total control by the state security agencies.

- The control was not total. Because it was impossible,” says Lomagin. - The number of NKVD officers in Leningrad was not very large: many went to the front, their places were taken by ideological people, but less experienced. For a city with a population of 2.5 million people, 1,200 NKVD officers, even taking into account 30,000 informant agents, are not enough for total control.

Lomagin listed other reasons for the weakening of supervision: in a besieged city, with extremely low mobility, it was difficult to receive information, transmit it, and verify it; the pre-war developments of the NKVD were practically inaccessible (the archives were prepared for evacuation and fell out of operational work).

But were the actions of the NKVD effective in this case? It turns out that yes, Nikita Lomagin answers: no serious act of sabotage has been recorded anywhere - although during the blockade and the battle for Leningrad, the critical attitude of the population towards the authorities grew.

Conclusion: the organs of the NKVD played an exceptional role in the defense of Leningrad - without this institution, chaos would have set in in the city: neither the party nor the Soviets, according to the historian, would have been able to cope with the situation. And after the war, the party had to work hard to return to the top rung of the hierarchy, pushing down representatives of state security and the military.

It was not possible to do without emotions. For example, the British scientist John Barber was shocked by the statement that the blockade, alas, is gradually becoming some kind of small-town issue - not even on an all-Russian scale, but simply an event in the life of the city, and nothing more.

“In my opinion, the history of the blockade of Leningrad is of interest to people all over the world,” Barber insisted.

And since it is impossible to take heroism out of the reasons why we won, and it is difficult to talk about heroism with restraint, Nikolai Baryshnikov, Doctor of Historical Sciences (he was in the personnel troops during the Great Patriotic War), spoke very emotionally:

– Avoiding the topic of heroism is a profound mistake. And the deepest mistake is to believe that the troops were not able to hold the defense.

Nikolai Ivanovich once again urged (as he already did in our newspaper of September 7) to pay attention to the date of September 25, 1941. This is the first victory of the defenders of Leningrad in defensive battles. And she deserves to be remembered.

Discussing the “disputable and indisputable”, everyone agreed that the decisive role in the victory was played, as it was said awkwardly, but correctly, “the presence of a large number of good Soviet people”, and the common denominator for both Soviet and “not especially Soviet” was patriotism.

It is clear that further “without emotions” will not work. Because mutual language seek those who understand what it is - not to know when the hunger will end and whether it will end at all, and those who, thank God, have never starved a day in their lives. And which of these sides will be more difficult is the question.

But the intention with which the conference was arranged - "the formation of a common scientific space between the leading historical schools of different countries" - remained in force. Detailed materials of the conference are expected to be published.

To put an end to the protracted discussions about the Blockade, provoked by the conflict around the Dozhd TV channel and its survey on the topic: “Was it necessary to surrender Leningrad in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives?” - there is no need to organize protest flash mobs and write petitions to the president. It's enough just to look at the facts. And it will immediately become clear that this whole conflict, from a historical point of view, is not worth a damn.

In fact, both the “blasphemous” TV people and the patriotic inquisitors come from the same historical myth. According to this myth, during the blockade, the Germans “rushed to capture Leningrad,” and the city, in response, “heroically repelled attacks, died, but did not give up.”

The city really did not surrender to the evil fate to which the totalitarian leaders - strangers and their own - doomed it. And yet the picture was not what it is seen by the "people of the Rain" and "Anti-Rain".

Firstly, the Germans were not "rushing to capture Leningrad". Beginning with early autumn 1941, Wehrmacht generals abandoned the idea of ​​taking the city by storm. Having closed the blockade ring on September 8, they - in order to avoid their own unnecessary losses and for the sake of transferring part of the troops to the Moscow direction - deliberately switched to siege tactics.

Secondly, the Soviet command, which did not figure out this maneuver of the German strategists, waited quite a long time for the assault and prepared for the possible surrender of the city.

Almost until the end of 1941, Stalin and his staff officers were not thinking about organizing a systematic supply of Leningrad and evacuating residents, but about how to quickly take out of the doomed (as it seemed to Stalin) Leningrad a maximum of soldiers and weapons, as well as machine tools and workers useful for the defense. .

The main task that the Kremlin set for itself at that moment was to break through the corridor to the East and save from inevitable captivity (in the event that the city is surrendered to the Germans) more than 500 thousand soldiers of the Leningrad Front and sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

The preservation of combat-ready units at that moment was a key task, since the losses were gigantic: by the end of 1941 alone, almost 4 million Soviet soldiers were captured.

"Nevsky Piglet"

On October 23, 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexander Vasilevsky sent Stalin's instructions to the commander of the Leningrad Front, Ivan Fedyuninsky, and the leaders of the regional and city party organizations, Andrei Zhdanov and Alexei Kuznetsov:

“Judging by your slow actions, it can be concluded that you still have not realized the critical situation in which the troops of the Leningrad Front are.

If you do not break through the front within the next few days and do not restore firmly ties with the 54th Army, which links you with the rear of the country, all your troops will be taken prisoner.

The restoration of this connection is necessary not only in order to supply the troops of the Leningrad Front, but especially in order to give an outlet for the troops of the Leningrad Front to retreat to the east in order to avoid capture, if necessity forces the surrender of Leningrad.

Keep in mind that Moscow is in a critical situation and it is not able to help you with new forces.

Either you will break through the front in these three days and give your troops the opportunity to withdraw to the east if it is impossible to hold Leningrad, or you will all be taken prisoner.

We demand decisive and swift action from you.

Concentrate eight or ten divisions and break through to the east.

This is also necessary in case Leningrad is retained and in case Leningrad is surrendered. For us, the army is more important. We demand decisive action from you." http://biblioteka-mihaila.ru/stalin/t18/t18_124.htm

As follows from this document, there was one priority for the Stalinist leadership: saving the troops, and not "holding the city of Lenin at any cost."

It is impossible to predict with accuracy how the Soviet military leaders would have behaved if the Leningrad Front had managed to break through in the direction of Volkhov, where the 54th Army was at that moment. However, it is more than likely that in this case the German command would have tried to eliminate this breakthrough as soon as possible. And, consequently, Stalin and his marshals in this case (let me remind you that in the fall of 1941 the Wehrmacht troops had almost universal superiority over the Red Army) would have to decide on the urgent withdrawal of the troops of the Leningrad Front through the resulting unstable corridor. Which would automatically mean the surrender of the city to the enemy.

Thus, in the autumn of 1941, the Soviet leaders were ready to surrender Leningrad to the Germans. However, nothing surprising. "Leningrad cauldron" was far from the first. During the first six months of the war, several such strategic disasters have already happened (Belarusian, Kiev, Tallinn, Vyazma, Luga, Odessa, Uman, Smolensk, Azov boilers), and they all ended in the capture of Soviet groups that fell into the ring. So the panicked reaction of Stalin and Vasilevsky to another similar situation looks quite understandable.

However, the Wehrmacht troops did not allow the Red Army to break through the German defenses in the first military autumn and carry out the proposed withdrawal of troops. The blockade ring was broken more than a year later - on January 18, 1943, when it was already clear that there would be no assault on the city, and when the supply of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the surviving residents was relatively stable. Of course, there was no longer any reason to surrender the city and withdraw the army from it. However, in the fall of 1941, these reasons seemed more than serious to Stalin and his marshals ...

All of the above allows us to draw several conclusions that deprive the “dispute about the Rain” and all the emotional discussions that have arisen from it of any historical, and therefore moral and political meaning.

Firstly, it becomes clear that there is nothing “blasphemous” about the possible surrender of Leningrad to the Germans during the first blockade winter. This option was considered by the Soviet leadership as one of the probable. Those who violently attack Dozhd journalists today are simply not familiar with historical facts.

True, the "raincoats" themselves are not familiar with it. The question they posed suggests that there was no other way to save a million Leningraders from death, except to let the Germans into the city (and therefore send more than half a million combat-ready Soviet soldiers and sailors directly to German concentration camps). But it's not. And the point is not only that the German command was by no means going to take on more than two million starving Leningraders (it is known that the Wehrmacht troops were ordered not to let civilians out of the city if they tried to get out and drive them back). Something else is much more important. It was quite realistic to evacuate the civilian population of Leningrad, and provide the rest with food. For this, only one thing was required: the political will, timely shown by the leaders of the country and the city.

All the sternly solemn talk about the fact that the blockade victims, they say, were inevitable, because: 1) the Soviet leadership was in a situation of catastrophic time trouble and a global shortage of resources, 2) in the winter of 1941-1942. it was about stopping the enemy at any cost, and therefore the civilian population was forced to be abandoned to the mercy of fate - all these are crafty verbal evasions.

Suffice it to recall the Dunkirk evacuation operation, when, in a critical situation for itself, the complete defeat of the allied forces on the continent, the British government in just 10 days, from May 26 to June 4, 1940, managed to transport about 340 thousand soldiers across the English Channel.

There is one more good example. In the winter-spring of 1945, Germany was in an even worse situation than the USSR in the autumn-winter of 1941. However, this did not prevent the German leadership from ensuring the evacuation of 2.5 million inhabitants of East Prussia (by sea transport, under the threat of submarine and air attacks) to the main territory of Germany. Compared with this operation, the transportation of two million Leningraders across Lake Ladoga would have looked much more technically simple. But…

But in the first blockade autumn and almost the entire winter, none of the top leaders of the country, apparently, seriously thought about saving the inhabitants of the city. (Just as they had not thought before about how to timely evacuate the inhabitants of Tallinn, Odessa and Sevastopol, although these cities were defending themselves, and there was enough time left for an organized evacuation). And after the awareness of the scale of the problem finally came, the flywheel of the Stalinist military-bureaucratic machine, paralyzed by fear and lack of initiative of the functionaries, spun slowly, with a huge creak ...

For almost the entire autumn, the Ladoga flotilla was not seriously involved in either the evacuation of residents (in September - early November, less than 15 thousand people were evacuated, and only skilled workers), or the delivery of food to the city. At the same time, the actual throughput of the Ladoga flotilla was very high - this was confirmed in early November 1941, when, despite the onset of ice formation, having received the appropriate order from the command, in just a few days she was able to take out about 20 thousand soldiers from Leningrad.

But there was no order for the evacuation of civilians and for the mass delivery of food for a long time ...

Dmitry Pavlov (authorized for supply and evacuation) writes in his memoirs that the established ice made it possible, starting from November 20, 1941, to send horse (sledge) convoys, and from November 22 - convoys. However, the civilian population, not connected with production needs, began to be taken out of Leningrad only at the end of January, when people in the city were already dying by the hundreds of thousands. This month, only 11,296 people were taken out. Mass evacuation went only in February 1942 - 117,434. In March - 221,947, in April - 163,392. Thus, a little more than 500,000 people were evacuated along the winter road in less than four months.

But it was fatally late - for those who did not live, as well as for many of those who eventually die from the consequences of dystrophy already in the evacuation - like Tanya Savicheva ...

And if the evacuation - through Ladoga, on barges - had begun back in September-October? And if at the same time began a massive supply of food to the city? It was possible to save almost the entire population! ..

But before that, Stalin and his marshals did not care at that moment. And because the planes at that time flew from Leningrad to the mainland, loaded with mortars and cannons, and not old people and children. And sledges and cars, until the end of January, were taken out through Ladoga soldiers and workers, and not "dependents" ...

That is why the question - "Was it necessary to surrender the city in the name of saving the inhabitants?" - put frivolously and, in fact, incorrectly. Surrendering a city in which troops are provided with weapons and food, and losing a half-million combat-ready army in the midst of a war, is, of course, madness.

The question is different - was it possible to save 1 million Leningraders from starvation and cold death under the blockade? The answer is obvious: you can! And the answer to the question of who is to blame for the fact that “useless”, from the point of view of the Kremlin leadership, the inhabitants of the city were left to their fate in the first blockade autumn and winter and, in fact, doomed to certain death, is just as obvious.

In order for the Siege of Leningrad not to turn into an actual genocide of an entire city, it simply required a different government, with a different, European political culture, a different psychology, a different system of priorities. The Eurasian communist leaders felt completely calm, sitting in warm offices and luxurious boss cars, looking at how emaciated people were dying outside the windows, pulling a sledge with the corpses of their already deceased loved ones.

Academician Dmitry Likhachev recalled how during the Blockade he was summoned to Smolny on some issue. Exhausted by hunger, Likhachev walked along the corridors of this Bolshevik citadel, soaked through and through with alluring aromas of the dining room. But at the same time, none of the authorities offered him food. Other people also recalled this - how, exhausted by hunger, they were called to Smolny, for example, to serve the leadership during large dinners, but they were also not even allowed to eat.

In the spring of 1942, after the most terrible blockade winter, large stocks of rotten tomatoes and other products were thrown out of the basement of Smolny. The writer Daniil Granin recently recalled (which infuriated the Minister of Culture Medinsky) how, during the Siege in Leningrad, a confectionery shop was actively working, baking sweet delicacies - rum women, Viennese cakes, etc. for city leaders. The diary of one of the less significant officials who worked in besieged Leningrad was also recently published - he described how he ate well in one of the boarding houses for the authorities in the midst of the blockade. Novaya Gazeta in Petersburg has just published the memoirs of a former saleswoman at the Eliseevsky Store (during the Soviet era it was called Grocery Store No. 1), where throughout the Siege the most exquisite products were distributed to representatives of the Soviet elite: “People came calm, well-dressed, not exhausted by hunger. They showed some special books at the checkout, punched checks, politely thanked for the purchase. We also had a department of orders "for academicians and artists", where I also had to work a little. No one choked in the queues at Eliseevsky, no one fell into a hungry swoon" http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/8396/.

The communist leaders of the city and the country did not go hungry themselves and, as follows from their actions, did not particularly sympathize with the starving. And in this - main reason the fact that a million Leningraders died in the very first blockade winter.

Daniel Kotsiubinsky

On early stages war, the German leadership had every chance to capture Leningrad. And yet, this did not happen. The fate of the city, in addition to the courage of its inhabitants, was decided by many factors.

Siege or assault?

Initially, the Barbarossa plan involved the rapid capture of the city on the Neva by the North army group, but there was no unity among the German command: some Wehrmacht generals believed that the city needed to be captured, while others, including the chief general staff, Franz Halder, suggested that a blockade could be dispensed with.

In early July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: "The 4th Panzer Group must set up barriers from the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad." This record does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockade the city, but the mention of the word "cordon" already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away.

Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.

Luga failure of the Leningrad blitzkrieg

The Soviet command understood the importance of the defense of Leningrad, after Moscow it was the most important political and economic center of the USSR. The city housed the Kirov Machine-Building Plant, which produced the latest heavy tanks of the KV type, which played an important role in the defense of Leningrad. And the name itself - "City of Lenin" - did not allow it to be handed over to the enemy.

So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began the construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luzhek area, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German 4th Panzer Group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed.

Hitler, dissatisfied with the delay in the offensive and the constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city must be taken and as soon as possible.

Dizzy with success

As a result of the Fuhrer's visit, the Germans regrouped their forces and in early August broke through the Luga line of defense, rapidly capturing Novgorod, Shiimsk, and Chudovo. By the end of the summer, the Wehrmacht achieved maximum success in this sector of the front and blocked the last railway going to Leningrad.

By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North. near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier the German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first task was to destroy industry and infrastructure.

"Third Option"

The withdrawal of troops proved to be a fatal mistake for Hitler's plans. The remaining troops for the offensive were not enough, and the encircled Soviet units, having learned about the confusion of the enemy, tried with all their might to break through the blockade. As a result, the Germans had no choice but to go on the defensive, limiting themselves to indiscriminate shelling of the city from distant positions. There was no question of a further offensive, the main task was to preserve the siege ring around the city. In this situation, the German command had three options:

1. Taking the city after the completion of the encirclement;
2. The destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aircraft;
3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force him to surrender.

Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad to the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants.
The second option, according to experts, was a failure on its own - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad was 5-8 times higher than the density of air defense systems in Berlin and London, and the number of guns involved did not allow fatal damage to the city's infrastructure.

Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.

environment and hunger

By mid-September 1941, the German army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian objects became targets: food warehouses, large food industry plants.

From June 1941 to October 1942, many residents of the city were evacuated from Leningrad. At first, however, very reluctantly, because no one believed in a protracted war, and even more so they could not imagine how terrible the blockade and battles for the city on the Neva would be. The children were evacuated to Leningrad region, but not for long - most of these territories were soon captured by the Germans and many children were returned back.

Now the main enemy of the USSR in Leningrad was hunger. It was he, according to Hitler's plans, who was to play a decisive role in the surrender of the city. In an attempt to establish a food supply, the Red Army repeatedly attempted to break through the blockade, organized "partisan convoys" that delivered food to the city right across the front line.

The leadership of Leningrad also made every effort to fight hunger. In November and December 1941, terrible for the population, active construction of enterprises producing food substitutes began. For the first time in history, bread was baked from cellulose and sunflower oil cake, in the production of semi-finished meat products they began to actively use by-products that no one would have thought of using in food production before.

In the winter of 1941, food rations hit a record low: 125 grams of bread per person. The issuance of other products was practically not carried out. The city was on the verge of extinction. The cold also became a severe test, the temperature dropped to -32 Celsius. A negative temperature stayed in Leningrad for 6 months. In the winter of 1941-1942, a quarter of a million people died.

The role of saboteurs

The first months of the siege, the Germans shelled Leningrad from artillery almost without hindrance. They transferred to the city the heaviest guns they had, mounted on railway platforms, these guns were capable of firing at a distance of up to 28 km, with 800-900 kilogram shells. In response to this, the Soviet command began to deploy a counter-battery fight, detachments of reconnaissance and saboteurs were formed, who discovered the location of the Wehrmacht's long-range artillery. Significant assistance in organizing the counter-battery fight was provided by the Baltic Fleet, whose naval artillery hit the German artillery formations from the flanks and rear.

International factor

A significant role in the failure of Hitler's plans was played by his "allies". In addition to the Germans, Finns, Swedes, Italian and Spanish units participated in the siege. Spain did not officially participate in the war against the Soviet Union, with the exception of the volunteer Blue Division. There are different opinions about her. Some note the steadfastness of its fighters, others - a complete lack of discipline and mass desertion, soldiers often went over to the side of the Red Army. Italy provided torpedo boats, but their land operations were unsuccessful.

"Road of Victory"

The final collapse of the plan to capture Leningrad came on January 12, 1943, it was at that moment that the Soviet command launched Operation Iskra and after 6 days of fierce fighting, on January 18, the blockade was broken. Immediately after this, a railway was laid to the besieged city, later called the "Road of Victory" and also known as the "Corridor of Death". The road was so close to military operations that German units often fired cannons at trains. However, a flood of supplies and food poured into the city. Enterprises began to produce products according to peacetime plans, sweets and chocolate appeared on store shelves.

In fact, the ring around the city held out for another whole year, but the encirclement ring was no longer so dense, the city was successfully supplied with resources, and the general situation on the fronts did not allow Hitler to build such ambitious plans anymore.